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I. ARREST, SEARCH & SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
1. Private searches
The language of the fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable"
search and seizure, without distinguishing between government and
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private* activity.' However, courts have distinguished the two types of
activity, applying the reasonableness and warrant requirements of the
fourth amendment only to the government.
2
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Gumerlock 3 amplified an ear-
lier holding in United States v. Humphrey,4 where a search by Western
Airlines personnel, motivated by private interests, was held not to be
within the scope of the fourth amendment. In Gumerlock, the court
confronted a private search motivated at least in part by a desire to aid
in law enforcement. Airline employees, their suspicions aroused by the
demeanor of a customer, searched the packages he presented for ship-
ment and discovered heroin. The appellants argued that the airline
employees were motivated by a desire to aid in law enforcement, thus
* This survey covers decisions of the Ninth Circuit prior to January, 1980.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. E.g., United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (contraband
removed during private search and before any police involvement not subject to exclusion-
ary rule); United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973) (private search motivated by
curiosity does not violate fourth amendment); Eisentrager v. Hocker, 450 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
1971) (trespassory search by private individual does not render evidence inadmissible).
California case law regarding private searches has developed differently from federal
law. E.g., People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1978). The
California Supreme Court in Zelinski held that where store detectives, "fulfilling a public
function in bringing violators of the law to public justice," detained a woman for criminal
process, evidence confiscated by them was subject to fourth amendment standards and to the
exclusionary rule. The Zelinski court recognized that the illegal conduct of private security
personnel presents a "threat to privacy rights. . . that is comparable to that which may be
posed by the unlawful conduct of police officers." Id. at 366, 594 P.2d at 1005, 155 Cal.
Rptr. at 580.
3. 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (reversing United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d
961 (9th Cir. 1977)). For a discussion of Fannon, see Note,Airport Search and Seizure, 44 J.
AIR L. & COM. 862 (1979) (urging that the Ninth Circuit reverse its decision on rehearing,
since excluding the evidence would not serve the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring
illegal government conduct).
4. 549 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). In Humphrey, the defendant's suspicious behavior
while picking up a package had led airline personnel to request that he open it. The package
revealed only crumpled paper. The defendant began to leave with one of the papers, which
an airline agent confiscated. The agent and an airport policeman, who had watched this
activity through a convex mirror, discovered contraband in the paper after the defendant
had left. Although the court observed that Humphrey presented problems not confronted in
earlier cases, where government officials had not been involved in any way, the court never-
theless held that the evidence was admissible. Because the airline employee had been moti-
vrated by his own private interest-protecting his company against spurious loss claims-his
acts could not be ascribed to the government. Thus, the seizure of the contraband did not
violate the fourth amendment.
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making their search governmental in nature and subject to fourth
amendment restrictions. However, the court held that
the airline employees acted officiously and not at the behest of
the government. A private search in which the government is
in no respect involved-either directly as a participant or in-
directly as an encourager-is not subject to the Fourth
Amendment because the private actor is motivated in whole
or in part by a unilateral desire to aid in the enforcement of
the law.5
In a lengthy footnote,6 the Gumerlock court distinguished previous
cases7 where there had been "prior or contemporaneous governmental
involvement."
8
But nowhere in its opinion did the court confront the problems
which may ensue when it becomes acceptable for private individuals to
search, discover, and then turn over to the government that which the
government is constitutionally prevented from seizing itself. Although
civil remedies are available against private trespass, once a criminal
prosecution is begun, the civil remedy is small compensation. Future
courts may have to deal with undesirable situations resulting from
these decisions which give substantially more leeway to private entities
than to government. 9
2. Reasonable expectation of privacy
Katz v. United States1 ° established the fundamental rule that a citi-
zen's reasonable expectation of privacy is a criterion for determining
5. 590 F.2d at 800.
6. Id. at 800 n.19.
7. The court distinguished Gambin v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (state troopers
aided in the enforcement of federal law under an established policy which constituted ratifi-
cation), Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (opening of package by agent
only because of request by government officials held to be direct government involvement),
and United States v. Krell, 388 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1975) (airlines agents had been
alerted by law enforcement personnel to the possible presence of heroin in package they
opened). In those cases, unlike in Gumerlock, there was some sort of governmental involve-
ment.
8. United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d at 800 n.19.
9. In United States v. Stevens, 601 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held
that the government need not honor promises of immunity given by a private investigator.
Ironically, the Government could legally accept the information he gave. In contrast, in
United States v. Perez-Castro, 606 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that
illegally gathered evidence by state and local officials was inadmissible. This decision re-
stated the holding of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960), where the court
had rejected the "silver platter" doctrine. This doctrine had allowed evidence obtained ille-
gally by state or local officials to be used in a federal prosecution.
10. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). Law enforcement officers had recorded Katz's calls
1980]
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whether there has been a violation of the fourth amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches.
This criterion was applied in the 1979 United States Supreme
Court case of Smith v. Maryland." Considering the warrantless instal-
lation of a pen register,' 2 the Smith Court looked to Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Katz for the two aspects of the test for reason-
able expectation of privacy: whether the individual has an actual, sub-
jective expectation of privacy, and whether that expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 3
In Smith, a woman had been robbed and was receiving threaten-
ing telephone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. After
tracing the license number of a suspicious vehicle, the telephone com-
pany, at police request, but without a warrant, installed a pen register
at its offices to record numbers dialed on Smith's telephone. The de-
fendant sought to have his conviction overturned on the ground that
the warrantless installation of a pen register violated his fourth amend-
ment rights.
The Court found that Smith had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in dialing his telephone because telephone users know that phone
companies record and use the numbers dialed for a variety of legiti-
mate purposes. The majority remarked that "it is too much to believe
that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any gen-
eral expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret."' 4 The
Court added that even if the petitioner did entertain some subjective
expectation of privacy, the expectation would fail under the second
prong of Justice Harlan's test, because it is not an expectation that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 5
Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Justice
from a public booth. Because Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the
booth, the Court held that the wiretap violated his fourth amendment rights.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978),
applied the Katz doctrine and held that petitioners, passengers in a car, had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or in the area under the seat. The Court
reasoned that the petitioners claimed no possessory interest in the car or in its contents.
For a general discussion of the development of the doctrine of a reasonable expectation
of privacy, see O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations ofPriacy. Princples and Policies of Fourth
Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv. 662 (1978).
11. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
12. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a tele-
phone ...." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977).
13. 442 U.S. at 740 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (concurring
opinion)).
14. Id. at 743.
15. Id. at 743-46.
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Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, simply disagreed with the majority:
"information obtained by pen register surveillance of a private tele-
phone is information in which the telephone subscriber has a legitimate
expectation of privacy." 6 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
doubted whether the public has the general knowledge of telephone
company methods that the majority assumes. Noting that "as a practi-
cal matter, individuals have no realistic alternative" to accepting tele-
phone company service, Marshall added that "[i]n my view, whether
privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz de-
pends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept when
imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he should be
forced to assume in a free and open society."' 7
As the dissenting opinions in Smith illustrate, the law can set forth
the guideline of "reasonable expectation of privacy," yet the ultimate
decision turns on a question of "fact" which is based on subjective in-
tent: whether or not individuals have expectations of privacy with re-
gard to the telephone numbers they dial.
In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,' 8 which concerned seizure of ob-
scene books and materials, the state government contended that its
search of the bookstore was valid under the fourth amendment because
a shopkeeper, by opening his premises to the general public, has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the goods he displays. But the
Court noted that the Town Justice viewed the material not as a member
of the paying public, but as a judicial officer with the help of an em-
ployee in a coercive situation. Thus, the state's argument did not fit the
facts of the case. The Court went on to declare that "there is no basis
for the notion that because a retail store invites the public to enter, it
consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to
Fourth Amendment guarantees."' 19
In 1979 the Ninth Circuit addressed the problem of reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in United States v. Humphries,2° which concerned
an agent's entry into a private driveway. Suspecting defendant Hum-
phries of dealing in drugs, an agent of the Arizona Department of Pub-
lic Safety, Narcotics Enforcement Division, drove to Humphries' home.
16. Id. at 747.
17. Id. at 750.
18. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
19. Id. at 329. Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1978) (even though
employees are not prohibited from reporting OSHA violations they observe in their daily
functions, employer still has reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to non-employ-
ees).
20. 600 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1979).
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He noticed a car in the driveway and drove up the drive to read the
license plates, from which he was able to positively identify the car as
one which had previously been stopped in connection with the crime.2 t
Applying the Katz doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy,
the court said that "[a]lthough a driveway may be private under com-
mon law notions of property, it may not be for purposes of the fourth
amendment. 22 The court cited United States v. Santana23 which held
that the doorway to a home is not a private place subject to fourth
amendment protection. The Humphries automobile was visible from
the street, unenclosed by a fence or other barrier. The agent had not
moved bushes or other objects to read the license plate, and the license
plates were affixed to the automobile for the very purpose of aiding in
identification therefore the court held that the agent's actions did not
violate any reasonable expectations of privacy, and thus did not "con-
stitute a search subject to fourth amendment limitations. 24
3. Warrantless searches: dwellings
Since Agnello v. United States,25 it has been settled that, even
where there is probable cause to. believe a dwelling contains articles
subject to seizure,, a warrantless seizure, absent a recognized excep-
tion,26 is contrary to the fourth amendment. 27 That position was re-
21. There were other issues in the case stemming from an earlier illegal arrest of Hum-
phries. The admissibility of an identification of Humphries, and of information gained from
the questioning of his accomplice was also at issue. 600 F.2d at 1243-47.
22. 600 F.2d at 1245. Compare this siatement with that in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 (1978): "[A]rcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests,
licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control [in determining reasonable expectations
of privacy]."
23. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
24. 600 F.2d at 1246. The court emphasized that it was not holding that automobile
license numbers are never protected by the fourth amendment, but rather that the purpose of
license plates-identification-affects the reasonable expectation of privacy concerning
them. Id. at 1245-46 n.12.
25. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
26. These exceptions are, in addition to the "plain view" exception, 1) consent,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); 2) search incident to lawful arrest, Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); 3) hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); 4) the "automobile exception," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); 5)
stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and 6) inventory, South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The automobile and border exceptions are covered beginning at
note 158 infra and accompanying text. The stop and frisk exception is discussed beginning
with note 291 infra and accompanying text. For this list as it fits into an overall outline of
search and seizure law, see Bloodworth, Where Search and Seizure Is Today, 39 ALA. LAW.
444 (1978). A recently developed exception to the warrant requirement is the "emergency
exception." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
27. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. at 34.
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stated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Allard,28 where Drug
Enforcement Administration agents entered the defendant's hotel room
without valid consent. The court held that even though there was prob-
able cause to believe the hotel room contained contraband, this did not
justify an illegal entry, and that a later valid warrant could not retroac-
tively validate the entry.
4. The plain view exception
The "plain view" doctrine, articulated in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire,29 has been established as an exception to the warrant require-
ment. If, in the course of a search supported by a warrant or by a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, an officer inadver-
tently comes across an article in plain view, its seizure does not violate
the fourth amendment.3°
In United States v. Cornejo ,3 1 a search was consented to by the
lessee of an apartment. The lessee was not a suspect, but legitimately
consented to the search of her apartment where weapons incriminating
the suspects were ultimately found. These weapons, found in plain
view in drawers opened with consent, were held to be legitimately
seized.32
A more delicate problem concerned the search of the purse of one
28. 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979).
29. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
30. Id. at 465.
31. 598 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 556. Compare this holding with that in United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1978). In Blalock, an agent saw a brown bag in plain view and reasonably believed
that the bag contained heroin. The court held that the evidence was admissible:
The fact that the heroin per se was not visible because of the opaqueness of the
brown bag does not preclude the application of the plain view rationale. The ines-
capable nexus between the brown bag and the purpose of the Agents' entry and
arrest of Blalock is too obvious to play riddle games.
Id. at 249.
Other circuits have recently indicated agreement with the Ninth Circuit. E.g., United
States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979) (where initial intrusion by police is lawful,
seizure of evidence in plain view does not violate fourth amendment); United States v. Hare,
589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979) (officers in valid search discover contraband in plain view);
United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 598 (1979)
(search limited in scope to noncriminal purpose reveals chart of marijuana location in plain
view); United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979) (police view subsequent to private search did not violate fourth amendment because
the view was confined to the scope of the original search); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d
/ 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (agent entered at defendant's invita-
tion and seized firearms freely offered); United States v. Stums, 549 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam) (prisoner's typewriter, left in plain view, legally seized from his cell without
warrant because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.)
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of the appellants. While the purse itself had been in plain view, its
contents were not, and the court stated that the warrantless search may
have been illegal under United States v. Chadwick.33 However, Chad-
wick had been decided after the questionable search in Cornejo, and
the court chose not to apply it retroactively.34 The search of the purse
was upheld under Ninth Circuit law as it existed at the time because
"the property was immediately associated with and in the possession of
the arrestee.
' 35
Extending the "plain view" doctrine, the court in Cuevas-Ortega v.
.S.3 6 found that officers may listen to what is freely told. In Cuevas-
Ortega, government agents were conducting an investigation of illegal
aliens. They went to petitioners' apartment where they asked one peti-
tioner, Del Toro, if she were an illegal alien, and she admitted she was.
Since Del Toro's comments were freely given, the Cuevas-Ortega court
said that "[just as there is no 'search' involved when an officer observes
that which is clearly and plainly to be seen, . . . there is no 'search' or
'seizure' when an officer listens to what he is freely told."37
In United States v. Ortiz, 38 an officer approached a service station
where he had reason to believe a drug transaction was taking place. It
was undisputed that he was lawfully in the station and that he would
have been entitled to seize the jar of heroin which was in plain view.
However, when he announced himself, the suspects ran from the room,
one of them taking the jar with him, removing it from the officer's view.
The court held that this did not invalidate the officers' ultimate confis-
cation of the jar under the plain view doctrine. 9
In United States v. Hoffman,4" firemen, who were legitimately
present in the defendant's trailer, discovered a sawed-off shotgun in the
33. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The Chadwick Court held that a warrantless search of a footlock-
er was not justified under the "automobile exception," because "a person's expectations of
privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." Id. at 13.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding
in Chadwick. The Court decided that even though there was probable cause to search lug-
gage taken from an automobile, the search should have been delayed until a warrant was
obtained. For a fuller discussion of the Chadwick case, see notes 164-184 infra and accom-
panying text.
34. 598 F.2d at 556. The court said that "[u]nder the law in this Circuit prior to Chad-
wick, the search of appellant Reyes's purse was lawful as a search of property associated
with and in the possession of the arrestee." Id. at 557.
35. Id. at 557.
36. 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. Id. at 1277.
38. 603 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1979).
39. Id. at 80.
40. 607 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 13
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course of fighting the fire. While they were still going in and out of the
trailer, but apparently after the fire was out, they told an arriving police
officer about the gun. The officer entered the trailer with the intention
of seizing the weapon, seized it, and left the trailer without assisting the
firemen in any way. Defendant, convicted of possessing a sawed-off
shotgun and of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, ap-
pealed on the ground that the seizure was not justified under the plain
view doctrine. The court agreed, finding that while the firemen had
legitimately seen the weapon in the course of their duties, the police-
man was not justified in entering the trailer solely to seize the weapon,
and thus could not invoke the plain view doctrine.41 No exigent cir-
cumstances justified the seizure: the weapon was known not to be
loaded, and thus not a fire hazard, and there was no necessity to seize it
to protect it from destruction.42
5. The "exigent circumstances" exception
United States v. Robertson43 defines "exigent circumstances" as
"those in which a substantial risk of harm to the person involved or to
the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to delay a
search until a warrant could be obtained." 44 The need for the search
must be "so strong as to outweigh the protection of individual rights
provided by the warrant requirement," and there must be "no practical
way to avoid these risks" and apply for a warrant. 5 In Robertson, after
a robbery of a savings & loan, police observed the suspects entering a
house. It was feared the defendant would escape and evidence would
be destroyed, but the officers were willing to await the arrival of an
F.B.I. agent before entering. Had they entered the house immediately,
the court would undoubtedly have found sufficient "exigent circum-
stances" to uphold the subsequent warrantless search. But the ensuing
41. Id. at 284-85. Accord, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (after extinguishing
fire, officials could remain in building to try to determine its cause, but any additional entries
to investigate were subject to the warrant requirement.) For a discussion of Tyler, see Note,
Michigan v. Tyler: The Arson Investigation-Its Dual Nature and Fourth Amendment Search
Requirements, 1979 DET. C.L. REv. 329.
42. Cf. United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (6th Cir. 1976) (police officer's
warrantless entry excused by need to protect counterfeit bills from destruction).
But see United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1063 (1978) (officers could legally enter house even though exigent circumstances no longer
existed, but, absent a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, had to
confine their intrusion to scope of original search).
43. 606 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1979).
44. Id. at 859.
45. Id.
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delay before entering of two hours led the court to question whether the
officers passed up a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain a warrant.46
Lacking sufficient knowledge of the facts, the court remanded the issue
of exigent circumstances for a close analysis in light of the above prin-
ciples.47
In United States v. Dugger,4 s the Government argued that the
emergency exception to the warrant requirement justified officers' fol-
lowing a trail of blood to Dugger's apartment, turning the key, and
entering when the doorbell went unanswered. Inside the officers identi-
fied themselves and shortly thereafter Dugger signalled that he would
be out shortly after he put on his shoes. The officers then conducted a
search of the apartment and discovered marijuana on the floor of the
living room. Based on these plain view observations, the officers ob-
tained a telephone warrant and discovered more marijuana and a
sawed-off shotgun. Dugger was later convicted of unlawful possession
of a firearm.
The Ninth Circuit reversed Dugger's conviction because there had
not been sufficient showing of emergency at the trial. Not only had the
Government pointed to no specific facts which would justify the war-
rantless entry, but even assuming that the entry was lawful, the fact that
Dugger had shouted that he would be out as soon as he put on his
clothes had dissipated the emergency. 9 Thus, evidence obtained from
any subsequent search either by way of a later warrant or because of
plain view observation was illegally obtained.
6. Consent to search
Consent by a suspect to a search obviates the necessity for a war-
rant under the fourth amendment. The leading United States Supreme
Court case on consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,50 held that whether
a consent is voluntary is a "question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances.'
In Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York,52 the Supreme Court considered
whether the consent to search was valid. Police, in searching for ob-
scene materials in a shop pursuant to a warrant later held inadequate
for the scope of their search, placed a clerk under arrest and advised
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 603 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1979).
49. Id. at 99-100.
50. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
51. Id. at 227.
52. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
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him of the warrant. They later contended that he had consented to
their search. The Court disagreed and held that "[a]ny 'consent' given
in the face of a 'colorably lawful coercion' cannot validate the illegal
acts shown here."
53 -
In United States v. Patacchia,54 officers at a Border Patrol check-
point asked Patacchia if he would open his car trunk. He seemed will-
ing to do so, but stated that he could not because the release switch was
not working and he had no key. Police pried the trunk open and dis-
covered marijuana. The court found that the defendant's reply on be-
ing asked to open the trunk did not constitute consent: "'I would but I
can't' is not the equivalent of 'Yes, you may open it if you can.' ,5
In United States v. Allard, 6"when police knocked at Allard's hotel
room and asked if they could come in, Berg, who also occupied the
room, replied, "I suppose I don't have any choice."57 The court upheld
the trial court's finding that Berg's statement did not constitute a con-
sent to the search.58
7. Standing to challenge an alleged illegal search
Jones v. United States59 established that to have standing to object
to a search or seizure, one must have been a victim of the activity "as
distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of
evidence as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone
else."6°
53. Id. at 329 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1968)).
54. 602 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 219.
56. 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 1303.
58. Id. at 1304.
59. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
60. Id. at 261. The Jones Court cited FEt. R. CRIM. P.-41(e) as support for this state-
ment.
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held that a warrant could be issued to search
the premises of one who is not even suspected of a crime. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978). The third party searched in Zurcher was a newspaper which had negatives,
films, and pictures of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers. The decision, which
overruled a Ninth Circuit holding, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977),
has generated extensive controversy. For critiques of Zurcher, see Mathias, Zurcher: Judi-
cialDangers andLegislative Action, 15 TRIAL 40 (January 1979) (calling for legislative modi-
fication of Zurcher's position); Note, The Past and Future of No,-Suspects' Privacy Interests,
16 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 505 (1979) (urging the Court to find itunreasonable to allow invasion
of a person's premises to secure evidence of another person's crime); Note, Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily: Newsroom Searches Held Valid, 15 IDAHo L. REV, 167 (1978) (criticizing the
opinion on first amendment grounds); Comment, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: The News-
Room and Third Party Search and Seizure, 5 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 739 (1978) (arguing that
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The Ninth Circuit confronted the question of standing in United
States v. Mazzelli.61 Mazzelli and his co-conspirator Conway were sus-
pected of smuggling drugs. Giving the appearance of traveling sepa-
rately, they arrived at the San Francisco airport where Mazzelli's
suitcase was searched and cocaine was discovered. Mazzelli was in-
dicted for possession and conspiracy, and Conway for conspiracy. The
case against Mazzelli was dropped when the Government conceded,
after an adverse ruling at a hearing, that the search of his suitcase had
been illegal. But the Government pressed appeal as to Conway, con-
tending that he lacked standing to move to suppress, since it was Maz-
zelli's, not Conway's, suitcase that had been searched.62 Both sides
stipulated that Conway did have a possessory interest in the suitcase.63
The Mazzelli court cited Rakas v. Zllinois64 as having reaffirmed the
Jones position that "a possessory interest in that which is seized confers
standing, ' 6' and held that the stipulated possessory interest gave Con-
way standing to challenge the legality of the search.66
Both Mazzelli and Rakas involved the "casual visitor. ' 67 United
States v. Robertson68 took up the question of a visitor who was more
than casual. Visiting his cousin overnight, the defendant had stored his
belongings in the room in which he was found. He argued that the
entry of the FBI into his cousin's home and his arrest violated the
fourth amendment probable cause and warrant requirements. Both
parties and the court agreed that defendant "[appeared] to have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched," and thus had
standing to object.
69
one not criminally involved should be safe from intrusion); Comment, The Theory ofProba.
ble Cause and Searches ofInnocent Persons: The Fourth Amendment and Stanford Daily, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1445 (1978) (outlining three views of probable cause, and declaring the
Zurcher decision wrong under all of them). One writer, counsel for the Stanford Daily,
raises the question of whether law offices can be invaded under Zurcher. Falk, Are Law
Offices Safe? 6 BARRISTER 17 (Spring 1979).
61. 595 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1979), appealpending.
62. Conway would have had automatic standing if the crime with which he was charged
had been one where possession was an essential element. See Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 229 (1973). However, possession is not an essential element of conspiracy, the
crime with which Conway was charged in Mazzelli.
63. 595 F.2d at 1158.
64. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). For a summary of the facts in Rakas, see note 10 supra.
65. 595 F.2d at 1160.
66. Cf. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973) (defendants had sold the stolen
goods before they were seized and having no remaining possessory interest in the goods, had
no standing to object to their seizure).
67. United States v. Mazzelli, 595 F.2d at 1160; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 128.
68. 606 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. Id. at 858 n.2.
[Vol. 13
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
B. Warrants
1. Entitlement to hearing on sufficiency of warrant
When a search or seizure has been conducted under a warrant,
and the defendant wishes to challenge the warrant's sufficiency, the
court will apply a two-pronged test to determine whether the defendant
is entitled to a hearing. This test was articulated in Franks v. Dela-
ware,70 a 1978 Supreme Court case in which the defendant asserted
that the search warrant, which had led to the discovery of incriminating
items of clothing, had been based on an affidavit containing misstate-
ments made in bad faith. The Court held that the test for determining
whether the defendant was entitled to a hearing on the sufficiency of
the warrant was twofold: 1) the challenger must allege deliberate false-
hood or reckless disregard for the truth, supporting his allegations with
facts, and 2) the allegedly false information must be necessary to a
showing of probable cause.7'
The Ninth Circuit applied this test in United States v. Young Buf-
falo,72 a bank robbery case where the challenged warrant was allegedly
based on intentional misstatements. The affiant allegedly failed inten-
tionally to include the full range of characteristics given by witnesses in
order to conform the description to that of the appellant, whom one
witness had identified. The affiant was also accused of reckless misrep-
resentation of the defendant's ownership of a motorcycle and of the
color of his car.73 The trial court had relied on precedent establishing
that any intentional misrepresentation invalidates a warrant, 74 and con-
victed Young Buffalo, asserting that any misrepresentations were unin-
tentional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction but stated that the
Franks test had established new criteria.75
70. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). For a discussion of Franks, see Note, Franks v. Delaware:
Granting the Right to Challenge the Veracity of Search Warrant Affidavits, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 391 (1979).
71. 438 U.S. at 171-72. California law as recently set forth in People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d
67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978), has established that where there is an intentional
misstatement in an affidavit for a search warrant, the warrant must be quashed and the
products of the search excluded, regardless of the effect of the false information on the show-
ing of probable cause. Id. at 87, 583 P.2d at 141, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 616. In addition, any
negligent misstatements must be excised from the affidavit. Id. at 84, 583 P.2d at 139, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 614.
72. 591 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2178 (1979).
73. Id. at 508-09.
74. Eg., United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
844 (1975) (intentional misrepresentations would invalidate search warrant regardless of ef-
fect on probable cause).
75. 591 F.2d at 512.
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Emphasizing the Franks determination "that '[a]llegations of neg-
ligence or innocent mistake are insufficient' to meet the first leg of the
test to determine whether a hearing is required,"76 the court found that
the "misstatements [regarding the motorcycle and the car] do not reach
the level of recklessness necessary to establish a constitutional viola-
tion."77 Regarding the alleged intentional misstatement, the court held
that the trial judge's determination that the misstatements were unin-
tentional may have depended on "'nuances of testimony and de-
meanor of witnesses', . . . [w]e cannot say that his finding that the
misstatements were unintentional was clearly erroneous ... ,78 Ap-
plying the materiality prong of the Franks test, the court agreed with
the trial judge that the affidavit contained sufficient facts to establish
probable cause without the challenged material.79
In reaching its conclusions, the Young Buffalo court reiterated the
settled position that, in evaluating the sufficiency of warrants, "great
deference" must be given to the decision of the magistrate.8 0
2. Affidavits based on hearsay
Two United States Supreme Court cases set forth what has now
become known as the Aguilar-Spinelli test for affidavits based on hear-
say. ' The Ninth Circuit applied this test in United States v. Beusch ,82
restating the test in the following manner: "First, the affidavit must
show some underlying circumstances as to why the informant believed
his information was reliable. Second, the affidavit must show some un-
derlying circumstances that would allow the affiant to conclude that the
informant was credible."
8 3
The Beusch court applied this test in a case where a foreign cur-
76. Id. at 510.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 511 (quoting Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 (1963)). Cf. United
States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1978) (because police had failed to disclose to magis-
trate full purpose and extent of proposed search, evidence thus seized ordered suppressed).
79. 591 F.2d at 512.
80. Id. at 511. The court cited United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1978)
(great deference must be given to the decision by the magistrate). See also Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (in spite of deference to magistrate's judgment, court did not
sustain warrant) and United States v. Solario, 577 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1978).
81. The two cases from which the test derives its name are Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 416 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). Those cases estab-
lished that there must be some underlying circumstances showing: (1) how the informant
reached his or her conclusion and (2) that there are reasonable grounds for believing the
informant is a credible person.
82. 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. d. at 874.
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rency company and its officers were accused of violations of the Bank
Secrecy Act. The defendants argued that the affidavit submitted by
suspicious customs agents, who had noticed a number of packages go-
ing to the same address, did not reveal enough to allow the magistrate
to assess the reliability of the information as required under the first
prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.84 Most of the information was based
on hearsay. The parties conceded that the second prong-reliability of
the informant-was met in this case.
Distinguishing the facts in Beusch from those in Spinelli, the court
found the reference to "certain documents" in Beusch, when flushed
out by a summary in the affidavit of the contents of the documents, was
sufficient to meet the first Aguilar-Spinelli requirement. This contrasts
with Spinelli, where the FBI mentioned only a "confidential inform-
ant," not substantiating the claim in "any acceptable way."' 85 The
Beusch court added that it was apparent from the affidavit that the
"documents" in question were postal and customs records, and that,
had this been stated outright, there would be no question that the Agui-
lar-Spinelli test was met.
8 6
The Ninth Circuit last year applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test to a
warrantless detention which had been based on an informer's tip. Be-
cause the detention so resembled an arrest, the court held that probable
cause was necessary to justify it, and looked to Aguilar-Spine//i to assess
the reliability of the tip upon which the detention had been based.
Finding that the tip had not described the criminal activity with suffi-
cient detail, the court in United States v. Perez-Esparza87 held that the
test was not met.
84. Id. at 875. The affidavit stated that the sources of the affiant's information were
"certain documents," but those documents were not identified.
85. Id.
86. Id. Recent cases on hearsay-based warrants include United States v. Harrick, 582
F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1978) (personal observations of a reliable third party working directly
for an affiant are sufficient explanation of the underlying circumstances to satisfy theAguilar
test);,United States v. Sclamo, 578 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1978) (evidence corroborating informa-
tion, where informant had been reliable in the past, sufficient for probable cause); United
States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978) (affida-
vit demonstrating reliability of informants and indicating that the information was corrobo-
rated through independent investigation sufficient to uphold finding of probable cause).
On the factual basis for warrants, see generally United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016
(5th Cir. 1978) (factual showing necessary in obscenity case); United States v. Dubrofsky,
581 F.2d 208, 212-13 (9th Ci. 1978) (affidavit must disclose some supporting facts, must be
tested in common sense fashion, and need only reveal sufficient underlying circumstances to
allow magistrate to make determination with a degree of detachment).
87. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
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3. Power to seal affidavits
A 1979 case examined the issue of whether the district courts have
the power to seal affidavits. In In re Sealed Affidavits to Search War-
rants,88 a Nevada district court had sealed an affidavit in order to avoid
disrupting a nationwide investigation, but then relying on rule 41(c) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 9 ordered it unsealed because
"federal courts have no power to seal affidavits upon which warrants
are based." 9°
The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court had erred in focus-
ing on rule 41(c), for "the courts have inherent power, as an incident of
their constitutional function, to control papers filed with the courts
within certain constitutional limitations." 9'
Deciding that courts do sometimes have the power to seal affida-
vits, the court remanded the case for determination consistent with the
facts.
4. Use of warrants
In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 92 the warrant for seizure of ob-
scene materials mentioned only two copies of films. It contained a
space to list items, but that portion was left blank. Later, after a sweep-
ing search, a long list of items was added to the warrant.93 The Court
condemned this use of a warrant as "reminiscent of the general warrant
or writ of assistance of the 18th century against which the Fourth
Amendment was intended to protect.
'94
The Court also reiterated the settled position that a warrant must
be issued by a detached magistrate.95 The Lo-Ji Court found it objec-
tionable that the justice who issued the warrant had participated in the
search. "[H]e was not acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct law-
enforcement officer."96
88. 600 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
89. Id. at 1257.
90. Rule 41 is entitled "Search and Seizure." Subsection c deals with the issuance and
contents of search warrants. The district court in In re Sealed Affidavits said "nowhere in
rule 41(c) is the power of a judge or magistrate to seal such an affidavit even suggested." 600
F.2d at 1257.
91. 600 F.2d at 1257.
92. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
93. Id. at 324.
94. Id. at 325.
95. Id. at 326. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971)).
96. Id. at 327.
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C. Electronic Surveillance
Perhaps in response to an increasing clamor for law and order,
three United States Supreme Court cases last year, 97 two reversing the
Ninth Circuit, held that the government's use of electronic surveillance
devices had not violated the fourth amendment.
1. Covert entry to install eavesdropping equipment
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196898 placed
restrictions on the interception of wire and oral communications, al-
lowing prosecutors to apply to a federal judge for authorization to wire-
tap where certain offenses are suspected. 99
In 1978 the Ninth Circuit held, in United States v. Santora,100 that
the Crime Control Act did not allow courts to authorize break-ins to
install legally warranted bugging devices and that any evidence gath-
ered as a result of such a break-in must be excluded.' ° In 1979 this
Ninth Circuit interpretation was reversed. 2 On remand, the Ninth
Circuit returned an opinion consistent with another 1979 United States
Supreme Court case, Dalia v. United States, 0 3 and held that break-ins
for the purpose of installing bugging devices are permitted by the
Crime Control Act."°4
The Dalia Court concluded that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does
not prohibitper se a covert entry performed for the purpose of install-
ing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment."'0 5
The telephone calls and office conversations of Dalia, suspected of
receiving stolen goods, were monitored pursuant to court authorization.
He challenged his conviction, moving to suppress evidence obtained
under the bugging order since FBI agents had secretly entered his office
to install bugging devices. Dalia contended that the bugging statutes,
since they do not explicitly mention covert entry, meant to prohibit it;
and that, even if such entry could be legal under the statutes, the appli-
cant for the warrant would need specific authorization for covert entry.
Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, stated that "[a]bsent covert
97. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979);
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
98. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
99. Id. at § 2516.
100. 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2155, rev'd, 600 F.2d 1317 (1979).
101. 583 F.2d at 456-66.
102. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. at 238.
103. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
104. 600 F.2d at 1321.
105. 441 U.S. at 248.
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entry. . ., almost all electronic bugging would be impossible."10 6 Re-
viewing the legislative history of the Crime Control Act, the Court con-
cluded that Congress must have recognized this. To suggest that
Congress then meant to exclude covert entry by its omission would be
to impute to Congress "a self-defeating, if not disingenuous pur-
pose."' 1 7 The fourth amendment, the Court said, generally leaves it to
"the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how
best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by war-
rant." 08
The Dalia majority also concluded that "the Fourth Amendment
does not require that a Title III electronic surveillance order include a
specific authorization to enter the premises described in the order."'10 9
The provision in Title III requiring notice upon completion of surveil-
lance"10 was deemed to be sufficient by the court.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, agreed that the fourth amendment
does not prohibit covert entryper se, but did not believe that Congress
implicitly authorized such entry, nor that a warrant which does not
mention such entry is sufficient to authorize it. Justices Stevens and
Marshall also dissented, contending that the Court should not read in a
Congressional authorization where none has been given."'
The Court's opinion in Dalia should at least temporarily calm con-
tentiousness among the lower courts on the question of covert entry. 1
2
The Ninth Circuit had held in Santora that the courts had no power to
authorize break-ins;"I3 the District of Columbia had required warrants
106. Id. at 253. In support of this contention, the Court cited to McNamara, The Problem
of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After the
Court Says "Yes"? 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1977), which traced the recent history of fed-
eral cases on covert entry, suggested that all eavesdrop orders should contain entry provi-
sions, and proposed a system of reporting to the authorizing judge as a check against abuse.
107. 441 U.S. at 254 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
108. Id. at 257.
109. Id. at 258-59.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
111. 441 U.S. at 262-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. For recent discussions of covert entry prior to the Dalia decision, see Comment,
Covert Entry in Electronic Surveillance: The Fourth Amendment Requirements, 47 FORDHAM
L. REv. 203 (1978) (comparing the circuits at 204 n.7); Comment, The Illegality of Eaves-
drop-RelatedBreak-ins: United States v. Finazzo and United States v. Santora, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 919 (1979); Note, United States v. Finazzo, 48 U. GIN. L. REv. 158 (1979) (comparing
the circuits at 160-61); Comment, Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Courts Split on
the Necessity of Separate Authorization for Covert Entry Under Title Ill of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (1978) (discussing
United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
113. 583 F.2d at 464.
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for covert entry; 14 but the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits had
held that covert entry without specific authorization was acceptable, at
least in some circumstances."15 After Dalia another Ninth Circuit case,
United States v. Licavoli,I 6 followed suit and held that orders authoriz-
ing electronic surveillance were not invalid merely because they au-
thorized surreptitious entry." 17
2. Naming conversants in warrant
Under the Omnibus Crime Control Act, officials must obtain a
warrant before installing eavesdropping equipment." 8 Three cases
have recently dealt with alleged deficiencies in such warrants.
In United States v. Martin,"9 a case involving conspiracy to dis-
tribute heroin and cocaine, numerous issues regarding the sufficiency of
the warrant were raised. The initial order to wiretap named some, but
not all, of those who were ultimately indicted as a result of the surveil-
lance. The court held the following: 1) that an innocent misstatement
(here attributing a drug-related call to the wrong person, but one also
involved in the conspiracy) does not invalidate the warrant; 20 2) that
unintentional withholding of the names of some of the suspects from
the application does not require suppression of evidence incriminating
them; 121 3) that the fourth amendment does not require that the reasons
for naming all probable conversers be shown in the application; 22 4)
that some suspects for whom no probable cause exists may be named
and the evidence may later be used against them; 23 5) that while it is
mandatory to send notice, following the wiretap, to those persons
114. E.g., United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (covert entry must be
accompanied by a warrant).
115. E.g., United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977) (warrant to install elec-
tronic surveillance must, to be effective, carry implicit authorization of covert entry); In re
United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977) (to effectuate legislators' purpose in allowing
some electronic surveillance, covert entry should be allowed where the judge knows of the
planned entry); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1045 (1977) (covert entry to business premises acceptable partly because less reasonable
expectation of privacy in a place of business, especially one unoccupied at the time of entry).
116. 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 619 (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979)).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976).
119. 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979).
120. Id. at 886.
121. Id. at 885-86.
122. Id. at 884-85. The Court quoted United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15
(1977), as establishing that only the line to be tapped and the conversations to be seized must
be named.
123. 599 F.2d at 885.
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named in the application, notice to those not named is discretionary; 24
and 6) that the investigative agency may establish necessity for the
wiretap without showing that it has exhausted all other possible investi-
gative techniques.1
25
In United States v. Baker,126 the defendant was not named in the
wiretap affidavit. The court held that the defendant could not com-
plain about alleged defects in the warrant, because before the wiretap
the government had had no probable cause to believe that he was in-
volved in the gambling operation. 27 Similarly, he could not object on
the grounds that the government had failed to show that traditional
investigative techniques had been tried and had failed .
28
In United States v. Kail,129 the Ninth Circuit held that a nonmate-
rial misrepresentation regarding the showing that other procedures
were attempted did not invalidate the warrant. And although the de-
fendant attacked the affidavit as lacking sufficient particularity about
other procedures attempted, the court found that the "considerable de-
tail" in the affidavit was adequate.
30
3. Necessity for wiretap
In United States v. Bailey,'3 ' a narcotics case, the court rejected the
defendants' contention that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act was unconstitutional. 32 The defendants also con-
tended that there had not been an adequate showing of necessity for
the wiretap, arguing that because the government had already accumu-
lated evidence against some of the suspects, normal investigative tech-
niques would have uncovered the desired additional evidence.
According to the defendants, "the statute should not be construed to
permit narcotics agents to evade the normal investigative technique re-
quirements simply because there remain some unknown details or un-
prosecutable associates." 1
33
124. Id.
125. Id. at 887.
126. 589 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1979).
127. Id. at 1011.
128. Id.
129. 612 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1979).
130. Id.
131. 607 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 240-41. The court relied on United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 158-159
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976), in which the
court "squarely held Title III to be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment." United
States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d at 241.
133. 607 F.2d at 242.
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Acknowledging that "[w]iretaps are not to be used routinely as
the first step in criminal investigations," the court nevertheless stated
that "the necessity requirement is also to be interpreted in a practical
and commonsense fashion, and need not therefore be used only as a
last resort."' 34 Quoting United States v. Baker,'35 the Bailey court said
that the statute'36 does not require the "'indiscriminate pursuit to the
bitter end of every nonelectronic device.' " 37 The court held that the
trial court had properly denied the motion to suppress evidence gained
through the wiretap.'
38
4. Pen registers
Smith v. Maryland 39 raised fundamental questions regarding the
use of pen registers. In Smith, the Court cited an earlier decision,
United States v. New York Telephone Co .,141 where the respondent tele-
phone company had been instructed by the district court to furnish the
FBI with assistance in installing pen registers in a gambling case. The
company refused to give the requeste d aid, stating that it would do so
only pursuant to a wiretap order meeting the requirements of Title III
of the Crime Control Act of 1968. The Court reasoned that Title III
applied to "interception" of a wire or oral communication, and there-
fore, not to the installation of pen registers. 14 ' In addition, the Court
noted that the district court could authorize installation and that it had
the power to order the telephone company to aid the FBI. "Without
the assistance of the Company in circumstances such as those presented
here . . . these devices simply cannot be effectively employed."'
142
The Smith Court emphasized the unique position pen registers oc-
cupy. "A pen register differs significantly from the listening device em-
ployed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications."'' 43 The Court found that there is no reasonable ex-
134. Id. at 241-42.
135. 589 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1979).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976).
137. 607 F.2d at 242.
138. Id. at 242-43.
139. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For a full discussion of Smith, see notes 11-17 supra and ac-
companying text.
140. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
141. Id. at 167-68.
142. Id. at 176.
143. 442 U.S. at 741. The listening device in Katz was installed outside a phone booth to
intercept the conversations inside. Even though the government had not actually invaded
the booth, and even though the booth was public, the Court found for the defendant, pro-
claiming that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." 389 U.S. at 351.
Pen registers present a unique problem because these'devices do not actually permit
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pectation of privacy with regard to the phone numbers which one dials,
and that therefore, the installation of pen registers was legal.
This holding reinforces two recent Ninth Circuit cases. United
States v. Louderman14 relied on the opinion in Hodge v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Co.'45 In Hodge, the telephone com-
pany had installed, without a warrant, a pen register on Hodge's tele-
phone to investigate his suspected obscene telephone calls. Employing
reasoning similar to that used by the Smith Court, the Hodge court had
held that the fourth amendment protects the contents of one's conversa-
tions, but that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in tele-
phone numbers dialed.'46
5. Failure to follow agency regulations
In United States v. Caceres,47 an agent failed to observe the pre-
liminary requirements of the Internal Revenue Service regulations148
before taping his conversation with a taxpayer and the taxpayer's wife.
The defendants offered a bribe to the agents, and were prosecuted. Re-
versing the Ninth Circuit,' 49 the Caceres Court held that the agent's
failure to follow the IRS regulations did not require suppression of the
tape recordings. Although courts must enforce agency regulations
when they are mandated by the Constitution or by federal law, the
Court found that the IRS had not been constitutionally required to
adopt the regulations in question. The Court concluded that "we can-
not ignore the possibility that a rigid application of an exclusionary
rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact
on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and
police procedures."' 50
eavesdropping. Rather, they simply record the numbers dialed from the telephone lines on
which they are installed.
144. 576 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
145. 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
146. Id. at 256 n.3. The court questioned whether this could be termed a government
"search," even though there was cooperation with the police, but did not decide this issue
because it found that this particular installation of a pen register did not violate the fourth
amendment.
147. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
148. IRS regulations require Justice Department approval for electronic surveillance.
The Court cited Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 429 (1962), for the proposition that no such
approval is mandated either by the Constitution or by federal law.
149. United States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)
(the unauthorized recordings must be suppressed).
150. 440 U.S. at 755-56.
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D. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
When a defendant seeks to have evidence disallowed under the
exclusionary rule,15"' the court must determine whether the challenged
evidence is sufficiently related to some illegal government act to make
it the "fruit of the poisonous tree." This doctrine, articulated in Wong
Sun v. United States,'52 looks beyond a "but for" analysis. Evidence is
not excluded just because it would not have come to light but for illegal
police activity. Rather, the courts ask whether the evidence was ob-
tained by exploitation of that illegality, or whether it has been obtained
"by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint."'1
53
In United States v. Jones, 54 the defendant was arrested illegally
for a Los Angeles burglary. In the course of a search incident to that
arrest, police discovered a motel key. Later, without taking the key,
police went to that motel room and were admitted by Bennett, Jones'
roommate, who consented to a search. Bennett told police that there
was a gun in his travel bag; its serial number was later matched to that
of a gun stolen in an unrelated San Francisco burglary. Bennett also
said that he had cases of jewelry in his car, and he consented to a re-
quest to search them. Some of the jewelry was identified as having
been stolen in the same San Francisco burglary. Later, after Jones had
been convicted of the Los Angeles burglary, and after being shown the
gun, he confessed to having committed the San Francisco burglary.
Jones challenged the admissibility of the gun, the jewelry, and the
two confessions, claiming that they were the fruit of the original illegal
arrest. Reiterating the Wong Sun principle that a "but for" link is not
sufficient to require exclusion, the Jones court found three factors to be
15 1. For a recent analysis of the exclusionary rule, see a debate between Yale Kamisar
and Malcolm Richard Wilkey culminating in 1979 with Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in
Historical Perspective: the Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More than 'an Empty
Blessing,' 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979) (defending the exclusionary rule and arguing that we
must not abandon it until we have meaningful alternatives), and Wilkey, A CallforAlterna-
tives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351
(1979) (contending that excluding the evidence entirely is an illogical penalty for govern-
ment excesses). The same issue of JUDICATURE carries two other articles on the subject:
Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that it Doesn't Deter Police? 62 JUDICA-
TURE 398 (1979) (arguing that the evidence is inconclusive, since the exclusionary rule seems
to deter police in some cities, and not in others), and Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule:
Have Proponents Proven that it Is a Deterrent to Police? 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) (the
rule's proponents have the burden of proving that it is effective--and they have not yet done
so).
152. 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
153. Id. at 488.
154. 608 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1979).
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of primary importance in determining whether the gun and the jewelry
should be suppressed: "First, how directly did the arrest lead to the
discovery of the evidence? Second, were there other events, independ-
ent of the arrest, which also contributed to the police's discovery? Fi-
nally, to what extent would suppression of the evidence further the
exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police misconduct?"'
155
Noting that discovery of the key gave the police no reason to
search for items stolen in the San Francisco burglary, the court stated
that an "illegally acquired lead may be so general and indirect" that
the evidence gathered after it will still be admissible. 156 In addition,
although the court said that consent alone would not dissipate the taint,
the consent of Jones' roommate further lessened it "when considered in
the light of the weakness of the initial connection . . .".
E. Warrantless Vehicle Searches
Warrantless searches of premises for fruits, instrumentalities or ev,
idence of a crime have been held to be constitutional only under a few
exceptional circumstances.1 58 However, warrantless vehicle searches
have been liberally upheld. Over the years, the Supreme Court has
upheld such searches under the "automobile exception" or the Carroll-
Chambers doctrine. 59 The Court's rationalization for the divergent
treatment it has afforded vehicle searches focuses upon two factors: (1)
155. Id. at 391.
156. Id.
157. Id. Other cases in which allegedly tainted evidence was an issue include United
States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1980) (where defendant was illegally de-
tained for three hours, and no intervening circumstances broke the causal connection, volun-
tary consent and inculpatory statements were tainted); United States v. Perez-Castro, 606
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1979) (see note 9 supra) (statements made to border patrol agent the
morning following illegal arrest not sufficiently removed to purge taint); United States v.
Hauser, 603 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1979) (evidence seized pursuant to lawful search warrant fol-
lowing possibly illegal arrest is not fruit of that arrest); United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d
1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (see note 28 supra and accompanying text) (court need not find evidence
tainted if information gained illegally merely intensified an investigation); United States v.
Humphries, 600 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1979) (see notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text)
(where road from illegal actions to evidence is short and straight, balancing of fourth
amendment rights against concern for truth requires suppression).
158. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971), the Court noted that the
warrant requirement is "a valued part of our constitutional law" and exceptions should be
properly limited in scope.
159. The first case dealing with the warrantless search of a vehicle was Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in which the warrantless search of a bootlegger's vehicle was
conducted at the arrest scene. In upholding the search-he Court stated:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a
warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehi-
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the inherent mobility of vehicles, making it impractical to obtain a
search warrant prior to a search 60 and (2) the lesser expectation of
privacy in an automobile than in a dwelling.
16 1
Although the automobile exception is firmly entrenched in consti-
tutional law,162 the permissible scope of these warrantless searches, par-
ticulary as it relates to searches of suitcases or containers found within
a car, has remained uncertain. After Chambers, some lower courts, in-
cluding the Ninth Circuit, upheld luggage searches pursuant to the au-
tomobile exception.
63
The first Supreme Court case confronting the issue of the permissi-
bility of searching luggage found during an automboile search was
United States v. Chadwick,"6 in which the Court held that the warrant-
less search of luggage after it was taken from a parked vehicle violated
cle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and
seizure are valid.
Id. at 149.
Carroll has been cited, in a subsequent Supreme Court case, as holding that a search
warrant is unnecessary when there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway, the automobile is moveable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may
never be found again if a warrant is obtained first. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51
(1970). In Chambers, the Court held that when there is probable cause to search an automo-
bile, there is no fourth amendment difference between searching a vehicle on the spot or
towing it to the police station for a warrantless search. Id. at 51-52.
160. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-50 (1925).
161. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12
(1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973).
162. There are five major Supreme Court cases which have developed this doctrine:
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding
search of a suitcase found within defendants' automobile where probable cause and exigent
circumstances were present); United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (removal of suitcase from trunk and subsequent search did not dissipate nexus be-
tween automobile and container); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 994-95 (9th Cir.
1973) (reversing motion to suppress a shotgun discovered during the warrantless search of a
footlocker confiscated from the trunk of an automobile).
164. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, federal agents in Boston were alerted that defend-
ants Machado and Leary were traveling on a train from San Diego to Boston and were
transporting a footlocker containing drugs. The agents' suspicions were based on their ob-
servations that the trunk was unusually heavy for its size and was leaking talcum powder
(which is often used to disguise the odor of marijuana), and that Machado matched a drug
dealer's profile. When the train arrived in Boston, federal agents were waiting with dogs
trained to detect marijuana. The dogs reacted positively, indicating the presence of drugs.
The defendants were met at the Boston train station by Chadwick and loaded the locked
footlocker into the trunk of Chadwick's car. Before the car was moved, the officers arrested
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the fourth amendment. 6 ' The Court concluded that the Carroll-Cham-
bers rationale for warrantless automobile searches should not be ex-
tended to luggage, because luggage is distinguishable from an
automobile in terms of both mobility and a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 16
6
While the Court in Chadwick refused to create a luggage search
exception analogous to the vehicle search exception, 67 it left unsettled
the question of whether luggage found inside a car may properly be
searched within the scope of an otherwise lawful warrantless vehicle
search. 68 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Finnegan 69 appeared
to recognize this distinction in Chadwick and, thus, relied on the pre-
existing law of automobile searches for the proposition that luggage
found in a movable automobile could be searched.170 But more re-
cently, in United States v. Stewart,'7' the Ninth Circuit concluded that
such a construction of Finnegan was inaccurate.' Rather, the Stewart
court reasoned that Chadwick actually stands for the broader position
that, absent exigent circumstances, luggage could not legitimately be
searched merely because it was properly seized pursuant to the Carroll-
Chambers automobile exception. 173 Nevertheless, the court in Stewart
all three defendants and, without a warrant, removed the footlocker from the trunk and
brought it to the federal building where it was subsequently searched. Id. at 3-5.
165. Id. at 15. Recognizing that the relationship between the footlocker and the vehicle
was sufficiently attenuated, the Government chose not to justify the warrantless search of the
footlocker on the basis of the automobile exception. Id. at 11. Rather, they argued that
luggage could be analogized to an automobile, and that therefore, the rationale underlying
the Carroll-Chambers doctrine was equally applicable to luggage searches. Id. at 11-12.
166. Id. at 11-13. In distinguishing luggage from an automobile the Court stated:
The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to
respondent's footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view. . . . Un-
like an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended
as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in
personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.
Nor does the footlocker's mobility justify dispensing with the added protec-
tions of the Warrant Clause. . . . With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was
unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without
a warrant.
Id. at 13.
167. Id.
168. While the contents of the car could have been searched pursuant to the automo-
bile exception, it is by no means clear that the contents of locked containers found
inside a car are subject to search under this exception, any more than they would
be if the police found them in any other place.
Id. at 17 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring).
169. 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977).
170. Id. at 641.
171. 595 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1979).
172. Id. at 504 n.6.
173. Id. at 503-04.
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decided that this Chadwick rule was not to be applied retroactively, and
thus held the search of the defendant's attache case proper under pre-
Chadwick Ninth Circuit law. 74
The rule attributed to Chadwick by the Stewart court was finally
set forth by the Supreme Court in the 1979 case of Arkansas v. Sand-
ers.175 In Sanders, police officers were alerted by an informant to the
fact that defendant Adkisson would be arriving at Little Rock's airport
on a particular flight and would be transporting marijuana in a green
suitcase. As predicted, Adkisson arrived at the specified time and
place. The police observed Adkisson go to the baggage claim area, pick
up a suitcase, and bring it to a waiting taxi. He then returned to the
baggage area where he met a man named Rambo. They both waited
until Adkisson retrieved the green suitcase described by the informant.
Adkisson gave the suitcase to Rambo and then waited in the taxi. A
few minutes later, Rambo came to the taxi and put the suitcase in the
trunk. The taxi cab drove off with Rambo, Adkisson, and the green
suitcase. The police pursued the taxi and stopped it a few blocks away
from the airport. They removed the green suitcase from the trunk and,
without the permission of either defendant, opened the unlocked suit-
case and discoverd 9.3 pounds of marijuana packaged in ten plastic
bags.
176
In invalidating the search of the suitcase, the Sanders Court ex-
pressly held that, absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain a
warrant before searching luggage found inside an automobile which
has been properly stopped and searched for contraband.177 The Court
refused to justify the warrantless search of the suitcase under Carroll or
any other case applying the automobile exception.'78 Relying on the
reasoning in Chadwick, the Court held that due to the inherent differ-
ences in the expectation of privacy and mobility, luggage and
automobiles do not deserve the same degree of fourth amendment pro-
tection. 17 The Court stated:
[A]s we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be
174. Id. at 503.
175. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
176. Id. at 755.
177. Id. at 763-64.
178. Id. at 765.
179. Id. at 762. In comparing this case to Chadwick, the Court explicitly stated that once
the luggage was seized, there was no longer a danger that the luggage or its contents would
be removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained. Id. Furthermore, the fact that
the defendant failed to lock the suitcase, and that the suitcase was smaller than the footlock-
er in Chadwick, was irrelevant in evaluating the defendant's expectation of privacy. Id. at
762 n.9.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
assessed at the point immediately before the search-after the
police have seized the object to be searched and have it se-
curely within their control . .. Once police have seized a
suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no
way affected by the place from which it was taken. Accord-
ingly as a general rule there is no greater need for warrantless
searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage
taken from other places.
Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped
on the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser ex-
ception of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from
other locations.180
The Sanders holding will undoubtedly be narrowly applied. First,
it is limited to luggage and does not articulate a clear-cut standard for
other types of containers. 8' Second, the decision does not affect the
government's ability to search luggage if exigent circumstances exist,'
82
or if the luggage is subject to a border search.'8 3 Sanders neither en-
larges nor diminishes the scope of the traditional Carroll-Chambers au-
tomobile exception; 184 it nevertheless helps to delineate the scope of the
exception more precisely.
F Vehicle Regulation Inspections
The operation of motor vehicles on public highways has been the
object of extensive statutory regulation for some time. Ordinarily, this
legislation requires motorists to have in their immediate possession
valid driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. 8 5 In order to seek
compliance with these regulations, many states either in practice or by
express statute permit police officers to stop vehicles for the sole pur-
180. Id. at 763-64 (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 766 n.13. Protection will not be afforded to the contents of a package in plain
view, nor to such containers as a kit of burglary, tools or a gun case, because by their very
nature, these items cannot support a reasonable expectation of privacy inasmuch as "their
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance." Id.
182. Id. at 763 n. 11. The exigencies will depend on the probable contents of the
container. E.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 443, 447 (1973) (warrantless police inven-
tory search of an automobile trunk suspected of containing a weapon held valid). Addition-
ally, Sanders does not interfere with a police officer's ability to conduct searches incident to
arrest. 442 U.S. at 763 n.ll.
183. 442 U.S. at 764 n.12.
184. Id. at 765 n.14.
185. For examples of representative statutes see CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1250(a), 12951 (West
1971); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 4000(a), 4454 (West Supp. 1980).
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pose of examining these documents. 186 The lower courts have been in
disagreement as to whether such procedures are lawful when conducted
without even a reasonable suspicion that drivers are not in compliance
with the law.'87 In 1979 the Supreme Court resolved this dispute in
Delaware v. Prouse.88 In Prouse, a Delaware policeman randomly se-
lected and stopped the automobile driven by the defendant for the sole
purpose of checking the defendant's driver's license and car registra-
tion. The policeman testified that he had not observed any traffic viola-
tions or suspicious activity. When the policeman approached the
stopped vehicle, he smelled marijuana and subsequently seized the ma-
rijuana which was in plain view on the floor of the car. The trial court
186. The investigative stop is accomplished by different methods. Some states set up a
fixed roadblock checking all vehicles that pass through a specific point. In other instances,
officers in a roving patrol arbitrarily pull over vehicles to check the registration or driver's
license, without requiring probable cause or a reasonable suspicion. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979).
187. The Ninth Circuit had orginally held in Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1965), that the stopping of a motorist for the sole purpose of examining the validity of
his driver's license was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 593. How-
ever, this ruling was somewhat limited in United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239
(9th Cir. 1975), in which the court stated that "[t]he rationale in Lipton is that laws requiring
possession of drivers' licenses while driving could not otherwise be effectively enforced ...
We have limited Lipton to that rationale; it permits stops without founded suspicion only to
enforce laws susceptible of no other means of effective enforcement." Id. at 241 (citations
omitted).
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, a significant number of jurisdictions have held that the
fourth amendment does not prohibit the type of automobile stop based solely on the officer's
discretion. E.g, United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975); Myricks v. United
States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967); State v. Holmberg, 194
Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973); Palmore
v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. App. 1972), ajf'don other grounds, 411 U.S. 389 (1973);
Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576 (rex. Crim. App. 1973).
On the other hand, five jurisdictions have held these arbitrary practices to be unlawful.
United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Montgomery, 561
F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39
(1975); State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 112
Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107,307 A.2d
875 (1973).
This jurisdictional conflict may be attributed to the fact that prior Supreme Court deci-
sions had suggested that such practices may be lawful. For example, in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), while upholding the legality of stops made by a roving
border patrol absent a reasonable suspicion, the Court maintained that its decision "does not
imply that state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited
stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses, vehicle registration, truck
weights, and similar matters." Id. at 883 n.8. For similar discussions see United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 442 U.S. 891 (1975). Although
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), expressly settled this conflict, the prior law will
continue to be important if Prouse is not given retroactive effect.
188. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and the Dela-
ware Supreme Court affirmed.' 89
The Supreme Court held that the evidence should be suppressed,
and stated that
except in those situations in which there is at least articulable
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that
an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an
occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law,
stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver's license and the registration of the automo-
bile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 90
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rationalized that the privacy of
persons traveling in automobiles should not be subject to the unbridled
discretion of police officers. 191 It recognized no appreciable difference
for fourth amendment purposes between stops made by a roving border
patrol and random stops such as in the instant case and adopted the
standard that it had previously applied in invalidating the roving bor-
der patrol unit searches. 92 Under this standard the reasonableness of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion
on the individual's fourth amendment rights against its promotion of
governmental interests.193
While acknowledging a strong state interest in promoting public
safety on its roads,194 the Prouse Court recognized that less intrusive
methods of enforcement were available to state officials. 19 As one pos-
189. Id. at 651.
190. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court
held that a roving border patrol unit could not randomly stop vehicles near the border unless
there existed a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the vehicle contained
illegal aliens. Id. at 884. In rejecting the Government's argument that Bngnoni-Ponce and
Prouse were fundamentally different, the Prouse Court stated that "[w]e cannot assume that
the physical and psychological intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a ran-
dom stop to check documents is of any less moment than that occasioned by a stop by
border agents on roving patrol." 440 U.S. at 657.
193. This test has also been used to judge the constitutionality of other situations. Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-59 (vehicle stops); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 555 (1975) (border check points); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975) (roving border patrols); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973) (extended border searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1968) (stop and frisk).
194. 440 U.S. at 658.
195. Id. at 659-60, 663. Unlike Marlinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1946), where a strong
government interest permitted vehicle stops at fixed border checkpoints without a warrant,
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, there is no comparable overwhelming state interest
with respect to vehicle stops for registration inspections. In Prouse, the marginal contribu-
[Vol. 13
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sible alternative, the Court expressly endorsed the stopping of all vehi-
cles at roadblock-type checkpoints. 1
96
Prouse is significant because it may invalidate a variety of statutes
or law enforcement practices which permit a stop, detention, or investi-
gative search under circumstances that do not satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard.'97 Prouse's impact was immediately apparent in
the 1979 Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Piner.
98
In Piner, Coast Guard personnel spotted defendants' boat after
sunset, which was underway, and went aboard for a routine safety in-
spection.' 99 Such investigations are conducted on a random basis ab-
sent suspicious circumstances pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).2 0 Upon
boarding the defendants' boat, the Coast Guard officers observed bags
of marijuana in plain view in a lighted cabin below deck. The defend-
ants were put under arrest and a thorough search of the vessel uncov-
ered two tons of marijuana.20'
The court held that the random stop and boarding of a vessel by
the Coast Guard after dark, absent a warrant, probable cause, or a rea-
sonable and articulable suspicion, violated the fourth amendment.
20 2
A stop and boarding after dark must be conducted for cause or under
tion to public safety from discretionary vehicle stops was not, the Court concluded, "a suffi-
ciently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests
which [such] stops entail." 440 U.S. at 659.
196. Id. at 663. The Court's suggestion is in line with its decision in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), in which the Court held that routine traffic stops of
vehicles at fixed checkpoints near the border for brief questioning need not be based upon
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. Id. at 556-64.
197. Eg., United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979) (court invalidated
Coast Guard search of boat at night relying on Prouse); United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d
545, 547-48, 550 (9th Cir. 1979) (Prouse relied on to invalidate search at border).
198. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
199. Id. at 359.
200. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States
has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws
of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers
may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the
operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board,
examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
Safety inspections conducted pursuant to the statute usually consisted of:
(I) Stopping and boarding the boat.
(2) Checking the boat registration papers and personal identification.
(3) Checking the boat for fire extinguishers and life jackets;
(4) Checking various pieces of the machinery for possible fire hazards.
201. 608 F.2d at 359.
202. Id. at 361.
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administrative standards so that the decision is not left to the sole dis-
cretion of the Coast Guard officer.2"3 In applying the balancing test
used in Delaware v. Prouse,2 4 the court held that even assuming argu-
endo that during an "ordinary" boarding the government's interest out-
weighs the intrusion into the privacy of a boat owner, the boarding of
isolated boats after dark created such "subjective intrusion" that the
government had a far greater burden to demonstrate the urgency of its
practices, 20 5 particularly in light of the less intrusive alternative of day-
time searches tacitly approved by the majority in dicta.20 6
In United States v. Soto-Soto," 7 decided in 1979, an FBI agent
searching for stolen vehicles focused his investigation upon
automobiles entering the United States from Mexico through a com-
mercial gate. The agent selected for inspection late model Ford and
Chevrolet pick-up trucks. The defendant was subsequently stopped
solely because he was driving a 1976 Chevrolet pick-up. In order to
complete his stolen vehicle investigation, the agent lifted the car hood
in an effort to check the serial number stamped on the truck frame. At
that point he discovered, in plain view, numerous packages of mari-
203. Id. The administrative standards the court referred to were formulated by the fol-
lowing line of cases: Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (fourth amendment
requires inspectors to obtain a search warrant before making housing inspections); See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (fourth amendment requires a suitable warrant proce-
dure in order to effect the unconsented administrative entry and inspection of private com-
mercial premises). The Piner court rejected the Government's contention that a warrant
should be excused under the authority of United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), in
which the Court upheld the warrantless search of the storeroom of a dealer federally li-
censed to sell sporting weapons because of the necessity of unannounced inspections. 608
F.2d at 360, 361.
204. 440 U.S. at 658-59. The test provides for balancing the governmental interests in a
particular law enforcement practice against the intrusion resulting from the practice. See
cases cited in note 193 supra.
205. 608 F.2d at 361. The court noted that the Government had forcefully demonstrated
an interest in random stops to effectuate the safety regulations and that the Coast Guard's
usual practice was to inspect pleasure craft only when underway. Dockside inspection
would be impractical and ineffective, since while a ship is docked the life jackets and other
safety equipment may be stored at home. Id. at 360. Unlike the situation in Prouse, the
Government provided statistical data that this method of inspection was successful in expos-
ing offenders. In 1977, forty percent of the vessels boarded and inspected were found to be
in violation. Id. at 361 n.2.
206. Id. at 361. In dissent, Judge Kennedy criticized the Piner decision because it invali-
dated two hundred years of accepted authority and put the Ninth Circuit at odds with the
Fifth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 889 (5th Cir. 1979), and
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 608 F.2d at 361
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Kennedy rejected the majority's reliance on
Prouse, stating that "Prouse does not establish a rule against all random stops; it concerns
automobiles only." Id. at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979).
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juana beneath the hood.20 8 In holding that the FBI's conduct violated
the fourth amendment, the court rejected the government's argument
that California Vehicle Code section 2805209 authorized this stop and
search of vehicles. In the past, the Ninth Circuit had limited the atl-
thority under section 2805 to situations in which a "founded suspicion"
existed.21o
Although the opinion cited Delaware v. Prouse,21' Soto-Soto was
in accord with a previous Ninth Circuit decision which refused to au-
thorize stops solely because the automobile stopped matched a certain
broad profile of vehicles commonly stolen.2 lz Car profiles generally
have been held to be insufficient to satisfy the founded suspicion re-
quirement because they lack "some reasonable ground for singling out
the person stopped as one who was involved or was about to be in-
volved in criminal activity.
213
G. Border Searches
1. Scope
It is well-established that routine searches conducted at the border
upon entry into the United States need not be supported by probable
cause or a founded suspicion.21 4 Justification for border searches is
208. Id. at 546.
209. At the time of the search, CAL. VEH. CODE § 2805 (West 1971) provided that:
A member of the California Highway Patrol may inspect any vehicle of a type
required to be registered under this code on a highway or in any public garage,
repair shop, parking lot, used car lot, automobile dismantler's lot, or other similar
establishment, for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles, investigating the title and
registration of vehicles, or inspection of vehicles wrecked or dismantled.
The FBI agent claimed he could qualify under this section beause he was working in con-
junction with the California Highway Patrol. 598 F.2d at 547.
210. 598 F.2d at 547.
211. Id.
212. For example, in United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975),
federal and state law enforcement officers were looking for stolen cars by randomly stopping
vehicles that satisfied a profile of cars commonly stolen. The Government justified its search
under Arizona law which required the owner to display vehicle registration in the vehicle,
have a driver's license in his immediate possession, and to produce these documents for
inspection to any highway patrol or police officers. Id. at 240-41. The court held the stop to
be unlawful and stated that at least either a "founded suspicion" was required in order to
justify such stops or a showing that no less intrusive means were available to enforce the
regulation. Id. at 241.
213. Id. at 241.
214. The first case to expressly so hold was United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
The Court stated that "searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of
the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into
this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. .. ."
Id. at 616. Accord, Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); United States v. Lin-
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founded in the sovereign's right to protect itself.21 5 Whenever a person
enters the United States after being in a foreign country a search may
automatically be conducted.z 6 However, this term, the Supreme Court
in Torres v. Puerto Rico2 17 refused to uphold the warrantless search of
an individual's luggage upon entering Puerto Rico from the United
States.2 1 8 The search was conducted pursuant to a Puerto Rican statute
which eliminated the need for probable cause.21 9 The Court expressly
held that the fourth amendment and all its protections, including the
right to privacy, apply to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Thus, the
statute was held to be unconstitutional.
2 2 0
Bound by the search warrant requirement, Puerto Rico argued al-
ternatively that an "intermediate border," analogous to the interna-
tional border, exists between Puerto Rico and the rest of the United
States. Thus, its warrantless search was justified under the border
search line of cases. 2 In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned
that Puerto Rico has no sovereign authority to prohibit entry into its
territory as that authority is delegated to United States federal of-
ficers.2 22
The permissible scope of border searches includes a search of an
automobile which has crossed the border,2 23 as well as baggage and
packages.224 In addition, a person may be required to submit to a
search of his or her outer clothing, which may include an examination
coln, 494 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
273 (1973) (search of defendant's car by roving patrol, twenty miles from border was not a
border search and thus required probable cause).
215. United States v. Ramsey, 413 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
216. Id.
217. 440 U.S. 465 (1979).
218. Id. at 474.
219. Public Law 22, § 1, P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 25, § 1051 (Supp. 1977). The Puerto Rican
statute was enacted in 1975, and authorized Puerto Rican police to search the luggage of any
person arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States.
220. 442 U.S. at 471.
221. Id. at 472. In support of this argument, Puerto Rico pointed to the serious problems
it is experiencing with smuggling of drugs and weapons into its land. Furthermore, Puerto
Rico's unique political status and its geographical location should enable it to "have the
same freedom to search persons crossing its 'intermediate border' as does the United States
with respect to incoming international travellers." Id.
222. Id. at 473.
223. E.g , Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973).
224. E.g. , United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1979) (pockets);
United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978) (undergarments); Henderson v.
United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967) (baggage and body cavities).
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of the contents of his or her purse, wallet, pockets or undergarments.225
However, the scope of the search is not without qualification and is
subject to the limitation that it be reasonable.226 The courts require
more stringent standards as the degree of intrusiveness of the search
increases.227 As stated in United States v. Palmer,228
for examination of vehicle[s], luggage, contents of pockets or
purse[s], no suspicion at all is required; for a strip search, real
suspicion, directed specifically to that person is required
S. .. But between a search of pockets and a strip there can
be a wide variety of types of intrusions, with varying degrees
of intrusiveness ... 229
The Ninth Circuit said that no suspicion is required to examine
the contents of pockets. Yet the court in United States v. Carter230 pre-
viously had held that a "mere suspicion" was required to justify a pat
down on the border.231
In the 1979 case of United States v. Grayson,232 the court was again
faced with deciding the validity of a pat down search conducted at the
border. The defendant's luggage was searched and subsequently, a sec-
ond examination, including a pat down, was ordered because the de-
fendant was evasive about having been in South America, appeared
bulky around the midriff, was unusually cooperative, and appeared to
be in a hurry.23 3 During the second examination, he hesitantly re-
moved from his pocket pieces of paper which ultimately led officers to
cocaine that defendant was transporting.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the pat down searches, deeming them to
be proper under either the "no suspicion" pocket rule or the "mere
suspicion" pat down standard,234 thereby avoiding the necessity of
choosing between the Palmer and Carter standards. The totality of cir-
cumstances presented in Grayson were sufficient to satisfy either re-
225. United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978).
226. If suspicion is based upon facts specifically relating to the searched person and if the
search is no more intrusive than necessary, then the search is reasonable. United States v.
Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978).
227. United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d at 1228.
228. 575 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1978).
229. Id. at 723.
230. 563 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding valid a pat down search conducted by a cus-
toms agent because defendant was nervous and evasive about his occupation and the pur-
pose of his overseas trip).
231. Id. at 1361.
232. 597 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1979).
233. Id. at 1227.
234. Id. at 1228.
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quirement.235
2. Use of unauthorized agents
Another problem regarding border searches arises in determining
which persons have the authority to conduct them. Since July of 1789,
when Congress passed the first customs statute, this authority has been
delegated to customs officials. 236 In addition, 19 U.S.C. § 482,237 which
sets forth the requirements for a valid border search, limits the persons
who may legally conduct a border search to "any of the officers or per-
sons authorized to board or search vessels. '2 38 The Fifth Circuit has
extended the authority under section 482 to include border patrol of-
ficers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,239 and the Second
Circuit has similarly held section 482 to include Coast Guard of-
ficers.240
In 1979, in United States v. Solo-Solo, 241 the Ninth Circuit refused
to extend the authority granted under section 482 to an FBI agent who
stopped and searched an automobile at the border which he suspected
was stolen.242 The court held that absent probable cause the search
may not be upheld merely because it was conducted .at the border.243
The court focused on the fact that the FBI agent was acting solely for
general law enforcement purposes and not for the enforcement of cus-
toms or immigration laws.2 " Furthermore, the FBI agent had not been
delegated customs authority or authority to board or search vessels
within the meaning of section 482.245
235. Id.
236. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 5, 1 Stat. 29, 36 (1789).
237. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976) provides
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehi-
cle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchan-
dise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States
in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or
by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise ....
238. Id.
239. United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1973) (border patrol
officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service had express and proper delegation of
Customs authority under the supervision of the Treasury Department of the Border Patrol).
240. Olson v. United States, 68 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1933) (Coast Guard officers have
authority to board and search vessels, and thus come within the meaning of 19 U.S.C.
§ 482).
241. 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979).
242. Id. at 549. The automobile was stopped solely because it fit a stolen-car profile
formulated by the agent. Id. at 546.
243. Id. at 548.
244. Id. at 549.
245. Id. The court noted that if this search had been conducted by the FBI at any other
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The Ninth Circuit, however, declined to invalidate an otherwise
proper border search merely because the search was conducted by cus-
toms officials at the request of Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) officials. In United States v. Schoor,246 customs agents were in-
formed in advance that the defendants, suspects in a heroin smuggling
conspiracy, would be arriving in the United States. The agents were
told that evidence of the defendants' criminal involvement would be
found in their possession in the form of cargo bills relating to an earlier
shipment of radios found to contain heroin.247 Upon their arrival in
the United States, the defendants were searched by customs agents and
the cargo bills were discovered. Defendants were then released by cus-
toms officers and arrested by DEA officers who seized the evidence.248
In upholding the search, the Schoor court stated that the mere fact
that the search was made at the request of the DEA officers did not
detract from its legitimacy, as the source of the suspicion was irrele-
vant.249 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the search
for the cargo bills by customs agents exceeded the scope of a proper
border search. Customs agents are authorized to search for material
which is subject to duty or for illegal substances. If during such a
search they discover instrumentalities of crimes, they may also seize
those items.2 ' Thus, the search and seizure of cargo bills in Schoor
was the product of a proper border search, and was legitimate in
scope.252
H Roving Patrols and Fixed Checkpoints
The number of illegal aliens entering into the United States each
year has increased by staggering proportions.5 3 In an effort to combat
this serious problem, investigative stops by border patrol officers have
been authorized at locations other than the immediate border. One
method utilized is the roving patrol, 5 4 which is however subject to re-
place away from the border, there would be no question that the search would have been
illegal.
246. 597 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
247. Id. at 1305.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1306.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. The DEA agents could also properly seize the documents uncovered by the
search as an arrest. Id. at 1306-07.
253. See generally, Fogel, IllegalAliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1977).
254. Officers assigned to the roving patrol police areas close to the border and look for
19801
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strictions. The roving patrol was initially limited by the Supreme
Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,255 in which the Court held
that the fourth amendment was violated when a vehicle was stopped
and searched solely because it was traveling twenty miles from the bor-
der.256 A few years later in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,257 the
Court was faced with a similar issue of whether a vehicle traveling
close to the border may be stopped and questioned by a roving patrol
when the only ground for suspicion was that its occupants appeared to
be of Mexican ancestry.25 The Court held that such a stop was im-
proper. However, it recognized that in view of the strong public inter-
est in controlling the entry of illegal aliens, detention and questioning
would be permissible as long as there exist articulable facts that war-
rant a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.2 9
The Court cautioned that the scope of the questioning must be limited
to an inquiry of citizenship and immigration status.260 Brignoni-Ponce
remains the standard to be applied when determining the constitution-
ality of activities by roving patrols.
In 1979, relying on Brignoni-Ponce, the Ninth Circuit held in
United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez,26' that border patrol officers had
a "reasonable suspicion" to stop the defendants' vehicles under the
facts presented. The officers' suspicions first arose when they observed
two cars traveling very close together sixty miles away from the Mexi-
illegal aliens. Initially, the government tried to justify the random stopping of vehicles for
questioning by the roving patrol as border searches, thus exempting its actions from fourth
amendment protections. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 273. The Court also refused to justify the stop and search by the rules applica-
ble to automobile searches or administrative searches. Id. at 269-72.
257. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
258. Id. at 876.
259. Id. at 883-85. In formulating this standard, the Court struck a balance between two
conflicting interests: the government interests in curtailing both the flow of illegal aliens and
drug trafficking, and the constitutional interest of the defendant in being protected from
unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. This balancing approach is
used repeatedly by the Court when dealing with a variety of fourth amendment issues.
260. Id. at 881, 882. In determining whether the BrIgnoni-Ponce standard had been satis-
fied, the Court set forth a number of factors which may be taken into account in deciding
whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop an automobile. These include: (1) characteris-
tics of the area; (2) proximity to the border, (3) usual patterns of traffic on the particular
road; (4) officer's previous experience with alien traffic; (5) information regarding recent
illegal border crossings in the area; (6) driver's behavior (e.g. erratic driving or obvious at-
tempts to evade officers); (7) aspects of the vehicle itself, such as the load of the vehicle, large
compartments for folddown seats or spare tires, an extraordinary number of passengers, or
passengers trying to hide; and (8) appearance of the occupants, such as the mode of dress or
style of haircut, which might indicate they reside in Mexico. Id. at 884-85.
261. 608 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979).
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can border.262 The vehicles were driving on a road which bypassed a
fixed checkpoint station and was often used by persons transporting
illegal aliens.263 While under surveillance, the occupants of each vehi-
cle were observed to be of Latin descent, and one of their vehicles was
"riding heavy." 264 It also appeared that the vehicles separated when
they spotted the roving patrol officers.2 65 The court held that the fac-
tors presented satisfied Brignoni-Ponce as there were a sufficient
number of specific articulable facts warranting a reasonable inference
that the vehicle contained illegal aliens.
266
However, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a stop and search of a ve-
hicle by border patrol officers in United States v. Cortez.267 The facts
surrounding the case reveal that the border patrol officers suspected
that illegal aliens were being transported across the border at night and
on weekends.268 Tracks discovered indicated that the aliens walked
some twenty-five miles to a highway where they were picked up by a
van. The tracks discovered by the police indicated that the leader of
the group wore shoes with a chevron pattern on the soles.269 On the
Sunday night of the defendants' arrest, the officers parked their car out
of sight, near the highway where they watched for vehicles. The of-
ficers testified that they would have stopped all vans, campers and pick-
up trucks which passed them traveling westward and then returned ap-
proximately ninety minutes later traveling eastward.27° The border pa-
trol officers stopped and searched the defendants' van solely because it
fit the proffle which the officers had formulated. The majority held the
procedure to be illegal, as it was not supported by a founded suspicion,
which requires some reasonable ground for singling out the person
stopped as one who was involved in criminal activity.
271
262. Id. at 1242.
263. Id.
264. Id. When a vehicle appears to be "riding heavy," it is reasonable for an officer to
suspect that it may contain illegal aliens hidden in the trunk.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1243.
267. 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979).
268. Id. at 506.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 507. Only two vehicles meeting the officers' profile passed by their patrol car,
the defendants' camper and another vehicle. Only the defendants' camper returned travel-
ing eastward. Moreover, it returned Within the alloted time the officers presumed it would
take to reach the pick up area for the illegals, load them and then return. Id. at 509-10
(Chambers, J., dissenting). Thus, it is arguable that the officers had the requisite particular-
ized suspicion necessary for a stop.
271. Id. at 508. It may be difficult to reconcile Cortez with Hernandez-Gonzales. But a
key difference between the two may lie in the fact that in Hernandez-Gonzales, the officers'
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
An additional method of enforcement is the fixed checkpoint sta-
tion.272 The leading Supreme Court decision dealing with this proce-
dure is United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,73 in which the Supreme
Court upheld stops for brief questioning when routinely conducted at
permanent checkpoints, absent any individualized suspicion that the
vehicles contained illegal aliens.274 Any further detention must be sup-
ported by either probable cause or a founded suspicion.275 However, a
search of vehicles may not be conducted at a checkpoint station unless
it is based on probable cause or consent.276
This rule regarding checkpoint searches was reaffirmed by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Patacchia,27 in which the court inval-
idated a search of defendants' car conducted by border patrol agents at
the San Clemente Border Patrol checkpoint station.278 After a prelimi-
nary determination by the border patrol officer, defendants were re-
ferred to a secondary inspection area where inquiries into their
nationality and identification were made.279 During this inspection an
agent observed several factors which he felt were highly suspicious.
280
suspicions were focused specifically on the defendant, whereas in Cortez the suspicions were
focused on a class of activities that fit a particular profile. As the testimony of the officers in
Cortez revealed, the officers had no reason to believe that those particular defendants were
involved in criminal activity. But the validity of this distinction is questionable. In a rather
strong dissent, Judge Chambers concluded that the founded suspicion test had clearly been
satisfied. In support of that conclusion, he criticized the majority's failure to take into ac-
count the officers' vast experience in detecting illegal aliens (one officer had been on this
patrol for nine years), in assessing whether or not a founded suspicion existed. Experience is
a factor that was expressly considered by the Court in Brignoni-Ponce. See note 260 supra.
Looking at the totality of circumstances and viewing them in light of the officers' experience,
the dissent stated: "I fail to see that suspicion, based on this sort of skillful police analysis
can be called 'unfounded' within the test of Brignoni-Ponce." Id. at 511 (Chambers, J.,
dissenting).
272. Stopping vehicles at permanent traffic checkpoints near the border has been held to
be permissible absent probable cause or a reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, the occupants
may be referred to a secondary area for brief questioning as to their immigration status,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 563. In distinguishing the checkpoint method from the roving patrol the Court
focused upon the fact that a stop at the checkpoint station was subjectively less intrusive.
The Court concluded: "Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and
their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other
vehicles are being stopped. . . [thus] he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by
the intrusion." Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)).
275. 428 U.S. at 567.
276. Id.
277. 602 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1979).
278. Id. at 219.
279. Id.
280. The factors relied upon by the agent included: (1) defendants' nervousness; (2) de-
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Based upon those observations the occupants were removed from the
car, the car was searched, and marijuana was uncovered. 28' The court
stated that even though the issue was close, "[w]hat is lacking is the
fact or two necessary to convert a strong hunch into probable cause.
282
Absent probable cause, Martinez-Fuerte will not sanction searches at
checkpoint stations.283
In United States v. Perez-Esparza284 the Ninth Circuit invalidated
the search of an automobile after the driver was referred to a secondary
checkpoint station. In Perez-Esparza, DEA agents relying upon an in-
formant's tip were alerted to the fact that a specifically identified vehi-
cle was being used to smuggle drugs illegally into the United States
from Mexico. 285 Due to a computer failure, the described vehicle
passed through the border crossing undetected. However, the next
morning the vehicle was stopped at the San Clemente checkpoint and
was referred to a secondary inspection area where the defendant was
detained approximately two and one-half hours until DEA agents ar-
rived.286 After being given a Miranda warning, the defendant con-
sented to a search of his vehicle. The agents found cocaine hidden in a
headlight.287
The Ninth Circuit found that the initial detention by the border
agents was proper, as it was supported by a reasonable suspicion. 88
However, relying on Dunaway v. New York,289 the court held that the
three hour delay between the initial stop and the search amounted to
an arrest for which probable cause was required. In examining the
facts, the court concluded that probable cause was absent as the in-
formant's tip did not satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
290
fendants' automobile which was similar to those often used to smuggle illegal aliens; (3) the
vehicle had no front license plates; (4) the vehicle had heavy duty shocks; (5) the car was
riding low in the rear, (6) one defendant claimed that he did not have a key to the trunk
when he was asked to open the trunk; and (7) defendants' impatience after the detention was
prolonged. Id. at 220.
281. Id. at 219.
282. Id. at 220.
283. Id. at 218-19 n.l.
284. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
285. Id. at 1285.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1285, 1286.
289. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). For discussion of this case see notes 334-42 infra and accompa-
nying text.
290. For a discussion of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, see notes 81-87 supra and accompanying
text.
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I. Stop of the Person with Less Than Probable Cause
Although the United States Constitution requires probable cause
to justify an arrest, it demands less to validate a "stop and frisk."
291
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio292 recognized that
"law enforcement officers [need] to protect themselves and other pro-
spective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable
cause for an arrest, '293 and held that officers may conduct a protective
search for weapons when "a reasonably prudent man in the circum-
stances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger." '294 To satisfy this standard, suspicion must be based on
specific articulable facts suggesting impending or recent criminal vio-
lence.2 95 Given this limited purpose, the search is restricted to actions
which are necessary to discover weapons on the suspect.
296
1. The United States Supreme Court
In Terry, the Supreme Court restricted its focus to the frisk and
declined to establish constitutional prerequisites for an investigative
stop based on less than probable cause.2 97 Paradoxically, it had formu-
lated a constitutional standard for a pat-down but not for the initial
stop. The Supreme Court filled this gap in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce298 when it adopted a reasonable suspicion standard for vehicle
stops made by the Federal Border Patrol: "Officers on roving patrol
291. "Stop and frisk" as used here denotes a pre-investigative stop made by a peace of-
ficer usually on a public street where the officer conducts a cursory search for weapons by
"patting down" the suspect's outer clothing.
292. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
293. Id at 24. While much of law enforcement work is reactive, officer initiated activity
such as pedestrian questioning and vehicle stopping is a regular feature of police efforts,
Because "American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this
country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are
wounded," the Court sought to recognize constitutional protection of police officers while
engaged in these activities. Id at 23.
294. Id at 27.
295. The Court declared that reasonableness is not supported by the officer's "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but ... [by] the specific reasonable inferences
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Id
296. The Court stated that "[tihe sole justification of the search in the present situation is
the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer." Id at 29.
297. The standard formulated in the Terry opinion relates to the frisk component of the
"stop and frisk." The limits of other pre-arrest investigations, e.g., detention and interroga-
tion, were not considered. The stop, of course, may or may not be accompanied by a frisk.
Id. at 19 n.16.
298. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably war-
rant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in
the country. ' 2 9 9 Although Brignoni-Ponce concerned the Border Patrol
and undocumented aliens, the Court extended the standard, originally
applied to frisks in Terry, to detentions for brief investigative question-
ing. To make a valid stop, the investigating officer must have a reason-
able suspicion that the suspect was recently, presently, or soon to be
involved in a crime. A subsequent frisk may be made only for weapons
and only if the investigating officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect threatens the officer's safety or that of others by carrying a
weapon.
The Court in Brown v. Texas,3" decided in June 1979, unani-
mously applied the Brignoni-Ponce standard to find the detention of a
pedestrian unconstitutional. The Court reaffirmed the narrowness of
the exception to the probable cause requirement. It held that presence
in an area characterized by frequent criminal activity is not sufficient to
meet the reasonable suspicion standard for detention of a suspect for
the purpose of requiring him to identify himself.
3°1
Petitioner had been convicted of violating a statute which made it
a crime to refuse to identify oneself when requested to do so by a po-
liceman. Prior to this request, officers "observed appellant and another
man walking in opposite directions away from one another in an al-
ley,"'30 2 apparently after sighting the patrol car. It appeared to the of-
ficers that the two men were about to meet until they saw the car. One
officer approached and asked appellant to identify himself and explain
his presence. The officer testified that the stop was made because the
situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen that subject in the
area before. 30 3 The area was characterized by a "high incidence of
drug traffic."' 3° After appellant refused to identify himself, the officer
frisked and arrested him.3 5
The Supreme Court reversed petitioner's conviction, noting that
the "Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on spe-
cific, objective facts" differentiating the suspect from the typical pedes-
trian, or it "must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
299. Id at 884.
300. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
301. Id at 52.
302. Id at 48.
303. Id at 49.
304. Id
305. Id
19801
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neutral limitations on the individual officers."3 6 Thus, in Brown, the
Court more clearly defined the character of activity necessary to meet
the Brignoni-Ponce reasonable suspicion standard. Neither the fact
that a person "looks suspicious" nor that a person is observed in a high
crime area is sufficient.30 7
2. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Cortez,3 °0 decided nearly three months prior to
Brown, the Ninth Circuit reversed convictions for knowing transporta-
tion of undocumented aliens because the stop was made on less than a
reasonable suspicion. Immigration officers had developed a suspect
profile which included a specific class of vehicles traveling west past an
observation point and returning within a certain time. After determin-
ing that appellant matched the profile, the officers stopped him. The
court concluded that the general basis of the stop did not fulfill the
reasonable suspicion requirement. 0 9
While articulable facts were assembled to generate a suspect pro-
file, none pointed specifically to the detained suspects. By not showing
particular individual suspicion, the officers failed to meet the essential
requirement of the reasonable suspicion test developed in Terry and
Brignoni-Ponce. That requirement had been emphasized by the Ninth
Circuit in 1975, when it noted that "[f]ounded suspicion requires some
reasonable ground for singling out the person stopped as one who was
involved. . . in criminal activity. ' 310 The Ninth Circuit's formulation
and application of the reasonable suspicion standard in Cortez comport
with the Supreme Court and prior Ninth Circuit cases.
Relying primarily on Terry, the Ninth Circuit also applied the rea-
sonable suspicion standard to a vehicle stop in United States v. Cla-
306. Id at 51.
307. Id at 51-52.
308. 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2983 (1980).
309. Id at 508. The Ninth Circuit had defined "founded suspicion" as "some basis from
which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing" before
Terry and Brignoni-Ponce in Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966). Later, it
had found no substantial difference between the "founded suspicion" standard and the "rea-
sonable suspicion" test. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 977 (1976).
310. 595 F.2d at 508 (quoting United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239, 241
(1975)). The court elaborated, stating that "there must be something at least in the activities
of the person being observed or in his surroundings that affirmatively suggests a particular
criminal activity." 595 F.2d at 508 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
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baugh,3 " decided in 1979. There, the court used the same test
developed in Brignoni-Ponce and Brown v. Texas but derived it inde-
pendently from Terry.
In Clabaugh, police officers spotted a known narcotics user-bur-
glar and three companions cruising a motel district. They briefly fol-
lowed the vehicle but terminated the surveillance when they were
recognized. On the following day, the officers again observed the four
suspects and surveilled them while they appeared to "case" several mo-
tels. When appellant entered a motel office while his companions sat in
the car, the officers flashed their spotlight and approached the vehicle.
They subsequently spotted a gun in the car which led to the convictions
of appellant and his companions for two prior bank robberies.'1 2 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling that the stop was justified
by the officers' observations.313
The factual context of Clabaugh is somewhat analogous to that of
Terry. In Terry, an experienced officer observed three men apparently
casing a store in preparation to rob it. In Clabaugh the officers surveil-
led a known burglar-narcotics user and his companions for two days
and stopped their vehicle after observing them case several motels. The
intrusiveness of the stop was minimal. The intrusion in Clabaugh was
simply the shining of a spotlight on the suspects' vehicle and approach-
ing it to briefly detain the suspects for questioning. In Terry, the pre-
frisk intrusion was halting the walking suspect and momentarily de-
taining him for questioning. Since the stop in Cortez was characterized
easily as a Terry-type intrusion, the crucial issue was reasonable suspi-
cion.
As in Terry, the specific facts identified by the officers were suffi-
cient to justify their suspicion. They included 1) the "casing" behavior
of the suspects; 2) the criminal record of one of the suspects; and 3) the
fact that the suspects were observed in a high crime area. The court did
not specify how significant each fact was to the finding of reasonable
suspicion. The significant fact, however, in the context of Terry and
Brown seems to be the "casing" behavior of the suspects.3 14 Such be-
311. 589 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1979).
312. Id. at 1021.
313. Id at 1022.
314. The court was less than explicit in specifying which observations were determinative.
It merely noted that on the first day "Officer Birney recognized the fourth man, Coughlin,
whom he had previously arrested twice and knew as a narcotics user and convicted burglar."
Id at 1021. The Court later noted that the suspects appeared to case the motels, and that
"[t]he officers knew that Coughlin lived in the 'Saugas, Newhall area' and that San Fer-"
nando Road was an area of frequent burglaries and narcotics trafficking." Id at 1021-22.
1980]
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW V
havior is discrete, associated with a particular crime and is alone suffi-
cient to raise reasonable suspicion.315
On the other hand, neither the suspect's prior criminality nor his
presence in an area characterized by a high crime rate was determina-
tive. Past criminality is a status, not specific behavior portending crimi-
nal activity, and, while presence in a particular area is activity, the
Supreme Court expressly discounted its significance in Brown v.
Texas. 316 At most, the suspect's background and his appearance in the
high crime area reasonably reinforced the suspicions initially evoked
by the officers' observations of "casing" behavior.
The Ninth Circuit found reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle
suspected of carrying undocumented aliens based on considerably
fewer facts in United States v. Munoz? 17 In Munoz the court held that
two vehicles "traveling in tandem on a hot summer day, one with a
child in the front between two adults in bucket seats" does not justify a
vehicle stop. 318 The apparent Latin heritage of the occupants and
"[t]he failure of the occupants to look at the agents [add] little to the
case." 319 After the illegal status of the occupants of the first vehicle was
discovered, however, the officers had reasonable suspicion that the sec-
ond vehicle also carried illegal aliens, "given the fair inference that
they were traveling in tandem. '320 Because, under the United States
Constitution, one may not vicariously assert a third person's fourth
amendment rights in this context, the court's conclusion is sound.32'
In United States v. Post322 the Ninth Circuit reiterated the reason-
able suspicion test and found adequate grounds for a stop based on the
following observations: 1) one suspect "paced the length of the airport,
tightly holding a brief case"; 2) he met a second suspect, appellant, who
purchased two one-way tickets to Los Angeles; 3) appellant's first initial
The court subsequently concluded that "[sipecific, articulable facts were shown below." Id
at 1022. The court also noted that just prior to observing the suspects on the second day the
officers were apprised of a robbery by three men five miles away. This fact was significant
because the suspects were subsequently convicted of that robbery. It did not, however, con-
tribute to the officers' suspicion: "Although the appellants proved to be the same robbers,
the stop was based on the officers' suspicion that a motel robbery was occurring." d at
1021.
315. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 28.
316. 99 S.Ct. at 2641.
317. 604 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
318. Id at 1161.
319. Id
320. Id
321. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141-42, 148, 150 (1978) (one who has no expectation
of privacy in an object or area cannot vicariously assert another's fourth amendment rights).
322. 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979).
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and last name corresponded to those of a known narcotics trafficker
from the area; and 4) the behavior matched a judicially recognized pro-
file of the activity of narcotics traffickers.323 That this array of facts
amounts to reasonable suspicion is readily apparent. Thus, discrete ob-
servations of generally typical behavior associated with criminal activ-
ity combined to form an adequate basis for a stop.
In United States v. Perez-Esarza,24 the Ninth Circuit upheld as
not clearly erroneous the lower court's finding that a tip from a reliable
informant identifying a vehicle, which was being used to smuggle nar-
cotics across the border, by description and license plate, justified stop-
ping the vehicle at an interior Border Patrol checkpoint.325  The
informant was reliable, having given accurate information to Drug En-
forcement Administration agents "on 20 to 25 separate occasions.'
'3 26
Reports from such an informant are enough to raise reasonable suspi-
cion if the reported activity is criminal.3 27 Like the decision in Cortez,
the court's holding in Perez-Esparza was a routine application of the
"specific articulable facts" test and is consistent with previous author-
ity.
In United States v. Chamberlin,s28 the Ninth Circuit routinely ap-
plied the reasonable suspicion standard to uphold the stopping of a
pedestrian on a public street. A police officer had observed appellant
and his companion, who were known by the officer as persons "with
extensive criminal records for narcotics violations, receipt of stolen
property, forgery and burglary. 3 29 As he drove by, the officer noticed
both suspects quicken their pace, and when he returned about a minute
later, they attempted to flee. The court found that when the suspects
fled, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain them. 3 °
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically considered the
significance of flight as a suspicious factor, it is clear that in the context
323. Id at 849, 850 n.3.
324. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
325. Id at 1285-86.
326. Id at 1285.
327. Id. at 1285. E.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-47 (1972) (police officer's
removal of a gun from petitioner's waistband after a reliable informant related at the scene
that petitioner was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist was constitutionally permis-
sible); United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
974 (1977) (Border Patrol agent validly stopped suspected illegal alien based upon informa-
tion provided by a local resident).
328. 609 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1979).
329. Id at 1320.
330. Id The court noted that "the flight of both men is a crucial fact which justified the
stop." Id at 1321. Accord, United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977).
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of Chamberlin, a reasonable person would interpret such a response as
indicative of criminal activity, at least to the extent that further inquiry
is warranted. This is all that the fourth amendment requires.
. Detention of the Person With Less Than Probable Cause
1. The United States Supreme Court
In Terry and Brignoni-Ponce the Supreme Court identified the cir-
cumstances which are necessary before a stop and/or frisk may be initi-
ated. Although the permissible scope of a frisk was delimited in Terry,
the permissible scope of the detention based on reasonable suspicion
remained an open question.33 1 The Ninth Circuit considered this issue
in United States v. Chatman332 in 1977 where it held that founded sus-
picion that appellant was engaged in illegal narcotics transportation
justified an order requiring appellant to walk to a private interrogation
room.333 The Supreme Court broke its silence on this question in June
1979. Raising doubts about the validity of Chatman, the Court held in
Dunaway v. New York 3 34 that a detention for interrogation with less
than probable cause was unconstitutional.
In Dunaway, officers took petitioner into custody without probable
cause. They requested that he accompany them to the police station
331. In Terry, the scope of the seizure was confined to a pat-down. The Court decided
"nothing ... concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less
than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation." 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that "[a] brief
stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status
quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the
facts known to the officer at the time."
332. 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
333. Id at 567. A DEA officer approached appellant in a public airport, directed him to
an "interview" room, and ordered him to remove his trousers (appellant had tried to conceal
a bulge in his pocket on the way to the room). The bulge turned out to be narcotics. The
court predicated its justification of the search on probable cause and consequently did not
consider the permissible extent of an interrogation based on reasonable suspicion. For a
discussion of the court's poor analysis leading to this determination of probable cause, see
id at 568-72 (Takasugi, J., dissenting). The Chatman court permitted a much greater intru-
sion than that seemingly allowed by the Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New York, 99 S.Ct.
2248 (1979) (see discussion at notes 334-42 infra and accompanying text). Because the issue
was clouded with the analytically confusing probable cause determination, it is unclear how
far beyond Dunaway the Chatman decision went. Chatman's significance lies in the fact that
the court without any precedential justification read into the Terry exception an intrusion
much greater than a frisk (direction to go to a private room for interrogation). Cf. United
States v. Salter, 521 F.2d 1326, 1328-29 (6th Cir. 1975) ("We. . . see nothing wrong in...
asking [a suspect] to step into the baggage room, a place more convenient for interrogation
than an open platform. .. ").
334. 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979).
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but did not tell him he was under arrest. Had petitioner attempted to
leave, however, the officers would have physically restrained him.
During subsequent interrogation, he incriminated himself.3 35 The
Court held that taking petitioner into custody and transporting him to
the police station constituted an arrest and required probable cause. 6
The state had argued that petitioner had voluntarily accompanied
the officers to the station and therefore had not been seized.337 If, how-
ever, petitioner had been seized, the state contended that the seizure
was constitutionally permissible "because the police had a 'reasonable
suspicion' that petitioner possessed 'intimate knowledge about a serious
and unsolved crime.' "338
The Court's rejection of the first contention is unassailable. The
request by police that petitioner accompany them to the station was
backed by an implicit but persuasive threat of coercion. The imposing
presence of uniformed police officers precluded consideration of the
"request" as anything but an order.339
The Court's further classification of the seizure as an arrest follows
given the transportation and interrogation of petitioner. It differed
from a formal arrest only in that officers did not verbally declare what
was apparent: that petitioner was under arrest.
3 40
The Court's conclusion is also analytically sound in terms of the
Terry frisk exception to the probable cause requirement. That excep-
tion is designed to meet the exigent need for officer safety and allows
only a momentary intrusion. In Dunaway petitioner was detained for
criminal investigation for an extended period.
Thus, Dunaway answered in large part the question remaining
after Terry and Brignoni-Ponce. Seizures for custodial questioning
must be supported with probable cause.3 4 ' Two factors emerge which
335. Id at 2251.
336. Id at 2258.
337. Id at 2253 n.6. The county court had found that petitioner had been taken into
custody and transported involuntarily. Id at 2252.
338. Id at 2254 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 10).
339. The Court observed that petitioner had been "taken involuntarily to the police sta-
tion." Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2253 (1979). In so doing, the Court recog-
nized that police authority asserted in the request created for the suspect a perceived legal
obligation to comply (the detaining officers had also testified that they would have forced
petitioner to accompany them to the police station if he had refused). Id n.6.
340. 99 S. Ct. at 2256.
341. Id at 2256. The Dunaway Court relied on the following language: "The officer may
question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he
may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but anyfurther detention or search must be
basedon consent orprobable cause. " Id (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
at 881-82) (emphasis in original). Accord, Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (finger-
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appear to render an investigative detention an arrest: 1) a request by
officers that the suspect submit to restrictions of his liberty which are
greater than those incurred during on-the-street questioning or a frisk
(ie. custodial interrogation); 2) a reasonably perceived legal obligation
to comply with the police officers' request. Compliance with this re-
quest is involuntary and triggers fourth amendment protection?42
2. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Post,343 decided four months after Dunaway,
the Ninth Circuit ostensibly distinguished the Dunaway decision and
held that a request by an identified DEA agent that appellant accom-
pany investigators to an interrogation room was permissible when
based upon reasonable suspicion.344 The agent confronted appellant at
the airport after eighteen hours of surveillance yielded several observa-
tions which created reasonable suspicion that appellant was smuggling
narcotics into the country. After asking appellant to accompany him to
an interrogation room, the agent escorted appellant and his companion
into an elevator and down a hall to the police station.345 He then took
appellant to an interview room and searched and questioned him there.
During the search, the agent found bags of cocaine on each of appel-
prints suppressed as unconstitutionally seized when petitioner was one of a group of suspects
questioned and fingerprinted on the basis of a general description of the assailant). The
Davis Court acknowledged that fingerprinting may take place on less than probable cause,
but that "no attempt [was] made.., to employ procedures which might comply with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. . . and petitioner was not merely fingerprinted
. . . but also finterrogated." Id. at 727-28.
342. In Dunaway, petitioner's compliance with the officers' request was constructively in-
voluntary. 99 S.Ct. at 2253 n.6 (petitioner's experience did not appreciably differ from that
of an arrestee). The Court also quoted A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraingment Procedure
§ 2.01(3) and commentary, at 91 (Tentative Draft No. 1 1966): "request to come to police
station 'may easily carry an implication of obligation, while the appearance itself, unless
clearly stated to be voluntary, may be an awesome experience for the ordinary citizen."' Id
(emphasis added). To consider compliance with an officer's request as voluntary is a denial
of common experience. The ordinary citizen typically defers to police authority. This is
implicit in Terry and subsequent cases. Under these cases, fourth amendment protection is
triggered by "intrusion[s] upon the sanctity of the person." Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. This
requires involuntariness; if citizen response to police requests in Terry situations were volun-
tary, there conceptually is no intrusion. That the request escalates to require the citizen to
submit to much more than a Terry frisk, as it did in Dunaway, eliminates neither the invol-
untariness of the response nor fourth amendment protection. In Dunaway, the Court
equated the arrest of petitioner with that of petitioner in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975), who was handcuffed after officers had drawn their guns and informed him that he
was under arrest. 99 S.Ct. at 2258 & n.17.
343. 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979).
344. Id at 851.
345. Id at 848-49.
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lant's legs.3 46
The Ninth Circuit noted that Dunaway held "that custodial ques-
tioning must be supported by probable cause. . . [but] [t]he holding
that the detention was unlawful was based on the determination by two
lower courts, that Dunaway went involuntarily to the police station."
347
Since the lower court made no specific finding of involuntariness and
the record disclosed conflicting evidence on the issue, the court found
for the state, which had prevailed below.348 The Ninth Circuit thus
concluded that the interview was voluntary and therefore not incident
to a seizure. The court relied on the uncertain authority of United
States v. Chatman34 9 and represented that decision as holding that "if
an officer is justified in stopping a person for questioning the stop does
not become an arrest, if, without coercion, the officer directs that the
questioning occur in a less public place.
350
In basing its conclusion on the absence of a finding of coercion by
the trial court, the Ninth Circuit completely ignored the discussion in
Dunaway concerning the involuntariness inherent in confrontations be-
tween law enforcement officers and suspects of criminal activity.
35 1
Furthermore, although the Ninth Circuit concluded that appellant's re-
sponse was voluntary, it attempted to justify the scope of the stop after
the "consent" occurred.352 If appellant's response was indeed consen-
sual, there was no further intrusion to justify. The court appeared to
treat the entire encounter as a seizure and justified isolation of appel-
lant for questioning by citing the state's interest in protecting the public
from the consequences of surprise encounters between officers and sus-
pects of crime.35 3
The factual similarity between Post and Dunaway is apparent.
3 5 4
346. Id at 849. Appellant claimed he had been constructively arrested "when they seized
him and took him to the interrogation room." Id at 850. Dunaway supports this conten-
tion, but the Post court ignored the Supreme Court's extensive discussion of involuntariness.
347. Id at 851.
348. Id
349. 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977). See note 333 supra. To the extent that Chatman per-
mits transporting a suspect for subsequent interrogation based on reasonable suspicion, it is
out of line with Dunaway. See note 341 supra.
350. 609 F.2d at 851.
351. See 99 S.Ct. at 2253 n.6.
352. 609 F.2d at 851 n.5.
353. Id
354. The circumstances in Dunaway and Post do differ, however, in some respects. Peti-
tioner in Dunaway was contacted at a residence and transported by automobile to the police
station. Appellant in Post was approached in a public airport and escorted to a private
room. The issue is whether the intrusiveness of appellant's seizure in Post is minimal, as in
Terry and BrIgnoni-Ponce, or substantial, as in Dunaway.
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In Post, as in Dunaway, a law enforcement officer briefly questioned
the suspect where he was first encountered and asked him to accom-
pany the officer to another location for further questioning. Analogous
to petitioners' in Dunaway, appellant in Post was under an apparent
compulsion to comply. This is precisely the type of situation referred
to by the Supreme Court when it recognized that a detention need not
be accompanied by all of the formalities of a conventional arrest to
require probable cause. 355 That appellant in Post was escorted to an
interrogation room in the same building where he was contacted does
not seem to reduce the stop to a Terry-type seizure. A Terry-type stop
involves only momentary delay and brief inquiry.356 In Post, appellant
was requested to leave the airport area and submit to a search and
questioning in private.
A closer reading of Dunaway by the Ninth Circuit might have led
to a different result in Post. Appellant was seized when the agent asked
him to go to the interrogation room and he complied. The question
then became whether such a seizure was an investigative stop or a cus-
todial arrest. According to Dunaway, transporting a defendant to an-
other location for interrogation requires probable cause.357 In Post,
however, the court found that the agent had only reasonable suspi-
cion. There is no authority for the proposition that the interest in
protecting the public from surprise encounters between law enforce-
ment agents and suspects of crime eliminates this requirement of prob-
able cause. Accordingly, the detention of appellant should have been
held unconstitutional.
In addition, the decision in Post conflicts with three recent Ninth
Circuit decisions which comport with Dunaway.359 In United States v.
Beck,36 ° the court classified a detention an arrest when a vehicle was
forcibly stopped and its occupants, including appellant, were ques-
tioned and searched at the scene. The court applied a reasonable per-
son standard, observing that "the dimensions of an encounter between
355. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a Sixth Circuit case in which one of the
issues was constructive involuntariness. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706 (6th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 42 (1979) (invalidated airport searches of suspects
who are stopped and asked to go to a private room).
356. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (detention for investigatory pur-
poses absent probable cause is unreasonable).
357. 99 S.Ct. at 2258.
358. 607 F.2d at 850.
359. United States v. Chamberlin, No. 79-1076 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 1979) (post-Dunaway);
United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Beck, 598
F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979) (pre-Dunaway).
360. 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the individual and officer may be sufficiently constrictive to cause the
average person, innocent of crime, to reasonably think that he was be-
ing arrested."36'
In Beck, four government vehicles boxed appellant's taxi to a stop
and several agents escorted appellant and his companions from their
vehicle and interrogated them in isolation. The agents subsequently
searched appellant and arrested him for possession of cocaine and her-
oin, and with intent to distribute the heroin.
362
The court rejected the contention that the stop of the taxi was a
mere "stop" governed by the reasonable suspicion standard. It con-
cluded that the excessive force used would have induced the ordinary
citizen, innocent of criminal activity, to conclude that he was being ar-
rested.363 In so concluding, the court's primary consideration was "the
extent that freedom of movement is curtailed. ' ' 364 This is clearly con-
sistent with the delineation in Dunaway between a brief stop and a
more intrusive investigative detention.365
The Ninth Circuit applied Dunaway in United States v. Perez-Es-
parza to reverse the conviction of appellant for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute.366 After Border Patrol agents stopped peti-
tioner at the border checkpoint, they detained him for two and one-half
hours to await the arrival of DEA agents who were to interrogate
hiM.3 6 7 When the agents arrived, they advised appellant of his Mi-
randa rights, explained "he was being detained because the agents sus-
pected narcotics were being transported in his car, and told that the
agents were in the process of obtaining a search warrant. 3 68 Appellant
subsequently consented to a search which led to the discovery of the
cocaine.
The court's application of Dunaway in Perez-Esparza contrasts
361. Id at 500. The Ninth Circuit adopted a reasonable person standard for defining an
arrest in Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969). This test was applied gener-
ally in analyzing seizures of the person. Eg., United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1029
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975) and Taylor v. Arizona, 471 F.2d 848, 851-52
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973).
362. 598 F.2d at 499-500.
363. Id at 502.
364. Id at 500.
365. The purpose of the stop is also given weight by the court in Beck: "Utilization of
force in making a stop will not convert the stop into an arrest if it occurs under circum-
stances justifying fears for personal safety." Id at 501 (citing United States v. Russell, 546
F.2d 839, 840 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., concurring)). This is consistent with the approach
in Terry of balancing the intrusiveness of the action against protection of the police officer.
366. 609 F.2d at 1285.
367. Id at 1291.
368. Id at 1285.
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with the restrictive view of Dunaway taken in Post. The factual context
of Perez-Esparza is similar to that of Post and its language suggests
that had the same panel heard Post, the case would have been decided
differently.
In Perez-Esparza, as in Post, appellant was being investigated for
narcotics trafficking. And like Post, he was detained and taken to an
office for interrogation. However, there were differences. In Post, the
appellant's person was searched for weapons and narcotics were found.
In Perez-Esparza, appellant's vehicle was searched after he "volunta-
rily" permitted agents to do so. That appellant in Post was not de-
tained as long as appellant in Perez-Esfparza (two and one-half hours)
is arguably determinative of the different results in the two cases. How-
ever the court's language in Perez-Esparza does not indicate this. The
court noted that
[t]he Court held in Dunaway that 'detention for custodial in-
terrogation. . . intrudes so severely on interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the tradi-
tional safeguards against illegal arrest. . . .' The detention in
this case, like that in Dunaway, was for the purpose of custo-
dial interrogation . . . [and] clearly falls within the broad
Dunaway language and is valid only if supported by probable
cause.
3 69
In United States v. Chamberlin,370 the Ninth Circuit applied the
rule of Dunaway, and reached a result inconsistent with that in Post.
On the basis of reasonable suspicion, an officer stopped and questioned
appellant. He then required appellant to get in the back of the patrol
car while he searched for appellant's companion who had fled upon the
officer's arrival. During his search, the officer obtained a check payable
to a third party that had been found in the area in which the suspects
were initially sighted. The officer returned to the patrol car and drove
369. Id at 1286-87. Despite the court's conclusion that Dunaway required probable
cause to support the detention in Perez-Esparza, it identified several "open questions:"
The fundamental issue here is the line of demarcation between a Terry "stop"
requiring only reasonable suspicion, and the "custodial interrogation" of Dunaway,
requiring probable cause. How many questions may a police officer ask a suspect
before the reach of Terry is exceeded? Can the police officer detain the suspect
pending a radio check with headquarters for confirmation of the suspect's identity
and determination whether arrest warrants are outstanding? If these detentions are
permissible, does Dunaway automatically govern as soon as the suspect is trans-
ported to the station? Or, may the police substitute station-house questioning for
that permissible on the scene, when the sole purpose is to facilitate questioning by
specialized and experienced personnel. .. or for other substantial reasons.
Id at 359 n.2. It seems that the question in Post is included in these "open questions."
370. No. 79-1076, slip op. at 1347 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 1979).
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appellant to the furniture store from which appellant had walked just
before being stopped. There the officer discovered that appellant had
attempted to cash the check earlier that day. He then arrested appel-
lant who was subsequently convicted of possession of a check stolen
from the mail. 7'
In reversing appellant's subsequent conviction for possession of a
check stolen from the mail, the Ninth Circuit correctly differentiated
between a stop, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and
a detention, which, under Dunaway, requires probable cause.372 Not-
ing that "[t]he Court in Dunaway drew a firm line between the limited
Terry stop, involving a very brief detention of a minute or so, and any
more extensive detention," the court concluded that "the twenty minute
detention of appellant constituted a 'detention for custodial interroga-
tion' within the meaning of Dunaway ....
The Ninth Circuit's emphatic adherence in Chamberlin to the
Supreme Court's insistence that a stop and frisk is a narrowly defined
exception to the probable cause requirement contrasts with the expan-
sive approach taken by the court in Post. In Chamberlin, the court
recognized the inherent coerciveness of an officer's request in an inves-
tigative context and focused on the real issue-the degree of the intru-
sion. "It is true," the court noted, "that the fact situation in Dunaway
constituted a more flagrant unlawful detention. . . . [The detention in
Chamberlin,] [h]owever, . . . is a significantly greater intrusion than
the brief Terry stop and the opinion in Dunaway makes it very clear
that [this seizure] . . . must be justified by probable cause.
'374
K Scope of the Frisk
A frisk based on reasonable suspicion must be limited to actions
which are necessary to discover weapons. 3 75 In United States v. Thomp-
son,376 the Ninth Circuit emphasized the narrow purpose for which a
371. Id at 1348-49.
372. Id at 1351.
373. Id at 1352.
374. Id As in Dunaway "[petitioner] was not questioned briefly where he was found
. [h]e was never informed that he was free to leave the car," and he was detained for
investigation. Id The court's conclusion in Chamberlin clearly follows from Dunaway.
Taken together, Dunaway and Chamberlin show that Post is an unreasoned aberration. The
confusion in the Ninth Circuit is magnified by the Post court's reference to Chatman as
sound case law. See notes 343-53 supra and accompanying text.
375. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29.
376. 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979).
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pat-down frisk is authorized and disallowed a search that continued
after the searching officer was satisfied that appellant was unarmed.
In Thompson, patrolling officers stopped appellant who had been
speeding, had rolled through a stop sign and whose vehicle had a bro-
ken taillight lens. Appellant was unable to produce a driver's license
but presented an envelope with his name on it. An officer routinely
377
frisked him while awaiting the outcome of a check for outstanding war-
rants. During the frisk, appellant kept reaching for his inside coat
pocket. After he ignored a command to cease reaching for his pocket,
the officer handcuffed him, checked the pocket, and discovered an en-
velope. The officer admitted that at this point he was not concerned
that the envelope might contain a weapon.378 Without appellant's per-
mission, he then removed the contents of the envelope and determined
that they were stolen checks. Appellant was convicted of possession of
items stolen from the mail after his motion to suppress the checks was
denied.
In reversing appellant's conviction, the Ninth Circuit found that
the stop was justified by appellant's vehicle code violations379 and that
the routine frisk380 and pocket search38' were reasonable. Nevertheless,
the court held that the further search of the envelope was unconstitu-
tional.38 2
While there is authority for the court's conclusion that the request
to exit the vehicle was reasonable following the valid stop,383 the valid-
ity of the routine frisk is questionable. In Terry, the court character-
ized a frisk as "a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished
personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating experience. ' 38 4 Consequently, specific facts must
indicate that officer safety is jeopardized before a frisk is allowed.85
Here there appeared to be none. The court stated that appellant's "in-
377. The officers testified that their actions were pursuant to standard departmental pro-
cedure which involved requesting the suspect to get out of his automobile, submit to a pat-
down for weapons, and sit in the police car during the "wants and warrants" check. Id at
189.
378. Id
379. Id at 189-90.
380. Id at 190.
381. Id at 191.
382. Id
383. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
384. 392 U.S. at 24-25. Accord, Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-55 (1979) ("Considera-
tion of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the -degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.").
385. See notes 294-95 supra and accompanying text.
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ability to produce adequate identification justified the request that he
get out of his car and sit in the police car." '386 The United States
Supreme Court opinion in Pennsylvania v. Mimms 387 is authority for
upholding the request that appellant get out of his car but not for the
subsequent frisk.3 88  In Thompson, the court mistakenly read into
Mimms authority for a routine pat-down incident to a valid stop dur-
ing which the suspect fails to produce identification and appears to be
violating a law requiring that drivers possess an operator's license while
driving.
3 89
Having determined the frisk was permissible, the court then con-
sidered the scope of the search. It concluded that the pocket search was
a limited intrusion designed to discover weapons and therefore consti-
tutional.390 This comports with the rule in Terry because appellant's
jacket was so bulky that it limited the effectiveness of a conventional
pat-down and since appellant "repeatedly tried to reach into his pocket
despite the officer's warning not to."
39 1
The court then held that the examination of the contents of the
envelope exceeded the scope of the frisk permitted under the fourth
amendment.392 Because the frisk was conducted to insure that the sus-
pect was unarmed, once the officer established that fact, he should have
stopped searching.393
This recognition of the narrow scope of a search conducted with
less than probable cause is well supported. Nevertheless, the fourth
386. 597 F.2d at 190.
387. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
388. In Mimms, the Court held that "the incremental intrusion resulting from the request
to get out of the car once the vehicle was lawfully stopped" need not be independently
justified. Id at 109, 111. A search followed the vehicle stop but was predicated on the
appearance of a bulge in petitioner's jacket which warranted reasonable suspicion that he
was armed. Id at 111-12.
389. It is unclear what weight, if any, the court accorded the fact that appellant's inability
to produce ati operator's license indicated that he was violating an Oregon law. In any
event, it alone certainly did not create reasonable suspicion that appellant was armed. There
is no "frisk incident to non-custodial detention" analogous to "search incident to arrest" and
absent reasonable suspicion, the frisk should have been held invalid. See United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227-28, 234 (1973) (frisks are designed to insure officer safety
whereas the purpose of the search incident-to-arrest is to prevent the loss of evidence.
Therefore different standards apply).
390. 597 F.2d at 191.
391. Id at 191. See also United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (officer's lifting up the shirt of a suspect who was stopped in the immediate vicinity
of a recent armed robbery to ascertain whether a bulge at suspect's waistband was a weapon
held constitutional).
392. 597 F.2d at 191.
393. Id
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amendment arguably prohibited even the removal of the envelope from
appellant's pocket.
In United States v. Gallop,3 94 the Ninth Circuit upheld a police
inventory of the personal effects of appellant and his companion who
were detained for detoxification under a noncriminal, protective cus-
tody statute.395 Prior to placing them in a holding cell, officers invento-
ried the contents of a "basket-type" bag carried by appellant's
companion and discovered syringes, pills and prescription bottles.
3 96
The officers arrested appellant and his companion for violation of state
narcotics laws and in a subsequent search found stolen money orders in
the bag and in appellant's wallet. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial
court which had ruled that the money orders taken from appellant's
wallet were inadmissible products of an illegal arrest because the initial
inventory of the bag was unreasonable.397 With questionable logic, the
court held that the constitutional justification for inventories of suspects
arrested for crime was equally applicable "to property taken under po-
lice protection when the owner of the property is 'detained' under po-
lice custody but not 'arrested'. "g398 That justification involved "three
distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains
in police custody; the protection of the police against claims or disputes
over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from po-
tential danger. '399 The court concluded that these needs are incident to
custody regardless of the pretext for such custody and held that inven-
tory of the bag was valid. To reach its conclusion, the court applied the
rule of South Dakota v. Opperman4 °° in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless inventory search of an im-
pounded vehicle. Notwithstanding the dubiousness of the "three dis-
tinct needs" 401 as applied to a vehicle inventory, the holding in Gallop
is generally unsupported. Since Opperman is an exception based on the
unique characteristics of automobiles and the relatively lower expecta-
tion of privacy with respect to one's automobile,402 it is difficult to ac-
394. 606 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1979).
395. Id at 837.
396. Id at 838.
397. Id
398. Id at 839.
399. Id at 838-39 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (routine
police inventory searches of impounded vehicles are permissible without a warrant)).
400. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See generally Note, The Final Word on Inventory Searches?
South Dakota v. Opperman, 26 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 834 (1977).
401. 428 U.S. 378-79 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); id at 389-92 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
402. Id. at 368.
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cept the court's unelaborated conclusion in Gallop. Surely one's
expectation of privacy with respect to one's wallet or handbag is sub-
stantial.
It is important to distinguish between a frisk based on reasonable
suspicion and a more extensive search based on probable cause devel-
oped during an initial investigation. In United States v. Orozco ,403 de-
cided by the Ninth Circuit in February, 1979, the court considered such
a distinction.
In Orozco, appellants contested convictions for possession of co-
caine and heroin with intent to distribute. The arrest occurred in the
early morning hours when sheriffs deputies observed one appellant
exit his car and throw an object over a retaining wall, apparently in
response to the approach of their patrol car. After the deputies stopped
to investigate, a second suspect exited another parked car and ap-
proached. One deputy retrieved a semi-automatic pistol from behind
the retaining wall. Another observed unusually large rolls of cash in
the second suspect's purse when she opened it to produce identification.
The deputies then noticed in plain view several packages labeled "coc"
or "coca" inside the first suspect's car. A search of the car revealed that
the packages contained heroin and cocaine. The deputies then arrested
appellants and conducted a thorough search of the vehicle, finding ad-
ditional heroin in a hidden compartment. The appellants contended
that the evidence seized from the vehicle was obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment and that their motion to suppress should have
been granted. 4°4
The court recognized that the initial investigative stop by the dep-
uties was supported by specific articulable facts arousing legitimate sus-
picion that illegal activity was occurring or contemplated.1 5 Under
this principle of founded suspicion, the observations made by the depu-
ties after the stop justified continued investigation, but not a search.
Further investigation led to probable cause which justified the subse-
quent warrantless search." 6
The decision in Orozco is not a true stop and frisk case. The ex-
ception recognized in Terry involved a pat-down search for one specific
reason-to check for weapons. The validating state interest was the
safety of police officers. In Orozco there was in fact no search until
probable cause had been established. The suspicious circumstances
403. 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1979).
404. Id at 791.
405. Id at 792-93.
406. Id at 793.
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which led to the investigatory stop were confirmed by subsequent ob-
servations made by the deputies. Retrieval of the pistol, observations
of the rolls of money, and discovery of the contraband in public view in
the car were all the results of observations made by the officers during
the course of routine questioning.
L. Search Incident to Arrest
In United States v. Spanier,40 7 decided in January 1977, the Ninth
Circuit recognized the validity of a search of a residence for additional
suspects, following an arrest outside of the house. Two suspects were
located at a residence after officers found a vehicle in front of the house
matching the description of one used in a recent robbery. As officers
approached the house, they observed a ski mask resembling one used
in the same robbery. After the officers surrounded the house, the sus-
pects exited and surrendered. Several officers went to obtain a search
warrant while others remained to guard the house. Prior to obtaining
the warrant, several officers entered the residence to look for additional
suspects. They observed smoking paper in the fire place but seized
nothing until the others returned with the warrant. Among the evi-
dence seized after the warrant was obtained were papers which the of-
ficers noticed during their pre-warrant check.408 Defendants contended
that the initial check for additional suspects was illegal because it was
not authorized by a warrant. The court rejected this argument and rec-
ognized the right of the officers to insure the safety of those involved by
accounting for all of the occupants of the residence.419
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on United States v. Mc-
Laughlin,4 1° which allows officers to preserve evidence by searching a
house to make sure that the premises are empty.4" I In the McLaughlin
case, law enforcement officers entered a residence with probable cause,
but without a warrant, to arrest several suspects inside who were "scuf-
fling" and possibly destroying evidence.4"2 The court noted that "to
delay the entry until the warrant was obtained involved a substantial
risk that evidence would be removed or destroyed and increased the
likelihood that innocent persons would be harmed or significantly in-
convenienced." '413
407. 597 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1977).
408. Id at 139.
409. Id at 140.
410. 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976).
411. 597 F.2d at 140.
412. 525 F.2d at 519.
413. Id at 521. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (an officer may search,
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In applying McLaughlin, the Spanier court noted that the officers
"had no reason to believe that the robbers were acting alone, or that
everyone connected with the crime had left the house." '414 In addition,
they had reason to believe evidence was being destroyed since smoke
and sparks were rising from the chimney.
Authority for the result in Spanier may be found in Vale v. Louisi-
ana415 where the Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search of a
residence when the suspect was arrested on the front porch. Prior to a
full search and immediately after the arrest, the officers conducted a
cursory search of the house for anyone present. Invalidating the full
search, the Court rejected the state's argument that exigent circum-
stances justified the search. It noted that "by their own account the
arresting officers satisfied themselves that no one else was in the house
when they first entered the premises [and conducted the cursory
search]. 416 One may read implicit approval of the initial cursory
search, however, since Vale was reversed on a different issue, and the
authority of Vale for the result in Spanier is uncertain.
The United States Supreme Court recently invalidated a search of
a bar pursuant to a warrant by applying the Terry standard to the
search of patrons not named in the warrant.417 Officers obtained a war-
rant to search a tavern and the bartender for heroin. During the subse-
quent search they frisked petitioner, a patron, pursuant to an Illinois
statute authorizing "law enforcement officers to detain and search any
person found on premises being searched pursuant to a search war-
rant. '4 18 The frisking officer "felt what he described as 'a cigarette
pack with objects in it.' ",419 He frisked the other patrons, returned to
petitioner, and removed the pack from his pocket. Subsequent exami-
nation revealed that the pack contained heroin.42 0
The trial court denied petitioner's motion to suppress the heroin
and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed and held the statute constitu-
tional as applied because petitioner was no "innocent stranger having
no connection whatever with the premises," because the location was a
without a warrant, an arrested suspect and the area within his immediate control, for self-
protection and preservation of evidence). The result in Spanier reflects this purpose but
allows a warrantless entry of the residence and a "cursory" search throughout the house.
414. 597 F.2d at 140.
415. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
416. Id at 34.
417. Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S.Ct. 338 (1979).
418. Id at 341.
419. Id
420. Id
19801
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one room bar, and because the heroin described in the warrant easily
could have been concealed.
42" '
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed petitioner's conviction.
The Court noted that "the agents knew nothing in particular about [pe-
titioner], except that he was present, along with several other custom-
ers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe
that the bartender would have heroin for sale." Thus, the Court held
that there was no probable cause for the initial frisk.422 Nor was the
search justified by a reasonable belief that petitioner was armed and
dangerous.42 In rejecting the state's argument that its interest in halt-
ing drug traffic and the ease with which narcotics may be concealed or
transferred from person to person justified the frisk, the Court returned
to the "narrow scope" of the Terry exception:
Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized
"cursory search for weapons" or indeed, any search whatever
for anything but weapons. The "narrow scope" of the Terry
exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be
frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises
where an authorized narcotics search is taking place. 24
When considered with the decisions in Dunaway, Brown v. Texas,
and Delaware v. Prouse,4 25 the Court's conclusion in Ybarra signals
continued jealous regard for the probable cause requirement. Thus, the
Terry pat-down rule remains a narrow exception to the fourth amend-
ment probable cause requirement which the Court appears to be justifi-
ably reluctant to expand.
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Right Against Self-incrimination
The right against self-incrimination4 26 does not attach solely to
421. Id
422. Id at 342.
423. Id "The initial frisk of [petitioner] was simply not supported by a reasonable belief
that he was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held
must form the predicate to a pat-down of a person for.weapons." Id
424. Id at 343-44.
425. 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (reasonable suspicion required for valid stop of an automobile in
order to check the driver's license or vehicle registration).
426. The fifth amendment provides that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
Vol. 13
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suspects under arrest on a criminal charge. Rather, it protects anyone
under interrogation in a custodial setting whose words may be used as
evidence in court.4 27 It has been enforced by means of such procedural
devices as Miranda warnings42 8 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure429 both of which are designed to insure that all answers made in
response to formal questioning are made voluntarily and without phys-
ical or psychological coercion.
4 30
Recent Ninth Circuit decisions have examined the right against
self-incrimination in terms of its applicability to voluntary statements,
its waiver, and its applicability in various judicial proceedings.
1. Voluntary statements made prior to Miranda warnings
In the decisions of United States v. Cornej043 1 and Phillps v. Attor-
ney General,432 the Ninth Circuit considered extending the privilege
against self-incrimination to statements which have been made volun-
tarily to police or other legal authorities as opposed to those given in
response to interrogation. Corneo involved the search of an apartment
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
427. Eg. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1965) ("the Fifth Amendment privilege
is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings
in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves").
428. Id. at 467-68.
[T]he Court [in Miranda] spelled out in detail the advice police must give suspects
in custody. The police must make known to the poor and the ignorant what is
more commonly known to the affluent and the informed. Suspects must be told of
their right to a lawyer and their right not to answer questions. And counsel must
be provided for the poor at the questioning stage. The suspect is entitled to counsel
from the time he is put in restraint-at the police station.
M. MELTZER, THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 94 (1972).
429. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. PROC. I l(d), which directs a trial judge to determine that a
defendant's guilty plea is voluntarily made before it is accepted.
430. Even before Miranda, the Supreme Court reversed convictions where confessions or
evidence was obtained from a suspect by means of physical violence. E.g., Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). However, Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the precursor to Miranda, was perhaps the first modem case
in which the Court recognized that psychological coercion could be as effective a tool for
extracting confessions as physical torture. Quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562
(1897), the Escobedo Court noted: "It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in
which the accused was when the statement was made to him. . . , the result was to produce
upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of
guilt. . . ." 378 U.S. at 485.
431. 598 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
432. 594 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979).
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in the course of a robbery investigation during which defendant
Cornejo was discovered hiding inside. Before he was taken to the po-
lice station, Cornejo voluntarily made statements to his captors which
were later used against him at trial. Cornejo later contested the admis-
sibility of his comments because he had not been issued Miranda warn-
ings. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Cornejo's statements were not
the products of coercion or interrogation and therefore were not enti-
tled to fifth amendment protection.433
Courts have consistently held that it is not necessary to give Mi-
randa warnings to those who volunteer statements.434 Therefore,
Cornejo merely demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit is in accord with
the prevailing view.43 ' Because Corejo's statements were not made in
response to interrogation but were volunteered, he could not claim fifth
amendment protections. Even if the statements had preceded the issu-
ance of Miranda warnings,43 6 they still would have been admissible as
evidence. The mere fact that statements were made to police does not
necessarily bring such statements under the purview of the fifth amend-
ment.
437
2. Miranda warnings
Even if proper Miranda warnings have been issued, a defendant
may still successfully challenge the admissibility of his statements if he
433. 598 F.2d at 557.
434. As the majority remarked in Miranda: "Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding to-
day." 384 U.S. at 478.
435. E.g., Pavao v. Cardwell, 583 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1978) (appellant's statement
made following a high speed chase which implicated him, but exonerated his wife in the
crime, was voluntary and did not require Miranda warnings); United States v. LaMonica,
472 F.2d 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1972) (since officer was asking routine questions regarding inven-
tory of defendant's personal effects, his response which revealed advanced planning of a
drug smuggling operation was a voluntary statement and did not require Miranda warn-
ings).
436. E.g., Pavao v. Cardwell, 583 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1978) (appellant's statement,
made immediately after he exited his car, was voluntary and did not require Miranda warn-
ings).
437. Had Cornejo contended that the presence of the police was particularly coercive or
confusing, he could have perhaps classified his otherwise voluntary statements as the invol-
untary products of psychological pressure. However, he challenged the admissibility of his
statements merely because they were made to police, not because he felt particularly ntimi-
dated by their presence. 598 F.2d at 557. Cf. Phillips v. Attorney General, 594 F.2d 1288,
1290-91 (9th Cir. 1979) (appellant's statement "[y]ou guys guess pretty good" which was
made after officers told him they suspected marijuana was inside his airplane was voluntary
and prior issuance of Miranda warnings was not required).
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can show that they were not made voluntarily.438 In addition, if a de-
fendant declines to talk after Miranda warnings have been issued and
his request is not honored, statements made in response to further in-
terrogation may be suppressed.439
This contention was raised in the Ninth Circuit case of United
States v. Boyce"' in which FBI agents arrested a defendant at his resi-
dence in Riverside, California. Boyce initially declined to sign a writ-
ten waiver of his Miranda rights, but talked freely to the agents about
personal matters during the one and one-half hour drive to Los Ange-
les. When he arrived at the FBI office, Boyce expressed his desire to
discontinue any further conversation. This request was immediately
honored. Later that day, Boyce was informed that his co-defendant
had been captured in Mexico. At this point he volunteered the state-
ment, "Let's talk."'441
On appeal of his conviction for espionage, Boyce claimed that the
FBI agents had violated his Miranda rights by continuing to converse
with him and ask questions after he had refused to sign the written
waiver.442 Had the agents failed to "scrupulously honor" Boyce's re-
quest to discontinue the conversation or his refusal to sign a waiver,
this would undoubtedly have been the case. 443 But until the time Boyce
had exclaimed "Let's talk," no direct interrogation had occurred.
4 44
The questions that were asked dealt with collateral personal matters.
445
In addition, Boyce's initial refusal to sign a waiver did not mean that he
had to maintain absolute silence or that interrogation could never re-
sume.446 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit properly affirmed the district
court's finding that the agents had scrupulously honored Boyce's re-
quest prior to the time of his waiver at the FBI office." 7
438. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390
U.S. 519, 521 (1968) (per curiam).
439. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975).
440. 594 F:2d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1965)).
444. 594 F.2d at 1250.
445. Id.
446. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975).
447. 594 F.2d at 1249, 1250. The situation in Boyce should be distinguished from one
where a suspect initially requests an attorney. In the latter case, interrogation cannot com-
mence until an attorney is present. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975); United
States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 489 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (Hufstedler, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
3. Waiver
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination may be
waived under certain circumstances. Three Ninth Circuit decisions
dealt with this issue in 1979. In United States v. Boyce, defendant
Boyce contested the voluntariness of his waiver of Miranda rights be-
cause of "psychological pressure."" 8 In making this claim Boyce at-
tempted to drawn an analogy to Brewer v Williams," 9 where
defendant had been subjected to the famous "Christian Burial Speech"
while riding in an automobile with two law enforcement officers.4a 0
The Ninth Circuit found Boyce's comparison unpersuasive for a
number of reasons. Brewer involved a sixth amendment waiver of
counsel, whereas Boyce's waiver involved his fifth amendment rights.
Evidently, the court viewed the interrogation of a suspect without the
requested representation of counsel with more suspicion than interro-
gation of a witness in violation of fifth amendment rights.
The court also noted that although the agents may have subjected
Boyce to emotional pressure by appealing to patriotic and family con-
siderations, the degree was minor compared to that exerted in
Brewer.451 In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on Boyce's
high level of intelligence and the fact that he selectively chose which
questions to answer.452 These factors were noticeably absent in Brewer
where defendant had a history of mental illness.45 3 Perhaps the deci-
sive fact was that "[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that [Boyce's] will
was in any respect overborne.
454
It is well settled that a waiver of Miranda rights must be "know-
ingly and intelligently" made.455 The degree of "intelligence" required
448. 594 F.2d at 1250.
449. 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977).
450. 594 F.2d at 1250.
451. Id. at 1251.
452. Id.
453. 430 U.S. at 392.
454. 594 F.2d at 1251.
455. The guidelines for determining whether a valid waiver has occurred were established
by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937), which involved waiver
of counsel. There the Court held that "[t]he determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver. . . must depend, in each case, [on various factors] including the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused."
However, the Supreme Court recently accepted the "implied waiver" of Miranda rights
in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). This theory had been adopted by the
Ninth Circuit and nine of the remaining ten circuits. Id. at 1758 n.5. E.g., United States v.
Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971).
The Court's decision would seem to fly in the face of the general idea that waivers must
be knowingly made, since an implied waiver by definition may be determined subjectively
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to validly waive such rights was at issue in the 1979 Ninth Circuit case
of United States v. Glover.456 Glover was arrested in connection with a
diamond theft. FBI agents presented Glover with a written waiver of
rights form which he allegedly understood and which he signed.457 On
the appeal of his conviction, Glover argued that he was incapable of
making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights because of his
substandard intelligence level. Evidence presented at a suppression
hearing revealed that he scored sixty-seven on an adult intelligence test,
was in the bottom one percentile, and had a first or second grade read-
ing comprehension level.458 Further testimony by the defense indi-
cated that Glover had a limited attention span and did not understand
a number of the terms on the waiver form.4 59
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged Glover's low mental ca-
pacity, it found that an intelligent waiver had been made primarily on
the strength of the defendant's previous experience with legal and crim-
inal procedures.460 The court was also influenced by the fact that the
evidence in support of Glover's substandard intelligence was not un-
controverted.46 '
The court's factual and legal conclusions appear to be questiona-
ble. Evidence was offered which indicated that a fifth or sixth grade
by the interrogator irrespective of the intent of the interrogatee. The dangers of such subjec-
tive analysis were enumerated by Justice Brennan in the Butler dissent: "Faced with 'actions
and words' of uncertain meaning, some judges may find waiver where none occurred.
Others may fail to find them where they did. In the former case, the defendant's rights will
have been violated; in the latter, society's interest in effective law enforcement will have
been frustrated." 441 U.S. at 378-79.
The Butler decision has already been explicitly refuted in a decision by the majority of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bussey, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979). That
court, relying on its supervisory power and the state constitution, refused to follow Butler
and held that a waiver of Miranda rights must be explicit. Id. at 1314.
456. 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 124 (1980).
457. Id. at 866.
458. Id. at 864-65. Glover's low intelligence apparently resulted from brain injuries suf-
fered during childhood. Id. at 865.
459. Id. at 865.
460. Id. at 866.
461. Id. In reaching this conclusion the court attempted to distinguish a Fifth Circuit
case, Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972), which found that two retarded teenag-
ers were incapable of giving an intelligent waiver. The Gover court noted that neither teen-
ager had previous criminal records and that the evidence offered as to their substandard
intelligence was uncontested. 596 F.2d at 866.
The court placed its principal reliance on United States v. Young, 355 F. Supp. 103
(E.D. Pa. 1973), where a defendant with an intelligence level slightly lower than that of
Glover's was found to have made a valid waiver. The Gloer court cited with approval
Young's similar reliance on the defendant's extensive criminal background. 596 F.2d at 866
(citing 355 F. Supp. at 111).
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reading level was necessary for proper comprehension of the waiver
form.4 62 Glover's first or second grade capacity would thus seem to be
clearly inadequate. It is also doubtful whether long term exposure to
the workings of the criminal process because of prior offenses can com-
pensate for a very limited ability to understand written English.
If Glover's standard of uncontested evidence is followed, it is prob-
able that few, if any, defendants, however marginal their intelligence,
will be able to establish that their waiver was ineffective because of the
lack of an "intelligent" waiver. In most cases it would appear that the
Government, as it did in Glover, would be able to produce expert testi-
mony to the contrary.
In addition to requiring that waivers be made knowingly and intel-
ligently, the federal courts also have imposed the requirement that sep-
arate waivers must be expressed at each level of the criminal
proceeding.463 The Ninth Circuit applied this rule in United States v.
Licavoli, where a Government witness had waived his right against
self-incrimination while testifying before the grand jury, but later in-
voked it during the trial.4 64 The defendant contended that the witness'
waiver before the grand jury precluded him from invoking his fifth
amendment right during the subsequent trial. However, the court
found no merit to this position especially in view of the fact that the
defendant had been able to introduce the grand jury testimony of the
witness at trial. 65
4. Special judicial proceedings
a. deportation hearings
In the decision of Cuevas-Ortega v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service,466 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the right
462. 596 F.2d at 865.
463. E.g., United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460,464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113 (Ist Cir. 1976); United States v.
Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); Jeffries v. United States, 215 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1954).
Contra, Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (waiver of right against self-
incrimination by witness before grand jury barred assertion of that right at trial as to those
issues that had been covered in the grand jury proceedings).
464. 604 F.2d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1979).
465. Id. at 623-24. The Licavoli decision also touched upon another issue in the area of
self-incrimination that is not encompassed by any subheadings in this article. Licavoli had
desired to call various witnesses to the stand whom he knew would invoke their fifth amend-
ment privileges and refuse to testify. The Ninth Circuit, as did the trial court, would not
allow this tactical maneuvering. Witnesses cannot be called for the sole purpose of forcing
them to invoke their fifth amendment privileges in front of the jury. Id. at 623.
466. 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979).
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against self-incrimination can be asserted by illegal aliens in deporta-
tion proceedings. During an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) investigation into a number of fraudulent home birth registra-
tions, INS investigators conversed with Ms. Del Toro, who, without
apparent coercion, freely admitted that she was illegally present in the
United States. Her statement was used as incriminating evidence at her
and Cuevas-Ortega's subsequent deportation hearing. Both were de-
ported despite Del Toro's claims that her statement was obtained in
violation of her fifth amendment rights.467 The Ninth Circuit upheld
the action of the INS.
46 8
In previous cases, the Ninth Circuit had held that Miranda warn-
ings need not be given to defendants in deportation hearings, primarily
because of the difference between criminal trials and deportation pro-
ceedings.469 Thus, it would appear that the only constitutional protec-
tion afforded a potential deportee in such situations would be the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.470 This position appears
somewhat overly restricted in view of prior Supreme Court holdings
which have allowed the privilege against self-incrimination to "be
asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigative or adjudicatory."47 '
b. grandjury proceedings
In United States v. Lemieux,47 2 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the
notion that grand jury witnesses who receive a grant of immunity are
467. Id. at 1277-78.
468. Id. at 1276, 1278.
469. Trias-Hemandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit has
chosen to follow the Seventh Circuit's reasoning on this issue, as indicated by the court's
reliance on language from Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1975):
A principal purpose of the Miranda warnings is to permit the suspect to make
an intelligent decision as to whether to answer the government agent's questions.
In deportation proceedings, however-in light of the alien's burden of proof, the
requirement that the alien answer nonincriminating questions, the potential ad-
verse consequences to the alien of remaining silent, and the fact that an alien's
statement is admissible in the deportation hearing despite his lack of counsel at the
preliminary interrogation-Miranda warnings would be not only inappropriate but
could also serve to mislead the alien.
(citations omitted). See Ben Huie v. INS, 349 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1965) (deportation
hearings are not criminal in nature and are hence without the protections given in criminal
procedures).
470. See Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1960) ("[d]eportation proceedings
must conform 'to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law' ")
(citing Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).
471. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
472. 597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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not shielded from testifying under the fifth amendment even though a
possibility of another prosecution might exist in a foreign country. Le-
mieux was convicted of civil contempt because he refused to testify
under a grant of immunity before a federal grand jury. He feared that
a prosecution in Mexico would result if he testified concerning his al-
leged involvement in a marijuana smuggling conspiracy. He conse-
quently claimed that the fifth amendment shielded him from making
statements that would incriminate him in a foreign prosecution.473 But
the Ninth Circuit found that rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which requires a limited form of secrecy for grand jury pro-
ceedings, provided adequate protection for Lemieux.474
The weight of established authority appears to support this posi-
tion. To date, federal courts have not required the issuance of Miranda
warnings in similar situations.475
473. Id. at 1167.
474. Id. The text of rule 6(e) on its face would not appear to cloak grand jury witnesses
with the protection granted by the federal courts. It provides in part:
(1) General Rule.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an opera-
tor of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney
for the Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph
(2)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may
be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing viola-
tion of rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(2) Exceptions.-
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand
juror, may be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney
for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the perform-
ance of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii)
of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attor-
ney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law. An attorney for the government
shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand
jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to
whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment be-
cause of matters occurring before the grand jury.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
According to the very words of the rule, another judicial proceeding could require the
statements made by a grand jury witness. Id. § (2)(C)(i).
475. E.g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) (un-
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However, in a concurring opinion that reads more like a dissent,
Judge Hufstedler pointed out the weaknesses in the holding.4 7 6 She
noted that rule 6(e) does not provide the protection for witnesses that
the majority assumed it did.4 77 Judge Hufstedler found support for her
conclusion in In re Cardassi,478 a 1972 federal district court decision.
The Cardassi court recognized the illusory nature of the protection af-
forded by rule 6(e). It noted:
While there is no reason to believe that any enforcement offi-
cials. . . would not honor the rule, the constitutional protec-
tion of the witness must rest on more than faith. If in fact a
law enforcement official wanted to make the witness's answers
known to the foreign prosecuting officials, it is unlikely that
he would apply. . . for disclosure of the grand jury minutes.
less grand jury witness demonstrates substantial possibility that he would be subject to for-
eign prosecution, he is without self-incrimination protection). See, e.g., United States v.
Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Zicarelli makes it clear that one invoking the
Fifth Amendment privilege has the burden of establishing, first, that the subject of the gov-
ernment's questions raises 'a real danger of being compelled to disclose information that
might incriminate him under foreign law,' and second, that there is a 'real and substantial'
fear that prosecution by the foreign government might ensue."); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067,
1070 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub nom. Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970)
(grand jury witness cannot refuse to answer questions under grant of immunity without
reasonable cause to fear danger of incrimination from a direct answer); In re Tierney, 465
F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973) ("Our view then and now is
that because of the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings no substantial risk of foreign prose-
cution is posed. Rule 6(e), F.R. Crim. P., provides for this secrecy.").
The Ninth Circuit had previously relied upon Zicarelli to decide In re Weir, 495 F.2d
879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974). Weir was a case similar to Lemieux in that
it involved a witness who feared prosecution in Mexico. The court held that Weir was not
entitled to fifth amendment protections because the possibility of prosecution in Mexico was
too remote. Id. at 881. In reaching this conclusion, the court assumed that rule 6(e) woul4
provide the witness with sufficient protection. Id. A majority of the Lemieux court found
Weir to be directly controlling. 597 F.2d at 1167.
476. Judge Hufstedler is not alone in the realization that a grand jury witness is not auto-
matically immune from foreign prosecution. Wigmore gives some spurious support to the
victimized witness in noting:
No one suggests. . . that the privilege [against self-incrimination] should ap-
ply because a mere possibility exists that disclosure might conceivably incriminate
the witness under the law of some remote jurisdiction. A suggestion appears, how-
ever, in what might be called the Michigan view, that the privilege should apply
where there is a substantial risk of prosecution by the foreign sovereignty under
whose law the testimony is incriminating.
J. WIrMORE, EVIDENCE § 2258 (3rd rev. ed. 1961) (citations omitted).
477. Judge Hufstedler interpreted rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii) to permit a cooperative exchange of
grand jury testimony with foreign officials for the purpose of stopping international drug
traffic. If this information is later used to prosecute a defendant under foreign laws, it would
be a violation of rule 6(e) but beyond the reach of the United States courts. 597 F.2d at 1168
(Hufstedler, J., concurring).
478. 597 F.2d at 1169 (citing In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972)).
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He would simply send the transcript. It may well be that such
conduct would render the official subject to the disciplinary
powers of [the] court if the conduct and the identity of the
person responsible ever became known, but such an after-the-
fact sanction would provide no protection for the witness.
479
In another case involving grand jury testimony, United States v.
Lawson ,48 an attorney was subpoenaed to reveal to a grand jury client
names and activities arising out of his firm's defense of two individuals
charged with narcotics violations. The attorney attempted to vicari-
ously assert the "Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination [be-
longing to] his unnamed clients."'48' However, the Ninth Circuit
viewed the controversy as a question of the validity of the attorney-
client privilege and avoided the fifth amendment implications.48 2 In
United States .Scheudfer,483 the court dismissed appellant's claim that
his fifth amendment rights were violated because a grand jury witness
had commented on his failure to testify. Prior Supreme Court cases
have held that such comments do not taint an otherwise valid indict-
ment.
4 84
c. juvenile court proceedings
The extent of the right against self-incrimination which was ex-
tended to juveniles by the Supreme Court in In re Gault,48 - has been
subject to widely divergent interpretations by the lower courts. Both
state and federal systems have deemed a juvenile request for counsel
479. 351 F. Supp. at 1082. Arguably Lemieux's fear of prosecution was substantial be-
cause of the proximity of Mexico. But the court held that when there was no real and
substantial danger of such prosecution, this fear was an insufficient basis upon which to
assert fifth amendment rights. 597 F.2d at 1167. There appears to be no other reason for the
court's holding other than adherence to precedent.
480. 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979).
481. Id. at 217.
482. Id.
483. 599 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1979).
484. The Court, as early as 1958, had in Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348-50
(1958), allowed the admission of evidence impinging on fifth amendment protections in a
grand jury proceeding. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) ("An indict-
ment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury ... is enough to call for
trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more."). See also
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251
(1966), the defendant protested the use of incriminating evidence in a criminal tax evasion
case that he himself had been compelled to produce a year before in jeopardy assessment
proceedings. The Court remarked that even if it is assumed that the prosecution does ac-
quire incriminating evidence in violation of the fifth amendment, the defendant could al-
ways have the evidence suppressed at trial. Id. at 255.
485. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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during interrogation as aper se invocation of the right to remain silent.
State courts have also concluded that a juvenile's request to see his par-
ents or other responsible adult automatically invokes Miranda rights.486
Federal courts, on the other hand, have limited this right to situations
where an attorney is requested.487 The Supreme Court followed this
practice in the 1979 decision of Fare v. Michael C. 188 In that case, a
sixteen-year-old murder suspect had argued in the California state
courts that his voiced desire to talk with his probation officer consti-
tuted an invocation of Miranda protections. The Court, focusing on
the prosecutorial role that a probation officer may take in the proceed-
ings against a juvenile offender, declined to equate Michael C.'s request
with a wish to see an attorney.
489
486. E.g., People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793, 797-99, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5
(1971) (juvenile's request to see his parents constituted a per se invocation of his Miranda
rights: "Any words or conduct which 'reasonably appears inconsistent with a present will-
ingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with the police at
that time. . . must be held to amount to an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege")
Id. at 797. (emphasis in original); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 594 (La. 1978) (a juvenile
cannot waive his Miranda rights until he has consulted with an attorney, parent, or other
adult interested in his welfare).
487. Eg., Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1977). The defendant, a
"streetwise" juvenile offender, asked to see his mother before making statements to the po-
lice, but his request was denied. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the request for parental support
was not a per se invocation of Miranda rights since, due to repeated offenses, the defendant
knew well how to voice those rights; "[h]e knew he could have had an attorney but did not
want one." Id. at 1132.
488. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
489. Id. at 724-25. The Court used a totality of circumstances test to determine whether
Michael C. had in fact invoked his rights by requesting to see his probation officer or had
waived them in failing to ask for an attorney. Id. at 725-26. The totality of the circumstances
test includes an examination of such factors as:
1) age of the accused; 2) education of the accused; 3) knowledge of the accused as
to both the substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his
rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; 4) whether the accused is held
incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or attorney; 5)
whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been fied;
6) methods used in interrogation; 7) length of interrogations; 8) whether vel non the
accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and 9) whether
the accused has repudiated an extrajudicial statement at a later date.
Id. at 725-27. West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968). Accord, United
States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972), discussedin 1 Jtuv. COURT DIG. 6 (Feb. 1973).
Only the dissent in Fare considered yet another circumstance that could have been
dispositive of the entire issue: Michael C.'s unwillingness to talk, as indicated by his desire
to consult with some adult before confessing to police. Justice Marshall asserted that "Mi-
randa requires that interrogation cease whenever a juvenile requests an adult who is obli-
gated to represent his interests." 442 U.S. at 729-30. Such a request is "surely inconsistent
with a present desire to speak freely." Id.
The Court's refusal to recognize unwillingness to talk as a determinative factor in dis-
covering whether fifth amendment rights had been violated in a juvenile interrogation is
anomalous when compared with the holding in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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Fare does little more than affirm the position taken by the Ninth
Circuit in juvenile proceedings. In United States v. Indian Boy X, the
court noted that while it was "mindful of the rights of juveniles at the
adjudicative stage of a proceeding to those essentials of due process and
fair treatment afforded adults," it was "not aware of any law to the
effect that juveniles are entitled to any greater rights than adults.
490
There is no precedent to suggest that the request for a probation officer
constitutes an assertion of fifth amendment protections in adult juris-
prudence.
B. The Right to Counsel
1. Court appointed counsel
The right to the assistance of counsel for an accused is guaranteed
by the sixth amendment of the Constitution.49' Although a literal read-
ing of the sixth amendment does not confer a right upon the accused to
representation by court appointed counsel,492 this right has evolved
through judicial interpretations of the amendment.
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court held in Powell v. Ala-
bama 493 that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment re-
quires the observance of certain fundamental rights associated with a
hearing, among them the right to the assistance of counsel. This right,
however, was held only to be present in cases involving capital offenses.
Johnson v. Zerbst expanded this right to cover defendants in federal
courts.49 4 Four years later in Betts v. Brady the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment did not require the appointment of counsel in
every state proceeding because the assistance of counsel was not
deemed a fundamental right.4 95 Betts established the use of a case-by-
case analysis through which it was determined whether, in a particular
case, the denial of the assistance of counsel was also the denial of fun-
damental fairness.
Betts was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright in which the Court
held that the right to counsel was fundamental and thus applicable to
Haynes' confession was considered involuntary because he had been denied permission to
call his wife until he confessed. It seems readily apparent that Haynes' spouse could not
have rendered him any more legal assistance than Michael C's probation officer.
490. 565 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original).
491. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
492. The language in question reads as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." Id.
493. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
494. 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938).
495. 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
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the states through the fourteenth amendment. 496 This right, however,
was extended only to state and federal felony cases. The question of
whether it applied to state defendants charged with misdemeanors was
left unanswered.
In 1972, Argersinger v. Hamlin expanded the right to counsel,
holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.
4 9 7
However, the Court specifically reserved the question of whether the
right to appointment of counsel attaches where no loss of liberty is in-
volved.4 98 In 1979, this issue came before the United States Supreme
Court in Scott v. Illinois.499 Scott, an indigent, was charged with shop-
lifting, a crime punishable under Illinois state law by up to one year in
jail, a five hundred dollar fine, or both."° He was unrepresented by
counsel at trial, convicted and ordered to pay a fifty dollar fine. 01 The
Supreme Court in a five to four ruling upheld his conviction. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that in a trial involving
a crime for which a loss of liberty is authorized but where none is actu-
ally imposed, an indigent defendant, unrepresented by counsel, is not
deprived of his sixth amendment rights.50 2 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Argersinger actual imprisonment
standard as representing the outer limit of cases where a state was re-
quired to appoint counsel for indigents.5 0 3
Justice Rehnquist's reading of Argersinger is flawed. Argersinger
at a minimum, required counsel when actual imprisonment was in-
volved.5°  The question of whether an indigent had a right to state
appointed counsel in crimes where imprisonment was authorized, but
not actually imposed, was not addressed by the majority. Justice
Douglas, who authored the majority opinion, noted that "we need not
consider the requirements of the sixth amendment as regards the right
to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved. 50 5
In spite of this language, the majority in Scott did "conclude...
496. 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
497. 407 U.S. 24, 37 (1972).
498. Id. In Argersinger, the defendant had been sentenced to a prison term.
499. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
500. Id. at 368.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 373-74.
503. Id. at 373.
504. 407 U.S. at 37.
505. Id.
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that Argersinger did indeed delimit the constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel in state criminal proceedings." 50 6 However, nothing
was offered in support of this statement. This conclusion is even more
questionable in light of the majority's own language that "the inten-
tions of the Argersinger Court are not unmistakably clear." 50 7
The majority in Scott perhaps could have avoided some of these
difficulties by using an approach closer to that espoused by Justice
Powell in his Argersinger concurring opinion. Instead of distinct, in-
flexible line-drawing, Justice Powell advocated the use of counsel
where necessary to insure a fair trial °.50  He expressly rejected an "ac-
tual confinement" standard.5 0 9 This flexible approach would avoid the
anomaly presented by both Scott and Argersinger of requiring counsel
in relatively minor actual imprisonment cases while dispensing with it
in more complex trials where loss of property is at stake.5 10
2. Effective assistance of counsel
The United States Supreme Court has required not only that
counsel be present in most criminal trials, but also that such counsel be
reasonably effective.' Once counsel is found to be ineffective, the
question arises whether such ineffectiveness requires automatic reversal
of the defendant's conviction.
The Ninth Circuit confronted this issue in the 1979 case ofEwing v.
Williams. There a defendant challenged the validity of his conviction
on the ground that his counsel had been "totally unprepared." ' The
506. 440 U.S. at 373.
507. Id. Justice Rehnquist failed to address the holding of the Court in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. at 341-44, and other right to counsel cases that the right to appointed coun-
sel is fundamental and essential to a fair trial. The Gideon approach tends to weaken any
arguments for definitive line drawing based on the severity of punishment imposed.
508. 407 U.S. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring).
509. Id. at 52. In Scott, however, Justice Powell's concurring opinion suggested an "ac-
tual confinement" standard rather than the more flexible case-by-case analysis which he had
advocated in Argersinger. The reason for his inconsistent opinions is unclear. In Scott,
Justice Powell did acknowledge his "continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule" but
stated that he joined the majority to "provide clear guidance" to courts confronting the issue
and to reach a result consistent withArgersinger for reasons of stare decisis. 440 U.S. at 374-
75 (Powell, J., concurring).
510. See Justice Powell's argument in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
511. E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 56 (1932).
512. 596 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1979). The district court had found that Ewing's counsel
had proceeded to trial totally unprepared to defend Ewing on one of the charges against
him.
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majority in Ewing reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit rule which requires that
once a determination has been made that a defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel,1 3 an additional showing of specific
prejudice must be made before his conviction can be overturned.514
The rule requiring an additional showing of prejudice was estab-
lished in the 1978 Ninth Circuit en banc decision of Cooper v. Fitzhar-
ris.51 5 In Cooper, the defendant alleged that specific acts by his
attorney had denied him the effective assistance of counsel. In Ewing,
the defendant did not allege affirmative acts but rather an omission
claiming that his counsel proceeded to trial unprepared. Due to the
above distinction, the district court in Ewing found the Cooper
prejudice requirement inapplicable 516 and granted the defendant relief.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a showing of prejudice was
required whether ineffectiveness of counsel was premised upon coun-
sel's specific acts or upon his omissions at trial." 7 The case was re-
manded for further consideration because the trial court had failed to
determine whether the defendant had actually been prejudiced. 8
In Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court first instituted the
harmless error standard for certain constitutional violations in criminal
513. The determination of whether defense counsel's performance fell below an estab-
lished standard of competence depends upon whether counsel's errors or omissions were
those that a "reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate
would not have made." Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). Accord, United States v. Boniface, 601 F.2d 390, 394 (9th
Cir. 1979).
The Ninth Circuit had formerly employed the "farce and mockery" standard which
required a showing that ineffective assistance of counsel pervaded the entire proceedings
resulting in a farce and mockery of justice. However, in Cooper, the Ninth Circuit held that
the former standard had become outmoded and that "reasonably competent and effective
representation" is a more accurate test for the quality of legal assistance required under the
sixth amendment. 586 F.2d at 1328.
Other circuits which have abandoned the "farce and mockery" standard include the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits as well as the District of Columbia.
For the standards employed by each circuit see ANN OT. 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218 (1976).
514. 596 F.2d at 394. Accord, United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1979). The
Ewing court held that the finding of prejudice to the defendant may be found from the
cumulative impact of multiple acts or omissions made by counsel at trial. Thus, even where
a petitioner is unable to show prejudice as a result of any single act or omission, prejudice
may still be found through the cumulative impact rule. 596 F.2d at 396.
515. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
516. 596 F.2d at 394. The district court stated that because the facts supported the de-
fendant's allegations of counse's total unpreparedness it "would be anomalous" to require
the defendant to make a showing of specific instances of prejudice. Id.
517. 596 F.2d at 396-97.
518. Id. at 397.
LOYO_,L OF.LOS.ANGELES LAW REVIEW
proceedings.51 9 The Court held that some types of errors did not re-
quire a reversal unless the defendant could establish that actual harm
or prejudice had resulted from the error in question.5 20 However, in
virtually the same breath the Court excluded right to counsel violations
because the right is "so basic that [its] infraction can never be treated as
harmless error. '5 21 The Cooper and Ewing courts failed to make a con-
vincing distinction between these two cases and the Chapman line of
authority, leaving both Cooper and Ewing at odds with the Chapman
standard.
The Supreme Court was more explicit concerning violations of the
right to counsel in Glasser v. United States. 22 In Glasser the Court
stated, "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial. 523 In addition, as recently
as 1978, Chief Justice Burger, in Holloway v. Arkansas, reiterated the
Supreme Court's automatic reversal rule for violations of the right to
counsel.524
However, the majorities in both Cooper and Ewing distinguished
this line of cases, noting that they applied only where there had been a
complete absence of counsel or where counsel had been "prevented
from discharging his normal functions. 525 In making this distinction,
both Ninth Circuit majorities ignored language of the Supreme Court
that "it has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel." 526 From the defendant's perspective, if
519. 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967).
520. Id. at 24.
521. Id. at 23 & n.8 (emphasis added).
522. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
523. Id. at 76.
524. 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978). The Ninth Circuit is in a distinct minority among the
circuits in its insistence on additional prejudice in right to counsel violations. E.g., United
States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 491 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)
("The Supreme Court has indicated that a Sixth Amendment violation, as it implicates a
substantial right of a party, cannot be harmless. . . and this proposition was forcefully
affirmed in Holloway v. Arkansas." (Citations omitted)); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970) (en banc) (automatic reversal where counsel was constitutionally
ineffective); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1101
(1979) (court did not inquire into the degree of prejudice suffered by defendant after a right
to counsel violation); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (did not
apply harmless error standard when defendant found to have been' deprived of right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel). Contra, Monteer v. Benson, 574 F.2d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 1978) (in
dictum court noted that had there been a right to counsel violation, reversal of conviction
would not have occurred unless defendant was prejudiced).
525. Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d at 359 (quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1332).
526. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
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he has been denied the effective assistance of counsel it makes little
difference whether the defendant's counsel was "prevented from dis-
charging his normal functions" or whether counsel was plainly incom-
petent.5 27
The distinction made by the Cooper majority also ignored the
sweeping language of Holloway, Glasser, and Chapman which was
clearly intended to apply to all violations of the right to counsel. This
was made evident by Chief Justice Burger's reference in Holloway to
the "general rule" of automatic reversal which has its origins in Chap-
man and Gideon. 28
Even more disturbing was the Ewing majority's requirement of a
showing of prejudice under the facts of the case. The Ninth Circuit
accepted the findings of the district court that Ewing's counsel was "to-
tally unprepared" for trial.529 But apparently the court felt that there
were some types of "unpreparedness" which could be condoned while
others could not.530 According to the court, unpreparedness because of
"sloth" is unacceptable while unpreparedness for "tactical considera-
tions" is permitted.53" '
Where counsel's ineffectiveness is premised upon omissions, as in
Ewing, as opposed to specific acts easily identifiable from the record,
the requisite showing of prejudice is very difficult to make. Judge Ely
noted in his dissent in Ewing that "the District Court. . .faced with
counsel's complete lack of preparation throughout the entire proceed-
ings, could only 'speculate' as to what might have been.-
5 32
3. Joint representation
A defendant's right to effective counsel can also be jeopardized if
he and one or more co-defendants are represented at trial by the same
counsel. Often two or more defendants will have conflicting interests.
The exoneration of one may tend to establish the guilt of the other. For
this reason courts have been sensitive to the possibility of conflict ex-
isting in joint representation.
In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed this question in Holloway v.
Arkansas.533 There, defense counsel, representing multiple co-defend-
527. 586 F.2d at 1338 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
528. 435 U.s. at 489.
529. 596 F.2d at 393.
530. Id. at 396-97.
531. Id. at 396 n.5.
532. Id. at 398 (Ely, J., dissenting).
533. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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ants, moved to have separate counsel appointed for each defendant due
to the possibility of conflict. The trial court denied this motion.534 The
Supreme Court overturned the subsequent convictions. In so doing,
the Court established a narrow rule requiring automatic reversal when
a trial judge refuses either to conduct an adequate hearing concerning
the potential of conflict or to appoint separate counsel after defense
counsel has raised this issue.535
The Court in Holloway was not presented with the issue of how
strong a showing of conflict is required to deprive a defendant of effec-
tive counsel. 36 This issue, however, was addressed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Willis v. United States.537
Willis was charged with possession of marijuana after contraband
was found in the cabin of a boat owned by co-defendant Evanoff. At
their trial, Willis and Evanoff were represented by joint counsel. 538 A
customs officer testified that the key to the locked cabin containing the
contraband was secured from Willis. Both Willis and Evanoff testified
that Willis did not produce the key.5 39 Willis asserted that the key was
the only evidence linking him to the contraband.540 He contended that
his attorney failed to effectively protect his interests by not developing
a separate defense of lack of knowledge or lack of constructive posses-
sion because he wanted to avoid putting the entire blame on co-defend-
ant Evanoff.541 The Ninth Circuit rejected Willis' claim finding no
"objective evidence that a conflict existed. 5 42
Willis is at odds with the Supreme Court's mandate which requires
separate counsel whenever any possibility of conflict exists.543 The
534. A motion for substitution of counsel must be made in a timely manner. When the
request comes during trial or on the eve of trial, the court has discretion to reject the request.
United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1973); Good v. United States, 378 F.2d
934, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1967). Mid-trial motions may be appropriate, however, where the con-
ffict is unknown or does not become apparent prior to trial. 435 U.S. 475, 495 n.4 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
535. 435 U.S. at 484.
536. Id. at 483-84.
537. 614 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1979).
538. The court notes that it makes no difference whether Willis and his co-defendant
were represented by members of the same law firm or by a single attorney for purposes of a
conflict of interest analysis. Id. at 1202 n. .
539. Id. at 1204.
540. Id. at 1205.
541. Id. The attorneys for Willis and Evanoff instead moved to suppress the contraband
and, when their motion failed, stipulated to the facts developed at the hearing on their mo-
tion to suppress. The court assumed that this was done to move on to an appeal of the
suppression ruling. Id.
542. Id.
543. In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1941), the Supreme Court overturned a
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court stated that the assertions made by Willis could only lead to "spec-
ulation" that a conflict existed 544 even though that is precisely the type
of situation which "any possibility of conflict" would appear to encom-
pass.
The court then proceeded to indulge in speculation as to why a
conflict may not have existed.5 45 It reasoned that even if a defense of
lack of constructive knowledge or possession had been entered on be-
half of Willis there might have been no conflict because "Evanoff had
no separate defense. '5 46 This reasoning is unsound. Whether or not
Evanoff had a separate defense is immaterial. In either case, a defense
by Willis that he lacked constructive knowledge or possession would
have been damaging to Evanoff and this situation would raise a poten-
tial or "possible" conflict between the two co-defendants. Willis, then,
would seem to stand for the proposition that no right-to-counsel viola-
tions based on conflicting representation will be found unless an appel-
late court can find a plausible reason to justify an attorney's conduct
(perhaps similar to a minimum rationality test).547
conviction where the trial court had been advised "of the possibility that conflicting interests
might arise." Accord, Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 839 (1967).
544. 614 F.2d at 1205.
545. Id. at 1206.
546. Id.
547. The Willis court distinguished an earlier Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Mar-
shall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973). In that case an attorney representing two co-defendants
failed to develop a line of defense for one of them because of their mutually conflicting
interests. Since the defendant in Marshall had no other "possible defense," the Willis court
noted that he had what amounted to "no defense at all." 614 F.2d at 1206. Thus, according
to the court, the Marshall defendant's lack of adequate representation "could only have
stemmed from a conflict of interest." (emphasis added). Willis, on the other hand, had
other options that could be explained on the basis of trial tactics. Id. at 1206. By making
this type of distinction, the Willis court is in effect saying that as long as the defendant has
an alternative to his optimum defense, no convictions will be reversed for reasons of possible
conflicting representation regardless of how inferior the alternative might have been. This
hardly comports with the principles of a defendant's right to effective counsel developed by
the Supreme Court.
As might be expected, there is considerable divergence among the circuits on the degree
of conflict, resulting from multiple representation, that will require a reversal of conviction.
E.g., Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (some conflict of interest or
prejudice must exist before denial of effective assistance of counsel will be found); United
States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1972) (petitioner failed to prove the existence of a
conflict because it appeared from the record that there was no divergence of interest between
two co-defendants); United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1970) (no conflict
was found when it was shown that positions each defendant claimed should have been
raised at trial were found not to be damaging to co-defendants); Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d
203, 209-10 (3rd Cir. 1973) (petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel where
it was shown that defense strategies used were not always in his best interest); Miller v. Cox,
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Had the Ninth Circuit ordered the trial court to conduct an evi-
dentiary hearing as in Holloway, perhaps it could have spared itself the
task of speculating on what might have occurred during the trial. 48
The Willis court concurrently relied on a unique interpretation of Glas-
ser v. United States,54 9 the leading case on multiple representation.
Glasser held that defendants are entitled to representation without any
possibility of conflict. But, the Willis court in a footnote, commented
that the Glasser language "should be read with care. '55 0 The court
continued, "[t]here are many degrees of 'possibility', but it is clear that
the court in Glasser meant something like 'significant possibility' as dis-
tinguished from absolute certainty."55'
4. Irreconcilable conflict with counsel
The denial of a motion for substitution of counsel may constitute a
denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel where the de-
fendant and his attorney are embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict.55 2
Although the trial judge has the discretion to deny the motion, such
457 F.2d 700, 701-02 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972) (petitioner failed to estab-
lish conflict because his interests were in harmony with other co-defendants and neither
attempted to shift blame to any of the others); Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1077
(5th Cir. 1975) (substantial possibility of conflict existed when one attorney represented four
boys all of whom were accused of murdering a fifth boy in a jail cell and there were no
outside witnesses); United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978) (since defendants had not presented any specific allegation re-
garding a potential conflict of interest, court did not feel compelled to conduct an evidenci-
ary hearing on the matter); United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976) (no conflict found when it was demonstrated that counsel had
faithfully fulfilled his obligations with respect to all his clients); Zurita v. United States, 410
F.2d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 1969) (conflict will occur when attorney represents "two masters"
who have opposing interests and he is unable to give his undivided support to either client);
United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1975) (since co-defendants relied on
alibi defenses, there was no indication that their defenses were inconsistent; thus no conflict
was found); Lugo v. United States, 350 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1965) (cannot create a conflict
of interest from "mere conjecture"); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1964) (existence of mere speculation regarding divergent
interests was insufficient to establish conflict).
548. Willis contended that the trial judge had erred in his failure to obtain from Willis a
waiver of his right to independent representation. 614 F.2d at 1206. Although the court
approved of the trial judge's inquiry and use of warnings to the defendant of his constitu-
tional right, the court held that the trial judge had not violated a duty through his failure to
conduct such an inquiry in Willis.
549. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). 4ccord, Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir.)
cer. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967); Lugo v. United States, 350 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1965)
(where a conflict of interests exists a conviction cannot stand).
550. 614 F.2d at 1207 n.5.
551. Id.
552. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970).
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discretion is limited.553 The factors to be considered include (1) the
timeliness of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the inquiry into the de-
fendant's basis for the motion, and (3) whether the conflict has resulted
in a total lack of communication between the defendant and his attor-
ney.
55 4
In United States v. Mills, 55 5 the Ninth Circuit found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for sub-
stitution of counsel. The motion was made one week prior to trial al-
though counsel had been appointed two months earlier. Delay would
have ensued if the motion had been granted. In addition, the break-
down in communication between defense counsel and his client was
not total. It involved a disagreement over an issue of trial strategy.556
However, in United States v. Williams,5 7 the Ninth Circuit found
that the denial of a motion for substitution effectively denied defendant
a right to effective assistance of counsel. Unlike Mills, William's mo-
tions for substitution of counsel were made in a timely manner 5 8 and,
if granted, would not have delayed the date of trial.5 9 The court also
found that the appellant had made a prima facie showing of an irrecon-
cilable conflict replete with quarrels, bad language, threats and
counter-threats.
5. Interference with the attorney-client relationship
In United States v. Glover,5 6° the Ninth Circuit held that an inter-
view of the defendant conducted by an FBI agent, without the permis-
sion of the defendant's appointed counsel was not violative of
defendant's right to counsel. The Glover court permitted reprehensible
and abusive government conduct.
Glover, a person of limited intelligence, 61 was arrested on charges
of attempting to sell stolen gems to an undercover agent. While in cus-
553. United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979).
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id. The disagreement concerned an alibi defense. The court found that Mills' coun-
sel prepared and presented an adequate defense despite the conffict. Additionally, the court
observed that Mills' chief complaint involved the infrequency of his meetings with his coun-
sel and not their difficulty in communication. Id.
557. 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979).
558. Id. at 1259-60. Two separate motions were made, the first approximately one month
prior to trial. This motion was renewed one month later and one week prior to the ultimate
commencement of trial.
559. Id. at 1260.
560. 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979).
561. Id. at 859.
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tody and in the absence of his counsel, Glover was interviewed by two
government agents who attempted to discover the location of the mis-
sing gems and to secure his testimony against the co-defendants in the
case. In response to Glover's inquiry concerning the absence of his
counsel, the agents falsely assured him that his counsel had given her
consent for the interview.5 62 Shortly after the interview commenced,
Glover's counsel discovered the interview in progress and promptly ter-
minated it, denying that she had given her permission.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Glover's subsequent conviction con-
cluding that "[w]e simply are unable to say that [the agent's] attempt to
interfere with the attorney-client relationship, as reprehensible as it
was, amounted to a constitutional violation of the right to counsel. 563
The court found that no information was gained by the governmental
interference. Thus, the court concluded that defendant had not been
prejudiced by the government's conduct and, as a result, no sixth
amendment violation had occurred. 5"
The court cited the Supreme Court case of Weatherford v. Bur-
sey5 65 for support, noting that even though there had been some impro-
prieties on the part of the government agents no right to counsel
violation was found.566 In Weatherford, like Glover, the fact that the
defendant was not prejudiced went to the determination of whether
there had been a right to counsel violation.5 67 Despite the govern-
ment's egregious conduct, the Glover court, in accordance with Wea-
therford, improperly restricted Glover's remedy to the exclusionary
rule which was inapplicable in this case because no prejudicial infor-
mation resulted from the interview which could have been sup-
pressed.568 Thus, under Glover, unless a defendant can show
"prejudice," he will be without a remedy.
In addition, the Glover court referred to language in Chapman v.
California,569 calling for automatic reversal and application of a non-
562. Id.
563. Id. at 864.
564. Id.
565. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
566. 596 F.2d at 963-64.
567. 429 U.S. at 558.
568. Weatherford was factually different from Glover in that it involved a government
undercover agent who participated in pre-trial meetings between a defendant and his coun-
sel. None of the information learned by the agent during the meetings was introduced at
trial. At no time, however, was the defendant, as was Glover, confronted with government
agents in a pre-trial interview without the presence of counsel.
569. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
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harmless error standard in sixth amendment cases as "dictum."57 But
in the 1979 Supreme Court case of Holloway v. Arkansas, the Chapman
non-harmless error standard for right to counsel violations was termed
a "general rule."'57 ' Thus, it is unclear to what extent the harmless er-
ror rule applies to right to counsel cases.572
The Glover court also distinguished the factually similar cases of
Brewer v. Williams573 and Massiah v. United States5 74 in which the
Supreme Court found that the government's interference had violated
570. 596 F.2d at 962 n.7.
571. 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1979).
572. The Glover court's confusion over the two different uses of the term "prejudice" was
repeated by the Ninth Circuit in both Ewing v. Williams and Cooper v. Fitzharris. In
Cooper, Judge Hufstedler noted,
Courts have considered the prejudicial impact of attorney behavior only to deter-
mine whether counsel measured up to the constitutional standard of competency.
Thus, cases that the majority reads as holding that "reversal is not required where
the defendant suffered no prejudice" actually are based on holdings that the rea-
sonable competency standard had not been violated. They do not hold that viola-
tions of the reasonable competency standard may be harmless error. Once trial
counsel has been held to have been constitutionally ineffective, no circuit has de-
nied relief because the error was harmless.
586 F.2d at 1337-38 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d
1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (counsel had not been proven constitutionally ineffective be-
cause his errors were not shown to be substantial enough to impair the defense); United
States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 957 (Ist Cir. 1978) (a "relatively slight showing of actual
prejudice is required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel"); United States v. Steele,
576 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1978) ("showing of prejudice is necessary"); Note, Multiple Crimi-
nal Representation Examined: Holloway v. Arkansas, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 251, 269-70 (1979).
573. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
574. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Glover court also attempted to distinguish two prior state
cases which involved similar factual circumstances. The first of these cases, Commonwealth
v. Manning, 367 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. 1977), involved a DEA agent who telephoned the de-
fendant in an attempt to secure his cooperation in undercover investigations. The defend-
ant's attorney had not approved of the conversation. During the conversation the agent
disparaged the defendant's counsel and warned him that his counsel's tactics may be injuri-
ous to his defense. The Glover court found the facts to be "clearly distinguishable" because
the agents in Glover had not disparaged Glover's counsel. 596 F.2d at 861. Similarly, in the
second state court case, People v. Moore, 57 Cal. App. 3d 437, 129 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976),
investigators from the district attorney's office, in an attempt to secure the defendant's assist-
ance, had made disparaging remarks regarding the competence of defendant's counsel and
falsely stated to the defendant that his counsel had been disbarred.: Again, the Glover court
distinguished Moore on its facts. 596 F.2d at 861. If this rule had been followed by the
Supreme Court, both Brewer and Massiah would have to be reversed because neither case
involved "disparaging remarks." Ironically, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Manning
was faced with the question of whether Manning's conviction should be overturned and
whether the same additional prejudice test used by the Ninth Circuit should be used. It
noted that "the application of the harmless error rule [is] singularly inapposite here." 367
N.E.2d at 638. It went on to hold that "[p]rophylactic considerations assume paramount
importance in fashioning a remedy for deliberate and intentional violations of constitutional
rights." Id. at 639.
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defendants' sixth amendment rights. These cases, according to the
Ninth Circuit were unlike Glover not only because they involved gov-
ernment conduct which was prejudicial to the defendant but also be-
cause incriminating statements were sought and used against the
defendants."' 5 The court's distinction on the basis of these facts ignores
the plain language of the Supreme Court in both cases. InMassiah, the
Court had ruled that "[a]ny secret interrogation of the defendant, from
and after the finding of the indictment, without the protection afforded
by the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in
the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons
charged with crime." '576 In Brewer the rule was expressed as follows:
"[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation
when the government interrogates him."
' 5 7 7
Under Brewer and MAassiah, Glover's sixth amendment right to
counsel appears to have been violated. However, unlike Brewer and
Massiah, no evidence was gained in Glover which was used against the
defendant, thus subjecting it to exclusion. As a result, Glover was left
without a remedy.
6. Waiver
The accused may waive his right to the assistance of counsel and
elect to represent himself pro se.578 It is well settled, however, that
before the accused may assert his right to self-representation, a know-
ing, competent and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must be
made.579
Recently in United States v. Crowhurst,8 ° the Ninth Circuit over-
turned a conviction upon finding that the requirements for waiver had
not been met. The defendant in Crowhurst was not represented by
counsel at trial and subsequently appealed his conviction arguing that
he had not waived his right to counsel before electing to represent him-
self.
575. The Glover court found that the interview had not been conducted in an effort to
elicit from the defendant statements that could be used against him at trial. 596 F.2d at 862.
576. 377 U.S. at 205 (citing People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445,448
(1961)).
577. 430 U.S. at 401.
578. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973).
579. Id. at 186. An indigent's right to representation by appointed counsel continues on
appeal. This right may be denied on appeal only upon finding that the appellant waived
such representation or his financial situation has changed, rendering him no longer eligible
for appointed counsel. United States v. Dangdee, 608 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1979).
580. 596 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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Although the defendant had been advised of his right to counsel as
well as the general disadvantages of self-representation, the Ninth Cir-
cuit court reversed his conviction because of the district court's failure
to advise him of the nature of the charges and the possible penalties
involved.5 ' Prior cases in both the Ninth Circuit and from the
Supreme Court have held that the type of information omitted in
Crowhurst is critical to a defendant's ability to make an intelligent
waiver.
5 82
In United States v. Conrad,5 83 defendant's counsel withdrew prior
to a hearing at which the defendant moved to withdraw his plea of
guilty and prior to his sentencing. The defendant chose to represent
himself on these two occasions and relied on the advice of an attorney
who was not admitted to practice in federal courts. In finding that the
defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel,
the Ninth Circuit focused on the fact that the defendant had been ad-
vised of his right to counsel and had been represented by counsel at
every prior hearing. In addition, he failed to object to his former coun-
sel's withdrawal and was aware that a new counsel could have been
appointed.584
Both Crowhurst and Conrad involved waiver of counsel at trial
and at sentencing, after the suspect had been formally charged with a
crime. Waiver of the right by a criminal suspect once the right has
been invoked, but prior to the time the suspect has actually spoken with
an attorney, presents a slightly different issue.
Prior to the 1978 decision of United States v. Rodriguez-Gas-
telum,585 the Ninth Circuit had rendered a series of inconsistent deci-
sions on the issue of waiver. Rodriguez-Gastelum rejected a per se
prohibition against waiver and held that a suspect may waive his rights
to counsel after asserting the right but before speaking with an attor-
ney.5
86
Recently, in United States v. Nick, 87 the Ninth Circuit addressed
581. Id. at 390. The court noted that the district court's omissions would not constitute
reversible error if the record revealed that the defendant was apprised of this information by
some other means. Id. at 390-91.
582. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); United States v.
Aponte, 591 F.2d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th
Cir. 1978); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1974); Hodge v. United States,
414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
583. 598 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1979).
584. Id. at 510.
585. 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
586. Id. at 486-88.
587. 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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the same issue and found Rodriguez-Gastelum to be controlling. In
Nick, the defendant was arrested by a tribal police officer on an Indian
reservation. The officer gave Nick his Miranda warnings"' and Nick
requested that the officer look in his bedroom for a piece of paper con-
taining the name and telephone number of his attorney. The officer did
not locate the paper at that time. Nick was subsequently interviewed
by an FBI agent who again advised Nick of his Miranda rights. Nick
signed a waiver form and, during the subsequent interrogation, con-
fessed to committing the crime. Thereafter, Nick again requested the
paper with his attorney's name on it.589 Although Nick denied that he
understood the meaning of the waiver form, the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged that an "express written waiver. . . is strong evidence" of
a valid waiver and held that "fidelity to Rodriguez-Gastelum requires us
to support the district court on the waiver point. '590
Although the prohibition of a per se rule against waiver is not un-
reasonable, it is difficult to see how either Nick or the defendant in
Rodriguez-Gastelum made a "knowing, competent and intelligent"
waiver of their right. In both cases, the defendants were not furnished
with counsel at the time of their request and therefore did not have the
opportunity to speak with a lawyer. 9' In addition, Nick testified that
he was not aware of the meaning of the waiver form and signed it be-
lieving it would help him. The court also noted that Nick was "mildly
retarded" with "limited verbal skills."592
In her dissent, Judge Hufstedler noted that Rodriguez-Gastelum ig-
nores the clear language of the Supreme Court in Miranda ." Therein
the Court stated, "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney,
the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time,
the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney
and to have him present during any subsequent questioning." 594 Nick
and Rodniuez-Gastelum have clearly narrowed the application of this
rule within the Ninth Circuit.
588. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that before a suspect may be ques-
tioned in a custodial setting he must be advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he
may say may be used against him, of his right to consult with an attorney prior to any
interrogation and of his right to court appointed counsel if he is unable to afford counsel.
589. 604 F.2d at 1201. The tribal officer, although present during the FBI agent's interro-
gation and the signing of the waiver form, failed to inform the agent of Nick's request for the
"piece of paper" before or during the interrogation. Id.
590. Id.
591. United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d at 491 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
592. 604 F.2d at 1201.
593. 569 F.2d at 489 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
594. 384 U.S. at 474.
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7. The right to self-representation
Once the accused has made an intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel the correlative constitutional right to self-representation may
be asserted. 95 The demand to proceed pro se must be unequivocal
5 96
and made in a timely manner.
5 97
Recently, in Walker v. Loggins,5 9 a state prisoner appealed denial
of habeas corpus relief asserting that he had been denied his constitu-
tional right to self-representation in a state court proceeding. At the
time of the appellant's trial, the Supreme Court had not yet decided
Faretta v. California which recognized that defendants in state prosecu-
tions have a constitutional right to self-representation. 99 Prior to
Fareta, however, the Ninth Circuit had recognized a federal constitu-
tional right to self-representation.co
The state contended in Loggins that it was under no obligation to
allow self-representation because Faretta was not in effect at the time
of the initial trial. The Ninth Circuit, however, found its prior decision
in Bittaker v. Enomoto6°1 to be controlling. Bittaker involved a Cali-
fornia petitioner who had been convicted four years prior to the Court's
decision in Faretta.602 The court applied the law of the circuit holding
that in federal cases there is a constitutional right to self-representa-
tion.60 3 In Bittaker, the court held that although they had not had the
occasion to apply the federal constitutional right to state habeas peti-
tioners "if. . .faced with the issue, we would have applied the right to
self-representation to a state habeas petitioner.
' 6 4
The Ninth Circuit in Loggins, relying upon the court's dictum in
Bittaker, extended this right to a state habeas petitioner holding that at
the time of appellant's trial he had a constitutional right to self-repre-
595. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
596. Id. at 186; Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Anderson v. Fay, 394 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno,
384 F.2d 12, f6 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. deniedsub nom. DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007
(1966).
597. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d at 186; United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695, 695
(9th Cir. 1971).
598. 608 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1979).
599. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
600. 608 F.2d at 734; Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67, 71 (9th Cir. 1971).
601. 587 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978).
602. The court in Biuaker held that federal courts must apply federal constitutional law
in cases before them under the federal habeas statute. Id. at 402 n. 1.
603. The court in Billaker held that where a denial of the right to self-representation is
found, the defendant need not make a specific showing of prejudice. Id. at 402.
604. Id.
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sentation. The court vacated the judgment of the district court denying
the appellant's petition for habeas relief. Finding that the record was
unclear as to whether the appellant's request to proceed pro se was une-
quivocal or whether his constitutional right was in fact denied, the
court remanded the case to the district.court for full consideration of
the claim.6 °5
C The Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense
The sixth amendment of the Constitution states in part that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense. ' 60 6 The United States Supreme Court sum-
marized the constitutional significance of these rights when it declared
that they guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered in a man-
ner
now considered fundamental to the fair administration of
American justice-through the calling and interrogation of
favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In short, the
Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary crim-
inal trial to make a defense as we know it.
607
These rights comprise the elements of a defense guaranteed the crimi-
nally accused.
1. The right of confrontation
The first of these rights, contained in the confrontation clause, has
been the subject of numerous interpretative decisions within the federal
judicial system. The United States Supreme Court has held that its
"primary object" is
to prevent depositions or exparte affidavits . . . being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness. . . compelling him to stand
face to face with a jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
60
At a minimum the clause guarantees the right of the defendant to ques-
605. 608 F.2d at 734.
606. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
607. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
608. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
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tion those persons brought to testify against him. In this context, a
court may not limit cross-examination so that the right to confrontation
is completely frustrated although other considerations may compel the
limitation.6 °9
a. the right to cross-examine
The right to pursue effective cross-examination was strongly af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska.6 10 The Davis Court
felt that a defendant should not be totally prohibited from asking ques-
tions of a hostile witness as to his possible biases. Chief Justice Burger
writing for the majority held that without sufficient cross-examination
the witness's testimony went untested to the jury and, hence, consti-
tuted a violation of the confrontation clause. The Court, in reversing
the lower court decision, declared that
[w]hile counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he
was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which
to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or lacked
that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial ...
[D]efense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the
jury the facts from which the jurors, as the sole triers of fact
and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating
to the reliability of the witness.6 1 1
This right to cross-examine a witness was at issue in the 1979
Ninth Circuit opinion of United States v. Bleckner 6lz in which the jury
had learned during direct examination the results of a plea bargaining
agreement with the star prosecution witness who had been charged in
the same indictment with Bleckner. However, the jury had not been
informed of the specific terms.6 13 The Ninth Circuit, emphasizing that
the witness provided "crucial" testimony for the Government's case,
held that the jury did not have "sufficient information to appraise [his]
biases and motivations. ' 614 The court further held that cross-examina-
tion into the complete picture of the witness's bargain with the prosecu-
609. E.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (a defendant's right to adequately
expose through cross-examination the bias of a prosecution witness was more important
than the state's law protecting juveniles from having their criminal records divulged); Alford
v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931) (reasonable cross-examination necessary to de-
velop potential witness bias); FED. R. EvID. 611.
610. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
611. Id. at 318.
612. 601 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1979).
613. Id. at 384.
614. Id. at 385.
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tor was essential and, contrary to the trial court's ruling, would not lead
to a discussion of "collateral" matters.1 5
Bleckner represents a specific application of the rule developed by
Davis v. Alaska.1 6 But a different result was arrived at in the 1979 case
of United States v. Cook.6 17 Defendant Cook attempted to challenge
the credibility of a key prosecution witness by introducing evidence re-
garding his 1959 assault conviction.618 Cook also had wanted to cross-
615. Id. at 384. The collateral matters doctrine generally limits a cross-examiner's ability
to impeach a witness's testimony when the impeachment involves the "production of addi-
tional evidence on factual propositions that have no direct or circumstantial bearing on any
element of a claim or defense." C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
306 (1978) (footnote omitted). However, this rule does not apply to an attempt to show bias,
which may otherwise be proved by extrinsic evidence. Id. at 298.
616. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). However, another Ninth Circuit opinion, Skinner v. Cardwell,
564 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978), was decided differently.
The defense attempted to cross-examine a police detective about prior releases of another
prosecution witness from jail. The releases were given in return for the witness's testimony
in other unrelated proceedings. The court concluded that those prior releases, over a year
old, were "only marginally relevant." In addition, the witness had already testified as to
those releases although he was somewhat confused about the details. 564 F.2d at 1389.
Other courts have generally followed a standard similar to that used in Bleckner. E.g.,
United States v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450, 461 (5th Cir. 1979) (jury was sufficiently apprised
of the fact that star Government witness had been given grant of immunity in return for his
testimony and that he had been involved in the same type of criminal activities as was
defendant); United States v. Williams, 592 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial court erred
when it prohibited defendant from cross-examining Government witness concerning the fact
that his testimony may have been given in return for the Government's promise to help his
brother and girlfriend); Flowers v. Ohio, 564 F.2d 748, 750 (6th Cir. 1977) (trial court should
have permitted cross-examination of Government eyewitnesses who identified defendant in
court about their pre-trial visual identifications); United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d
1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1977) (defense should have been allowed to cross-examine witness about
his prior narcotics dealings because such transactions may reveal any biases or prejudices of
the witness); United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 981 (7th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 425
U.S. 973 (1976) (in view of the fact that previous cross-examination had revealed that wit-
ness had much to gain from testifying, it was within the discretion of the trial court to find
that further questioning into his subjective state of mind would not be meaningful);
Thergood v. Tedford, 473 F. Supp. 339, 344 (D. Conn. 1978) (state judge was overly restric-
tive in prohibiting cross-examination regarding ulterior motive of witness in testifying);
United States v. Manson, 425 F. Supp. 1272, 1276-77 (D. Conn.), aff'dsub nom. Annunziato
v. Manson, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977) (defendant should have been allowed to cross-ex-
amine Government witness concerning pending charges because this could have demon-
strated an agreement by police to treat these charges with greater leniency in return for
witness's testimony); Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (D. Conn. 1976), a Jd
memn., 559 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977) (defense should have been
allowed to cross-examine Government witness about his involvement in same criminal
scheme for the purpose of showing possible bias).
617. 608 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).
618. Id. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) allows the admission of prior crimes to attack the credibil-
ity of a witness if such evidence was
[e]licited from [the witness] or established by public record during cross-examina-
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examine the witness about his prior drug use. Both of these tactics
were prohibited by the trial judge. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
609(b), evidence of prior convictions, such as assault, which are used to
attack a witness's credibility can only be introduced if the conviction
occurred within the last ten years. 61 9 Cook's attorney, however, argued
that the ten year restriction applied only to defense witnesses and
should not have been so limited when government witnesses were in-
volved. This argument has appeal because in the criminal trial context
any discussion of "prejudicial effect" normally refers to the defend-
ant. 20 In rejecting this argument, the court cited the past practice in
the Ninth Circuit of applying rule 609(b) to both prosecution and de-
fense witnesses. 21 In following this past practice, the court did not go
tion but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
619. FED. R. EvID. 609(b) provides in part:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than
ten years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, un-
less the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial value.
While the use of prior convictions to attack a witness's veracity is governed by FED. R. EvID.
609, the type of evidence permissible to show a bias is governed by the general Rule 611,
which sets out the control a court has over the presentation of evidence. The only other
formal restraint under Rule 611 would be the Constitution, specifically the sixth amend-
ment. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931).
For a discussion of the different consequences when these methods of impeachment are
used, see United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1977); Moynahan
v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139, 1142-43 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'dmem., 559 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977). See 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[03b] at 609-80.4 to 80.5
(1978) ("Rule 609(b) extends the balancing approach in a very limited way to timeliness
.... In the case of aprosecution witness, the pressure of the confrontation clause may, at
times, require admission.") (emphasis added) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Speaking in terms of a state's hearsay rules,
the Court in Green rejected the notion that "the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or
less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed histori-
cally at common law." Id. at 155. The witness had been secluded by the government before
trial through the Federal Witness Protection Program. 608 F.2d at 1179-80. Cook also
questioned this seclusion in his appeal. See notes 727-33 and accompanying text infra.
620. See the language of FED. R. EvID. 609 (a), note 616 supra.
621. 608 F.2d at 1182 (citing United States v. Carpio, 547 F.2d 490, 493 (9th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam)). Accord, United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf., e.g.,
United States v. Garger, 471 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1972) ("credibility of any witness may
be impeached by evidence"); Bendelow v. United States, 418 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970) (prior convictions can be used to impeach any witness, including
defendant).
The Cook court also cited United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976). How-
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beyond its analysis of rule 609(b) to a discussion of the sixth amend-
ment.622 Unfortunately, the principal case cited, United Stales v.
Carplio, applied the ten year limitation to a prosecution witness in a
perfunctory manner and never addressed the defense-prosecution dis-
tinction.623
Secondly, the Cook court affirmed the lower court's decision to
restrict the cross-examination of the witness's prior drug use because
the district court had allowed "considerable latitude" in the cross-ex-
amination. The result was that the jury "became well aware" that the
witness was a "regular heroin user" as well as that he had "[o]ther char-
acter defects."
624
In Cook the Ninth Circuit also found that the limitations on cross-
examination were not excessive and did not violate the sixth amend-
ment. Unlike Bleckner, an extensive record exposing the witness's
character defects was before the jury. Therefore, the limitations im-
posed were not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Cook also differed from Bleckner because specific rules of evi-
dence were applied in Cook while Bleckner was decided under the con-
frontation clause.625 Although rule 609(b) was complied with in Cook,
a constitutional challenge under this clause to the limited cross-exami-
nation might still be argued,626 especially since the government witness
ever, Dixon deals with the inverse situation in which defendant wishes to introduce a convic-
tion less than ten years old. 608 F.2d at 1083.
622. 608 F.2d at 1182.
623. 547 F.2d 490, 493 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Bynum, 566 F.2d 914
(5th Cir. 1978). In Bynum, the trial court had disallowed defense counsel's inquiry into a
Government witness's convictions of using worthless checks and of obtaining property
under false pretenses, which were sixteen and twenty years old respectively. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed without much discussion. The court noted that the defendant had been al-
lowed to inquire into a more recent conviction and that nothing else was offered to show an
abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 566 F.2d at 923.
624. 608 F.2d at 1182.
625. While the use of prior convictions to attack a witness's veracity is governed by FED.
R. EvID. 609, the type of evidence permissible to show a bias is governed by the general
Rule 611, which sets out the control a court has over the presentation of evidence.
For a discussion of the different consequences when these methods of impeachment are
used, see United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1977), Moynahan
v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139, 1142-43 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'dmem., 559 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir.)
434 U.S. 939 (1977).
626. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[03b] at 609-80.4 to 80.5 (1978) ("Rule 609(b) extends
the balancing approach in a very limited way to timeliness. .. .In the case of aprosecudlon
witness, the pressure of the confrontation clause may, at times, require admission.") (empha-
sis added) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)). Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970). Speaking in terms of a state's hearsay rules, the Court in Green rejected the
notion that "the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules
of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law." 399 U.S. at 155.
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appeared to play such a key role.627
In another 1979 decision, United States v. Angelini,628 the Ninth
Circuit reviewed a defendant's challenge that he had been "unfairly
surprised and denied his rights to effective cross-examination" when
the Government had called a surprise witness.629 Defendant Angelini
was charged and found guilty of dealing in firearms without a license.
The prosecution introduced evidence which showed that the defendant
had been twice warned concerning his operating without a license
before he was arrested with nineteen price-marked firearms in his pos-
session.630 Angelini contended that he was a "collector who occasion-
ally sold off pieces that no longer fit into his evolving collection."63'
The surprise witness testified that the gun sold to ATF (Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms) agents immediately prior to defendant's arrest in
December, 1977, had been sold to Angelini in the preceding month.
Thus, the witness's testimony tended to rebut Angelini's claim that he
was merely a gun collector.6 32
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's claims of unfair surprise
for four reasons.633 First, the court seriously questioned whether the
issue had been preserved for appellate review because defense counsel
had not objected or asked for a continuance. Then, substantively, the
court pointed out that in non-capital cases, the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure do not require the prosecutor to provide a list of witness
names.634 Although the rule itself is silent regarding witness lists, the
federal courts have generally required their production in capital cases.
This rule was obviously not applicable to Angelini since he was in-
627. The witness had been secluded by the government before trial through the Federal
Witness Protection Program. 608 F.2d at 1179-80. Cook also questioned this seclusion in
his appeal. See notes 727-33 infra, and accompanying text.
628. 607 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1979).
629. Id. at 1308.
630. Id. at 1307.
631. Id. at 1309.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 1308-09.
634. Id. at 1309. The court cited FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 for this proposition. The rule is
actually derived from 18 U.S.C. 3432 (1976) which requires production of a list of witnesses
in capital cases three days before trial. The House attempted to revise rule 16 to require
mandatory production of witness lists in both capital and non-capital cases, but this provi-
sion was rejected by the full conference committee. H.R. REP. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
12, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. AD. NEWS 713, 716. Thus, the decision as to
whether to require production of such lists lies within the discretion of the trial court. E.g.,
United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976) (in
view of potential danger which might have arisen to inmates who were scheduled to testify
against defendant, trial court decision to deny discovery of witness list was not an abuse of
discretion).
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volved in a non-capital offense.635 Next, noting that the surprise wit-
ness gave testimony in rebuttal, the court of appeals declared that, in
any case, such a list would extend only to those witnesses of the prose-
cution's case-in-chief and not to those rendered necessary for rebuttal
purposes.636 Finally, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court
decision of Weatherford v. Burse 6 37 for the proposition that neither "a
defendant's due process [nor his] Sixth Amendment rights are denied
when a witness is called contrary to the government's previous repre-
sentations.
638
Alternatively, one could argue that the Supreme Court, by not re-
quiring a witness list in a misrepresentation case, such as Weatherford,
would, a fortiori, not require one in Angelini where no misrepresenta-
tion had occurred. The critical element in both cases appears to be that
of surprise rather than misrepresentation. In Weatherford, the majority
downplayed the misrepresentation element partially because it was not
deliberate. 39 Angelini appears to be a better case for not requiring a
witness list because, unlike Weatherford, it involved a witness used in
rebuttal, rather than one involved in the Government's case-in-chief.
In another 1979 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Hernandez,640
defendants wanted the address of a principal Government witness and
informer in order to investigate his background. 4 The district court
denied their pretrial motion because of a Government affidavit that de-
tailed the existence of threats against the informant and his family. Al-
though no evidentiary hearing was allowed before trial, one was held
after the witness had given his direct testimony. As a result of the hear-
ing, the defendants learned the address of the witness but were unable
to obtain a continuance in order to perform an investigation of the wit-
ness. The defendants appealed, claiming that their right to prepare an
adequate defense was hampered.
The Ninth Circuit, acknowledging that the witness's role in the
events made his testimony critical to the prosecution, agreed that the
635. Accord, United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
964 (1978) (discovery of prospective witnesses is not required); United States v. Thompson,
493 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974) (in non-capital cases no re-
quirement to disclose). See generally 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.03[3] (2d ed. 1979).
636. 607 F.2d at 1308-09. Accord, Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 76 (1895);
United States v. Windham, 489 F.2d 1389, 1392 (5th Cir. 1974).
637. 429 U.S. 545, 550 (1977).
638. 607 F.2d at 1309.
639. 429 U.S. at 560.
640. 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979).
641. Id. at 744.
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address was an "integral element of identity." '642 Defendants urged
that on the basis of Smith v. Illinois,"3 the witness's address should
have been disclosed before the cross-examination. However, as the
court pointed out, Smith allows only the disclosure of the address on
cross-examination. 6 " Smith did not involve pre-trial disclosure. Since
the defendant in Hernandez was given the address on cross-examina-
tion, no error occurred under Smith.
Assuming that Smith could be expanded to cover pre-trial disclo-
sure, the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez held that the affidavit provided
sufficient information for the judge to decide whether the address had
to be divulged. In dictum, the court suggested that an evidentiary hear-
ing would have been the better procedure but did not find reversible
error because the district court relied on the sworn affidavit." 5
b. hearsay evidence
The confrontation clause is also at issue when hearsay is admitted
through an evidence exception.646 Hearsay is a "statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 7 The
United States Supreme Court has formulated an approach to be used in
testing hearsay evidence under the confrontation clause.648 These fac-
tors include the trustworthiness of the statement, its spontaneity, its rel-
ative importance in the eyes of the jury, and the availability of
corroborating evidence.
642. Id. at 745.
643. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
644. Id. at 131. The Hernandez court also distinguished a former Ninth Circuit case,
United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1974). In Harris the trial court's decision
preventing disclosure of a key Government witness's address on cross-examination was
overturned. Unlike Hernandez, the Government in Harris made no showing as to why this
information should not have been disclosed. 501 F.2d at 9.
645. 608 F.2d at 746. Cf. United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 9 (9th Cir. 1974) (nondisclo-
sure may be justified if "answer may subject the witness to harassment, humiliation, or dan-
ger," and reasons are specified by either Government or witness.).
646. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)(plurality opinion)("Confrontation
Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots."); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (major reason for confrontation clause is to allow defendant an
opportunity to cross-examine). But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970)
(confrontation clause and the hearsay rule are not co-extensive because violation of one can
occur independently of the other). The Court in Green, however, did state that creation of
new exceptions in a state's hearsay rule "will often raise confrontation issues." 399 U.S. at
156.
647. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
648. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970)(plurality opinion).
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The 1979 Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Nick 649
presented a situation in which admissible hearsay statements were
tested against similar factors to see if they satisfied the confrontation
clause. The hearsay statements in question were made by a three year
old boy to his mother and physician following an alleged sexual assault
upon the child by the defendant.6 50 These statements were held admis-
sible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), the excited utterance ex-
ception, 65 1 and rule 803(4), the medical description exception.6 5 2
Notwithstanding their admissibility under the federal rules, the
court was still faced with the troublesome issue of the confrontation
clause.653 The court noted the crucial problem was that the three-year-
old declarant was not subjected to cross-examination and could not
have been cross-examined even if called as a witness by reason of his
tender years.
First, the court rejected the argument that the confrontation clause
was only satisfied by cross-examination of the hearsay declarant. 4 In-
stead, citing the later Court decision of Dutton v. Evans,655 the Ninth
Circuit stated the test is "whether the admissible hearsay, under all of
the circumstances, has a very high degree of reliability and trustworthi-
ness and there is a demonstrated need for the evidence.' 656 Using the
language of rule 803(24) as a guide,657 the court held that the child's
649. 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979)(per curiam).
650. Id. at 1201.
651. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) allows admission of "[a] statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition."
652. 604 F.2d at 1201-02. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) allows admission of "statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or pres-
ent symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."
653. 604 F.2d at 1202.
654. Id. at 1202-03. The Supreme Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162-63
(1970) (plurality opinion), declined to measure the validity of all hearsay exceptions against
the confrontation clause. The Court noted that the validity of a hearsay exception is usually
based on "indicia of 'reliability'" other than being subject to cross-examination. 399 U.S. at
161. Although the Court has looked at hearsay exceptions with "careful scrutiny," it noted
that it had "no occasion. . . to map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would
determine the validity of all such hearsay 'exceptions' permitting the introduction of an
absent declarant's statements." 399 U.S. at 162.
655. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
656. 604 F.2d at 1203.
657. FED. R. EvID. 803 (24) allows admission of
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
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statements were reliable because they were "directly responsive" to the
mother's questioning, had the "ring of verity" because of the child's
terminology, and were corroborated by physical evidence. 65 Since the
child knew his assailant well prior to the incident, the identification of
the defendant was considered "inherently trustworthy."659 In addition,
the witness, his mother, had been subjected to "rigorous cross-examina-
tion. 6 6 o
The Nick decision comports with the approach taken in Dutton v.
Evans as far as it balances the reliability of the hearsay statement. In
addition, as in Dutton,661 the hearsay statements in Nick were not
"devastating" because Nick's out-of-court inculpating remarks were
also admitted into evidence. 66z However, the child's statements were
perhaps more crucial than the one in Dutton because the statements
came from a minor victim and clearly identified the defendant as the
perpetrator. In Dutton one somewhat ambiguous statement by a co-
conspirator was admitted along with the testimony of nineteen other
prosecution witnesses. Nick represents a clear example of the balanc-
ing involved in evaluating arguable violations of the right to confronta-
tion.
In two other 1979 cases, the Ninth Circuit considered the Dutton
reliability factors. In United States v. Rosales,663 it quickly dismissed a
defendant's claim that a co-conspirator's statement introduced through
a government agent's testimony was hearsay and was violative of his
right to confrontation. The alleged co-conspirator had named and de-
scribed the defendant as his "source. ' 664 The court concluded that the
statement met at least three out of the four tests of reliability enumer-
ated in Dutton.665 Specifically it found that (1) the statement was made
by a declarant who "'had personal knowledge of the identity and role
of the participants'" (the declarant's description of his source fit the
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
658. 604 F.2d at 1204.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. 400 U.S. at 87.
662. 604 F.2d at 1201.
663. 606 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1979)(per curiam).
664. Id. at 888-89.
665. Id. The following factors were set out in Dutton: (1) does the statement contain an
express assertion about past fact, (2) did the declarant have personal knowledge of the sub-
ject of the statement, (3) was the possibility that the declarant's statement was founded on
faulty recollection remote, and (4) the circumstances under which the statement was made
give reason to believe that the declarant was telling the truth at that time. 400 U.S. at 88-89.
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defendant), (2) "'the possibility that the declarant was relying upon
faulty recollection was remote'" (no evidence otherwise), and (3) "the
surrounding circumstances strongly reinforce[d] [the declarant's] iden-
tification of appellant" (the declarant was speaking to an undercover
agent who had purchased cocaine from him in his own bar).666 The
first Dutton factor, whether the declaration contained an assertion of a
past fact, was deemed by the Rosales court not to be determinative,
even if applicable.667
As in Dutton and Nick, evidence corroborative of the statements
was present in Rosales. The declarant was present during one of the
sales, and at the other he had apparently retrieved the cocaine from the
defendant's car. Thus, the "devastating" effect of the hearsay state-
ments was diminished.668
In the second 1979 case, United States v. Lee,669 the Ninth Circuit
upheld the federal hearsay exception which permits the showing of the
absence of a public record or entry. Defendant Lee was charged with
delivering defense secrets to the Russians in Mexico City. Lee claimed
he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by selling
misinformation to the Russian agents.67 ° In order to refute this de-
fense, the Government, following the recognized hearsay exception for
the absence of information in records under Federal Rules of Evidence
803(7) and 803(10),671 introduced the affidavits of three top CIA offi-
666. 606 F.2d at 889.
667. Id. at 889 & n.l. See also United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Adams, 445 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cer. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971).
668. However, in United States v. Snow the defendant's own statements corroborated the
hearsay remarks. 521 F.2d at 735. See also United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d at 684 ("over-
whelming and undisputed evidence of defendant's guilt"). Cf United States v. Rosales, 606
F.2d at 889 (only defendant's presence at the scene of one of the cocaine sales and declar-
ant's delivery of cocaine in connection with defendant's car were independent evidence af-
firming the hearsay statement). Yet, in Snow the court relied on just two of the four factors
of Dutton; whereas in Rosales three of the four were found to be present. In sum, some
trade-off has been allowed when evaluating the Dutton reliability factors and when there is
other evidence lessening the devastating effects.
669. 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979).
670. Id. at 984.
671. FED. R. EVID. 803(7) establishes a hearsay exception for
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda reports, records, or data
compilation, in any form .... to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(10) establishes a hearsay exception for
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report,
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cials who swore that their department records did not disclose the entry
of Lee's name or his aliases.672 The defendant contended that the use
of these affidavits was a violation of his right to confrontation.
After finding that the affidavits satisfied the hearsay exception,
673
the Ninth Circuit went on to hold that the affidavits were compatible
with the sixth amendment. The court found the same three of the four
Dutton factors were satisfied as it had in Rosales. First, the three de-
clarants were in a position to have personal knowledge of the records,
because one official had personally examined the records, and the other
two had supervised the searches in their departments.6 7 4 Second, be-
cause the statements were made by "public officials in the discharge of
their duties," they are considered generally trustworthy, thus bolstering
the court's position that the statements were not based on faulty recol-
lection. 675 Finally, the court noted that since the statements were made
during trial, there was an increased probability that they were truthful
because the officials were aware of the "consequences" of making them
under oath.676
c. statements of co-defendants
Confrontation and hearsay issues also frequently arise when two
or more co-defendants undergo a joint trial. In the Supreme Court case
of Bruton v. United States,677 two defendants were jointly tried, and
one's out-of-court confession was correctly admitted against him under
a hearsay exception. The defendant-declarant did not take the stand.
However, the statement also incriminated his co-defendant.678 In addi-
tion, the confession was hearsay as to the second defendant, and was,
thus, inadmissible against him. The inadmissibility weighed heavily in
defendant's favor when the Court decided to reverse the conviction.679
statement, or data compilation, in any form was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with
rule 902 or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report,
statement, or data compilation, or entry.
672. 589 F.2d at 986-87.
673. Id. at 987. Written statements regarding a search are acceptable according to rule 27
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the incorporation of other federal rules in rule
802.
674. 589 F.2d at 988.
675. Id.
676. Id.
677. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
678. Id. at 123-26.
679. Id. at 128 n.3, 136 n.12. The Court stressed that the evidence was presumptively
unreliable.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4WREVIEW [
The Bruton court saw three problems involved in the use of a non-
testifying co-defendant's confession. First, the lack of cross-examina-
tion allowed the statement to go to the jury untested. Since the confes-
sion added "substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the
Government's case, in a form not subject to cross-examination," the
defendant's right to confrontation had been violated. 68 0 Next, the
Court decided that juries would not be able to follow the trial judge's
instructions "where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the de-
fendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial."68 ' The
Bruton court noted the initially prejudicial atmosphere in which a de-
fendant enters a joint trial, where the advantages in judicial economy
may be gained at the expense of constitutional rights.682
The Court in Bruton, after first acknowledging that an evidentiary
rule had been violated, concluded that a constitutional right was also
violated.683 Consequently, the Bruton rule recognized the error in ad-
mitting a non-testifying co-defendant's confession which implicates an-
other joined defendant.
For a Bruton error to occur, a co-defendant's statement must in-
culpate himself and his co-defendant and then be admitted in such
form at their joint trial.684 United States v. Hernandez68 5 dealt with the
use of a co-defendant's inculpatory remarks which were admitted into
evidence but from which all references of the other alleged co-conspira-
tors had been deleted. In order to avoid any Bruton error, the district
court had also prohibited any inquiry into the deleted material. How-
ever, attorneys for the co-defendants argued that inquiry was necessary
to demonstrate that each of their clients did not have knowledge of the
charged conspiracy to distribute heroin.686 Citing almost exclusively
Fifth Circuit decisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the deletions
had eliminated any potential Bruton problem.687 The record indicated
680. Id. at 128.
681. Id. at 135-36.
682. Id. at 130-36.
683. Id. at 136 n. 12. "The reason for excluding this evidence as an evidentiary matter also
requires its exclusion as a constitutional matter." Id. (emphasis in original).
684. Cf. United States v. Davis, 418 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir. 1969) (Bruton distinguishable
when statement itself is not incriminating).
685. 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979).
686. Id. at 749.
687. Id. The cases cited included United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.
1979)(defendant's right to confrontation is not violated when co-defendant's statement does
not allude to him); United States v. Gray, 462 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972)(right of confrontation not abridged when reference to defendant deleted); White
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that the "redacted post-arrest statement .. .successfully eliminated
any suggestion of involvement of other co-defendants in the acts de-
scribed therein."6 '
Since the Bruton rule stems from the right to confrontation, or to
challenge the evidence brought against a defendant, this conclusion
seems logical. The deletion eliminates any evidence which might be
impermissibly used against one defendant although it is ostensibly ad-
mitted against his co-defendant. Thus, the defendant who is not chal-
lenged by any evidence has no reason to confront the statement-
maker.
68 9
Further, the court of appeals in Hernandez upheld the district
court's prohibition against inquiries into the deleted materials. The
court criticized defense proposals as asking for the best of two worlds:
arguing for the deletion of-references under Bruton, while still using the
deleted portions to cast the blame on the other conspirators. As a re-
sult, the court held that the district court acted properly because the
"procedure would unjustly prejudice the nonconfessing co-defendants"
in the setting of a joint trial.69 0 More importantly, the Ninth Circuit
was not directed to any "explanatory or exculpatory" material in the
deletions which the defense could have used.69 1 Instead, the statement
was generally corroborative of the prosecution's evidence. Thus, no
particular prejudice was found.
v. United States, 415 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 993 (1970)(co-
defendant's confession was admissible because it did not implicate or inculpate defendant).
Accord, United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 494 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 921 U.S. 911
(1980) (statements of co-defendant were admissible because they alone were not clearly in-
culpatory); United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 930 (1974) (since jury would have no problem distinguishing an admission made con-
cerning one defendant's activities from that of another and, therefore, would not miscon-
strue such statements against the wrong defendant, admissibility was found not to violate the
Bruton rule).
688. 608 F.2d at 749. See also Williams v. Nelson, 457 F.2d 376, 377-78 (9th Cir.
1972)(deletion left nothing in the confession to identify defendant and Bruton requirements
were met); United States v. Kershner, 432 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970)("unless such a
procedure [of deletion] distorts a confession, it may be used because it does not violate any
constitutional right of the defendant to be confronted with the Wvitnesses against him");
Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946
(1970)("evidence supplied through the statement did not give substantial or critical support
to the government's case as to the co-defendants in a form not subject to cross-examina-
tion").
689. 608 F.2d at 749.
690. Id.
691. Id.
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d Bruton and harmless error
The application of Bruton has been further tempered by the
"harmless error" rule which reflects the Supreme Court's judgment that
"not all 'trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call
for reversal.' "692 In Harrington v. Calfornia,693 the United States
Supreme Court held that a violation of the right of confrontation as
guaranteed in Bruton could be harmless if the weight of other evidence
was overwhelming.
Two 1979 Ninth Circuit opinions came to different conclusions
about Bruton and the harmless error rule. In the first case, United
States v. Longee,69 4 the court of appeals found a plain Bruton error
which required the reversal of one defendant's conviction but the court
affirmed his co-defendant's conviction because the Bruton error was
deemed harmless.
695
Longee involved the killing of a man by his first cousin, Chaser,
and by Chaser's half-brother, Longee. The murder was the result of an
argument which erupted during a drinking party. Allegedly Longee
fired into a car windshield at the victim, and then Longee forced
Chaser to do the same.6 96 Defendant Chaser's two statements which
implicated both himself and Longee, his co-defendant, were introduced
into evidence.697 Chaser depicted Longee as the inducer of the crime.
In addition, his account was circumstantially corroborated by other ev-
idence.698 First, the events leading up to the shooting had been ob-
served by a witness who, however, had fled the scene before the actual
shots were fired. Second, defendant Longee also made statements
while in custody which placed him in close proximity to the murder,
but he shifted the entire blame to his co-defendant Chaser. Since each
non-testifying defendant had made out-of-court statements that incrim-
inated the other, both defendants' confrontation rights were violated
under Bruton when the statements were admitted at trial.
The two were tried before a judge. Yet, at trial, defense counsel
did not raise the confrontation issue, and neither did the judge sua
sponte recognize any error in the proceedings. In spite of the other
evidence introduced against Longee, the court of appeals held that
692. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969)(quoting Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
693. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). Accord, Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972).
694. 603 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1979).
695. Id. at 1345.
696. Id. at 1343.
697. Id. at 1344.
698. Id. at 1343-44.
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plain error had been committed in Longee's case, and, thus, reversal
was in order.699 The Ninth Circuit especially noted that in finding the
defendants guilty the district court judge had "substantially adopted
Chaser's account of the incident" and credited an accusatory statement
made by Chaser to Longee.7° In addition, neither the eye witness ac-
count nor Longee's own statement actually established that he was
present while the shooting took place. Moreover, Longee gave a pri-
marily exculpatory rendition of the events. The opinion also demon-
strates that Bruton is applicable even if the case is tried before a judge
instead of a jury. Here the judge had obviously not disregarded the
statements in finding Longee guilty; he referred to them in his conclu-
sion.
70 '
The same court reached an opposite conclusion in defendant
Chaser's case. The court held that the admission of Longee's state-
ments implicating Chaser was harmless error. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the district court had not relied on Longee's statement in coming to
its conclusion; therefore, the independent evidence was sufficient to
render any error harmless.7 ° z
In the second decision, United States v. Cornejo ,73 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the alleged Bruton error had been harmless. In Cornejo
one co-defendant, upon arrest for bank robbery by the police, blurted
out statements which implicated the other two defendants.7 0 How-
ever, the court found that the error in admitting these statements was
harmless in the face of other evidence. The three defendants had been
seen leaving and returning to the apartment where they were later ar-
rested. More importantly, immediately following the robbery the three
were discovered hiding in a bedroom inside the apartment in which the
bait money and an identifying piece of clothing were also found. °5
This evidence rendered the confrontation clause error constitutionally
harmless.
Besides pairing the harmless error rule with the Bruton rule, the
United States Supreme Court this past term further narrowed the
Bruton holding in Parker v. Randolph .7 1 Randolph involved three de-
699. Id. Plain error can be noticed on appeal even though the issue was not raised by
defendant at trial. FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b).
700. 603 F.2d at 1344.
701. Id. at 1345.
702. Id.
703. 598 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1979).
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
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fendants-Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton-who were hired by Joe
Wood to aid in the staged robbery of William Douglas, a professional
gambler.7"7 Douglas had won a great deal of money from Wood's
brother Robert by cheating at poker. Before Joe Wood led the three
respondents to the gambling scene, Robert Wood had killed Douglas
with a derringer his brother Joe had given him. The lack of positive
identification resulted in the state's reliance on the out-of-court confes-
sions of the three respondents in their prosecution for murder under
Tennessee's felony-murder rule. The confessions were determined to
have been given freely and voluntarily.
The Supreme Court did not recognize any confrontation clause er-
ror because both defendants' confessions were introduced.70 8 Thus, ac-
cording to the reasoning in Randolph, if confessions "interlock" no
constitutional violation has occurred. While the opinion did not indi-
cate why the Court concluded that the Randolph confessions inter-
locked,70 9 apparently the word was used to signify out-of-court
statements which corroborate each other.
Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority posited one main reason
for not finding any error in Randolph: once the defendant has given his
own confession, the admission by a co-defendant "will seldom, if ever,
be of the 'devastating' character referred to in Bruton.' .7 10 Therefore,
the Bruton right "has far less practical value to a defendant who has
confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his
innocence. 7 1 1 Once the defendant's confession is before the jury, his
inability to cross-examine a co-defendant whose confession is admitted
against him will be a small disadvantage. Although recognizing that
prejudice may flow from the introduction of a co-defendant's confes-
sion even though limiting instructions are given to the jury (as they
were in Bruton), the Court decided in Randolph that the prejudice was
so greatly reduced when the defendant also had confessed that admis-
sion of the evidence with the requisite instructions was sufficient.712
Notably, the Court did not contend that juries will better be able to
707. Id. at 65.
708. Id. at 72-74.
709. Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Certiorari was granted in part to clear up the
conflict among the circuits. Eg., United States v. Marcusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970) (rejecting the Bruton rule where confessions interlock). Contra
Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1969) (assuming
Bruton applies but finding harmless error).
710. 442 U.S. at 73.
711. Id.
712. Id. at 74. Justice Rehnquist argued that the "possible prejudice resulting from the
failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so 'devastating' or 'vital' to the
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follow the jury instructions7 13 when the defendant's own confession is
introduced, but rather that the co-defendant's statement will not cause
significant damage. Thus, any additional prejudice which arises from
the introduction of the confession of his co-defendant will probably not
affect the outcome of the jury's decision.
The Randolph opinion ignores the resulting harm which the
Bruton rule was designed to prevent. First, the statements admitted
into evidence are not admissible against the defendant under any hear-
say exception. Second, a defendant is still unable to cross-examine his
co-defendant. Additionally, Justice Rehnquist seems to acknowledge
that the jurors may not be able to follow the jury instructions. The
defendants still stand side by side in the prejudicial setting of a joint
trial. If the jury does not follow the instructions, then an error in the
trial has occurred, and Bruton should apply. 1 4 In limiting Bruton, the
Court did not cite any other high court opinion which presented argu-
ments in favor of the position taken in Randolph.
715
More than denying the applicability of the Bruton factors in Ran-
do/ph, the Court's rule is at odds with previous applications of
Bruton .7 6 The wording of the rule previously had not been limited to
non-confessing defendants.717 Consequently, Justice Blackmun's con-
currence rejected the approach of the majority opinion and instead
would have recognized the error but declared it harmless.7 18
The decision additionally leaves open the definition of "interlock-
ing confessions." Both the concurring and dissenting opinions see this
question as a future area of contention.719 The majority opinion may
mean that any statement corroborative of a co-defendant's confession
cures the violation of the sixth amendment. What kind of a statement
and how corroborative it must be are questions that were not answered
by this opinion.
confessing defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evi-
dence with limfiting instructions." Id.
713. See note 681 and accompanying text supra.
714. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 136-37.
715. 442 U.S. at 73.
716. In both Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), and Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223 (1973), the confessions of joint defendants were introduced, and the Supreme
Court held Bruton applicable although the error was deemed harmless. But see Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (Bruton errorpresumed but found harmless).
717. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 127-28; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
252 (1969).
718. 442 U.S. at 77 (concurring opinion).
719. Id. Justice Blackmun points out that the principal opinion simply assumes the con-
fessions interlock although respondents argued that they did not. Id. at 80. Justice Stevens
dissents and refers to the concurring opinion on this point. Id. at 82 n.2.
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The Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Longee,720 decided after
Randolph,72 1 may provide some insight. In Longee, defendant's state-
ment did place him at the scene of the crime but was basically exculpa-
tory, blaming his co-defendant Chaser for the commission of the
crime.7 2 2 However, Chaser implicated both himself and Longee (de-
picted as the inducer) in his out-of-court statements.723 Thus, while
Longee's statements may have "interlocked" with Chaser's to the de-
gree that they both placed him at or near the scene of the crime, overall
they were contradictory. Nor did the Longee court hold that Chaser's
remarks (admitting his part in the crime) interlocked with Longee's
statement implicating Chaser. Instead, the court, not citing Randolph
at all, held that Bruton was violated but that the error was harmless as
to Chaser. 2 Since the statements were corroborative of each other,
under Randolph Longee's statement could have been admitted against
Chaser. At any rate, the result would have been the same because of
the harmless error rule.
2. The right to compulsory process
The Supreme Court has stated,
[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to
present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version
of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of chal-
lenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.725
This right is found expressly in the sixth amendment right to compul-
sory process. 726 Several Ninth Circuit opinions in 1979 dealt with par-
ticular aspects of this right.
First, in United States v. Cook,72 7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals denounced the cat-and-mouse tactics of the Government, which
720. 603 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1979). See notes 694-702 and accompanying text supra.
721. Randolph was decided on May 29, 1979 and Longee on June 25, 1979.
722. 603 F.2d at 1344.
723. Id.
724. Id. at 1345.
725. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
726. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states that a criminal defendant has the right "to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
727. 608 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1979).
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secluded two witnesses and evasively answered in a motion before the
court that no wrongdoing was involved. However, the Ninth Circuit
refused to reverse defendant's convictions even though the prosecutor's
actions had effectively prevented any pre-trial interviews of the se-
cluded witnesses. Defense counsel had not continued to demand de-
fendant's right to interview, 728 but instead sought only the drastic
recourse of dismissal.
Further, a week before trial the Government released summaries
of the witnesses's expected testimony in compliance with the Jencks
Act 729 and the requirements of Brady v. Maryland.730 In light of the
combination of curative acts by the prosecution and the failure by the
defense lawyer to diligently pursue the defendant's right, the Ninth
Circuit refused to reverse.73
Cook demonstrates that in order to preserve a defendant's right to
interview witnesses or to gain access to them, defense counsel must
consistently pursue those rights. Since the Ninth Circuit has held that
the Government's seclusion of Government witnesses is by itself not
violative of a defendant's rights,73 2 defense counsel must seek a "sub-
poena or court order for the taking of a deposition under proper safe-
guards."733
Once a witness has been located by the defense and is willing to
testify, the actions of neither the judge nor the prosecutor may interfere
with the defendant's right to have his witness give favorable evidence.
The United States Supreme Court in Webb v. Texas734 concluded in
1972 that a defendant was denied due process because the trial judge
singled out the defense's only witness for a lengthy admonition about
the dangers of perjury. After the stem warning, the witness refused to
testify.
728. But see Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 865 (1969). The circuit court held that the government could not interfere with defense
counsel access to witnesses. "Witnesses, particularly eye witnesses, to a crime are the prop-
erty of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have an equal right, and should
have an equal opportunity, to interview them." Id. at 188.
729. 18 U.S.C.A. 3500(a) (West 1969 & Supp. 1979), which allows a defendant to gain
recorded out-of-court statements of a Government witness once the witness has testified on
direct examination.
730. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady forbids the Government to suppress evidence favorable to
an accused where the evidence is "material either to guilt or to punishment," irrespective of
the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. Id. at 87.
731. 608 F.2d at 1171-82.
732. United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837
(1974).
733. 608 F.2d at 1181.
734. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
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A Third Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, United States v. Morri-
son, extended the holding of Webb to prosecutorial interference with a
defense witness.7 35 In Morrison, before trial, the prosecutor sent
messages through the defense counsel to a defense witness, who was
threatened with perjury and other charges (related to defendants' case).
In addition, the witness was subpoenaed to meet with the prosecutor,
who, then, in the midst of the three undercover agents used in the case,
warned her again of possible perjury problems. The Morrison court
found the prosecutor's actions as reprehensible as those of the judge in
Webb. The court of appeals held that the actions contravened both
due process notions and the compulsory process right of the sixth
amendment.736
Relying on the doctrine of Morrison, the defendant in United
States v. Vargas-Rios,737 a 1979 Ninth Circuit case, argued that the
prosecutor had violated his rights to a fair trial. The defendant was
convicted of distribution of heroin and conspiracy to distribute her-
oin.7 38 During his guilty plea, a co-conspirator, Pena, made statements
incriminating another alleged co-conspirator, Barajas, but exonerating
defendant, Vargas-Rios. Counsel for defendant alleged that a condi-
tion of Pena's plea was a requirement not to testify against the govern-
ment. Subsequently, Pena changed his plea, and the prosecutor denied
defendant's accusation. During an examination on the question of
Pena's alleged conditional plea, the prosecutor admitted she had told
Pena's counsel, "'I might not be very happy if [Pena] took the stand
and perjured himself.' ,,739 Pena's counsel asserted that his client
feared a longer sentence would be recommended if he testified and was
not believed. He then indicated that although subpoenaed he would
invoke his fifth amendment right if called to the stand.740
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished the facts of Morrison from those of Vargas-Rios. The court
discovered "[n]o concerted effort on the part of the prosecutor to sup-
press the testimony of a possibly exculpatory witness. 741 Certainly the
prosecutor's actions in Vargas-Rios were not as coercive as those in
Morrison. Additionally, since the government is not required to grant
735. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
736. Id. at 226-28.
737. 607 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1979).
738. Id. at 833.
739. Id. at 837.
740. Id.
741. Id. at 838.
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immunity to witnesses,742 the defendant has "no absolute right to elicit
testimony from any witness whom he may desire."74 3 In sum, the case
demonstrates that in order to prove prosecutorial misconduct more
than just one comment from a prosecutor is necessary to show the de-
fendant's right to a defense was violated.
Four 1979 cases dealt with protecting a defendant's right of access
to witnesses who were non-resident aliens. Defendants are assured of
this right because they have the right to compel a witness's attendance
at trial, and, hence, they are given constitutional aid in formulating a
defense .7 However, once a witness is outside the jurisdiction of the
United States, the compulsory process provision has no effect. Conse-
qu&tly, the Ninth Circuit has refused to allow the government to de-
liberately and routinely return deportable witnesses to their country of
origin (generally Mexico) before defense counsel has interviewed them
to determine if their testimony would be favorable.745 In the principal
case, United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit based this
right on the fifth (due process) and sixth (compulsory process) amend-
ments.746
However, subsequent to Mendez-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit has
distinguished the rule in two instances: (1) when the unavailability of
the witnesses is not the result of unilateral action by the prosecution 747
and (2) when the unavailability is not prejudicial to the defendant. 748
Two 1979 Ninth Circuit opinions affirmed the lower courts on the basis
of those exceptions to the Mendez-Rodriguez rule.
In the first case, United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez,74 9 the un-
availability of the witnesses was not the result of unilateral government
action. Instead, the potential witness, an illegal alien, had escaped gov-
ernment detention by impersonating another alien ready to be properly
742. United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1976); Cerda v. United States, 488 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jenkins, 470
F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
743. 607 F.2d at 836 (citing United States v. Carman 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978)).
744. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that the criminally accused shall enjoy the
right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
745. United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
746. Id. at 5-6 (9th Cir. 1971). Accord, United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th
Cir. 1974).
747. Eg., United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234,235 (9th Cir. 1979) (over prose-
cution objection, the court determined that the two juveniles of the nine aliens should not be
detained because of the inadequate detention facilities for minors).
748. Eg., United States v. McQuillan, 507 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974) (no prejudice because
nothing indicated that the aliens found in border dragnet to discover suspect marijuana
smugglers were connected with the commission of the crime).
749. 608 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979).
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released.7 5 0 Thus, there was no "deliberate nor even negligent selective
retaining and returning of material witnesses."
751
Further, in dictum, the court went on to find that any prejudice
was remote because the other Mexican nationals were not cross-ex-
amined by the defense. It was unlikely that the missing alien would
rebut the first four's testimony since all five aliens were discovered to-
gether in a car being used for smuggling Mexicans into this country.
Yet, according to the strict holding of Mendez-Rodriguez, a defendant
is not required to show that the missing person would have been a
favorable witness because, being unavailable, the witness could not be
questioned by the defendant.7 52 Such a strict interpretation of Mendez-
Rodriguez has not, however, been followed in other decisions.753
Where prejudice is "remote," reversal under Mendez-Rodriguez has not
been granted.
In the other 1979 Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. Vaidez, 754
the court did not reverse when the Government allowed the witness to
return to Mexico because the missing person was present at trial and
neither side called him to the stand. Further, the Valdez court required
a showing that the witness's testimony could have benefited the defend-
ant.755 Such a showing is normally not required when the witness is
absent from the proceedings.756 Where the witness is available, as in
Valdez, the defendant has the opportunity and is required to find out if
the witness's testimony would be beneficial.
The Valdez court also found support for its conclusion based on
the Government's apparent lack of active involvement in the witness's
movements.757 From this opinion, it is difficult to determine what kind
of action or nonaction by the government triggers a violation. The
court recites that the witness was "questioned" by an immigration of-
750. Id. at 1242.
751. Id. at 1246. The Hernandez-Gonzalez court also labelled the system used for identi-
lying and retaining or releasing witnesses "clearly reasonable even if not totally failsafe."
Id.
752. 450 F.2d at 5.
753. E.g., United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 967 (1979) (Mendez-Rodriuez inapplicable because the aliens in question could
have offered no testimony as to guilt or innocence of defendant); United States v. McQuil-
lan, 507 F.2d at 32-33 (court did not follow Mendez-Rodriguez because there was "nothing
to indicate that the aliens were witnesses to the crime. . . or that their testimony could have
been of any benefit to the accused").
754. 594 F.2d 726 (9th- Cir. 1979).
755. Id. at 728.
756. See note 747 and accompanying text supra.
757. 594 F.2d at 728.
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ficer and then "allowed to return" to Mexico."' 8 These scanty facts fail
to fully demonstrate why the witness was questioned. However, if the
question dealt with the charges brought against defendant Valdez, the
policy of Mendez-Rodriguez would seem to require reversal.
A third 1979 case, United States v. Winnie Mae Manufacturing
Co. ,759 is a startling decision because the Ninth Circuit seems to have
added a difficult burden to defendants who wish to argue a Mendez-
Rodriguez error. Winnie Mae arose out of Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service raids on the defendant factory, at which 453 aliens were
arrested. Nearly all of the Mexican nationals were deported to Mexico.
As a result, the district court dismissed the three count indictment.
However, while affirming the lower court's decision as to two of
the counts, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the third count. Of the forty-
eight aliens allegedly arrested in connection with this count, thirty-five,
all women, were deported. The court of appeals reversed because it
believed that the women had returned to the Los Angeles area and
were available for any defense purposes. The court noted that ten of
the women were subsequently arrested in Los Angeles. Defendants did
interview these returnees. In addition, the manufacturing company is-
sued termination checks payable to all thirty-five women. The court
especially noted that "[ailmost every check was endorsed by its payee
and cashed in the Los Angeles area. 76 °
The court's conclusion that all thirty-five women were available is
startling because the court assumes that since the checks were cashed in
Los Angeles with the payee's name, the aliens were actually "available"
as Mendez-Rodriguez requires. Technically the Mexican nationals may
have been reachable by the subpoena power of the district court (as-
suming they were actually in Los Angeles when the checks were
cashed). However, as far as defendants were concerned, the aliens had
been sent back to Mexico. Requiring defendants to show that each
alien is unavailable is a "near impossible task." 761 Such an added de-
fense burden reduces the chances of proving that a Mendez-Rodriguez
error has occurred.
Finally, according to the 1979 Ninth Circuit decision in United
States v. Lujan-Castro,762 legal assistance is not required for a person to
waive his right to demand that the government retain deportable aliens.
758. Id.
759. No. 78-2101 (9th Cir. June 13, 1979).
760. Id. slip op. at 2125.
761. Id. at 2127 (Tang, J., dissenting).
762. 602 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Under circumstances which show that waiver was "knowingly and in-
telligently made" the court was "unwilling to exalt that right above
other equally important rights of constitutional derivation. 7 63 The
court failed to see any distinctions between such rights as the right to
remain silent7 ' or to be brought promptly before a magistrate765 and
the right guaranteed under Mendez-Rodriguez, which has been de-
scribed as part of the "right to formulate his defense uninhibited by
government conduct.
766
D. The Right to a Speedy Trial
1. Pre-accusatorial delay
Inherent in delays occurring between the commission of a crime
and the return of an indictment is the danger of prejudice to the de-
fense. Prejudice may result from the loss of witnesses, the loss of evi-
dence, or the dimming of memories. In the leading case of United
States v. Marion,76 7 the Supreme Court considered whether the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial768 or the fifth amendment right to
due process 769 was violated by a three-year delay between the end of an
alleged criminal scheme and the return of the indictment. 770 The Court
declined to extend the protection of the sixth amendment to delays oc-
curing before arrest, indictment, or other formal charge.7 7 1 However,
the Court acknowledged:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would re-
763. Id. at 879.
764. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
765. United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
841 (1978).
766. United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1974). United States v.
Lujan-Castro, 602 F.2d at 878-79.
767. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
768. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
769. "No person... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
770. 404 U.S. at 313.
771. On its face, the sixth amendment applies only to "prosecutions" and the "accused."
Id. The history of the adoption of the amendment and prior cases do not support the con-
clusion that the amendment is triggered before accusation. Id. at 313-15. Most importantly,
the major evils guarded against by the guarantee of a speedy trial occur after arrest or for-
mal charge: "Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty,
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial
resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him,
his family and his friends." Id. at 320. Prejudice to a fair trial can result from delays before
or after arrest, but that does not justify removing the sixth amendment from its proper con-
text. Id. at 321-24.
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quire dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that
the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial
prejudice to appellee's rights to a fair trial and that the delay
was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the
accused.772
The Marion Court adopted an ad hoe approach that required a "deli-
cate judgment based on the circumstances of each case.
773
In United States v. Mays,7 74 the Ninth Circuit interpreted Marion
as requiring a balancing of three factors: actual prejudice to the de-
fense, length of the delay, and reasons for the delay.775 The Mays court
decided that the initial burden was on the defense to establish actual
prejudice by definite proof.7 76 If the defense meets this burden, the
government is obligated to provide reasons for the delay.
777
The difficulty of establishing actual prejudice is illustrated by re-
cent Ninth Circuit decisions. In United States v. West,77 8 the indict-
ment was filed against the defendants some five months after an
abortive prison escape attempt. 779 The defendants claimed that their
defense was prejudiced by the delay because many witnesses were not
available, memories had faded, and the defense's ability to gather evi-
dence and contact witnesses was frustrated.7 0 However, offers of proof
as to what the missing witnesses would testify to were speculative and
largely irrelevant.7 8 ' The West court concluded that the trial court's
finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish actual prejudice
was not clearly erroneous.78 2
In United States v. Kail,783 two years passed between authorization
to intercept telephone conversations and the return of an indictment for
772. Id. at 324.
773. Id. The Marion defendants had not alleged or proven prejudice nor had they shown
that the delay was intentional by the government to gain tactical advantage. Thus, the case
was reversed and remanded for trial. Id. at 326.
774. 549 F:2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
775. Id. at 678.
776. Id. at 677. Statutes of limitation guard against the possibility of prejudice. See
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966) (such statutes designed to prevent "bringing
overly stale criminal charges").
777. 549 F.2d at 678.
778. 607 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
779. Id. at 302-03.
780. Id. at 304.
781. Id. at 305. Proof that some witnesses would not be available for trial is not sufficient
to establish actual prejudice. The courts require a demonstration of how the loss of the
witness is prejudicial. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
782. 607 F.2d at 305.
783. 612 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1979).
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conducting a gambling business. 84 The defendants alleged that they
were actually prejudiced by the delay because of their loss of memory
and the loss of possible witnesses.785 However, the defendants did not
specify what may have been forgotten or what possible witnesses might
be unavailable.7"6 The Kail court concluded that the due process claim
was unsubstantial.787
2. Post-accusatorial delay
The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial788 is triggered by for-
mal charge or arrest.78 9 Courts are more willing to find that a delay is
impermissible after this right has attached than before.790  The
Supreme Court adopted an ad hoc test in Barker v. Wingo791 to deter-
mine whether a speedy trial has been denied. The test weighs the
length of the delay,792 the reasons for the delay,793 the defendant's as-
sertion of his right,794 and prejudice to the defendant.795 The Barker
Court rejected proposals that it adopt a more definitive test such as a
strict time limit796 or the "demand-waiver doctrine. '797 In the Barker
784. Id. at 446.
785. Id.
786. Id.
787. Id.
788. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial ... " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
789. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971); see note 771 supra.
790. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he courts have been
more willing to find [post-accusatorial] delay to be constitutionally impermissible.").
791. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1971).
792. The length of the delay is a triggering mechanism. Whether the delay is presump-
tively prejudicial depends upon the circumstances of the case. Id. at 530-31.
793. Reasons for the delay weigh differently against the government: (1) intentional de-
lay to gain advantage over the defense weighs heavily against the government, (2) negligent
delay such as crowded courts, has some weight against the government, and (3) innocent or
valid delay, such as an unavailable witness, justifies an appropriate delay. Id. at 531.
794. The assertion of the right to a speedy trial can be used as a factor but cannot be
determinative. Id. at 525. See note 805 infra.
795. Prejudice to the defendant includes oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and
concern of the accused, and the impairment of the defense. 407 U.S. at 532. The most
serious prejudice is the impairment of the defense. Id.
796. Although setting a definite time limit would provide a definitive test, it would consti-
tute rule-making which is the province of Congress and the states. Id. at 523.
797. The "demand-waiver doctrine" deemed the right to a speedy trial waived unless
asserted. The Court decided that this doctrine was inconsistent with pronouncements that
inaction is not enough to waive a constitutional right. Id. at 525. There must be an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege before there can be a
waiver. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1935). However, the failure of the de-
fendant to assert his right to a speedy trial is a factor to be considered when denial to a
speedy trial is claimed. 407 U.S. at 528.
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case, the Court decided that a delay in excess of five years did not deny
the defendant his right to a speedy trial.798
The Barker test was employed in several recent Ninth Circuit de-
cisions. In United States v. Young,799 the court concluded that a speedy
trial claim was without merit. The court noted that the defendant had
conceded that the length of the delay was too short to raise a suspicion
that a speedy trial had been denied.8" Furthermore, substantial por-
tions of the delay had resulted from the defendant's requests to change
counsel.80 In United States v. Santos,802 there was a post-indictment
delay of fifteen months and the defendant had asserted his right to a
speedy trial by filing a motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the govern-
ment's excuse for the delay, a "disastrous typhoon," did not impress the
court.80 3 However, the Santos court concluded that the defendant was
not unduly prejudiced and therefore not denied a speedy trial.
8°4
An unusual situation was encountered by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Hooker. °5 The defendant was indicted for a narcotics
violation while serving time in a Peruvian prison for a violation of that
country's narcotics laws.s' The defendant could not be extradited,80 7
and the government made no diplomatic effort to obtain his return.80 8
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because it
concluded that the Government's failure to make a good faith effort to
obtain his release resulted in a delay which adversely affected his right
to a speedy trial.81 The Ninth Circuit reversed, deciding that the gov-
798. The defendant and an accomplice were charged with murder. The prosecution
needed the testimony of the accomplice against the defendant, but could not obtain it until
the accomplice was convicted. The accomplice was tried six times before he was convicted
and thus available to testify against the defendant. 407 U.S. at 515-19.
799. 593 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1979).
800. Id. at 892.
801. Id. When delay is attributable to the defendant, the right to a speedy trial is waived.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1971).
802. 588 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
803. Id. at 1307.
804. The witness who died was the alleged victim of the defendant's beating and un-
doubtedly would have been hostile. Id. There were photographs of the evidence that were
lost. Id. Assertion that defendant was prejudiced by absence of witnesses who had testified
before the grand jury was countered by the fact that the defense had access to all the prior
statements of these witnesses and was unable to point out inconsistencies between those
statements and testimony at trial. Id.
805. 607 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1979).
806. Id. at 287.
807. The United States had an extradition treaty with Peru, but the treaty did not include
the offense with which the defendant was charged. Id.
808. Id. at 289.
809. Id. at 287. The trial court relied upon United States v. McConahy, 505 F.2d 770 (7th
1980]
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
emnment was under no duty to make a good faith effort to effect the
release of an accused from a foreign prison so that he could be brought
back for trial.810 The Hooker court reasoned that the chance of effect-
ig the release was remote because there was no history of international
cooperation in these matters.81 Furthermore, the court concluded,
courts should not interfere in the exclusive province of the President
and the Senate.
812
E The Use of the Exclusionary Rule
The fourth amendment guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 1 3
However, neither the fourth amendment nor the rest of the Constitu-
tion provide any remedies when these rights are violated.
In Weeks v. United States,81 4 the United States Supreme Court
first fashioned a remedy, known as the exclusionary rule. The unani-
mous Court held the courts as well as law enforcement officers respon-
sible for acting in accordance with the fourth amendment. Evidence
gained without compliance with the amendment could not be used to
prosecute a criminal defendant. Otherwise, the Court felt that the
rights guaranteed would be valueless.81 ' Although applicable only to
federal prosecutions at that time, the exclusionary rule was later held to
apply to the states as well.
81 6
The exclusionary rule has been justified in order that (1) individu-
als can be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, (2) "fair"
trials, involving the integrity of the judicial system, can be maintained,
and (3) overzealous police officers will be deterred from trampling the
Cir. 1974), which required that the government make an effort to obtain an accused incar-
cerated in foreign countries for trial. The Seventh Circuit had relied upon Smith v. Hoocy,
393 U.S. 374 (1969), which held that a charging state must make a good faith effort to obtain
for trial an accused incarcerated in a federal penitentiary.
810. 607 F.2d at 286, 289.
811. Id. at 289. In contrast, there is a history of cooperation among the states and be-
tween the states and federal government. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
812. 607 F.2d at 289.
813. U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
814. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
815. Id. at 393.
816. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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rights of citizens.817 A marked divergence has emerged in Supreme
Court opinions dealing with the exclusionary rule. The current trend
of the Burger Court has been to narrow its application. The Court has
stressed that the rationale for the rule is the deterrence of police mis-
conduct.8 18 Therefore, the application of the exclusionary rule in non-
criminal proceedings 81 9 or to situations where the police have acted in
"good faith '8 20 has been questioned. These issues arose in a 1979
United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Caceres.8 2'
In Caceres, evidence obtained in violation of certain Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) administrative regulations was admitted in the
criminal trial of a taxpayer accused of bribing an IRS agent. The IRS
regulations in question prohibited the electronic surveillance of taxpay-
ers and IRS agents unless approved through normal channels.
Respondent Caceres was being audited when he allegedly offered
a bribe to an IRS agent wearing a secret monitoring device.8 22 The
lower federal courts ruled that the IRS had violated its regulations be-
cause its agent had not gone through proper channels in securing ap-
proval for the device. Although "emergency approval" had been
received, the courts determined that an emergency did not in fact exist
because it had been created by governmental action. Thus, the courts
excluded any evidence obtained by the IRS concerning the conversa-
817. Id. at 656. The Court seemed to stress that future police conduct was the object of
deterrence "'to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard it'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
818. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court wrote:
While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of
highly probative evidence....
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights .... It is not calculated to
redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any
'[r]eparation comes too late.'"
Id. at 485-86 (quoting Linidetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)). Accord, United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976).
819. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (exclusion in a federal civil
(tax) proceeding of evidence gained illegally by state police for a criminal (bookmaking)
investigation would not be likely to deter police misconduct).
820. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 417-18 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (good faith police errors should not be punished by use of exclu-
sionary rule). Accord, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421-22 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); cf United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (no retroactive application of
previous decision, United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), because of good
faith reliance by law enforcement on pre-Almeida-Sanchez rulings).
821. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
822. Id. at 747-48.
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tions in question. The Government did not challenge the lower court's
conclusion regarding the violation of administrative regulations, but
urged that the exclusionary rule should not be applied.
The Supreme Court agreed and reversed. First, because the re-
cording of face-to-face conversations is not protected by the fourth
amendment, 823 the Court found that the IRS infraction was non-consti-
tutional in nature. Thus, the IRS was not required by the Constitution
or by statute to adopt the regulations. Further, the Court treated the
government action as a good faith error of misconstruing the situation
as an emergency.
The Court also found no due process violation because the defend-
ant did not prove actual reliance on the IRS regulations prior to the
meetings with the IRS agent. Presumably the defendant would have
suffered the same prejudice even if the regulations had been followed.
Finally, the Court distinguished the application of the Administrative
Procedure Act,824 which authorizes judicial review and invalidation of
agency action "that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
not in accordance with law."81 2 Since the remedy sought was not inval-
idation of agency action, the Caceres Court reasoned that use of the
exclusionary rule to enforce agency regulations in a criminal proceed-
ing was not correct.
In dictum which indicates a less than overwhelming approval of
the exclusionary rule, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated
that "we cannot ignore the possibility that a rigid application of the
rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact
on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and
police procedures."8 26 On the other hand, without any attempt to en-
force these regulations, the protection at which they are aimed will not
be achieved. In creating the exclusionary rule the Supreme Court in
the past has emphasized that self-regulation by law enforcement bodies
and civil actions brought by search and seizure "victims" have not
proven to be effective remedies.8 27 Unfortunately, Caceres did not
present an especially strong case for the exclusionary rule's use because
no recognized right under the fourth amendment was at stake. Thus,
the opinion still raises questions whether law enforcement activity in
823. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-40 (1963).
824. 5 US.C. §§ 551-576 and 701-706 (1976).
825. 440 U.S. 753-54 & n.17.
826. Id. at 755-56.
827. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961).
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violation of its own self-regulation should be allowed to continue un-
checked.
One effect of the Caceres decision has already been felt. In United
States v. Soto-Soto,828 the Ninth Circuit had to distinguish between the
violation of an agency regulation and the violation of a federal statute.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's suppression of marijuana
found in defendant's truck in the course of a Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) border inspection for stolen vehicles. 29 The FBI agents
stopped the defendant's car only because it was a late-model pickup.
In doing so, the agents acted in excess of the authority granted by both
California and federal statutes. First, since there was no "founded sus-
picion" that defendant was violating any vehicular law, the agents
could not have been properly working with the California Highway
Patrol. 30 Second, not being customs or immigration officers, the FBI
agents were not authorized to make a border search of the pickup.8 3"
The Government, however, argued that under the rule of Caceres
the marijuana could be introduced even though an infraction had oc-
cured. The Ninth Circuit held that Caceres did not apply because, in
that case, only an agency regulation had been transgressed, whereas in
Soto the FBI agents had violated statutory law. 32 The court also ad-
dressed the question raised in Caceres that use of the exclusionary rule
might deter the affected administrative agency from creating its own
remedies to counter such violations. It noted that in the case of a viola-
tion of federal statutes, it was unlikely that the use of the exclusionary
rule would similarly deter Congress from defining the powers of the
respective federal law enforcement branches. "Rather, exclusion will
deter individual officers from ignoring these definitions."8 33 This as-
sumption is similar to that asserted by the dissent in Caceres, which
found no evidence to indicate that application of the exclusionary rule
would induce the agency to discontinue adoption of such regula-
tions.834
In contrast to Caceres, the Ninth Circuit also stated:
828. 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979).
829. Id. at 546.
830. Id. at 547.
831. Id. at 546.
832. Id. at 550. The Soto court cited Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1958)
as authority for its holding. In Miller the Supreme Court reversed a conviction because law
enforcement personnel had failed to comply with statutory law in conducting a search of an
apartment. Miller was also distinguished by the Caceres Court because it involved a statu-
tory violation which was lacking in the latter case. 440 U.S. at 755 n.21.
833. 598 F.2d at 550.
834. 440 U.S. at 768 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Whether the defendant was injured in any way or his consti-
tutional rights were violated is not an essential issue. Statu-
tory law was disregarded. Exclusion of the evidence seized is
the only available effective deterrent of such disregard ...
[T]he evidence obtained here was solely for purposes of prose-
cution in state or federal court and exclusion by this court will
directly deter illegal conduct in future searches at the border.
FBI agents and other general law enforcement officers will
know that they will not succeed in any attempt to expand
their authority by searching at a border.835
The emphasis is on deterrence of future conduct. As noted in the dis-
sent of Caceres, the exclusionary rule may be the only way to enforce
such regulations and laws. 36 Unlike the Caceres majority, the Ninth
Circuit focused on the fact that a law was broken and not whether that
infraction violated a constitutional right.
While the current trend of the Court has been to narrow the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in Caceres, a more liberal approach was
taken in the 1979 case of Dunaway v. New York. 837 There, the Court
relied on Brown v. Illinois838 and held that a seizure, in the fourth
amendment sense, had taken place when a defendant in response to a
request accompanied police officers to their station house and was in-
terrogated there, at which time he made inculpatory statements. 39 In
asking the defendant to accompany them, the officers had acted on less
than probable cause, had intended to restrain the defendant if he did
not cooperate, and had not told the defendant that he was free to go.
840
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan,
held that the inculpatory statements made during the custodial interro-
gation should have been suppressed because they were not "sufficiently
attenuated" from the initial illegal seizure. Concluding that the exclu-
sionary rule should have been used, the Court re-affirmed the factors
listed in Brown v. Illinois which measure the degree of attenuation: (1)
the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, (2) the pres-
ence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct.8" Although the police in Dunaway did not
835. 598 F.2d at 550.
836. 440 U.S. at 766-68 & n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
837. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
838. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
839. 442 U.S. at 203.
840. Id. at 212.
841. Id. at 218.
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threaten or abuse the defendant as had occurred in Brown, 42 the Court
felt that the statement should have been suppressed because a sufficient
"causal connection" existed between the illegal arrest and the inculpa-
tory statements.8 43 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that when such a
connection exists, "not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to
deter similar police misconduct in the future, but use of the evidence is
more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts."" This state-
ment seems to be an attempt to bolster the rationale for the exclusion-
ary rule which has been challenged by other high Court decisions.8 45
Four other Ninth Circuit cases decided in 1979 also illustrate a
marked divergence of thought concerning this rule.
In United States v. Jones,8 " the Ninth Circuit was faced with the
difficult question of whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to
the fortuitous discovery of evidence. The defendant Jones had been
arrested for burglary by the Los Angeles Police Department, but the
arrest was later held to have been made without probable cause.8 47 In-
cident to the arrest, the police found a motel key. Leaving the key be-
hind, the police went to the motel and discovered that the room was
registered to a man named Bennett. Bennett consented to a search of
the room and his car after he was told that the police were investigating
a Los Angeles burglary of which Jones was suspected. The police then
found evidence which was subsequently connected with a San Fran-
cisco burglary committed on federal property and which had occurred
about a month prior to Jones' Los Angeles crime. In his federal prose-
cution, Jones argued that this latter evidence was tainted by the illegal
arrest and should have been suppressed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected this contention and refused
to apply the exclusionary rule because the discovery of the San Fran-
cisco burglary evidence was deemed fortuitous. 48 In reaching this con-
clusion the court focused on the fact that the police were initially
investigating with the intent of uncovering evidence in connection with
the Los Angeles burglary, not the one in San Francisco.
842. In Brown, the police had broken into defendant's apartment, searched it, and then
"arrested" the defendant at gun point without probable cause (with the purpose of investi-
gating a murder). The defendant was escorted to police station, where he made inculpatory
statements. 422 U.S. at 592-95.
843. 442 U.S. at 218.
844. Id.
845. See notes 818-27 supra and accompanying text.
846. 608 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1979).
847. Id. at 388.
848. Id. at 391.
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Implicit in this decision is the thought that the "deterrence" ration-
ale of the exclusionary rule is best fulfilled when the evidence sup-
pressed directly relates to the initial illegality.849 Where the connection
is close, the exclusionary rule has greater impact. The connection is not
close in the case of a fortuitous discovery, because it cannot be said that
evidence so obtained has been achieved by the exploitation of [the] ille-
gality.-
850
By focusing on the deterrence aspect, the Jones opinion ignores
other reasons for applying the exclusionary rule such as maintenance of
judicial integrity and the preservation of the individual's fourth amend-
ment rights.
Another 1979 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Humphries,851 in
deciding that certain evidence had to be excluded, relied on the United
States Supreme Court decision of Stone v. Powell.8 52 In Stone, the
Supreme Court focused on the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary
rule and struck a balance between the purpose of the rule and its cost to
society in terms of lost convictions.8 53 Although such balancing was
not a part of the original adoption of the exclusionary rule,8 54 the Ninth
Circuit seems to have followed the current approach adopted by the
Supreme Court. The Humphries court thus held that evidence had to
be suppressed in spite of the public's interest in convictions because the
information gathered in an illegal arrest led directly to a stakeout order
which produced further evidence.
8 55
Taken together, both Humphries and Jones follow the Supreme
Court's present concern that the exclusionary rule should not be ap-
plied indiscriminately. Both look for a direct connection between the
initial illegality and the subsequent recovery of evidence.
Although the Ninth Circuit, in Humphries and Jones, focused on
the deterrence rationale of the exclusonary rule, in United States v. Pe-
rez-Esparza, 56 the court turned its attention to the judicial integrity
849. See, e.g., United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Allen v. Cupp, 426 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Deterrence can have its
effect only when it can be said that an object of the illegal conduct was the securing of the
evidence sought to be suppressed.").
850. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
851. 600 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1979).
852. Id. at 1246 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976)).
853. The exclusionary rule suppresses relevant evidence which is gathered in contraven-
tion to the fourth amendment. Thus, it "often frees the guilty." 428 U.S. at 490.
854. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
855. 600 F.2d at 1246 (excludable under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine of Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).
856. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
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rationale.85 7 The case arose from the stop of a narcotics smuggler at a
border patrol checkpoint in San Clemente, California. The defendant
was detained for two and one-half hours until Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration agents arrived to question him. After receiving his con-
sent to search the car, the agents discovered cocaine in the car's
headlight. In addition, the defendant made a confession after being
advised of his Miranda rights.
After deciding that the detention was illegal under the rule of Dun-
away v. New York,858 the court held that the evidence discovered was
the fruit of the poisonous tree and reversed the defendant's conviction.
In applying the exclusionary rule, the Ninth Circuit discussed two rea-
sons for its existence: deterrence of illegal police conduct and mainte-
nance of judicial integrity. The court noted the "conflicting signals"
given by the Supreme Court regarding the rationale of the exclusionary
rule,85 9 but adhered to the twin justifications used in the Dunaway anal-
ysis.8 60 In relying on Dunaway, the court stressed that no intervening
circumstances broke the chain of events from detention to the search
and that both events were close in time.8 61 Thus, the court held that
"the deterrence rationale was not vitiated" by a lengthy period away
from police influences, and that the defendant's decision to speak was
not "so independent of police pressures as to absolve the judicial sys-
tem from the charge of savoring the forbidden fruits of unconstitu-
tional conduct. 862
In determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply, the
Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's approach in Dunaway,
which did not emphasize the "flagrancy" of police activity. Police con-
duct in Dunaway was less susceptible to this type of criticism than it
had been in Dunaway's predecessor, Brown v. Illinois.863 As noted by
the Ninth Circuit, the Dunaway Court "gave short shrift to the 'purpose
857. Id. at 1288-89.
858. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The two-and-one-half-hour custodial detention in Perez-Es-
parza was similar enough to the Dunaway seizure to require probable cause, which was
ultimately found to be lacking. 609 F.2d at 1286-88.
859. 609 F.2d at 1288.
860. Id. at 1289.
861. 609 F.2d at 1290. The court began its analysis with the three-pronged test of Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), but concentrated on the two factors mentioned in text. Fol-
lowing the analysis in Dunaway, the Perez-Esparza court "gave short shrift" to the purpose
and flagrancy of police conduct, the third factor in Brown. See notes 837-41 supra and
accompanying text.
862. 609 F.2d at 1290.
863. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). See notes 842-43 supra and accompanying text.
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and flagrancy' factor emphasized in Brown." 864 However, the Perez-
Esparza court did not overlook this factor but gave the other two more
weight in light of "Dunaway's sweeping language.
865
Another reversal based on the exclusionary rule was ordered by
the Ninth Circuit in the 1979 decision of United States v. Perez-Cas-
tro.866 In this case, the defendant had been mysteriously awakened
and taken by the Tucson police at night from his friend's home. With-
out an arrest warrant, the police transported him to the United States
Border Patrol Sector Headquarters in Tucson. After a night in a deten-
tion facility, the defendant made incriminating statements which he
later sought to suppress. At the suppression hearing, the Government
was "unable to give any details or explanation of the events surround-
ing [defendant's] arrest."867
Although the district court denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no attenuation between the
statements and the illegal arrest. No intervening circumstances less-
ened the taint of the initial illegal arrest and not much time had elapsed
between it and the confession. The most important reason for applying
the exclusionary rule (although not specifically mentioned) may have
been the "purpose and flagrancy" of the police conduct. Without ex-
planation, Tucson police had roused the defendant and taken him to
the border patrol. This conduct appears to be the most appropriate
candidate for application of the exclusionary rule.
F The Right to a Public Trial
One of the rights enumerated in the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."'86
The public trial right has its roots in the development of the jury system
in England and by the seventeenth century had become a fairly well-
recognized common law tradition. 69 English and American commen-
tators have justified open proceedings on several grounds, which in-
clude: (1) deterring witnesses from committing perjury;87 0 (2) bringing
864. 609 F.2d at 1291.
865. Id. at 1291.
866. 606 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1979).
867. Id. at 253-54.
868. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
869. Madsen, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1308, 1322
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Right to Attend].
870. M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343,345 (6th ed. 1820)
("That it is openly, and not in private before a commissioner or two, and a couple of clerks;
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forth persons, unknown to the parties or their counsel, with knowledge
of the facts;87' (3) educating the public;872 and (4) promoting fair and
ethical work by the participants in the action. 73 The United States
Supreme Court, in In re Oliver,874 focused on what it perceived to be
the principal safeguard of the public trial guarantee:
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his
trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the
guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against
any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecu-
tion. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.
875
Thus, at the core of this sixth amendment right are the interests of all
criminal defendants who are benefitted by proceedings which do not
hide prosecutorial misconduct.
876
However, to implement this right most members of the public
must rely on the press to communicate and discuss courtroom proceed-
ings. Consequently, public trials often include an audience far larger
than the few spectators actually in the courtroom. As a result, two con-
stitutional guarantees-freedom of the press 877 and due process878-
sometimes are at loggerheads. On the one hand, no prior restraint on
the dissemination of information from criminal proceedings is permit-
ted because of the first amendment.879 On the other hand, massive,
pervasive, and prejudicial publicity creating a circus-like atmosphere
may lead to a denial of a defendant's life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. 8 Consequently, the ramifications of open pro-
where, oftentimes witnesses will deliver that which they will be ashamed to testify publickly
[sic].").
871. Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944).
872. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966) ("justice cannot survive behind the
walls of silence"); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948).
873. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 522-24 (1827).
874. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
875. Id. at 270.
876. Right to Attend, supra note 869, at 1325 ("Ultimately, the goal is fairness for all
defendants, and its attainment depends upon public awareness, discussion, and criticism of
the criminal process.").
877. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part that the "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
878. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." These rights are protected against
federal action by the fifth amendment.
879. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
880. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966) (Jury's verdict must be based on
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ceedings extend beyond those defendants to whom the right has been
given.
The effect of a public trial on a participant other than a defendant
was at issue in the 1979 Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Her-
nandez."s ' In Hernandez, the Government asked the district court to
exclude all spectators during the testimony of its lead witness, an in-
formant, who was "in fear of his own personal safety. '88 2 On the basis
of an affidavit of a government agent, the court imposed the exclusion-
ary order.
The court of appeals first rejected the contention that a criminal
defendant has an absolute right to a public trial.883 Instead, the court
stressed that "[a]n accomodation must be made of the individual's right
to a public trial and those societal interests that might justify closing
the courtroom to the public." ' 4 The Ninth Circuit found that the ex-
clusionary order was "reasonably limited" and necessary to protect the
witness and his family from "harrassment and physical harm."88 5
Although the right to a public trial is by its own terms without
limitation, there seems to be a consensus among the courts of appeal88 6
and the Supreme Court8 8 7 that narrow exceptions or limitations are
constitutionally permissible. Therefore, the Hernandez court, in decid-
"evidence received in open court, not from outside sources."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
881. 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979).
882. Id. at 746.
883. Id. at 747.
884. Id.
885. Id. at 748.
886. The reason for excluding some or all of the public include retaining courtroom deco-
rum, protecting witnesses, and protecting the confidentiality of certain testimony. See Lloyd
v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (spectators removed in
order to protect confidentiality of government agents); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972) (public excluded during discussion of skyjacker
profile); Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966) (all
spectators except press removed to protect witnesses and preserve order); Geise v. United
States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959) (most spectators ex-
cluded in rape case where prosecutrix and two other witnesses were of.4ender years and a
large audience would inhibit testimony); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913)
(trial judge's action in excluding certain spectators did not prejudice defendant's right to a
public trial when it appeared that their morbid curiosity might cause embarrassment to a
victim in a rape case).
887. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-63 (1966) (holding that the carnival
atmosphere denied defendant due process rights and authorizing limitations of the press to
protect defendant); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) ("Because of the
Constitution's pervasive concern for these due process rights, a trial judge may surely take
protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary."). See gener-
ally Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381 (1932).
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ing against an absolute right to a public trial, appears to be in accord
with the weight of authority.
As for the procedural aspects of the trial, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's reliance on the affidavit instead of the eviden-
tiary hearing.888 The defense counsel had claimed that the affidavit
made no mention of the witness-informant's fears. However, the affi-
davit did recount mysterious telephone calls and numerous threats,
thus giving a reasonable basis for the district court's conclusion.8 9 The
court of appeals found the affidavit sufficient, although it agreed that
an evidentiary hearing might have been the better approach.890
Hernandez demonstrates that, while a public trial is guaranteed to
the criminally accused, the ramifications of public exposure may extend
far beyond the individual interests of the defendant. This was readily
apparent in the 1979 Supreme Court case of Gannett Co. v. De Pas-
quale, where a newspaper owner brought a suit challenging a trial
court order which had excluded the public and the press from a pre-
trial suppression hearing. 91 The criminal case itself involved two
young men, aged sixteen and twenty, who were suspected of murdering
a forty-two year old man. Throughout the search, capture, and ar-
raignment of the defendants, several newspaper accounts of the murder
and the police procedures utilized were reported. 892 During the next
ninety days until defendants' suppression hearing, no reporting oc-
curred. At the suppression hearing, the defense attorneys moved to
close the hearing to the public because of "unabated buildup of adverse
publicity," which, it was claimed, would jeopardize defendants' right to
a fair trial.8 93 The prosecutor acquiesced, the judge agreed, and Gan-
nett's reporter covering the hearing made no objection. Later, in re-
sponse to a written demand of the reporter, the court conducted a
hearing and concluded that, although the press was guaranteed a con-
stitutional right of access, "the interest of the press and the public was
outweighed in this case by the defendant's right to a fair trial.
894
In affirming the New York state court decision, 95 the United
888. 608 F.2d at 748.
889. Id. at 744 n.2.
890. Id. at 748. Cf. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1275 (no affidavit presented, only
prosecution's asserted need to maintain confidentiality of government undercover agents).
891. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
892. Id. at 370-76.
893. Id. at 374.
894. Id at 375.
895. The trial court's action was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. 43 N.Y.2d
370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
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States Supreme Court adhered to a literal interpretation of the sixth
amendment. First, the Court found that the "Constitution nowhere
mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public;
its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the accused."8 96
This conclusion is consistent with language in other Supreme Court
decisions8 97 and has been uniformly arrived at by commentators, even
by those rationalizing a right of access on other grounds.89 Thus,
while a defendant had no right to unilaterally compel a closed proceed-
ing, the Court held that the public interest is adequately protected by
the other participants in the trial-the prosecutor and judge.8 99
Second, the Supreme Court refused to elevate the traditional com-
mon law rule of open courtrooms to a constitutional right held by the
public. The Court held that the framers of the Constitution did not
"ccreate a constitutional right in strangers to attend," but only conferred
upon the accused "an explicit right to demand a public trial." 9c In
addition, the common law rule applies to both civil and criminal ac-
tions,90' whereas the sixth amendment specifically applies to "criminal
prosecutions." 902
While the Gannett dissenters were convinced that strong public in-
terests demanded recognition under the amendment, 03 the majority re-
jected this expansive view and stuck to the principle interests at the
core of the right.9°4
Two questions remain open after Gannett: (1) the role of the first
amendment and (2) the type of proceedings affected by this holding. In
896. 443 U.S. at 379-80 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
897. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-21 (specifically right to counsel is enjoyed
personally by the defendant); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965) (public trial guar-
anteed accused so that he "would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned"); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) ("the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution").
898. The Rightto Attend, supra note 869, at 1321 (specifically dealing with the lower court
treatment in Gannett); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 392 (1932);
Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings,
91 HARV. L. Rv. 1899, 1902 (1978); Note, The Right to a Public Trial in Criminal Cases, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1138, 1156 (1966) (public interest does not equal a public right).
899. 443 U.S. at 383-84. Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) ("no constitu-
tional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this right [to be tried by an impartial jury-
sixth amendment] on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if
either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to. . .the very
thing that the Constitution guarantees him").
900. 443 U.S. at 383-84.
901. Id. at 386 n.15.
902. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
903. 443 U.S. at 405-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
904. See notes 875-76 supra and accompanying text.
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regard to the first question, Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opin-
ion, rejected the notion that any right of access emanated from the first
amendment.90 5 The dissenters, although claiming never to have
reached the issue, seem also to reject the argument. 90 6 The majority,
while citing the same cases as the dissent and Justice Rehnquist, as-
sumed the point arguendo, but found that "all appropriate deference"
to the amendment had been given.9 7 Finally, although Justice Powell
forcefully argued that Gannett had an interest protected by the first
amendment, he agreed with the majority that due deference had been
given.
90 8
The second open question is whether the case is restricted to sup-
pression hearings or extends to full trials. At several places in the plu-
rality opinion the holding is limited to pre-trial suppression hearings.
Justice Stewart first notes the "special risks of unfairness" which result
from publicity of suppression hearings. 909 Secondly, the Court assumes
arguendo that while the common law tradition of public attendance at
trials is a constitutional right, no common law rule is associated with
public hearings.910 Concurring, Justice Burger specifically limited the
holding to pre-trial hearings-partially due to his dislike for the exclu-
sionary rule.911 This question, however, may be answered shortly. Re-
cently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a case dealing with
closure of an entire trial as permitted under a state statute.912 How this
future decision may modify or expand Gannett remains to be seen.
III. PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Bail
1. Relief from forfeiture of bail
Bail forfeiture is mandatory when a condition of bail is
breached.913 The purpose of bail forfeiture is to discourage violations
of bail covenants and to discourage defaults that create unnecessary
905. 443 U.S. at 403-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
906. Id. at 411 and 446-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
907. Id. at 391-92.
908. Id. at 397-403 (Powell, J., concurring).
909. Id. at 378.
910. Id. at 387-91.
911. Id. at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
912. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (Va. July 9, 1979), cert granted, 444 U.S.
896 (Oct. 9, 1979).
913. FED. R. CRiM. P. 46(e)(1) states that "[i]f there is a breach of a condition of a bond,
the district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail."
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delay and expense to the government. 91 4 Forfeiture may be set aside,
however, if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of
the forfeiture.915 The factors to be considered with respect to motions
to set aside bail forfeiture are the willfulness of the breach, the
prejudice to the government, and any explanation or mitigating factors
presented by the defendant. 916
In United States v. Stanley,917 the defendant violated the travel re-
strictions of his personal appearance bond, and the government suc-
cessfully filed an ex parte motion to revoke the defendant's bail.
Finding that his breach was intentional1 8 and that he could provide no
justifiable explanation or factors mitigating the breach,919 the Ninth
Circuit refused to grant the defendant relief from forfeiture of bail,920
even though there was no showing of prejudice or inconvenience to the
government.
921
In Stanley, the Ninth Circuit also made it clear that it will not
overturn a district court's decision to refuse to remit all or part of for-
feited bail, absent an abuse of discretion.9 22 This indicates a greater
reluctance to set aside forfeitures in the Ninth Circuit than in other
circuits, which have allowed less than total forfeiture when there is no
evidence that the government suffered any delay or expense from the
defendant's breach.923 Here, the refusal to set aside part of the forfei-
ture seems unduly harsh in light of the fact that Stanley made all re-
quired court appearances and that no showing was made by the
914. Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 468, 490 (5th Cir. 1966).
915. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(e)(2) provides that "[t]he court may direct that a forfeiture be
set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not
require the enforcement of the forfeiture."
916. United States v. Nolan, 564 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Foster, 417 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1969).
917. 601 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
918. A condition of bail was that Stanley not leave the Northern District of California.
Stanley was arrested in Maine on suspicion of smuggling. Id. at 381-82.
919. Id. at 382.
920. The court stated that "[w]e do not believe that the district court abused its discretion
in refusing to remit all or part of the forfeited bail." .d.
921. Apparently, Stanley made all court appearances and the government made no show-
ing of any prejudice. Id.
922. Id. See also United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1978) (though trial
judge has wide discretion whether to remit a forfeiture, the forfeiture must not be arbitrary
or capricious); United States v. Foster, 417 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1969) (trial court's
judgment may be reversed only if decision was arbitrary and capricious).
923. See United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir. 1978) (forfeiture of $25,000 of
$100,000 appeared excessive when no evidence that the government suffered any delay or
expense).
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government of prejudice by the breach.924 A partial forfeiture of Stan-
ley's bail may have been an adequate penalty.925 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has taken a more inflexible stand on this question than other
circuits.
2. Bail jumping
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1966,926 the five elements of the
crime of bail jumping are that the defendant "(1) was released pursuant
to . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3146; (2) was required to appear in court; (3) was
aware of this required appearance; (4) failed to appear as required; and
(5) was willful in his or her failure to appear."927 These elements were
considered by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. MGill.928 In Mc-
Gill, the defendant appealed a conviction of bail jumping, asserting
that the district court erred in taking from the jury the first element of
the crime, when he decided that the defendant's release was pursuant to
the Act as a matter of law.
929
In 1975, McGill was indicted for violating the Controlled Sub-
stance Act930 and was released on bond. Subsequently, a superseding
indictment was filed against him under which he was tried and con-
victed. McGill then failed to appear for sentencing and was tried and
convicted by a jury of bail jumping. At trial, he conceded that he was
released pursuant to the Act under the original indictment, but argued
that his failure to appear was in connection with the superseding indict-
ment, to which his bond did not relate. On appeal, he argued that the
court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that the release was pursu-
ant to the Act, asserting that the jury should have been allowed to de-
termine whether that element of the crime had been proved.
931
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that criminal defendants are en-
titled to trial by jury of every element of the offense charged, but held
that "in most cases, the question whether a release was pursuant to the
Act will be one on which the trial judge should instruct the jury as a
matter of law."932 The court conceded that the question may involve
924. 601 F.2d at 382.
925. See, United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The purpose of bail is
not punitive; it is to secure the presence of the defendant.").
926. 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976). Hereinafter referred to as the "Act."
927. United States v. McGiU, 604 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979).
928. 604 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1979).
929. Id. at 1254.
930. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 (1976).
931. 604 F.2d at 1254.
932. Id.
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issues of law and issues of fact, but in such cases as the present one,
where the principal issue was the authority by which a judge released a
defendant, the question is one of law.
933
In reaching its decision, the court relied on section 3146(e) of the
Act, which provides broad discretionary power to a judge to impose
additional or different conditions on a defendant's release. 9 4 The
Ninth Circuit found that the trial judge acted within his discretion
when he applied the original bond to the superseding indictment, thus
making the release in question pursuant to the Act.935
The MicGill decision is significant in that a contrary holding would
have allowed juries to question a judge's discretion on procedural mat-
ters. It is clear that the Act was intended to grant broad discretion to
the judge.936 Thus, it would be unreasonable to permit a jury to rule on
the propriety of a judge's discretionary decisions. As the Ninth Circuit
pointed out, issues of fact may be present in cases involving the release
element of the crime of bail jumping. 937 If such a showing is made by a
defendant, then the issue should go to the jury. However, where no
showing is made that factual issues are involved, as in McGill, there is
no basis to attack the trial judge's decision.
B. Compliance with Discovery
In Flavorland Industries, Inc. v. United States,938 the Ninth Circuit
indicated that corporations must take affirmative steps to comply with
grand jury subpoenas. Flavorland Industries was served with a grand
jury subpoena requesting certain depositions that were taken of its em-
ployees as part of a state court antitrust action between private parties.
Flavorland refused to comply, arguing that the materials sought were
subject to a protective order issued in the state court action.939 The
933. Id.
934. Id. at 1255. Section 3146(e) provides that "[a] judicial officer ordering the release of
a person on any condition specified in this section may at any time amend his order to
impose additional or different conditions of release. .. .
935. The court pointed out that the trial judge noted during the subsequent proceedings
that the defendant was present on bond. In addition, it was undisputed that McGill under-
stood the order to appear. 604 F.2d at 1255.
936. The court stated that "[w]e believe this broad grant of discretionary power to change
the terms of release reflects a congressional decision that the trial judge should resolve in
favor of release most questions that arise in connection with a defendant's bail." Id.
937. Id. at 1254.
938. 591 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1979) (order).
939. Flavorland also argued that the grand jury exceeded its authority in issuing the sub-
poena and that it was against the company's interest to produce the requested material. Id.
at 525.
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Ninth Circuit refused to allow Flavorland to hide behind the cloak of
the state court's protective order, stating that Flavorland "had not done
all it might to remove any impediment to its ability to comply with the
subpoena that was created by the State court protective order.
The court directed Flavorland to petition the state court judge for a
modification of the protective order.
941
Flavorland is significant in that it establishes a rule in the Ninth
Circuit that civil discovery orders cannot be used to subvert discovery
in criminal cases.942 When subpoenaed, a criminal defendant can be
required to seek a determination whether the information sought by the
subpoena is unobtainable or if the civil proceeding's order can be mod-
ified so as to enable compliance with the criminal discovery request.
Rather than allow Flavorland to stand passively behind the state
piotective order, the Ninth Circuit ordered it to petition for a modifica-
tion so that the state judge could indicate whether it was his intention
to shield the particular information from the federal grand jury.
943
This allowed the state judge to consider the possibility of a more nar-
rowly framed protective order9 " and promoted a fair and reasonable
attempt to provide relevant information to the grand jury while pro-
tecting the rights of the defendant in the civil action.
945
C. Competency to Stand Trial
A guilty plea in a criminal case functions as a waiver of important
constitutional rights.946 Thus, great care must be taken to insure that
an individual is competent to plead guilty.947 It is well settled that
"failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right
940. Id.
941. Id.
942. Cf. McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 671-72 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (civil discovery
may not be used to subvert limitations on criminal cases).
943. The court stated that it perceived "no intention or purpose on his [state court judge's]
part to prevent the documents coming to the federal Grand Jury which is investigating a
possible indictment of Flavorland." 591 F.2d at 525.
944. E.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d at 672 (case remanded where there was no
indication that the District Court considered the possibility of a more narrowly framed pro-
tective order).
945. The court stated that it had "no desire to issue an order which would have the effect
of contravening any purpose of Judge Elston [state court judge] in preserving the orderly
process of the private litigation .... " 591 F.2d at 525.
946. A defendant who enters such a plea waives his privilege against self incrimination,
his right to trial by jury and his right to confrontation of his accusers. McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
947. See Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 131 (8th Cir. 1977) (in view of the totality of
the circumstances, defendant's guilty plea was not entered voluntarily).
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not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives
him of his due process right to a fair trial." '948
In Darrow v. Gunn,94 9 the defendant contended that a state court
erred in failing to hold a competency hearing when a good faith doubt
arose as to his competency to stand trial.95 0 The defendant also con-
tended that the district court's retrospective hearing was not sufficient
to compensate for this error. In Darrow, the defendant originally
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to charges of first degree mur-
der, kidnapping and use bf a firearm in the commission of the alleged
crimes.95 1 Over the objection of his attorney, Darrow withdrew his
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and entered a plea of guilty.
After two court-appointed psychiatrists determined Darrow to be
sane,952 the judge accepted Darrow's guilty plea.
Darrow subsequently filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea,
alleging that he was mentally incompetent at the time the plea was en-
tered.953 In support of his motion, Darrow cited a report of a forensic
psychiatrist hired by his appointed counsel which concluded that Dar-
row was a paranoid schizophrenic living in a delusional world and was
legally insane at the time of the crimes charged.954 The trial court de-
nied the motion to set aside the guilty plea, and the district court re-
fused Darrow's writ of habeus corpus. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
remanded for reconsideration. 95" On remand, the district court, unable
to determine if Darrow was competent, remanded to the state trial
court for the determination. After an evidentiary hearing,95 6 that court
concluded that Darrow was competent at the time his plea was ac-
cepted. The district court affirmed the state court's findings and Dar-
948. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
949. 594 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1979).
950. Id. at 769.
951. Id.
952. Id.
953. Id. at 770.
954. The report also stated that Darrow was aware of the nature of the charges against
him and could cooperate and collaborate with the public defender's office unless the para-
noid system within which he operates was enlarged to include the public defender's office.
Id. at 769.
955. The Ninth Circuit cited an absence of the transcripts in which Darrow's plea was
accepted and the district court's failure to apply the standards set forth in Sidling v. Eyman,
478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973), which provide that "[a] defendant is not competent to
plead guilty if a mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned
choice among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the consequences of his
plea."
956. At the time of the hearing, the state court interviewed all psychiatrists involved in
the case. 594 F.2d at 770 n.5.
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row appealed to the Ninth Circuit, alleging that the trial court erred in
not holding a competency hearing and questioning the propriety of the
retrospective hearing.
957
Although the United States Supreme Court has not prescribed a
standard which dictates the quantum of evidence necessary to require a
competency hearing,958 the Ninth Circuit has held that
a due process evidentiary hearing is constitutionally com-
pelled at any time that there is "substantial evidence" that the
defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. ... . Evidence
is "substantial" if it raises a reasonable doubt about the de-
fendant's competency to stand trial . . . . At any time that
such evidence appears, the trial court sua sponte must order an
evidentiary hearing on the competency issue.
959
Clearly, the rule in the Ninth Circuit is that the duty to hold a compe-
tency hearing on the court's own motion is not limited to any particular
part of a criminal proceeding.
After careful review,960 the Ninth Circuit refused to overturn Dar-
row's conviction. The court stated that "[a] reasonable judge . ..
should not have entertained a good faith doubt concerning Darrow's
competence to stand trial or to plead guilty." 961 The court cited an
absence of factors that would have indicated a good faith doubt as to
Darrow's competency: 1) a long history of irrational behavior and
mental illness, 2) a psychiatric report throwing doubt on the defend-
ant's competency, and 3) irrational behavior in the courtroom.96 2
Without question, the trial court was not faced with the above fac-
tors prior to the acceptance of Darrow's guilty plea. The introduction
of the psychiatrist's report that concluded that Darrow was a "paranoid
schizophrenic," however, should have raised a reasonable doubt in the
judge's mind concerning Darrow's competency. At that time, a compe-
tency hearing was compelled.
957. The court felt that in most cases, a retrospective hearing is not sufficiently reliable to
be constitutionally proper. Id. at 770.
958. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (the Court noted that in previous
decisions it did not "prescribe a general standard with respect to the nature or guarantee of
evidence necessary to require resort to an adequate procedure").
959. Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). See
also United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Bare assertions by defend-
ant's counsel that defendant is not competent to stand trial generally are not sufficient to
raise the requisite doubt.").
960. The court stated "recognizing that our review of a failure to provide a competency
hearing must be 'comprehensive' we conclude that the court did not err." 594 F.2d at 771.
961. Id.
962. Id.
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In affirming the trial court's decision, the Ninth Circuit ignored its
own rule that "any time such evidence appears, the trial court sua
sponte must order an evidentiary hearing on the competency issue."
9 63
Although the evidence before the court was not conclusive, 964 the psy-
chiatrist's report should have presented a good faith doubt about the
defendant's competence. In view of the seriousness of the charges Dar-
row faced and the conflicting evidence, he should have been granted a
competency hearing when the trial court considered his motion to set
aside the guilty plea.
A ruling in Darrow's favor would have established a sturdy rule
that courts in the Ninth Circuit carefully consider a defendant's compe-
tency to stand trial and his waiver of important constitutional rights.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling eroded those concerns, however, allowing a
retrospective hearing on competency to remedy prior due process viola-
tions. The inherent difficulties in holding a retrospective competency
hearing make it a highly questionable remedy.
965
D. Identfcations
In 1967, the Supreme Court recognized that "[a] major factor...
contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mis-
taken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the
manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for
pre-trial identifications. 966 The Court established that the sixth
amendment right to counsel9 67 and the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments' due process clauses968 can be used to challenge unnecessarily
suggestive969 pre-trial identification procedures. Further, if the totality
of the circumstances shows that a lineup was unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, then the exclu-
sionary rule applies and the identification will not be allowed into evi-
dence.970
963. Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d at 666.
964. Two court-appointed psychiatrists felt that Darrow was sane. 594 F.2d at 769 n.l.
One psychiatrist hired by defense counsel felt that he was legally insane. Id. at 769.
965. Id. at 770.
966. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
967. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967).
968. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
969. Pre-trial identification procedures are "unnecessarily suggestive" if they create a sug-
gestion that the accused committed the crime. Such a suggestion must be so unnecessary or
impermissible as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification under the
totality of the circumstances. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
970. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
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In United States v. Williams,971 the defendant claimed that the re-
quirement that he don a wig at a lineup violated the limits set forth in
two Supreme Court cases, Simmons v. United States972 and Neil v. Big-
gers. 973 Citing Manson v. Brathwate,974 the Ninth Circuit side-stepped
the issue of suggestive identification by holding that even if the use of
the wig were considered suggestive, "based on the 'totality of the cir-
cumstances', the out-of-court identification was sufficiently reliable to
go to the jury for ultimate determination of weight and reliability.
975
The witness, a bank teller, was approached by the defendant during a
robbery. She was face to face with him and heard his voice when he
threatened her.976 The court stated that the witness had an excellent
opportunity to view the defendant during the robbery and that her sub-
sequent unequivocal identification of him outweighed any suggestive-
identification argument put forth by the defendant.977
The Ninth Circuit's decision was clearly in line with the general
rule in the federal courts. Under the "totality of circumstances" test,
the pre-trial identification procedure used in Williams was not unduly
suggestive. Investigative reports on the robbery concluded that the rob-
ber wore a wig during the commission of the crime.9 78 Each partici-
pant in the lineup was required to wear the wig. Had Williams been
the only person required to wear the wig, a clear constitutional viola-
tion would have occurred. The procedure used in this lineup, however,
was evenly and fairly applied. Attention was not focused on the de-
fendant. "[A] reasonable effort to harmonize the lineup is all that is
normally required. 979
971. 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
972. 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) ("[P]retrial identification by photograph will be set aside if
the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.").
973. 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) ("primary evil to be avoided is 'a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable.misidentification.' ") (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 384).
974. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) ("reliability [of a witness] is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony").
975. 594 F.2d at 1259. Factors to be weighed "include the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of
his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation
and the time between the crime and the confrontation." Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at
114.
976. In Williams, the witness was a bank teller who was approached during a robbery.
She was face to face with the robber and heard his voice when he threatened injury to her
family if she did not comply with his demands. 594 F.2d at 1259.
977. Id.
978. Id.
979. United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1111 (1977).
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Other circuits are in accord and have upheld requirements that
participants in pre-trial identifications wear certain items of clothing if
relevant to the identification.9"' Lineups have been invalidated as con-
stitutionally impermissible only when the procedures were "unnecessa-
rily suggestive." 981
In United States v. Cook,982 the Ninth Circuit upheld a pre-trial
identification procedure, even though the identification procedure di-
rected a witness' attention to the defendant. In Cook, Jack Stockham
and Douglas Fluaitte witnessed a gun battle between police and four
bank robbers. Each witness viewed the "get-away" man for a few
seconds from a fairly long distance.983 Each was unable to make a pos-
itive identification when shown six photographs, one of which was of
the defendant. Stockham positively identified Cook at a subsequent
lineup, but admitted that he recognized Cook as one of the men in the
photo-spread. Both witnesses later identified Cook as the get-away
man at trial.
984
Although, as the court pointed out, lineups conducted after a
photo-spread are not unusual,985 the circumstances surrounding Stock-
ham's selection of Cook cast serious doubts as to the reliability of his
lineup and in-court identifications. First, Stockham was a retired po-
lice officer. He returned to the robbery scene for the specific purpose of
identifying the get-away man. Thus, it must be presumed that he had a
stronger interest in identifying the robber than an ordinary witness.
Even with this second look, he was unable to pick Cook's photograph
out of a six photograph display, concluding that three out of the six
980. United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186, 195-96 (3rd Cir. 1971) (no error in requiring
defendant to appear before witness with scarf around face when bank teller testified that
robber wore a scarf during robbery); United States v. Wilkerson, 453 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir.
197 1) (lineup not unduly suggestive even though all participants required to put on hat and
glasses).
981. United States v. Smith, 527 F.2d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 1975) (lineup impermissibly sug-
gestive where rape victim testified that assailant wore green shirt and defendant required to
wear green shirt at lineup, but not all participants so required); Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d
1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1975) (accused only person in lineup to wear glasses, which was integral
part of assailant's description; lineup held suggestive).
982. 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979).
983. "Stockham viewed the 'get-away' man for two five-second intervals at a distance of
30 to 40 yards. Fluaitte viewed the same man for a few seconds at a distance of 30 to 35 feet
and 'got a really fast look' from about a 'foot away' as the man sped by in his car." Id. at
1178.
984. However, on cross examination, Fluaitte could not positively identify Cook. Be-
cause the probative value of Fluaitte's identification was slight, the reliability of his identifi-
cation will not be discussed. Id.
985. Id. at 1178-79.
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photographs may have been the man he saw.986 Second, as a former
police officer, Stockham was undoubtedly familiar with police identifi-
cation procedures and could be expected to give greater attention to the
procedures than an ordinary witness. Because of his training, there was
a substantial likelihood that the selection process impermissibly nar-
rowed his choices so that the final selection of Cook at the lineup was
obvious. When presented with the six photographs, Stockham would
reasonably infer that one of the six was the person who the police sus-
pected as the get-away man. Stockham felt that three of those might
have been the man he saw. When Cook was the only one of the three
to appear in a subsequent lineup, the choice was obvious.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that Stockham's identification was re-
liable because he was a former police officer, inferring that less scrutiny
of the identification procedure was required.987 Because Stockham was
a retired police officer, familiar with identification procedures and be-
cause he actively sought to identify the get-away man, a higher degree
of scrutiny should have been applied.
The facts of this case are unique, and the likelihood of misidentifi-
cation was high. When an identifying witness has a higher than normal
understanding of lineup procedures and has taken affirmative steps to
assist in the identification, a higher degree of scrutiny should be applied
to the pre-trial identification procedure.
E Grand Jury Prejudice
An accused facing indictment is entitled to have that indictment
delivered by an impartial grand jury.98 8 In determining whether a
grand jury has been impartial, the courts are reluctant to circumscribe a
prosecutor's power to argue before the grand jury, even when his con-
duct might cause prejudice to the defendant. In the Ninth Circuit, for
example, as long as there is sufficient evidence to indict an accused, the
problem that the evidence itself might be presented in such a way as to
prejudice the grand jury is one considered to be easily resolved within
the court system. 989 Consequently, a defendant who asserts undue
grand jury prejudice because of prosecutor misbehavior bears a heavy
burden of proof.990
986. Stockham indicated that Cook's photograph "most closely resembled the man he
had seen." Id.
987. Id. at 1179.
988. United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D. Conn. 1975).
989. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1022 (1971).
990. The Ninth Circuit has declared that it will not interfere with prosecutorial discretion
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In United States v. Samango, the Ninth Circuit considered a de-
fendant's claim that he had been denied his right to an unbiased grand
jury.99 ' Alfred Samango, charged with "continuing criminal enter-
prise," alleged before the court that the conduct of an overzealous pros-
ecutor had caused the grand jury to be prejudiced against him. The
district court agreed with Samango and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.992
In particular, the record indicated that the prosecutor had engaged
in irrelevant questioning of Samango and had criticized him before the
grand jury for his failure to perform properly under a nonprosecution
agreement. 993 He elicited conclusory evidence from an unknowledge-
able witness. 994 Lengthy transcripts were presented by the prosecution
to the grand jury without giving the jurors ample time to read them.995
The most flagrant abuse was the prosecutor's use of perjured testimony
as persuasive evidence.9 96 The court, however, did not condemn the
prosecutor's motives for his over-enthusiastic prosecution, but rather
his conduct itself for "[exceeding] the limits of acceptability. ' 997
F Pre-indictment Delay
Federal courts have traditionally allowed the government great
leeway in its decisions as to the proper time to arrest a suspect.998 Al-
though pre-indictment delay may violate a federal defendant's fifth
amendment due process guarantee to a fair trial,999 the government has
"unless it is abused to such an extent as to be arbitrary and capricious and violative of due
process." United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 842 (1978).
991. 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
992. Id. at 878.
993. Id. at 878-79.
994. Id. at 879.
995. The prosecutor indicated to the grand jury, as he turned over some 1000 pages of
transcripts on December 12, 1977, that he had "a December 20 deadline." d. When the
grand jury handed down its indictment on December 19, there was no indication as to "how
much time the jurors spent with the transcripts nor whether they read them at all. Indeed,
there [were] indications in the record of their proceedings that some of the jurors were not
familiar with the contents of those transcripts." Id. at 881.
996. Id. at 882.
997. Id. at 884. The court also noted that it was within its supervisory powers to deter-
mine the limits of such acceptable conduct. Id. (citing United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d
781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring)).
998. United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S, 906
(1976) (ongoing investigation justified delay); United States v. Medina-Arellano, 569 F.2d
349, 352 (5th Cir. 1978) (four year delay between crime and arraignment not violative of
fifth amendment due process).
999. The sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial does not extend to the period
before arrest, but unreasonable and prejudicial delay prior to arrest may violate due process
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not been required to file charges as soon as the requisite amount of
proof for an indictment has been developed against an individual. 000
Further, actual prejudice to a defendant resulting from pre-indictment
delay may not by itself warrant dismissal of a criminal prosecution,
unless the delay was caused by the government's intentional miscon-
duct or negligence.}°° A due process inquiry must balance the reasons
for the delay against the prejudice to the accused. Thus the reasonable-
ness and necessity for the delay must outweigh the length of the delay
and the prejudice to the defendant.1c° 2
In United States v. Valenzuela, 0 3 the defendant contended that
the government's delay in prosecuting him substantially prejudiced his
defense because the delay forced him to stand trial with his brother.'104
The government conceded that it delayed prosecution, but argued that
the delay was justified so that evidence could be accumulated against
the defendant's co-conspirators.' ° 5 The Ninth Circuit, following the
Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Lovasco,1c° 6 held that de-
spite the delay, Valenzuela was not deprived of due process, even if his
defense was somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.1c° 7 The court
stated that forcing the prosecutor "to fie charges as soon as the requi-
site amount of proof has been developed. . . would cause numerous
problems in those cases in which a criminal transaction involves more
than one person. ... "Io
Balancing the reason for the delay against the actual prejudice to
Valenzuela shows that Valenzuela experienced no deprivation of due
process. The government delayed prosecution against him until evi-
dence against his co-conspirators could be obtained. Prosecutorial de-
of law. United States v. Kail, No. 78-1633 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 1979); see Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972); Gable v. Massey, 566 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 975 (1978).
1000. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 792-93 (1977).
1001. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[D]espite the degree of
actual prejudice, for a judgment in favor of dismissal, there must be some culpability on the
government's part either in the form of intentional misconduct or negligence.").
1002. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790.
1003. 596 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
1004. Valenzuela's argument was that, because the evidence pertaining to him related to
1971-1973, the delay in indictment prejudiced him because the delay forced him to stand
trial with his brother. 596 F.2d at 826.
1005. Id.
1006. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
1007. 596 F.2d at 826. Further, defendants are protected from undue delay by the applica-
ble statute of limitations. United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1979).
1008. Problems cited by the court were 1) the impairment of investigations, and 2) the
burdening of courts with multiple trials involving the same facts. 596 F.2d at 826 (quoting
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796).
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lay for the purpose of developing evidence is not necessarily violative
of a defendant's due process guarantee."° 9 Obviously, had the govern-
ment been required to arrest Valenzuela the instant the evidence per-
taining to him was acquired, the government's ability to obtain
evidence against his co-conspirators would have been diminished.
Adopting this rationale, the Supreme Court has ruled that pre-indict-
ment delay is warranted if the reason for the delay is to develop proof
in criminal prosecutions against additional parties or for additional
crimes.
1010
The prejudice claimed by Valenzuela might have been grounds for
a severance motion due to prejudicial joinder, 0 1' but it was insuffi-
cient to demand dismissal due to pre-indictment delay. Had
Valenzuela been able to show actual prejudice in combination with im-
proper prosecutorial motive or prosecutorial negligence,10 1 2 he may
have been able to assert a plausible due process argument. Since no
such showing was offered, the Ninth Circuit could not provide
Valenzuela with relief from his conviction. 1013
In United States v. Walker, 0 14 the defendants contended that a
thirteen-month delay between the commission of an arson offense and
the return of an indictment constituted prejudicial delay and was a vio-
lation of their due process fights. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding
that the thirteen-month delay was due to a justifiable investigative de-
lay and did not substantially prejudice the defendants. 015
On May 16, 1977, a fire broke out in a federal correctional institu-
tion. A two-month FBI investigation indicated that the cause of the fire
1009. "[To prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive [the de-
fendant] of due process." United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796. Cf. United States v.
Evers, 552 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1978) (prosecutorial delay
for purpose of ensuring most fully developed view of the law is not a denial of due process of
law).
1010. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 792-93.
1011. The government pointed out, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that Valenzuela's argu-
ment that the delay forced him to stand trial with his brother was essentially a claim of
improper or prejudicial joinder. 596 F.2d at 826 n.l. Severance due to prejudicial joinder is
covered by rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which states in relevant part
that if"it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a joinder ... of defendants ... the
court may ... grant a severance."
1012. Had the delay been caused by the prosecution's desire to obtain a tactical edge, then
pre-indictment delay would have been improper. United States v. Gaddis, 418 F. Supp. 869
(W.D. Okla. 1976) (delay is denial of due process if used to gain a tactical edge).
1013. See United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 1978) (there must be some
culpability on the government's part).
1014. 601 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1979).
1015. Id. at 1053.
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was arson but failed to identify the responsible parties. No further in-
vestigation was conducted until December 17, 1977, when a witness
revealed for the first time that the defendants had set the fire. 10 16 Less
than one month later, the case was assigned to the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice. On May 14, 1978, the matter was presented to the grand jury,
which returned an indictment in June of that year.
As in Valenzuela, the Walker court cited United States v. Lovasco,
stating that "'the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the
delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.' 1017 Here, the longest
period of delay was caused by the unavailability of evidence from
which a prosecution could proceed. Once it was obtained, prosecution
did not commence until the prosecutor had an opportunity to evaluate
the strength of his case. 018 As the Supreme Court noted in Lovasco,
such a delay is a proper exercise of the prosecutorial function. 019 Bal-
ancing the reason for the delay against the prejudice to the defendants,
the Ninth Circuit found no constitutional violations.0 20
As indicated by Valenzuela and Walker, the Ninth Circuit is in
accord with the Supreme Court's holding that the due process clause
plays a limited role in protecting against oppressive delay.' 0 2' Absent a
showing that the prosecutor delayed prosecution to obtain a tactical
advantage, the Ninth Circuit will not condemn a prosecutor's judgment
as to when to seek an indictment.
G. Defendant's Right to Discovery
A federal defendant's right to discovery of prosecutorial evidence
helpful to his defense has been well established ever since the United
States Supreme Court decision of Brady v. Maryland.0 22 Non-disclo-
sure of such information violates the due process clause "irrespective of
1016. From June 1977 to December 1977, the witness was a fugitive. Shortly after her
capture, she ifidicated in an interview that the defendants caused the fire. Id. at 1054.
1017. 601 F.2d at 1055 (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790).
1018. The prosecution wanted to hear the grand jury testimony of the key witnesses in
order to assess their credibility and the expected impact of their testimony in a jury trial. 601
F.2d at 1057.
1019. 431 U.S. at 792.
1020. 601 F.2d at 1057.
1021. 431 U.S. at 789. The Walker court stated that "insisting. . . on immediate prosecu-
tion once sufficient evidence is developed to obtain a conviction would pressure prosecutors
into resolving doubtful cases in favor of early-and possibly unwarranted-prosecutions."
601 F.2d at 1055 (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 793).
1022. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (co-conspir-
ator promised that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for the government; held that
non-disclosure of that information violated due process).
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the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."'' 0 23 Thus, the prosecu-
tion is under a strong obligation to produce for each defendant any
material which may prove to be exculpatory.
Although the specific contours of a prosecutor's duty to disclose
have not been fully delineated, the Ninth Circuit has established that
the prosecution is required to produce evidence in its possession that is
favorable to the defense. Furthermore, a new trial is warranted if the
,"non-disclosure might reasonably have affected the jury's judgment on
some material point."'0 24
In recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has considered the government's
duty to disclose classified documents, the effect of abandoning a motion
to produce discovery materials, the applicability of the Harris rule to
non-FBI agents, and the government's duty to timely disclose requested
documents.
1. Failure to request Brady material
Although the Brady rule requires the government to provide ex-
culpatory information to an accused, it does not require disclosure ab-
sent a request for the exculpatory information. 0 2
In United States v. Haro-Esinosa,26 one of the defendants con-
tended that he should be granted a new trial because the government
failed to disclose that a codefendant had stated in an interview that the
defendant was not involved in the crime. No request for the informa-
tion was ever made, however, even though the defendant was aware
that the codefendant could have provided exculpatory testimony.1
0 27
The Ninth Circuit denied the defendant's motion for a new trial
holding that "an important element in the Brady rule is that the de-
fendant make a request for the exculpatory material."'' 0 28 The court
ruled that in light of the circumstances, "the failure to make a request
or at least an independent inquiry cannot be ignored."'
' 0 29
The ultimate issue in cases like Haro-Espinosa is whether the sup-
pression of information by a prosecutor denied the accused his consti-
tutional right to a fair trial. 0 30 If the information is available to the
1023. 373 U.S. at 87.
1024. United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1978).
1025. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972) ("The heart of the holding in Brady is the
prosecution's suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request .. ..
1026. 608 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1979).
1027. Id. at 801.
1028. .Id. at 800.
1029. Id. at 801.
1030. Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1976).
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accused from a source other than the government and if he was aware
of that alternate source, he cannot be harmed by the nondisclosure.
°10 3
Here, the defendant was aware of the alternate source and failed to
inquire into that source. Further, he neglected to request the informa-
tion from the government. Under these circumstances, the defendant
had no basis for his claim.
10 32
2. Discovery of classified Government documents
United States v. Lee1 33 and United States v. Boyce 10 34 involved an
espionage prosecution which resulted in the conviction of both defend-
ants for selling defense secrets to Russian agents. 1035 Both defendants
appealed their convictions, asserting inter alia that they were denied
their right to discovery. Although the government did not disclose cer-
tain documents to the defendants, the Ninth Circuit determined that
neither defendant's rights were violated. 36
In Lee, the defendant moved for a production of thirty-five docu-
ments relating to a classified government project. 0 37 The trial court
ordered production of only eight of those documents. Lee contended
that the trial court's denial of his motion to produce all of the docu-
ments was prejudicial error. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating:
First, Lee completely fails to show how the eight documents
. . . were inadequate to substantiate his claim . . . . Sec-
ondly,. . . the government did stipulate that a representative
of Lee's. . . would be permitted to view the documents ....
Third, Lee had the opportunity to fully cross-examine Leslie
Dirks, the C.I.A. Deputy Director . . . who authorized the
Pyramider project .... 1038
Boyce argued that his discovery rights were violated because the
1031. United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978).
1032. But see United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1978) (absent spe-
cific request, failure to disclose information violates due process if the non-disclosed evi-
dence could create a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist).
1033. 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979).
1034. 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979).
1035. Both defendants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 793 and § 794, which pro-
tect information relating to "national defense."
1036. In Lee, twenty-seven classified documents were not disclosed. In Boyce, classified
documents, although not produced, were subject to an in camera inspection by the trial
judge to determine discoverability.
1037. The government possessed thirty-five documents relating to the "Pyramider" pro-
ject, a top secret study. Documents from the project were allegedly passed to the Russians.
589 F.2d at 983, 989.
1038. 589 F.2d at 989.
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government required that some of the requested documents remain in
its possession. Boyce's counsel was allowed to view the documents but
was not allowed to have copies of them. In addition, some documents
were sealed and not disclosed. The court, however, examined those
documents in camera and concluded that they were not discoverable
under Brady v. Maryland.°3 The Ninth Circuit held that although
Boyce's counsel may have been inconvenienced, the requirement that
he inspect the documents while they were in the government's posses-
sion did not amount to prejudicial error." 0 '
Thus, Lee and Boyce stand for the proposition that if requests for
classified information are presented to the government, the government
may not be required actually to produce the materials as requested, if it
can provide the defendant with an adequate substitute in lieu of actual
production. Although the documents were not made available to the
satisfaction of Lee and Boyce, it is apparent that each defendant was
offered an adequate opportunity, prior to trial, to inspect some or all of
the documents they requested. Those documents that were not pro-
duced were submitted to the judge for a determination of their discov-
erability. Each defendant was to some degree inconvenienced, but
when balanced with the government's interest in protecting classified
documents, the inconvenience was minimal and clearly did not amount
to prejudicial error. Absent a showing that the government's substitute
discovery procedure was insufficient or prejudicial to the defendant's
case, the Ninth Circuit will not require exact compliance with Brady
when the requested materials are classified.
3. Abandonment of discovery rights
In United States v. Lyman,"' the prosecutor stated in his closing
argument that "Bradshaw [a key government witness] was a good wit-
ness because he had kept notes in a diary to 'refresh his recollection'
....,04 The defendant's counsel timely moved for a mistrial and
also for discovery of the diary, arguing that the defense had no knowl-
edge of the diary's existence. 1043 The trial judge deferred his ruling on
the issue. The next day, after the jury had returned its verdict, the
judge asked counsel if he had anything else for the record. Counsel
replied that he did not. At that time, it was incumbent upon the de-
1039. 594 F.2d at 1252.
1040. Id.
1041. 592 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979).
1042. Id. at 498.
1043. Id.
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fendant's counsel to raise the discovery issue again. Since he did not,
the court could only conclude that he had abandoned the matter.
There was no indication that the motion was substantively discussed at
trial nor that the judge was obviously disposed against the motion. In
fact, when the defense raised the issue, it was clear that the judge would
consider the motion, but at a later time. Thus, counsel did not preserve
the issue for appeal by merely objecting in court.
On appeal, the defense argued that a remand was justified so that a
determination could be made of the discoverability of the diary. In
rejecting that argument, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the defendant's
counsel had abandoned the issue because he did not pursue the ques-
tion and obtain a decision."
The Ninth Circuit followed the general rule that motions for dis-
covery of documents made after conviction are too late.' 45 Thus, a
mere objection at trial is insufficient to preserve an issue on appeal.
4. Discovery of investigative agent's notes
In United States v. Marques,' 6 the defendant asserted that a Drug
Enforcement Administration investigator's destruction of notes con-
cerning a telephone conversation with Marques violated the Harris
rule, which requires that FBI agents keep all notes of conversations
with persons suspected of criminal conduct."° 7 Harris was decided by
the Ninth Circuit in 1976 after the passage of the Jencks Act and the
enactment of rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
°48
1044. Id. at 499.
1045. United States v. Gibson, 513 F.2d 978, 980 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (no error in
refusing motion for discovery when made after verdict); accord, Farnell v. Solicitor-Gen-
eral, 429 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
1046. 600 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979).
1047. United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976). In Harris, an FBI agent
destroyed the notes he made of an interview with the defendant after incorporating them
into a formal report.
1048. Id. at 1249. The Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1976)) provides in part:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement. . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to
the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any
such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court
shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) provides in part:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the gov-
ernment, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may
become known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral state-
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The Jencks Act requires discovery of written or recorded statements
made by a government witness if he or she later testifies at trial.1°49
In Harris, as in Marques, government agents testified at trial con-
cerning statements made by the defendant at an earlier interview. But
prior to trial, the agents, following routine administrative procedures,
had destroyed the interview notes.1050 The Ninth Circuit held that the
destruction of the notes violated the Jencks Act even though it was
done in good faith. 05' It refused to reverse defendant's conviction,
however, because it found that he had not been prejudiced by the
agent's actions.10 52 The court did give notice that, in the future, inter-
view notes must be retained regardless of whether their loss would
prejudice defendant. 10 53
The Marques court, unfortunately, did not apply Harris correctly.
It did note that the minor factual differences that existed between Mar-
ques and Harris would not preclude the possibility of a Harris viola-
tion. '
054
The court ignored the Harris rule and applied the pre-Harris
prejudice rule. The court stated: "We choose instead to assume with-
ment which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the
defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person
then known to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testimony of
the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged.
1049. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1976).
1050. 543 F.2d at 1249.
1051. Id. at 1252-53. The Harris court followed the rule established by the D.C. Circuit in
United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1975), which expressly disap-
proved of the destruction of notes by government agents even though done in good faith.
The Harris court concluded that handwritten interview notes were "statements" under
the meaning of the Jencks Act. 543 F.2d at 1250, 1252. Accord, United States v. Harrison,
524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Contra, United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (but critical of Seventh Circuit's role);
United States v. Martin, 565 F.2d 362, 363-64 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Smaldone,
544 F.2d 456, 460-61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1976); United States v. Hurst,
510 F.2d 1035, 1036 (6th Cir. 1976).
The court in Harris also found independent support for its holding requiring discovery
of the interview notes in rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Several cir-
cuits have held that under the broader scope of rule 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), a court has the discretionary power to order the production of such statements.
United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d at 1252. Accord, United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421,
433 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (relied on Brady as well as the Jencks Act).
1052. 543 F.2d at 1253.
1053. Id. Accord, United States v. Shields, 571 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1978) (Harris
rule requiring preservation of notes should not be applied retroactively without a showing of
prejudice); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1976) (Harris requirement
of retaining rough interview notes can only be applied prospectively in the absence of
prejudice).
1054. 600 F.2d at 748.
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out deciding that the Harris rule was violated when the notes were de-
stroyed, but we reject appellants' request for reversal because the
destruction constituted harmless error."'1 55 Marques, then, appears to
stand for the principle that when a court does not want to follow ex-
isting precedent, it can declare that a defendant was not prejudiced by
a violation of that very precedent.
Four months later in United States v. Bernard, 56 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a Drug Enforcement Administration agent could be pre-
cluded from testifying at a criminal trial if he destroyed rough notes
taken during surveillance of a defendant. 057 Citing United States v.
Wells, 0 58 the court held that "[i]f the government fails to produce such
statements, the court is required to strike the testimony of the wit-
ness." 1
059
In Bernard, the government contended that the Harris rule only
applied to interviews of prospective witnesses and not to rough notes
made by an agent during surveillance activities. 0 60 But, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the government's narrow interpretation.' 0 6 ' Thus, Ber-
1055. Id. The cases cited by the Marques court in support of its prejudice rule are inappo-
site. United States v. Shields, 571 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1978), United States v. Parker,
549 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977), and United States v. Wood,
550 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir. 1976), all involved trials that occurred prior to the Harris no-
prejudice rule. In each case, the Ninth Circuit held that Harris could not be applied retroac-
tively.
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits appear to be the only ones that follow this rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Principe, 499 F.2d 1135, 1139 (1st Cir. 1974) (not every failure of the gov-
ernment to disclose under the Jencks Act will require excluding the testimony of the witness
in question); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1974) (no real prejudice
was shown from government's failure to produce transcripts of conversations prior to trial);
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 410 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969)
(appellant required to show actual prejudice from lack of discovery); United States v. Crow-
ell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1028 (4th Cir. 1978) (Jencks Act violations can be excused when there is a
showing of no prejudice to defendant); United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 890 (5th Cir.
1971) (courts will find error resulting from Jencks Act violations when prejudice to defen-
dant is shown); United States v. Ball, 428 F.2d 26, 30-31 (6th Cir. 1970) (government's de-
struction of handwritten interview notes was not prejudicial to defendant); United States v.
Cleveland, 507 F.2d 731, 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (new trial will not be ordered when Jencks Act
violation does not result in prejudice); United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 856-57 (8th
Cir. 1971) (good faith destruction of interview notes was not considered prejudicial); United
States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 318 (10th Cir. 1973) (in finding no Jencks Act violation
had occurred, the court also noted that there was no prejudice to defendant because of the
government's failure to produce certain material).
1056. 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979).
1057. Id. at 1263-65.
1058. 573 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1978).
1059. 607 F.2d at 1264-65.
1060. Id. at 1264.
1061. Id.
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nard appears to insure that defendants in criminal trials will be
afforded broad protection under the Jencks Act.
5. Government's untimely production of requested materials
In United States v. Knowles," 62 the Ninth Circuit held that the
government violated the defendant's discovery rights because the gov-
ernment failed to timely produce a grand jury transcript of a key gov-
ernmental witness' testimony. In Knowles, the defendant attempted to
obtain the transcript pursuant to the Jencks Act. 10 63 The requested
transcript, which did not arrive until after the trial, disclosed that the
witness had previously lied under oath and revealed several inconsis-
tencies between the testimony at trial and the testimony before the
grand jury.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that in failing to produce the transcript,
the government not only violated its obligation under the Jencks Act,
but also the rule in United States v. Butler which provides that a new
trial is warranted if the non-disclosure might have reasonably affected
the jury's judgment on some material point.'°64 The court held that
under the Butler standard, the government's failure to produce was re-
versible error. 0 65 Since the non-disclosed evidence in this case clearly
would have had an effect on the jury, the Ninth Circuit was correct in
refusing to condone the government's untimely production.
By contrast, in United States v. Smith, °66 the defendant argued
that his due process rights were violated when the government delayed
production of a Drug Enforcement Administration Report which con-
cerned an investigation of a key government witness, until after the
witness began testifying. The defendant argued that the delay pre-
cluded his counsel from using the report to impeach the witness.
0 67
The Ninth Circuit found that suppression had not been complete and
refused to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial.
In Smith, the delay in production may have been detrimental to
the defendant, but the trial judge adequately protected the defendant's
rights when he gave the defense the opportunity to recall the witness
and cross-examine her on anything contained in the tardily disclosed
1062. 594 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1979).
1063. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
1064. 594 F.2d at 755 (citing United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam)).
1065. 594 F.2d at 756.
1066. 609 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
1067. Id. at 1302-03.
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report. 10 68 Since the suppression was not complete-the prosecution
produced the information at trial-the defendant was not precluded
from receiving a fair trial as was the defendant in Knowles.
10 69
The Knowles aid Smith decisions are significant in that they allow
the judge to fashion appropriate remedies. 1 70 Clearly, if the informa-
tion were produced after trial as in Knowles, or if the government
delayed production to gain a tactical edge, then the defendant would be
irreparably prejudiced and a new trial should be granted. If the infor-
mation is provided early enough so that the prejudice can be remedied,
such as in Smith, however, then ordering a new trial would be wasteful.
Further, in Smith, there was no showing that the information would
have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist 10 7 1 or that
it caused the defendant to materially alter his defense. If such a show-
ing is made, then the remedy fashioned in Smith would be inappropri-
ate. 10
72
6. Discovery of sealed affidavits
In United States v. Agosto ,1073 the defendants sought discovery of a
sealed "master affidavit" which described an on-going federal investi-
gation. The government opposed unsealing the affidavit because it
concerned a nationwide investigation of which the defendants were a
part. 0 74 The district court ordered that the affidavit be unsealed, be-
cause "federal courts have no power to seal affidavits upon which
search warrants are based."'' 0 75 The court based its decision on rule
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 0 76 noting that "no-
where in rule 41(c) is the power of a judge or magistrate to seal such an
1068. Id. at 1303. See also United States v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976).
1069. Id. See also United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1972) ("The test is
whether the undisclosed evidence was so important that its absence prevented the accused
from receiving his constitutionally-guaranteed fair trial.")
1070. Other circuits are in accord. See, e.g., Gorham v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 178, 179-80
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (failure to produce lab reports pursuant to discovery order rem-
edied when judge offered recess so that defense counsel could evaluate reports); United
States v. Pope, 574 F.2d 320, 325-26 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 429 (1978) (failure to
produce information until after witness testified remedied by allowing defense to recall wit-
ness).
1071. United States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 1978).
1072. Sanctions will normally follow when the government has deliberately destroyed dis-
coverable material. United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1978).
1073. 600 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1074. Id. at 1257.
1075. Id.
1076. Rule 41(c) provides for the issuance and contents of a search warrant and affidavit.
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affidavit even suggested."10 77
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court erred in narrowly fo-
cusing on rule 41(c), stating that "the courts have inherent power to
control papers filed with the courts within certain constitutional and
other limitations." 1078 The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the
district court to determine if sealing the affidavit was within the court's
inherent powers.
Although the defendant's right to discovery was not at issue, it is
clear that the court's sealing of affidavits could potentially conflict with
this or other constitutional rights. 1079 The government contended that
the affidavit should remain sealed "in order to avoid disrupting the na-
tionwide investigation .. "080 Presumably, the government would
not object to disclosure if the matter proceeded closer to the trial stage.
If it did, then the defendants could resort to various protective mea-
sures to compel disclosure. 0 8'
7. Disclosure of informant's identity
The government's privilege to withhold disclosure of an inform-
ant's identity has long been established.108 2 This privilege not only
protects the informant, but encourages others to furnish vital informa-
tion to law enforcement officers. 1083 Disclosure is required, however, if
the informant was a principal actor in the crime108 4 or if the inform-
ant's identity was relevant and helpful to the defense. 10 85 "The prob-
lem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the
1077. 600 F.2d at 1257.
1078. Id.
1079. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the fourth amendment might prevent
sealing an affidavit. Id. at 1258 n.3.
1080. Id. at 1257.
1081. For example, the defendant could request an in camera inspection to determine if
disclosure is warranted. United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 989 (9th Cir. 1979).
1082. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) ("[T]he informer's privi-
lege is in reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of per-
sons who furnish information of violations of law. . . . The purpose of the privilege is the
furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege
recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of
crimes . . . and by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obliga-
tion."); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1894) (disclosure of informant's identity
cannot be compelled without the assent of the government).
1083. See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2374 at 762 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
1084. Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1947) (identity allowed when
informant was person to whom accused sold opium).
1085. United States v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) ("where the disclosure of an
informer's identity. . . is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to
a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way").
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flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his de-
fense."108 6 In any event, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
show a need for disclosure of an informant's identity.
0 8 7
In United States v. Smith,1088 the defendant claimed that the trial
court's refusal to order disclosure of an informant's identity was error.
The government had agreed prior to trial that it would disclose the
informant's name if it could locate him, but was unable to do so.'
0 8 9
The defendant contended that "had his identity been revealed, that the
defense could have found the informer and 'had the possibility' of se-
curing his testimony for the defense."' 10 90
Citing Lannom v. United States,1" 9' the Ninth Circuit held that
"'[m]ere speculation that the informer might possibly be of some
assistance is not sufficient to overcome the public interest in the protec-
tion of the informer.' "1092 The Smith decision is consistent with prece-
dent in the Ninth Circuit'0 93 and with the Supreme Court's decision in
Roviaro.1094 Since there was no showing that the informer was an ac-
tual participant in the crime, the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying disclosure. 095
H Interlocutory Appeals
Generally, piecemeal review of district court decisions in on-going
actions is disfavored. 0 96 In Fendler v. United States,10 97 a citizen under
1086. Id. at 62.
1087. United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1979) (error for magistrate to
require government to make showing that disclosure of informant's identity would result in
physical injury or intimidation).
1088. 595 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1979).
1089. Id. at 1180. At an earlier hearing, the government said that it intended to call the
informer as a witness at trial but was having difficulty locating him. Subsequently, the gov-
ernment did not find him and, therefore, the informer did not testify at trial.
1090. Id.
1091. 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968).
1092. 595 F.2d at 1180 (quoting Lannom v. United States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968)).
1093. United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
923 (1976) ("mere suspicion that the informer may be helpful to the defense is not sufficient
to overcome the public interest in protecting the informer's identity").
1094. See note 1085 supra and accompanying text.
1095. See United States v. Edwards, 503 F.2d 838, 840-44 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 977 (1975); McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1973) ("where the
informant is an actual participant,. . . fundamental fairness dictates that the accused have
access to him as a potential witness").
1096. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) ("[slince appeals of right have been
authorized by Congress in criminal cases.. . there has been a firm congressional policy
against interlocutory or 'piecemeal appeals' . ..
1097. 597 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1979).
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investigation by a federal grand jury appealed an interlocutory order
that denied his petition to conduct a voir dire of the grand jurors. The
Ninth Circuit held that "[tlhere is no reason to depart from the policy
against piecemeal appeals in his case."' 1 98 The court noted that the
appellant's rights could be adequately protected in subsequent proceed-
ings, and that since such a motion is reviewable on direct appeal from a
criminal conviction, denial of the appellant's appeal would not render
review impossible.0 99
The Ninth Circuit's decision is directly in line with the Supreme
Court's ruling in DiBella v. United States,"100 which held that the final
judgment rule is the dominant rule in federal appellate practice, espe-
cially in criminal prosecutions.1 0' The Ninth Circuit and other circuits
have held that a "final judgment" in a criminal case means the order
sentencing the defendant.102 Absent a showing that the interlocutory
appeal raises claims of right separable from rights asserted in the action
that are too important to be denied review, the prerequisite of finality
will be upheld. 1103
IV. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Joinder and Se'erance
Joinder, according to rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, focuses on the procedure of connecting two or more counts or
two or more defendants in the same indictment.' 1 4 Severance, how-
1098. Id. at 1315.
1099. Id.
1100. 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
1101. Id. at 126.
1102. United States v. Young, 544 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); In
Re Special March 1974 Grand Jury Possible Violations of Title 18 and 26, 541 F,2d 166 (7th
Cir. 1977) ("As a general rule, an interlocutory decision in a criminal case stemming from an
action taken by a grand jury is not a proper subject for review by a court of appeals.").
1103. United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1978) (although order
denying motion to disqualify counsel is not final judgment, such order held appealable be-
cause it was not an ingredient of the cause of action and did not require consideration with
it); United States v. Neumann, 556 F.2d 1218, 1219 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cavin,
553 F.2d 871, 873 (4th Cir. 1977) (double jeopardy clause intended to erect constitutional
bar to hardship of undergoing second trial).
1104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-
meanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act
or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or consti-
tuting parts of a common scheme or plan.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) sets out:
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ever, focuses on the prejudice that results from an initially proper join-
der. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14,1105 a court has
discretion to grant a severance which separates counts or defendants.
Rule 8 sets out different standards for joining the offenses of a sin-
gle defendant and for joining multiple defendants in a single action. In
the case of a single defendant, rule 8(a) applies, and joinder of offenses
is correct if the offenses are based on the same acts or series of acts, or
are "of the same or similar character."" 6 Yet, with multiple defend-
ants, under rule 8(b), similarity of inculpatory acts is not determinative.
Suspects may be joined as defendants only by virtue of joint participa-
tion in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses. 11
0 7
Of the eight 1979 Ninth Circuit cases dealing with joinder and sev-
erance, the only one in which severance and new trial were ordered
involved a single defendant who had been charged with similar
crimes. 110 8 That the other seven were not reversed reflects in part the
court's continued belief that connecting counts or defendants is neces-
sary to insure that trials, always growing more costly, are run in the
most efficient manner.
While joinder may reduce court time and costs, it also increases
the possibility that a defendant will be prejudiced. Included in the
problems which result are guilt by association, confusion by the jury of
the evidence, and the inability to present an effective defense. 109 If
prejudice results, a court may order severance of counts or defendants
under rule 14. On appeal, motions for severance are reviewed to see if
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defen-
dants need not be charged in each count.
1105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sever-
ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a
motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the gov-
ernment to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confes-
sions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial.
1106. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
1107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
1108. United States v. Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (counts were of similar char-
acter but resulted from two unconnected acts).
1109. 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 14.03[2], .04[l] (2d ed. 1976). For cases typifying
these problems, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131-35 (1968) (joint defendants);
United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1975) (joint counts).
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the trial court judge abused his discretion in denying severance."'10
Generally, a defendant must show some articulable facts beyond just
the inherent prejudicial circumstances of the joinder which would re-
quire severance."" He must meet a two pronged test which requires:
(1) that "prejudice" be clearly evident and (2) that the prejudice out-
weighs the need for judicial economy.' 2 In the past, the Ninth Circuit
has been reluctant to overturn a trial court's refusal to sever."' 13
In United States v. Vaienzue/a, 1 14 several defendants were con-
victed of counts arising from the possession and sale of heroin. Joinder
of the defendants pursuant to rule 8(b) was accomplished by use of a
conspiracy count. On appeal, one defendant argued that misjoinder
had occurred because the conspiracy count was improper. Alterna-
tively, the defendant alleged that the failure to grant severance was an
abuse of discretion. 1'5
The Valenzuela court noted that "[o]rdinarily, the mere charging
of a conspiracy count linking together substantive counts against vari-
ous defendants fully satisfies the rule 8(b) requirement of relatedness
and makes joinder proper under that rule."" 6 The court further noted
that joinder would be proper even if the conspiracy count was later
dismissed due to insufficient evidence. 7' " However, the Valenzuela
court recognized that misjoinder would occur if the prosecution made
the conspiracy charge in bad faith to "sidestep the requirements of
Rule 8(b)."' " The court concluded that the defendant's mere allega-
I110. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1111 (1977) (the test is whether thejoinder is so prejudicial that it outweighs the concern for
judicial economy and compels the exercise of the court's discretion to sever).
1111. United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
944 (1978) (burden is on defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976) ("The
defendant must show more than the fact that a separate trial might offer him a better chance
of acquittal."); accord, United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1978).
1112. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429
U.S. 1111 (1977).
1113. See e.g. United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 944 (1978) ("the ruling of the trial court will seldom be overturned on appeal");
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976) ("The burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the ruling of the trial
judge will rarely be disturbed on review.").
1114. 596 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979).
1115. Id. at 826.
1116. Id. at 829.
1117. Id. The court relied on Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1960);
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1978).
1118. 596 F.2d at 829.
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tion of bad faith was insufficient to meet his burden.111 9
The defendant's alternative argument was also rejected by the
court. Severance would be granted only if joinder would result in
prejudice to the defendant. On appeal, the burden is on the defendant
to show prejudice resulting from the joinder. The Valenzuela court
concluded that the defendant had not met this burden.
11 20
Interestingly, the Valenzuela court did not review the sufficiency of
the evidence relating to the conspiracy count. The court noted that the
defendant had been sentenced concurrently for the conspiracy and sub-
stantive convictions. The defendant had not appealed the substantive
conviction for which the evidence was described as "strong."' "2' It is
important to note that the court's failure to decide whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy count did not affect the
defendant's misjoinder claim. That claim could only be supported by a
showing of bad faith.
The Ninth Circuit also failed to find prejudice in United States v.
Martin.1122 In Martin, five defendants were joined in a trial for heroin
and cocaine dealing. All five were charged in one count with conspir-
acy to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, heroin and
cocaine. In addition, they were charged with various counts of using a
telephone to facilitate a conspiracy. Three of the defendants were tried
separately before a judge. The other two, Lewis Dixon and Stephan
Davenport, were tried together before a jury, which acquitted only
Davenport (apparently a buyer for his own use) of the conspiracy to
distribute."' Yet, the jury convicted the two as charged on the re-
maining counts.' 124
On appeal, defendant Dixon challenged the trial court's refusal to
1119. Id.
1120. Id. Accord, Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960); United States v.
Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344, 349 (9th Cir. 1971); Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 906
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964). In Cozzeli, one of three defendants was acquit-
ted (by judgment of acquittal) of the conspiracy charge. The other two defendants argued
prejudice because evidence admitted against the acquitted defendant involved "illegal and
immoral conduct with which they had no established connection and that even the limiting
instructions left the jury hopelessly confused." 441 F.2d at 349. Still the court of appeals
found no abuse of discretion.
Cf. United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) (severance granted
because conspiracy charge dismissed; of 2,300 pages of transcript less than fifty pages were
relevant to defendant, defendant had no apparent connection with the acts of the other de-
fendants, and the trial judge was replaced mid-trial).
1121. 596 F.2d at 829.
1122. 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979). Improper joinder was not raised on appeal.
1123. Id. at 882.
1124. Id. Davenport's conviction on the facilitation charge was reversed because the
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grant his request for severance from defendant Davenport. The Ninth
Circuit summarily dismissed finding that neither had Dixon been "enti-
tled to a severance nor [had] he ultimately suffered any prejudice from
the joint trial."''125
The different conclusions arrived at by the jury in the trial of
Dixon and Davenport may have been instrumental in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's denial of Dixon's motion for severance. Evidence that the jury
arrived at different verdicts has validated the argument used in other
Ninth Circuit opinions that juries are able to "compartmentalize" the
evidence according to each defendant."t 26 The evidence used against
Dixon, a co-conspirator of the drug deal, was significantly different
from that used against Davenport, a purchaser of drugs. Thus, because
of the difference in the nature of the two crimes involved, it would ap-
pear that the jury would have had little difficulty in compartmental-
izing the evidence introduced against both defendants.
As a general rule, appellate courts have maintained their faith in
the jury's ability to perceive all the evidence and follow their instruc-
tions. In Opper v. United States,' 27 the United States Supreme Court
Ninth Circuit concluded that since the jury had found him to be a personal buyer, he could
not have taken part in the distribution conspiracy.
1125. Id. at 889.
1126. See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d at 359. The court supplied the following
standard:
The ultimate question is whether under all the circumstances of the particular case,
as a practical matter, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's
admonitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the independent
evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements,
and conduct..
The jury did in fact distinguish among the defendants, finding some not guilty,
others not guilty of one or more offenses but guilty of others.
See, e.g., United States v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931
(1975) (assessment of jury's ability to compartmentalize evidence against joined defendants
determines whether severance should be granted); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329,
1334-35 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978) (jury's varied decisions to convict
or acquit the five defendants on the different counts showed that jury members are able to
"understand and separate the evidence as to each defendant and to individually determine
the issues presented"); Accord, United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1979); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 769-70 (9th Cir.
1977) (mere fact that evidence only admissible against one of joined defendants does not
warrant finding prejudice to others); United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1979); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901-02 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
1127. 348 U.S. 84 (1954) (each defendant received a fair and impartial consideration where
there were careful instructions, few critical factual issues, and an exhaustive presentation by
both sides). However, this presumption has been rebutted in situations where the potential
prejudice to joined defendants appears substantially great. For example, where a confession
by a non-testifying co-defendant implicates another defendant, the defendant's right to con-
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expressed confidence in the capabilities of jurors when Justice Reed
wrote, "To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to
nothing more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disre-
garded clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict."
' 28
When the jury demonstrates it can limit the evidence to a particular
defendant and not consider it in regard to another, the appellate courts
have reason to hold that a particular defendant was not prejudiced.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged this principle in the 1977 case of
United States v. Nace112 9 where it noted that "[t]he fact that evidence
may be admissible against only one of two defendants does not consti-
tute such prejudice as to require separate trials."" 3 The holdings of
Opper and Nace as well as other Ninth Circuit opinions" 13' lead to the
conclusion that Dixon did not suffer any prejudice.
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the jury's ability to compartmen-
talize the evidence against a joined defendant in the 1979 decision of
United States v. Mills."32 In Mills, three defendants were charged and
convicted of armed bank robbery and the fourth defendant, Bryan, was
convicted of being an accessory after the fact. Bryan was apprehended
with a co-defendant as they were attempting to flee to Canada after the
bank robbery.1
33
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that rule 8(b) was satisfied be-
cause Bryan had participated "'in the same series of acts or transac-
tions constituting the offenses charged.' ",113 Although the joinder of
an accessory with three perpetrators reflects a somewhat broad view of
the "same series of acts" under rule 8(b), it is not an unusual ap-
proach.1135 Where a large area of overlapping proof is involved, join-
der under rule 8(b) is permissible to encourage trial economy and
convenience." 36 Much overlapping proof would undoubtedly occur if
Bryan had been tried separately from the perpetrators of the robbery.
frontation will be violated. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968). The decision
rested on what the Court perceived as the jury's inability to limit the confession to the co-
defendant against which it was introduced. Id. at 135.
1128. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. at 95.
1129. 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1977).
1130. Id. at 769-70.
1131. See note 1111 supra.
1132. 597 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1979).
1133. Id. at 695.
1134. Id.
1135. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.06 [2] at 8-36 (2d ed. 1979): "Where separate
offenses arise out of a transaction of this nature, proof of the entire transaction is ordinarily
necessary, whether or not there is a joint trial. Thus, a conviction for possessing or receiving
stolen property requires proof of the theft and of the defendants' knowledge of the same."
1136. See United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899 (9th Cir. 1970). Accord, Parker v.
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Evidence of both the robbery and of Bryan's knowledge of it were nec-
essary elements in her trial.
After finding that Bryan had been properly joined to her co-de-
fendants, the Ninth Circuit denied her severance motion raised under
rule 14.1137 Bryan failed to show the requisite level of prejudice. Like
the defendant's acts in United States v. Martin,"38 Bryan's participa-
tion was recognizably different and, therefore, enabled the jury to com-
partmentalize the evidence between her and her co-defendants.
Mills illustrates the inherent tension that exists between rule 8(b)
and rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the one
hand, the circuit courts generally employ a broad view of "same series
of acts" so that defendants may be joined more easily.1 39 On the other
hand, where the acts seem to be sufficiently distinct, jurors are assumed
to be able to sort out and weigh the evidence with greater ease.
140
However, if the acts are apparently distinct, they should not be in-
cluded under the scope of rule 8(b).
The application of rules 8(b) and 14 was also questioned in United
States v. Ortiz,114 1 in which the defendant claimed that his minimal
involvement with the other defendants mandated severance." 142 De-
fendant Ortiz was charged with nineteen others and was convicted of
conspiracy and of possessing heroin with intent to distribute.
Ortiz's connection with the conspiracy was developed by the testi-
mony of two witnesses." 43 A police officer testified that he had ob-
served Ortiz participating in a drug transaction. The officer's testimony
was corroborated by an unindicted co-conspirator and participant in
the drug deal.
Defendant first argued that the evidence did not link him with
most of the other defendants and, hence, joinder was improper. 1144
However, since a conspiracy charge has been held sufficient for such
purposes," 145 the initial joinder was found to be proper. Moreover, the
United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968) (where proof of charges dependent upon the
same evidence, then no severance).
1137. 597 F.2d at 696. A motion for severance will be denied unless the lower court
abused its discretion. The test is whether the joint trial was so prejudicial that the judge
could exercise his discretion in only one way. Id.
1138. 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979). See notes 1122-30 supra and accompanying text.
1139. See notes 1135-36 supra and accompanying text.
1140. United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1979).
1141. 603 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1979).
1142. Id. at 78.
1143. Id. at 79.
1144. Id. at 78.
1145. See notes 1116-19 supra and accompanying text.
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court denied his motion for severance. 4 6 Sufficient evidence sup-
ported his conviction.
In another decision, United States v. Smith," 4 7 the Ninth Circuit
also looked at the sufficiency of conspiracy evidence to determine if
severance was required. In Smith, three of eighteen defendants were
tried together and convicted of conspiracy to possess heroin and co-
caine with intent to distribute.' 48 Two of the participants in the al-
leged conspiracy were also the principal government witnesses in each
proceeding. One defendant, Lama, was the supplier. The Government
witnesses, Smith and Herrin, were his distributors and acted as in-
termediaries between Lama and the retailers, Crayton, Pedote, and
Jones." 1
49
Defendant Jones asserted that while the indictment might have
properly joined defendants by charging them with a single conspir-
acy, 1 °0 the evidence showed that three separate conspiracies had ex-
isted between Lama and Jones, Lama and Crayton, and Lama and
Pedote. Jones contended that the evidence of the latter two conspira-
cies was prejudicial and that his trial should have been severed.
15 1
The Ninth Circuit held that sufficient evidence existed to convict
Jones of participating in one overall conspiracy."l 5 2 The court noted
that Smith and Herrin were part of an operation in which they ob-
tained drugs from Lama and then passed them on to distributors."
53
Also Jones had been informed that the intermediaries, Smith and Her-
rin, were the distributors of the narcotics. This evidence established
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones had at least a "slight connection"
with the conspiracy." 54 Finally, the general nature of narcotics traffic
and the continued large sales enabled the court to affirm the jury's fac-
tual conclusion that Jones was aware of his participation in a grand
scheme, even though he never met the other retailers.1155 Because there
1146. 603 F.2d at 79-80.
1147. 609 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
1148. Id. at 1296-97. A fourth defendant, Weaver, also was tried but he was not a defen-
dant in this proceeding.
1149. Crayton, Jones, and Pedote were joint defendants with Lama. In addition, Pedote's
conviction was not appealed in this case. Id. at 1297 n.1.
1150. See United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1979); see also notes
1114-21 supra and accompanying text.
1151. 609 F.2d at 1297.
1152. Id. at 1299.
1153. Id. at 1299-1300.
1154. Id. at 1299. See United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977).
1155. 609 F.2d at 1300.
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was sufficient evidence to convict Jones on a conspiracy charge, the
court denied the severance motion.
Jones also argued that his trial should have been severed because
the jury could not compartmentalize the evidence as to each defendant
and therefore he suffered guilt by association.1"56 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this contention and found no error in references made con-
cerning his participation as part of a team. The court was also satisfied
that the jury instructions protected him from "guilt by association."
' 157
A different kind of prejudice was claimed in United States v.
Moreno-Nunez.1158 One defendant, Badilla-Yescas, was unable to call
a co-defendant to the stand and also could not comment on the failure
of the co-defendant to testify." 59 Thus, his ability to present a com-
plete defense was restricted. However, the Ninth Circuit has tradition-
ally refused automatic severance to a defendant who is unable to
comment on a co-defendant's refusal to testify."160 A defendant mov-
ing for severance must demonstrate that he probably will benefit "from
commenting on a co-defendant's refusal to testify."" 6' Because
Badilla-Yescas did not show this type of benefit, severance was de-
nied. 1 62 As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction." 63
In United States v. Haro-Espinosa,"64 three of four joint defen-
dants contended that they were prejudiced by joinder because the
fourth defendant, Gonzales, would have provided exculpatory testi-
mony for them had he not been tried simultaneously."16 However,
Gonzales stated that he would testify only if tried first or if the Govern-
ment agreed that his testimony would not be used against him at his
subsequent trial. The trial judge agreed to sever only if the three de-
fendants were tried first. Since the three were in custody, but Gonzales
was not, this action would have been necessitated by the Speedy Trial
Act." 166 Counsel for Gonzales objected to this order of the trials claim-
ing that his client would then receive no benefit from severance because
1156. Id.
1157. Id. at 1301. See also notes 1126-30 supra and accompanying text.
1158. 595 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1979).
1159. Id. at 1188.
1160. United States v. De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 398
U.S. 942 (1970). Accord, United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 1976).
1161. Id.
1162. 595 F.2d at 1188.
1163. Id. at 1189.
1164. 619 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1979).
1165. Id. at 792.
1166. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976).
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he would have to forfeit his fifth amendment privileges. After further
deliberations, the motion for severance was denied.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion,
noting that when a defendant makes only a conditional offer to testify
based on the order of the trials rather than an outright commitment, a
denial of the severance is proper."1 67 This holding falls within the pur-
view of United States v. Gay."68 In Gay, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
district court's denial of a motion for severance when one defendant
similarly offered his exculpatory testimony but conditioned it upon the
order of the trials. The district court in that case had labelled such
conditions as game playing. 1169 This characterization resulted from de-
fendant's attempt to testify at his co-defendant's trial but at the same
time preserve his fifth amendment privileges by preventing such testi-
mony from being used against him at his own trial."170 While similar
considerations were present in Haro-Esinosa, the Ninth Circuit did
not have to resort to such labelism in order to find a valid reason for
the trial court's denial of severance. The fact that defendant's condi-
tional demand conflicted with the overriding need to try the other three
defendants first was sufficient in itself to justify the trial court's denial
of severance. 171
Severance, however, was granted in United States v. Bronco." 7 z
Defendant Bronco was charged with conspiracy to sell three million
dollars in counterfeit money and possession and passing of a counter-
feit $100 bill on a later date.
The United States Attorney was unable to prove that the bills
came from the same source. Thus, the charges were not factually re-
lated. Bronco first argued improper joinder. However, since the crimes
were of a "similar character," the Ninth Circuit first held that the initial
joinder was proper. 1173 Bronco then contended that the conspiracy
count should have been severed from the other two counts because he
could not testify about one set of events without being cross-examined
about the other. In addition, Bronco claimed that "little or no overlap
in proof would be avoided by a joint trial."" 74
As to Bronco's first contention, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, hold-
1167. 619 F.2d at 793.
1168. 567 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978).
1169. Id. at 920.
1170. Id.
1171. 619 F.2d at 793.
1172. 597 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1979).
1173. Id. at 1301.
1174. Id. at 1302.
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ing that the defendant had not had his specific reasons for testifying as
to one offense and not the other.' 175 However, the court did grant
Bronco's severance motion based on his second contention.'
1 76
The Ninth Circuit held that Bronco was prejudiced in presenting
his defense on the possession and passing charges because of the exten-
sive evidence of the conspiracy admitted at the joint trial.11 77 Part of
the evidence included a defense witness' comments about Bronco's vio-
lent propensities in response to prosecution questioning. The court
held that some evidence of the conspiracy conviction would have been
admissible to establish Bronco's knowledge and intent1 78 at a separate
trial on the possession and passing counts. However, the extensive evi-
dence introduced along with the questionable testimony relating to
Bronco's violent conduct significantly prejudiced him. Thus, severance
was ordered.
B. Guilty Pleas
1. Rule 11 violations
In Boykin v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court character-
ized the guilty plea as "more than a confession which admits the ac-
cused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to
give judgment and determine punishment."'1 179 Because of its finality,
a guilty plea must face strict judicial scrutiny to insure that it has been
made voluntarily" 80 and not in violation of constitutional safeguards.
To give some guidelines to that scrutiny, rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure establishes a procedural checklist a trial judge
1175. Id. at 1302-03.
1176. Id. at 1303. Cf. notes 1158-63 supra and accompanying text.
1177. 597 F.2d at 1302-03.
1178. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.
1179. 395 US. 238, 242 (1968) (citing Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223
(1927)). 4ccord, United States v. Benson, 605 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1979) (plea of guilty
in state court was considered the equivalent of a conviction for determining whether defen-
dant was a convicted felon for the purpose of a federal firearms statute); Larios-Mendez v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 597 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (because
defendant had pleaded guilty, he could not contest the admissibility of certain evidence on
fourth amendment grounds; a plea of guilty in effect admits all material facts on which the
conviction is based).
1180. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 (1973).
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must follow before accepting a guilty plea. 1 8 1
The Supreme Court first ruled on a trial judge's failure to comply
with rule 11 in the decision of McCarthy v. United States1 82 and held
that non-compliance with the rule resulted in automatic prejudice to a
defendant and required that he be given another opportunity to
plead." 83 McCarthy's "per se" approach was applied by all the circuits
whenever a defendant contested the validity of his guilty plea on direct
appeal.1
84
1181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), which governs the procedural steps involved in acceptance
of a guilty plea, provides that:
[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendre, the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he un-
derstands the following:
(I) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by
law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be
represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if
necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has
already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial
has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself;
and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendre there will not be a further trial of
any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendre he waives the right to a trial;
and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendre, the court may ask him questions
about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under
oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used
against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
1182. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). The pre-1975 version of rule 11 under review in McCarthy
provided, in part, that:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a
plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and de-
termining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.
.d. at 462-63 n.4.
Under this rule most courts applied a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine if
defendant's guilty plea was made voluntarily and with sufficient awareness of the conse-
quences thereof. E.g., Kloner v. United States, 535 F.2d 730, 733-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 942 (1976). The purpose of the 1975 amendment was to codify the consequences of
a guilty plea listed in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) so that a trial judge
would be required to fully inform a defendant regarding the consequences of his plea.
United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 1976).
1183. 394 U.S. at 471-72.
1184. E.g., United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1976) (court rejected harm-
less error standard with regard to violations of rule 11 (c)); United States v. Keller, 594 F.2d
939, 942 (3d Cir. 1979); Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1970)
(strict compliance required); United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d 1090, 1091 (4th Cir. 1976)
(followed McCarthy's per se rule); United States v. Boatright, 588 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.
1979) (in accord with McCarthy; no showing of prejudice required); Government of Canal
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However, different considerations came into play when a defen-
dant attacked his guilty plea collaterally by means of a section 2255
habeas corpus petition." 85 In Davis v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that collateral relief should not be granted under a section
2255 motion unless there was "'a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice.' "1186 Subsequently, a
number of circuits, in deciding rule 11 violations raised by defendants
in section 2255 motions, followed Davis and required that mere formal
infractions of the rule would not result in retrial absent a showing of
prejudice of "manifest injustice."'"1 87 Other circuits, however, granted
Zone v. Tobar T., 565 F.2d 1321, 1321 (5th Cir. 1978) (omission of rule l1(c)(1) advice
required reversal of conviction); United States v. Del Prete, 567 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir. 1978)
(non-compliance with rule 11 in failing to advise defendant of special parole term requires
setting aside his conviction); Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) ("McCar-
thy. . . held that no guilty plea is proper without strict adherence to the procedures and
language of rule I "). See, e.g., United States v. Yazbeck, 524 F.2d 641, 643 (1st Cir. 1975)
(since court was not "disposed to find. . . error harmless" in rule 11 violation on collateral
habeas corpus motion, it would afortiori have used the same approach on direct appeal);
Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372, 374-75 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 780 (1979)
(prejudice to defendant results from failure of trial judge to strictly comply with require-
ments of rule 11); Richardson v. United States, 577 F.2d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1978) (trial
judge required to conform to rule 11 (c), but since defendant's attack was collateral rather
than by way of direct appeal, he was required to show more than formal violations of the
rule); United States v. Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1977) (although the court noted
that other circuits had decided a rule 11 violation based on the McCarthy rule, since defend-
ant was attacking his guilty plea collaterally, he was required to show that a miscarriage of
justice had occurred). But see, e.g., United States v. Fels, 599 F.2d 142, 148 (7th Cir. 1979)
(defendants' convictions were vacated because there was no "substantial compliance" with
rule 11); Keel v. United States, 585 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (court "ex-
presse[d] no opinion. . . on those panel decisions which impose a per se rule on direct
appeal").
1185. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) allows a federal prisoner to collaterally challenge his cus-
tody on the grounds that his sentence was in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.
1186. 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962)).
1187. Eg., Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1977) ("without in
any way detracting from the force of. . .United States v. Journet,. . . on direct appeal, we
believe that ...there must be flexibility in the collateral review of a Rule 11 claim");
United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court rejected the McCar-
thy per se rule for collateral attacks and instead adopted the standard of FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(d) which requires a defendant to show that guilty plea may be set aside only "to correct
manifest injustice"); United States v. White, 572 F.2d 1007, 1009 (4th Cir. 1978) (no collat-
eral relief available unless defendant can show he or she was prejudiced by rule 11 viola-
tions); Keel v. United States, 585 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (court rejected per
se rule of McCarthy with respect to § 2255 relief); Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589,
591-93 (7th Cir. 1975) (after Davis, court should examine a rule 11 violation to determine if
there hag been an error which results in a "complete miscarriage of justice"); McRae v.
United States, 540 F.2d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 1976) (after Davis, rule 11 errors should be ex-
amined to see if they are prejudicial or result in a complete miscarriage of justice); United
States v. Eaton, 579 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1978) (followed Davis for § 2255 motions
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habeas relief solely on the basis of even a "formal" rule 11 violation
irrespective of whether the defendant had been prejudiced. 188
The Supreme Court ended this double standard in 1979. Its hold-
ing in United States v. Timmreck foreclosed collateral relief for rule 11
violations "'when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the for-
mal requirements of the Rule.' "119 The Ninth Circuit followed Timm-
reck in United States v. Salas in which defendants Betty and Alfred
Salas were convicted of assorted narcotics violations." 90 The trial
judge informed the Salases that their punishment would include a
mandatory special parole term of at least three years in length. Betty
Salas received the three year term, but Alfred was given special parole
of ten years." 9' The Salases filed a rule 32(d) motion which allows for
withdrawal of guilty pleas after sentencing has occurred if "manifest
injustice" would result."1 92 In their motion, they claimed that rule 11
had been violated because the trial judge failed to inform them of the
specifics of the special parole term before accepting their pleas."
193
The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of the rule 11 violation
because the court found that even if one had occurred, it would only
have been a "technical" violation which, according to Tmmreck,
would not entitle defendants to any post conviction relief.1194 But the
attacking validity of guilty pleas). But see Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176, 179 (7th
Cir. 1978). There, defendant's guilty plea was invalidated on § 2255 motion after one judge
refused to accept his guilty pleas because there was a factual question regarding his guilt, but
a second judge, who was aware of this refusal, still accepted the plea on the basis of counsel's
recommendation that defendant had been fully advised of the consequences. The court re-
lied on McCarthy even though it acknowledged that McCarthy "involved a direct appeal."
Id. The appeals panel also used its opinion to strongly admonish district judges concerning
their attention to the procedures found in rule 11. Id. at 179-80.
1188. E.g., Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441
U.S. 780 (1979); Yothers v. United States, 572 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978). See, e.g.,
Horsley v. United States, 583 F.2d 670, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1978) (although the court agreed
with Davis that prejudice had to be shown by a defendant in a § 2255 proceeding, it found
that entering k guilty plea without the understanding required by rule 11 was "inherently
prejudicial"). See also United States v. Yazbeck, 524 F.2d 641, 643-44 (lst Cir. 1975) (the
court, using broad language, followed McCarthy).
1189. 441 U.S. 780, 785 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962)).
The Ninth Circuit followed Timmreck in denying a § 2255 motion when all that could be
shown was a "technical" violation. Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979).
1190. 602 F.2d 215, 216 (9th Cir. 1979).
1191. Id.
1192. Id. FED. R. ClM. P. 32(d) provides that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or
nolo contendre may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is
suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judg-
ment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
1193. 602 F.2d at 216.
1194. Id. at 217.
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court acknowledged that Timmreck involved a collateral attack under
section 2255 while the Salases motion was raised under rule 32(d).
1195
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the "manifest injustice" required by
rule 32(d) was essentially equivalent to "a complete miscarriage of jus-
tice" needed for section 2255 habeas corpus relief.
1196
There are, however, problems with equating these two standards.
It is conceivable that a sentence could be manifestly unjust and still not
have resulted from procedures which were a complete miscarriage of
justice. In addition, the term "manifest injustice" was expressly singled
out in the federal rules to be applied in connection with post conviction
challenges to guilty pleas. Thus, it appears that the Salas court, in sub-
stituting the standard of review normally used for habeas corpus relief,
at least partially frustrated the clear intent of the framers of rule
32(d).
1197
Rule 11 violations were also at issue in the 1979 case of United
States v. Conrad, but unlike Salas, involved a direct appeal which was
made prior to sentencing."198 Conrad claimed and the government
conceded that the trial judge erred when he failed to inform Conrad
that any answers Conrad gave in conjunction with his guilty plea could
later be used against him in a perjury trial.' 199 As such, the automatic
prejudice rule of McCarthy which required withdrawal of guilty pleas
when rule 11 violations occur was directly applicable.1
2
00
1195. Id. at 217 n.3.
1196. Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141, 141 n.l (9th Cir. 1976)).
1197. Cf. United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rule 32(d) is a
special form of collateral attack which should govern a challenge to a guilty plea after sen-
tencing, and it provides a more certain standard of review than is often available under the
rather "opaque judicial formulations" surrounding § 2255 motions); United States v. Guy,
466 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (post conviction guilty plea challenge should be
evaluated under the standard of rule 32(d) rather than the more general standard of § 2255
because of the "specific remedy" provided by the rule and because Congress, by so provid-
ing, indicated a desire that this standard be employed).
1198. 598 F.2d 506, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1979).
1199. Id. at 508. FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(c)(5) requires the court to inform the defendant in
open court that:
if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the
offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on
the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against
him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
1200. See 394 U.S. at 471-72. The Court stated that:
We thus conclude that prejudice inheres in a failure to comply with Rule 11, for
noncompliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's procedural safeguards that are
designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of his
plea. Our holding that a defendant whose plea has been accepted in violation of
Rule 11 should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew not only will insure that
every accused is afforded those procedural safeguards, but also will help reduce the
great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty
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But the Ninth Circuit decided the McCarthy standard was inappli-
cable. This decision was based primarily on the assumption that
1 1(c)(5) was unlike the other provisions of rule 11 and thus did not
require the same standard of review."" 1 Relying on a footnote in a
Fourth Circuit case, the court noted that " '[flaimess, not voluntariness,
is the concept underlying Rule 11 (c)(5).' "122 Implicit in this reading is
the concept that once voluntariness is no longer required, then a court
is not bound by the literal requirements of the rule. A reading of the
passage in question reveals that the "fairness versus voluntariness"
statement of the Fourth Circuit was used to explain the legislative in-
tent for the inclusion of section 11(c)(5) in the rule.12 0 3 The quoted
passage which discussed "fairness" had nothing to do with establishing
or changing the standard used by appeals courts to evaluate rule 11
violations.
The Conrad court looked for additional support in Second Circuit
cases which have not allowed defendants to withdraw guilty pleas in
the face of 1 (c)(5) violations.' ° The Second Circuit position appears
plea convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the
original record is inadequate.
Id.
1201. See 598 F.2d at 509. The court noted that "[o]ther parts of rule 11 are intended to
insure that pleas are voluntary; subsection (c)(5) is intended to insure that perjury prosecu-
tions are fair."
1202. Id. (citing United States v. White, 572 F.2d 1007, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978)).
1203. The Fourth Circuit explained that:
As originally proposed, Rule 1 l(e)(6) contained a broad prohibition against the use
in later proceedings of defendant's statements made at the Rule 11 hearing. The
Committee amended this to make statements made by the defendant under oath,
on the record, and in the presence of counsel admissible in a subsequent criminal
proceeding for perjury or false statement. Since this exception created a potential
risk to defendants, subsection (5) was added to Rule 11 (c) to insure that defendants
have notice of this risk. Fairness, not voluntariness, is the concept underlying Rule
11 (c)(5).
United States v. White, 572 F.2d 1007, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978).
It is at least arguable that rule 1 (c)(5) violations raise constitutional issues. The House
Judiciary Committee in commenting on the addition of this provision noted that it was
following Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1975). In Boykin, the Supreme Court noted that a defendant who pleads guilty waives his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Id. at 243. A subsequent trial in which the
defendant's own statements are used to establish a perjury conviction would be one form of
self-incrimination.
1204. In United States v. Journet, 554 F.2d 633, 637 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976) the Second Circuit,
while requiring strict compliance with the provisions of rule 11, apparently allowed some
leeway in the enforcement of 1 l(c)(5), noting that "the district courts in this circuit do not
follow the custom of placing the defendant under oath before questioning him in connection
with the acceptance of his guilty plea. However, since the court has the right to do so and
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to be a minority interpretation of rule 11.1205 In addition, the Second
Circuit follows a practice of never placing a pleading defendant under
oath. 20 6 Therefore, Second Circuit courts have held that the failure of
a trial judge to warn a defendant that his answers might be used in a
subsequent perjury trial amounts to an "inconsequential error."'1
20 7
Conrad, however, was placed under oath.120 8 Consequently, the court's
reliance on the Second Circuit cases is misplaced.1
20 9
The Ninth Circuit's further attempt to distinguish United States v.
Boone, 1210 a Fourth Circuit case, was equally in error. Boone involved
a rule 1 (c)(5) violation which the Fourth Circuit found required auto-
matic reversal.' 21' The Boone court, although acknowledging that the
chance of a subsequent perjury prosecution was remote, 1212 made no
attempt, as did the Conrad court, to distinguish that type of violation
Rule 1 1(c)(5) is phrased in mandatory terms, it is advisable to give the warning to the de-
fendant." .d. at 637 n.6 (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit in United States v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1977),
relied on the phrase "it is advisable" to find that strict compliance with 1 l(c)(5) was not
required. And in United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), the court found
that I l(c)(5) violations were "inconsequential" in the absence of an oath.
1205. United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 948 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Clark and
Rubin, JJ., dissenting). For cases upholding strict compliance with rule 11, see, e.g., United
States v. Cammisano, 599 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Fels, 599 F.2d 142,
149 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Boatright, 588 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Boone, 453 F.2d 1091, 1092 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. O'Donnell, 539
F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Del
Prete, 567 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (defendant pleading guilty must be
advised of special parole term in compliance with rule 11); Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155,
1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (in holding that rule I1 required that defendant be advised of
mandatory parole term, court cited McCarthy for proposition that rule 11 requires strict
compliance). Contra, United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1130 (8th Cir. 1977) ("not
every failure of a district court to comply with the Rule entails the setting aside of a convic-
tion with leave to withdraw a plea of guilty").
1206. United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 637 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976).
1207. United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
1208. 598 F.2d at 507.
1209. In addition, other courts have found that violations of rule 1 I(c)(5) mandate with-
drawals of guilty pleas in line with the McCarthy rule. E.g., United States v. Boone, 543
F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th Cir. 1976).
The Conrad court further compounded its interpretive errors by citing United States v.
White, 572 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1978), for support. There, defendant was not allowed to
withdraw a guilty plea after a I 1(c)(5) violation. But White involved a § 2255 habeas mo-
tion, whereas Conrad was on direct appeal. Because of this difference, defendant in White
had a far greater burden and, unlike Conrad, had to show not just a technical violation of
the rule, but a violation which resulted in a fundamental defect causing "a complete miscar-
riage of justice." Id. at 1009.
1210. 543 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1976).
1211. Id. at 1092.
1212. Id. at 1092 n.2.
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from other rule 11 violations. Instead, the court noted that "we think
the thrust of McCarthy has continuing vitality and that we should not
anticipate its erosion, or undertake to separate inquiries that may be
thought more essential from others contained in the command of the
rule."'
12 13
However, the Conrad decision received independent, albeit be-
lated, support from the en banc case of United States v. Dayton, de-
cided some four months later. 2 4 There, the Fifth Circuit classified
rule 11 violations into a "core" group requiring automatic withdrawal
and a peripheral group which would require a showing of actual
prejudice. 215 The rationale for the Dayton holding was that rule 11,
as it existed when McCarthy was decided, did not contain the lengthy
list of specific warnings which a trial judge is now required to give.
1216
It also appears that the Conrad court independently adopted this same
rationale. The court noted that "McCarthy was based on an earlier
form of Rule 11. .. 1217
This "two-tier" approach is not without its difficulties. In United
States v. Timmreck, decided in 1979, the Supreme Court implicitly ac-
knowledged the continuing vitality of McCarthy's per se rule which re-
quires withdrawal of guilty pleas based on technical violations of rule
11 asserted on direct appeal. 218 Further, the structure of rule 11 does
not admit to a two-tier level of violations. 21 9 Nor does there appear to
be any legislative intent to require a lesser standard of compliance with
provisions such as 1 (c)(5) which were later added to the rule.
220
2. Voluntary stipulations
Regardless of the interpretation used, rule 11 has not been applied
1213. Id. at 1092.
1214. 604 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
1215. Id. at 939-40.
1216. Id. at 936, 939. The court based its grouping distinction on pre- and post-McCarthy
provisions of rule* 11. Id. at 939-40.
1217. 598 F.2d at 509.
1218. 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). The Court noted that respondent's "only claim is of a
technical violation of the rule [11]. That claim could have been raised on direct appeal, .
but was not." Id.
1219. Section I l(c)(5) is listed in tandem with several of the fundamental or "core" provi-
sions of the rules such as the defendant's right to be informed of the nature of the charge,
1 l(c)(1), his or her right to know the minimum penalty provided by law, 1 l(c)(1), the right to
plead not guilty, I1l(c)(3), and that he or she has a right to a jury trial, I1l(c)(3).
1220. The Conference Committee Notes states that
"Rule ll(c) enumerates certain things that a judge must tell a defendant before the
judge can accept that defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
H.R. REP. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975) (emphasis added).
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when a defendant merely makes a damaging stipulation of facts prior
to trial. 22 This rule was followed in the 1979 case of United States v.
Stapleton when defendant made a potentially damaging statement con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence. 222 The reason behind this rule is
that a defendant, in making a damaging stipulation, does not undertake
the same risks that he would if he pleaded guilty. Thus, there is not as
great a need to afford a stipulating defendant the equivalent level of
protection associated with guilty pleas.
223
3. State court proceedings
But, the Ninth Circuit has extended some of the protections af-
forded by rule 11 to state court defendants by requiring that they be
informed of all possible punishments prior to pleading guilty. 224 This
requirement, known as the Pebworth rule, was at issue in the 1979 case
of Miller v. McCarthy where defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a
rape charge in a California state court. 1225 After conviction, defendant
Miller, by way of a federal habeas corpus petition, contended that his
plea would have been altered had he been apprised of the full range of
allowable punishments. Because California law equated the legal effect
of a plea of guilty with that of nolo contendere, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied federal law controlling guilty pleas.
226
In this regard, earlier Ninth Circuit cases had held that a defen-
dant could have his state court guilty plea set aside if he could show
that knowledge of the additional sentencing information would have
changed his plea.1227 Because the district court failed to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on this matter, the case was remanded. 22
4. Competency to plead guilty
Mental competency was at issue in the post conviction proceedings
of Sara Jane Moore after she challenged her guilty plea following an
attempted assassination of former President Gerald R. Ford.
229
1221. E.g., United States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1264 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1975).
1222. 600 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1979).
1223. United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1975). However, a trial judge is
still required to insure that stipulations are made in a voluntary manner. United States v.
Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1264 (1978).
1224. Pebworth v. Conte, 489 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1974).
1225. 607 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1979).
1226. Id., at 856.
1227. Yellowwolf v. Morris, 536 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1976).
1228. 607 F.2d at 856-57.
1229. United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Moore had pleaded guilty but later claimed that her original plea was
invalid because of her own mental incompetence at the time it was
made.2 30 The Ninth Circuit rejected her claim, noting that she had
been found competent to stand trial by six psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists.'2 3' In addition, she was unable to demonstrate to the court that
her alleged impaired mental ability was sufficient to prevent her from
making "a reasoned choice among ...alternatives."'l232 The Ninth
Circuit was also influenced by the fact that the examinations which
found her competent occurred within a short period of time prior to her
plea. 1
233
5. Plea bargaining
In the 1979 Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Arnett,
234
defendant Steven Arnett agreed to plead guilty to one count of an in-
dictment if the Government in turn agreed not to oppose any position
he would take regarding sentencing. 235 The Government kept its part
of the bargain during the sentencing hearing, 236 and shortly thereafter
Arnett brought a rule 35 motion asking for a reduction of his sen-
tence.1237 The Government was allowed by the district court to oppose
this motion. 238 It contended that since Arnett had presented no new
evidence which would justify a reduction in his sentence, his rule 35
motion should have been denied. 239 On appeal, Arnett moved to
1230. Id. at 312-13.
1231. Id. at 313.
1232. Id. This competency test, which is followed in the Ninth Circuit, was enunciated in
Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing with approval Judge Hufstedler's
language in Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 1970)).
1233. 599 F.2d at 314. Cf. Makal v. Arizona, 554 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976) (since
petitioner was found competent to stand trial only seventeen days prior to the time he pled
guilty, the court could reasonably conclude that he was competent to make a guilty plea).
1234. No. 79-1243 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1979).
1235. Id., slip op. at 285.
1236. Id., slip op. at 288.
1237. Id., slip op. at 287. FED. R. CRiM. P. 35 provides:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of
sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon
affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal or within 120 days after entry
of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the
effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The court may also reduce a sen-
tence upon revocation of probation as provided by law.
1238. No. 79-1243, slip op. at 288.
1239. Id, slip op. at 285.
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strike this response, contending that it violated the original plea bar-
gain agreement.1
2 40
Arnett relied on the Fifth Circuit decision of United States v. Ew-
ing 241 It interpreted a similar plea bargain agreement, in which the
Government agreed not to oppose defendant, to include the rule 35
proceedings which followed the trial.1242 The Ninth Circuit, however,
found that the Government had fulfilled its part of the bargain by not
opposing Arnett during the initial sentencing process. 243 Thus, the ac-
tions it took during the rule 35 proceedings were found to be proper.1
244
The decision inArnett is sound from both a procedural and policy
standpoint. Except for the statement offered by the Government to the
effect that Arnett had presented no new evidence, his motion was unop-
posed as to substantive issues. 1245 In addition, from a procedural
standpoint it would seem unwise to extend the scope of such agree-
ments to the point where the government would be virtually neutral-
ized during any type of post sentencing or appellate review.
1246
6. Acceptance of the guilty plea
A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a guilty plea
should be accepted. 247 The standard for acceptance, established by the
Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, is "whether the plea repre-
sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses
of action open to the defendant."'' 248 In United States v. O'Brien, the
Ninth Circuit followed this standard and rejected the defendant's argu-
1240. Id.
1241. 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973).
1242. No. 79-1243, slip op. at 285.
1243. Id., slip op. at 288. The court found persuasive United States v. Johnson, 582 F.2d
335, 337 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1979), which held that Ewing did not
give a defendant the right to an unopposed rule 35 motion. Id.
The Ninth Circuit also found the Supreme Court decision of Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971) to be controlling in evaluating such disputes. No. 79-1243, slip op. at
286. Santobello held that principles of contract law should govern plea bargain agreements.
404 U.S. at 262-63. Thus, trial courts normally have the responsibility to determine the
terms of such an agreement. No. 79-1243, slip op. at 287. However, the defendant inArneft,
instead of asking for a remand in order that such a determination could be made, requested
that his rule 35 motion be heard by a different judge. .d.
1244. No. 79-1243, slip op. at 288.
1245. Id.
1246. Id.
1247. E.g., United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1978); United States
v. Bettelyoun, 503 F.2d 1333, 1336 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d
615, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Martinez, 486 F.2d 15, 20 (5th Cir. 1973).
1248. 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
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ment which would have limited the court's discretion in such a deter-
mination. 249 Specifically, the court declined to "adopt a rule making it
an abuse of discretion to reject a guilty plea when a defendant refuses
to admit guilt."' 25
7. Influence of counsel
A guilty plea will normally not be invalidated because a defend-
ant, in making such a plea, relied on the mistaken, but good faith ad-
vice of his attorney.'25 If the level of advice falls below what the
courts would consider to be within the range of competence normally
demanded of criminal attorneys, then a court could invalidate a guilty
plea on the grounds that it was not knowingly or intelligently made. 252
The Ninth Circuit followed this standard in two cases and rejected
the claims of two defendants who challenged their guilty pleas on these
grounds. 253 In United States v. Bonface defendant was unable to
demonstrate that he had been coerced by his attorney into pleading
guilty. 254 Likewise, in United States v. Moore, there was no showing
of incompetence because defendant's attorney had repeatedly advised
against a guilty plea, defendant had been satisfied with his perform-
ance, and there was no indication that he had ever been unprepared
prior to the time the plea was made.
1255
C Jury Administration
1. Waiver of jury of twelve
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
trial by jury.256 In a federal court, an important element of that right
1249. 601 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1979).
1250. Id. at 1070.
1251. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 769-71 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970). Accord,
Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483, 485 (Ist Cir. 1971) ("Mere prediction by counsel
of the court's likely attitude on sentence, short of some implication of an agreement or un-
derstanding, is not ground for attacking a plea."); Floyd v. United-States, 260 F.2d 910, 912
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 947 (1959) ("[i]t has nowhere been held that if counsel
advises his client in good faith that a plea of guilty will result in a recommendation of a
lighter sentence in one of several indictments, this strips a plea of its voluntary nature.");
Pinedo v. United States, 347 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1965); ("Due process does not require
'errorless counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance.' ")
1252. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
1253. United States v. Boniface, 601 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Moore,
599 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1979).
1254. 601 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1979).
1255. 599 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1979).
1256. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
1980]
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is that the jury be composed of twelve members. 257 However, the right
to a jury of twelve can be waived.
258
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b) requires court approval
of a written stipulation by the parties in order to proceed with fewer
than twelve jurors. 1259 Oral stipulations can satisfy the requirements of
rule 23(b) if it appears from the record that the "defendantpersonal
gave express consent in open court, intelligently and knowingly, to the
stipulation."'
260
In United States v. Reyes,1261 a juror was excused because of a
physical disability after the trial had begun. By oral stipulation, the
parties agreed to proceed with eleven jurors. 262 The defendant later
moved for a new trial, contending that the oral waiver was insufficient.
The trial court denied the motion after the judge was assured that the
defendant had made a knowing waiver. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
citing the trial judge's failure to directly interrogate the defendant.
263
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that rule 23(b) waiver was
similar to the waiver of a jury trial under rule 23(a)' 21 and that "the
better practice. . .[is] to interrogate the defendant so as to satisfy [the
court] that the defendant is fully apprised of his rights and freely and
voluntarily desires to relinquish them."'
1261
2. Extrinsic material in jury room
It has been long established that jurors should be influenced only
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
1257. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) provides that "U]uries shall be of 12 but at any time before
the verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury
shall consist of any number less than 12 ...."
1258. Eg., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1950).
1259. FED. R. CriM. P. 23(b) provides in part that "the parties may stipulate in writing
with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 ...."
See United States v. Taylor, 498 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) ("waiver of a
jury trial, even the waiver of one juror, is the waiver of a basic and important right which
cannot be accomplished upon a 'silent record' "). But see United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d
488, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977) (pre-trial stipulation to proceed with less
than 12 jurors in the event of juror disability is effective throughout trial and defendant not
required to consent again when the need arises during trial).
1260. United States v. Lane, 479 F.2d 1134, 1136 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 861
(1973) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (oral stipulation intelligently and knowingly expressed
was valid waiver of jury of 12).
1261. 603 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1979).
1262. Id. at 70-71.
1263. Id. at 72.
1264. Id. at 71. Rule 23(a) requires that a waiver of jury trial in criminal cases be written.
1265. Id.
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by evidence submitted in open court. 12 6 6 "Accordingly, courts have
been continually sensitive to the jeopardy to a criminal defendant's
sixth amendment rights posed by any jury exposure to facts collected
outside of trial."'
' 267
In United States v. Vasquez,12 68 a clerk-bailiff left an official court
file containing unadmitted and prejudicial information in the jury
room during deliberations. 269 After the jury returned a guilty verdict,
the judge questioned each of the jurors to determine whether the ver-
dict was tainted because of the exposure to the extrinsic information.
Based on the juror response, the verdict was sustained. 1270
The Ninth Circuit, facing a question of first impression, adopted
the test of the Fifth Circuit, which requires a new trial if there exists a
reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information could have affected
the verdict.' 271
Under this test the court found that the trial judge "should not
[have investigated] the subjective effects of any such breach upon the
jurors," when attempting to determine if a reasonable possibility of
harm existed. 272 Instead the "hearing should have been limited to as-
certaining the extent, if any, that jurors saw or discussed the prejudicial
extrinsic evidence or other circumstances surrounding the breach."'
1273
Since it was clear that the prejudicial information had been before the
jurors and that some had reviewed the file, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
"it [was] a useless exercise even to ask the jurors whether the evidence
1266. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
1267. United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975); accord, Jackson v.
United States, 414 U.S. 820 (1971). For an extensive list of cases involving juror exposure to
extrinsic material, see 506 F.2d at 866-87.
1268. 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979).
1269. The government conceded that the file included prejudicial information. The file
included motions which had been denied and evidence which had been ruled inadmissible
prior to trial. Some jurors admitted reviewing the fie extensively. Id. at 193, 194.
1270. Id.
1271. Id. at 193 n.l. E.g., United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975). The
Second, Tenth and D.C. Circuits require reversal "if there is the slightest possibility that
harm could result." 597 F.2d at 193 n.l. E.g, United States v. Marx 485 F.2d 1179, 1184
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546,
548, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1967). If the error "might have operated to the substantial injury of the
defendant," the Seventh and Eighth Circuits will require reversal. 597 F.2d at 193 n.1. Eg.,
Osborne v. United States, 351 F.2d 111, 119 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Grady, 185
F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1950).
1272. 597 F.2d at 194 (citing United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1975)).
1273. 597 F.2d at 194 (emphasis added). The court felt that the judge "should reach a
judgment on the reasonable possibility of harm on his own without the benefit of juror
opinions which might negate or affirm a conclusion of harm." Id.
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affected their verdict."'1274 Thus, the conviction was reversed.
3. Juror bias
The sixth amendment guarantees that all criminal defendants shall
have the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 1275 The voir dire exami-
nation of prospective jurors helps to ensure this right. 12 7 6 The trial
court has considerable discretion over the conduct of voir dire. 277 This
discretion is limited only by the requirement that the examination pro-
vide some reasonable basis for determining whether a prospective juror
would be impartial, so that counsel is then able to exercise his peremp-
tory challenge.' 278 The required scope and content of voir dire is nec-
essarily dependent upon the circumstances of each case.
Recent Ninth Circuit decisions illustrate the case-by-case factual
inquiry which is employed when courts determine the adequacy of a
voir dire. For instance, in United States v. Baldwin279 the defendant
was convicted of stealing cacti from government owned land. Two
agents of a state commission were principal witnesses for the prosecu-
tion. The defendant contended that the trial court committed revers-
ible error by refusing to ask the following defense-proposed voir dire
questions: "1) Whether any of the prospective jurors would give
greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a law enforcement officer,
by the mere reason of his/her position; [or] 2) Whether any of the pro-
spective jurors were acquainted with any of the prospective witnesses in
the case."' 2 10 The Baldwin court reversed the conviction and held that
1274. Id.
1275. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury.... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
1276. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979).
1277. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the gov-
ernment to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his attor-
ney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such
further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors
such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
1278. United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1976) (discretion of judge bal-
anced against right of parties to information upon which to exercise challenges); Cook v.
United States, 379 F.2d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1967) (Trial court should have asked questions
that would have elicited information that "was reasonably necessary to enable the accused
to exercise his peremptory challenges.").
1279. 607 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
1280. Id. at 1297. Baldwin submitted eleven questions; the court asked only whether any
venireperson had been the victim of theft. Id.
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the judge's failure to ask the two questions so limited the scope of voir
dire that there was no reasonable opportunity for defense counsel to
expose any possible juror prejudice.
1 281
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Brown v. United
States128 2 which recognized that jurors may be predisposed to lend
credibility to the testimony of government witnesses merely because of
their position. Brown concluded that in situations where the testimony
of an official-witness is significant, a request to ask veniremen about
their attitudes towards officials should be granted. 283 The Baldwin de-
cision also depended upon Cook v. United States1284 which held that
the trial court should question prospective jurors about possible rela-
tionships with important government witnesses. 285 Finally, the Bald-
win court decided that reversal was required even if prejudice to the
defense had not been proven since the meaningful number of peremp-
tory challenges had been reduced by the inadequate voir dire.
1286
In United States v. Giese1287 the defendant was convicted of vari-
ous offenses in connection with the bombings of military recruiting cen-
ters. The bombings were carried out as a protest against the Vietnam
War. On appeal defendant claimed that the voir dire was inadequate.
However, during voir dire, the trial court thoroughly examined several
of the prospective jurors about their attitudes toward war protests, the
military, law enforcement officers, and pretrial publicity. Although
other veniremen were subjected to a more limited inquiry, the judge
admonished them to consider the more detailed questions asked of
other prospective jurors and to answer those if their responses would
have been different. The trial court also permitted the defense to sug-
1281. Id. at 1298. "[Tlhe trial judge should keep uppermost in his mind the fact that the
parties have the right to some surface information about prospective jurors which might
furnish the basis for an informed exercise of peremptory challenges .. " Id. at 1297. See
United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d
403, 413 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he trial judge does not possess unlimited discretion to ignore
proposed questions. . . . Adequate questioning must be conducted to provide under the
facts in the particular case some basis for a reasonably knowledgeable exercise of the right of
challenge. . . .") (citation omitted).
1282. 338 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("[W]hen important testimony is anticipated from
certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might
reasonably be. . . inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would
have such an inclination. . . should be given if requested.").
1283. Id. However, the court also noted that the test for reversal should be dependent
upon "the degree of impact which the testimony in question would be likely to have had on
the jury and what part such testimony played in the case as a whole." Id.
1284. 379 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1967).
1285. Id. at 971.
1286. 607 F.2d at 1298. See United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977).
1287. 597 F.2d 1170, 1181-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
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gest additional questions after the initial voir dire, most of which were
subsequently asked.
1288
In evaluating the propriety of the voir dire examination, the Giese
court reasoned that a relatively elaborate voir dire was necessary be-
cause crimes of terrorism directed against the government easily arouse
prejudice. 289 The court concluded that the voir dire in the instant case
was adequate to reveal the prejudices of the veniremen. It noted that
the examination of several of the jurors was beyond reproach.1290 The
court relied upon United States v. Amaral1291 in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit had approved a limited examination of some veniremen when they
had been reminded that the more detailed questions asked of others
were asked of all. More important, the Giese court concluded that the
voir dire was sufficient because it had accomplished its purpose of iden-
tifying biased jurors-several of the veniremen subjected to the limited
inquiry had answered questions asked of others and had admitted
strong feelings about law enforcement officers and the Vietnam
War. 1292 According to the Giese court, the trial court was not obligated
to ask all of the questions submitted by the defense as long as the voir
dire was adequate.
1293
In United States v. Clabaugh 1294 the defendants were convicted of
two separate robberies. Two jurors revealed possible sources of bias,
but the trial court ceased examining them after each claimed that he
could act impartially. One juror had been the project architect for the
corporate headquarters of one of the banks that had been robbed. Al-
though he had no financial interest in the bank, he was acquainted with
all of the corporate officers. The other juror had been employed by the
police department as a radio operator for eighteen years. 1295 The Cla-
baugh court acknowledged that subjective assurances of impartiality
1288. Id. at 1182. "[Tlhe court refused to ask requested questions about President Ford's
conditional amnesty plan and his pardon of former President Nixon ... ." Id.
1289. Id. at 1181. The court recognized that the scope and content of voir dire varied with
each case. Id.
1290. Id. at 1182.
1291. 488 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1973). The Amaral court approved a voir dire where
the first venireperson was asked about racial prejudice and the court "reminded the prospec-
tive jurors that all questions asked of one juror were asked of all and that the voir dire
process was a cumulative one designed to probe into the juror's state of mind to discover
whether each could determine guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence presented at
trial." Id.
1292. 597 F.2d at 1182.
1293. Id. at 1182-83.
1294. 589 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1295. Id. at 1023.
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were not sufficient to indicate the presence of bias, 1296 but identified the
issue in the case as determining "when . . .a possibility of bias be-
come[s] sufficiently definite so that further inquiry is necessary."'
1297
The court distinguished cases where a more substantial possibility of
bias had been shown,12 98 concluded that the potential bias revealed in
this case did not make further questioning necessary, and thus upheld
the trial court's actions.
1299
Voir dire examination will not always result in the elimination of
biased jurors. For example, in United States v. Eubanks'30, the defen-
dants were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin. After the con-
clusion of the trial, the defense counsel discovered that a juror had two
sons serving long prison terms for robbery and murder. The crimes
had been committed so that the sons could obtain heroin for their own
use. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, rea-
soning that the single juror could not have influenced the jury ver-
dict.' 30 ' The Eubanks court reversed, noting that "[i]f only one juror is
unduly biased or prejudiced, the defendant is denied his constitutional
right to an impartial jury.""'3 2
In United States v. Ortiz the defendant was convicted of conspiring
to distribute heroin. 30 3 The defense alleged that the jury was biased
because one of the prospective jurors made the following statement
during voir dire examination: "I don't like heroin. I'm kind of
prejudiced. I hate the stuff and what it does. I honestly don't know if I
could be fair or not. If I had my way, I would hang them if they were
guilty.' 3 ° 4 The juror was subsequently dismissed, and the Ortiz court
concluded that the defendant had failed to carry his burden of showing
1296. Id. The court cited Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971). See also United States v. Martin, 507 F.2d 428, 432-33 (7th
Cir. 1974) ("The sole purpose of voir dire is not to tell potential jurors that they are to be fair
and then ask them if they think they can be impartial.")
1297. 589 F.2d at 1023.
1298. Id. The cases cited by the defense included United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th
Cir. 1977) (bias inferred from jurors who were employees of bank that was robbed by the
defendant and who should have been excused for cause); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d
1223 (5th Cir. 1976) (one juror disliked unions, and the other had argued with the union that
was a party).
1299. 589 F.2d at 1023.
1300. 591 F.2d 513, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1301. The trial judge believed the juror was biased. Id. at 517 n.4. However, he did not
believe that a poorly educated Oklahoma Indian could influence the outcome of a two-hour
jury deliberation. Id. at 517.
1302. Id. (citing United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 818 (1977)).
1303. 603 F.2d 76, 78 (9th Cir. 1979).
1304. Id. at 80.
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that he was prejudiced by the jury hearing the statement.130 5
4. The Allen charge
InAllen v. United States,130 6 the Supreme Court approved supple-
mental jury instructions that had been given by the trial court to en-
courage a jury verdict. In essence, the instructions urged the jurors to
reach a verdict if they could conscientiously do so and instructed mi-
nority jurors to consider the reasonableness of their views that had not
impressed the majority. 1307 Since the Allen decision, many courts have
shown an understandable reluctance to use this procedural device. If
an Allen charge is used prematurely or indiscriminately, it can easily
jeopardize the defendant's right to an impartial jury.130 8
The Ninth Circuit has generally approved the use of the Allen
charge if given as part of the original instructions, 30 9 in response to a
jury's request,1310 or in response to a jury deadlock.' 31' Thus, the Allen
1305. Id. See United States v. White, 524 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
922 (1975) ("Prejudice of a juror will not be presumed, but must be demonstrated."). But
see United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (bias presumed where sons
of juror in jail partly because of heroin use; defendant accused of distributing heroin);
United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1977) (bias may be presumed if certain
family or emotional relationships are involved).
1306. 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896).
1307. The charge instructed the jury that:
[I]n a large proportion of cases, absolute certainty could not be expected; that al-
though the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, they should examine the question
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other, that it was their duty to decide the case ifthey could conscientiousl do so;
that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's argu-
ments; that, !f much the larger number werefor conviction, a dissenting.juror should
consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the
minds of so many men, equally honest, equal, intelligent with himself, If, upon the
other hand, the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of/ajudgment which was not
concurred in by the majoriy.
Id. at 501-02 (emphasis added).
1308. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a. . . trial, by an
impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Under the best of circumstances, the use of
the Allen charge "approaches the ultimate permissible limits to which a court may go in
guiding a jury towards a verdict." Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th. Cir.
1969).
1309. United States v. Guglielmini, 598 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
943 (1979) (possible coercive effect of charge eliminated by giving the instruction as part of
the original instructions).
1310. United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Circ. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
991 (1978) ("If the charge is to pass muster as instruction on the law there is little need to
repeat it save at the jury's request.").
1311. United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (singleAllen charge after
jury reported deadlocked is proper).
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charge was improperly given when circumstances did not indicate
clearly a jury deadlock. 131 2 The Ninth Circuit also has forbidden giv-
ing the charge in response to a second reported deadlock after it had
already been given in response to the first reported deadlock.1
313
Several circuits have critized the Allen charge because it instructs
jurors to distrust their own judgments when they are contrary to those
of a large majority of jurors.1314 These circuits have adopted standard
instructions 31 5 which eliminate this aspect of the charge and merely
encourage collective deliberations. Thus far, the Ninth Circuit has not
disapproved of the "minority-majority" element of the instruction. In
United States v. Guglielmini, 316 the Ninth Circuit refused to recom-
mend the use of its supervisory powers to discontinue the use of the
Allen charge or to adopt aper se rule. However, the Guglielmini court
recognized that further consideration of Allen charges was inevita-
ble. 13
17
1312. United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (Allen
charge given prematurely when there was no clear indication that the jury was deadlocked).
1313. United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
9,91 (1978) ("[I]t is reversible error to repeat an Allen charge. . . after a jury has reported
itself deadlocked and has not itself requested a repetition of the instruction.").
1314. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc)
(concerned about coercive effect of "minority-majority" element of the Allen charge);
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1979).
1315. The standards most commonly accepted have been those adopted by the ABA:
Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction
which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with
a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individ-
ual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impar-
tial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexam-
ine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or
effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for
the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may
require the jury to continue their deliberation and may give or repeat an instruc-
tion as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to re-
quire the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable
intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it ap-
pears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY 15-16 (1968).
1316. 598 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1979).
1317. Id.
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D. Impeachment of Witnesses
At common law, a party was not allowed to impeach his own wit-
nesses.131 8 This maxim, known as the "voucher" rule, was founded on
the following three principles, which slowly eroded during the develop-
ment of the modem court system: "First, that the calling party
vouched for the testimony of his own witnesses; second, that the calling
party was therefore morally bound by that testimony; and third, that to
allow the calling party to impeach was to invite the prospect of making
a case by coercing the witness . . ,. . In 1975 Congress abolished
this common law principle in the federal judicial system by enacting
rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which provides that "[t]he
credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him."'
' 320
Rule 607 was at issue in the 1979 Ninth Circuit case of United
States v. Petsas.'32' Defendant Petsas, convicted of supplying false in-
formation to the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, contended on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion
in allowing the Government to impeach its own witness. The witness,
Sharon Barrow, had been convicted of lying to the Federal Housing
Administration in connection with some of the defendant's activities.
Before trial, the court ordered the Government not to use this informa-
tion for impeachment purposes, but later rescinded this order because it
appeared that Barrow had lied on the stand.
1322
Petsas claimed that the Government's sole motive for calling Bar-
row was to later impeach her. The Ninth Circuit allowed the impeach-
ment because under the Federal Rules of Evidence a party may
impeach its own witness by showing previous criminal acts. 1323
In further support of its decision, the court cited United States v.
Binger.1324 In Binger, the court considered the permissibility of im-
peaching a coconspirator witness with evidence that he had pleaded
guilty to a substantive count for which the defendant was being tried.
The court primarily considered the taint a witness' guilty plea could
lend to the claims of a defendant charged with same crime. Following
Bingler, the fact that the Petsas court allowed the impeachment was
1318. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896, at 659-60 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
1319. 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 297, at 182 (1979).
1320. FED. R. EvID. 607.
1321. 592 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1979).
1322. Id. at 528.
1323. Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 607 and 609(a)).
1324. 469 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1972).
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deemed to be harmless error in light of the weight of the evidence
presented against the defendant.
1325
E. Exclusion of Witnesses
The exclusion of witnesses serves two purposes in adjudicatory
proceedings: 1) preventing the testimony of one witness from being
colored by what he hears in the testimony of another, and 2) assisting
the prosecutor, defense counsel, judge, and jury in detecting error or
falsehood by a witness. 1326 Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
codifies the procedure for excluding witnesses in the federal courts. It
states in pertinent part that "[a]t the request of a party, the court shall
order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of
other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion."'
1327
In United States v. West, 1328 defendants argued that under rule 615
witnesses should have been excluded from a pretrial hearing because of
the possibility that their subsequent testimony might have been im-
properly influenced. But the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted rule
615 to mandate exclusion only during the evidentiary portion of a trial
when other witnesses are giving testimony. 1329 The purpose of such a
rule is to prevent collusive testimony among witnesses. 1330 In West,
this possibility would have been remote because the witnesses were ex-
posed to a pretrial proceeding in which offers of proof were dis-
cussed. 1331
However, a trial judge does have the discretion to order the exclu-
sion of witnesses in situations where rule 615 would not apply. 1332 In
West, neither defendant could prove he had been prejudiced because
of the trial court's failure to exercise this discretion. 1333 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit noted that "[amny prejudice asserted [was] merely specu-
lative" and upheld the trial court's action. 1
334
1325. 592 F.2d at 528 (citing 469 F.2d at 275-76).
1326. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 371, at 595-96 (1979).
1327. FED. R. EVID. 615.
1328. 607 F.2d 300, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1979).
1329. Id. at 306, (citing United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 37 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 905 (1977)). The language of the rule itself limits its scope to the testimonial phase
of a trial. 547 F.2d at 37.
1330. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1837, 1838 (Chadbour rev. ed. 1976).
1331. 607 F.2d at 305.
1332. Id. at 306.
1333. Id.
1334. Id.
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F Prosecutorial Misconduct
The alleged misconduct of the prosecution was the subject of sev-
eral Ninth Circuit criminal cases in 1979. In United States v. Jones,1 335
defendant initially failed to object to misrepresentations made during
the prosecutor's opening statement. Because of this initial failure, the
Ninth Circuit noted that reversal could occur on appeal only if there
was plain error. 1336 However, the prosecutor's error was anything but
"plain." In his opening statement he had mistakenly referred to the
get-away car as a "truck."' 1331 Since there was no possibility of
prejudice from such a miscue, especially because the jury had been
warned that the prosecutor's statements were not evidence, the Ninth
Circuit had no difficulty dismissing defendant's claim. 1338
The Ninth Circuit also found harmless error in United States v.
Vargas-Rios, in which a prosecutor, in addition to minor misstate-
ments, argued that defendant was a coconspirator in a drug distribution
scheme because he must have been capable of smelling the heroin lo-
cated inside his vehicle. 339 No evidence, however, had been offered to
establish the extent of defendant's olfactory abilities. 1340 Although the
Ninth Circuit was critical of the prosecutor's performance, it found the
nature of the errors to be trivial.' 34' The court noted that the argument
in controversy had been subject to rebuttal by the defense and that the
prosecutor had not repeated this particular mistake in his closing state-
ments. 1342 Thus, judgment was affirmed, and the errors ruled harm-
less. 1343
A similar situation arose in United States v. Lyman, where the
prosecutor sought to bolster the credibility of one of his witnesses by
remarking to the jury that the witness kept notes in a diary. 1344 The
Ninth Circuit first disposed of the Government's contention that de-
fendant's failure to interrupt the prosecutor's argument meant that he
had lost the right to raise the issue on appeal. The court noted that
defendant's motion for a mistrial which followed the argument in ques-
1335. 592 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979).
1336. Id. at 1043.
1337. Id.
1338. Id. at 1044.
1339. 607 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 1979).
1340. Id.
1341. Id.
1342. Id.
1343. Id.
1344. 592 F.2d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979).
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tion was sufficient to prevent a foreclosure of review.1 345
The Lyman court then weighed the seriousness of the prosecutor's
error using a standard which calls for reversal when it can be shown
that the jury's verdict was materially affected. 1346 Because other testi-
mony tended to establish the credibility of the witness, the court found
the prosecutor's error not to be material.
347
Guilt by association was the issue surrounding the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct in United States v. Marques.'34  Defendant
Marques objected to the prosecutor's statements linking him to the
Hell's Angels. 1349 The court acknowledged that attempts to link a de-
fendant with organized crime can be reversible error if "the spectre of
organized crime. . . serves no proper purpose and is without founda-
tion in the evidence."' 135 ° In Marques, however, evidence had been ad-
mitted which indicated that the Hell's Angels were prominent
customers of defendant's alleged drug sales. '35  Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit had little difficulty in allowing defendant's conviction to stand.
352
G. Continuance
A trial court has broad discretionary powers in granting or deny-
ing a party's request for a continuance. 13 53 A decision denying a re-
quest for continuance normally will not be reversed on appeal unless
there is a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court 1354 or a
showing that defendant was actually prejudiced by the denial. 355 Re-
versals of continuance decisions are so rare that one leading commen-
1345. Id. at 499. The court acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit forecloses review if closing
argument is not interrupted and plain error is not involved. Id. at 499 n.2. E.g., United
States v. Ward, 481 F.2d 185, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1973). The First and Eighth Circuits "have
suggested" that such objections should be made during argument. 592 F.2d at 499 n.2. E.g.,
Holden v. United States, 388 F.2d 240, 242-43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 464 (1968);
Birnbaum v. United States, 356 F.2d 856, 866 (8th Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, allows for such objections at the end of argument. E.g., United States v. Briggs,
457 F.2d 908, 911-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 986 (1972).
1346. 592 F.2d at 499.
1347. Id.
1348. 600 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979).
1349. Id. at 749.
1350. Id. (citing United States v. Love, 534 F.2d 87, 88 (6th Cir. 1976)).
1351. 600 F.2d at 749.
1352. Id. at 749, 752.
1353. E.g., Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); United States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d
113, 118 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Harris, 436 F.2d
775, 776 (9th Cir. 1970).
1354. E.g., United States v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113, 118 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
931 (1979); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1978).
1355. United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1974).
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tator has classified them as trial court actions which are "ordinarily not
reviewable." 1
356
Four appeals following denials of continuance requests in criminal
cases were heard by the Ninth Circuit in 1979. In all four, the action of
the trial court was upheld. One of the four, United States v. Petsas,
involved an agreement by the defendant with the court not to seek a
second continuance if his request for a first continuance was
granted.1357 Subsequent to the agreement defendant asked for a second
continuance one day before the trial was scheduled to begin. In United
States v. West, defendant, who was a prisoner representing himself,
claimed that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance just prior to
the time of his closing statement prevented him from preparing an ade-
quate defense. 358 Defendants unsuccessfully requested a continuance
in United States v. Hernandez in order to investigate the background of
a key Government witness for impeachment purposes. 135 9 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the denial in Hernandez and noted that to establish
abuse of discretion by the trial court, the moving parties must do more
than show there was a mere possibility that impeachable evidence
might have been produced had the additional time been granted.
1360
In each of these three decisions the actions taken by the trial court
in denying continuance appears to be sound. However, in a fourth
Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Mills,1361 the trial court's denial of
a continuance request rests on a less secure foundation.
The defendant in Mills requested a one day continuance after the
Government had called a "surprise" witness to the stand. Additional
time was needed to produce evidence which would either rebut or im-
peach the witness. 362 After a brief discussion of the general law gov-
erning continuances, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court
action. 363 The court did not find the clear abuse necessary to disturb
the trial court action. 
364
Because of the broad discretion allowed trial courts, it is difficult to
fault the Mills decision. However, a denial of a continuance request for
1356. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 832, at 333 (1969). See Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) ("Disposition of a request for continuance. . . is made
in the discretion of the trial judge, the exercise of which will ordinarily not be reviewed.").
1357. 592 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1979).
1358. 607 F.2d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1979).
1359. 608 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1979).
1360. Id.
1361. 597 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1979).
1362. Id. at 698.
1363. Id. at 699.
1364. .d.
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only one day when a party has been surprised is questionable. 1365
Certainly Mills can be factually distinguished from Hernandez, where a
continuance was also denied. There, the defense had both adequate
advance warning about the witness and access to appropriate reference
and investigatory material, 1366 so there was sufficient time to investigate
these matters, had the defense chosen to do SO. 13 6 7 None of these op-
tions, however, was available to the defendant in Mills.
H. Admission of Evidence
1. Character evidence
a. character trait
Under the common law tradition 368 and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 1369 prosecutors generally are not allowed to introduce evidence
of a defendant's character trait to show a prior disposition to commit
the offense with which he is charged. The same restrictions do not ap-
ply to defendants.
370
But once a defendant attempts to prove his or her good character,
the prosecution then is permitted to rebut this evidence by presenting
character evidence of its OWn. 137 1 Under the common law, both sides
1365. Cf. Gavino v. MacMahon, 499 F.2d 1191, 1196 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (trial
court's overriding concern with calendar and failure to grant a continuance when trial date
in a multi-defendant narcotics case was set approximately one month after arraignment and
two weeks after pretrial discovery and where defense attorneys were required to interview
out-of-state witnesses constituted a "gross abuse of discretion"); J.E. Hanger, Inc. v. United
States, 160 F.2d 8, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (trial court's refusal to grant two day continuance to
defense attorney after Government had unexpectedly rested its case and after court's previ-
ous assurance that one would be available constituted an abuse of discretion).
1366. 608 F.2d at 746.
1367. Id.
1368. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).
1369. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) provides:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except:
(I) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-
dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor,
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609.
1370. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 56, at 450 (3d ed. 1940) ("[A] defendant may offer his
good character to evidence the improbability of his doing the act charged, unless there is
some collateral reason for exclusion; and the law recognizes none such."). Accord, FED. R.
EVID. 404(a)(1) which permits a defendant to introduce character trait evidence.
1371. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948)
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were limited to presenting testimony as to the defendant's reputa-
tion. 1372 When character evidence is permitted the Federal Rules allow
proof to be established by means of personal opinion. Specific in-
stances of conduct then may be raised on cross-examination. 1373
The Ninth Circuit considered these issues in the 1979 case of
United States v. Giese. 1374 The effect of Giese was to allow a criminal
conviction of a defendant partially based on the contents of books he
read. This holding is not only highly questionable, but also appears to
set a dangerous precedent regarding government infringement of a de-
fendant's first amendment rights.
1375
The defendant-a university professor, who opposed the Ameri-
can involvement in the Vietnam conflict, and proprietor of the "Radi-
cal Education Project" bookstore was convicted of conspiracy and
other crimes associated with the bombing of military recruiting centers
in Portland, Oregon. 1376 The fundamental evidentiary issue at trial
centered around the use of a book entitled From the Movement Toward
Revolution. The Government was able to use From the Movement To-
wardRevolution as the centerpiece of a two-pronged evidentiary attack
on the defendant.
It first used the book as physical evidence to establish the existence
of the bombing conspiracy because it bore the fingerprints of Giese and
the other defendants. 1377 Secondly it was also permitted to use the con-
tents of From the Movement Toward Revolution ostensibly to impeach
Giese's character.
378
Normally, adverse character evidence cannot be introduced
against a defendant. 1379 But the majority in Giese noted that defendant
first "testified about the contents of a number of books and suggested
("The price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open
the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnera-
ble where the law otherwise shields him.").
1372. 2 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 409, at 117-20 (1969); but see
Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1949) ("[I1f the defendant attempts to
prove his innocence by evidence of good reputation, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, pre-
sent evidence of bad reputation, and in doing so, present evidence of specific criminal
acts.").
1373. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
1374. 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
1375. See id. at 1208-09 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1376. Id. at 1174-76.
1377. Id. at 1185-86.
1378. Id. at 1189-91. Giese also was forced to read selected passages while he was on the
stand. Had the introduction of the book itself been proper, this Government tactic would
have been permissible. Id. at 1208 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1379. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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they were indicative of his peaceable character."1 381 Once the defen-
dant had testified, the majority felt that the trial court correctly had
afforded the Government an opportunity to cross examine and rebut
such testimony.138' The court concluded that such testimony may not
have been "a persuasive form of character evidence," but instead found
the issue to be "whether the government had a right to respond once
the defendant had, of his own volition, chosen that method of proving
he was a peaceable, law-abiding individual."'
1382
Dissenting Judge Hufstedler found the majority's version of the
case factually and legally erroneous. While the majority might have
been correct technically in saying that Giese utilized a number of books
to establish his peaceable character, it inexplicably ignored the trial tes-
timony which preceded this event. The record of the case presented in
Judge Hufstedler's dissent shows that the subject of books was actively
pursued by the Government not for the purpose of impeaching charac-
ter evidence as the majority maintained, but rather to establish that the
defendants were violent, revolutionary characters who formed a con-
spiracy after reading the books.
383
Particular emphasis was placed on books such as The Blasters
Handbook, The Underground Bombing Manual, and The Anarchist's
Cookbook. 384 Judge Hufstedler's comments in this regard are perti-
nent:
The prosecutor used the contents of this book [From the
Movement to Revolution] in the same way in which he used
the contents of books describing the manufacture of explo-
sives and explosive devices: namely, to convince the jury that
it should attribute the ideas in the book to the defendants,
who thereafter acted upon them to form the conspiracy and to
engage in the substantive offenses. This was the very purpose
that the prosecutor had announced in his opening statement.
The prosecutor had been unable to produce any evidence of
any kind that linked Giese with these so-called do-it-yourself
manuals. He therefore concentrated his attention on [From
the Movement Toward Revolution] which Giese admitted that
he had read. The Government has never argued that the
book was admissible for impeachment purposes. Rather, its
1380. 597 F.2d at 1188-89.
1381. Id. at 1190 & n.23.
1382. .d. at 1191.
1383. Id. at 1207 (Hufstedler, ., dissenting).
1384. Id. at 1202, 1203, 1204 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
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argument before us, consistent with its argument in the trial
court, was that [From the Movement Toward Revolution] was
admissible to prove that Giese adopted the ideas of the book
and, acting on those ideas, joined a conspiracy to bomb
recruiting centers.
13 5
Since the Government ultimately failed to establish any eviden-
tiary connection between Giese and the blasting manuals or the books
he stocked in his store, its case against him fundamentally turned on his
"revolutionary" reading habits. 386
Thus, the majority's holding runs squarely afoul of the first a-
mendment 13 7 and the earlier Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Mc-
Crea.138  In McCrea the appellate panel found that introduction by
the Government of book titles in an attempt to establish illegal posses-
sion of firearms was prejudicial to the defendant because this evidence
had no probative value. 138 9 This prejudice occurred even though the
Government had made no inflammatory or exploitive remarks con-
cerning the literature after it was introduced. 390 But in Giese, the Gov-
ernment's exploitation of book titles and contents was pervasive
throughout the trial. 139 1 Thus, the prejudice resulting from the use of
the book titles in Giese was all the more egregious.
The majority's argument that Giese and McCrea could be distin-
guished is unpersuasive. The majority assumed that From the Move-
ment Toward Revolution was a critical piece of evidence because the
fingerprints of the defendants were found on it. 1392 But this line of rea-
soning is specious at best. No evidence was offered that the prints were
made at approximately the same point in time. 1393 Instead, what little
evidence there was indicated that the prints had been made over a
broad time span.1 394 In dissent Judge Hufstedler concluded: "The
fingerprint evidence did not prove that the persons whose prints ap-
peared had been associated with each other. The evidence only proved
1385. Id. at 1207 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1386. See id at 1202-03 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (Although the Government presented
two witnesses in an effort to establish the conspiracy, both were "seriously impeached" by
the defense. Thus, the Government's principal case rested on the revolutionary reading ma-
terial.).
1387. Id. at 1208-09 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1388. 583 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1978).
1389. Id. at 1086.
1390. Id.
1391. 597 F.2d at 1202-07 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1392. Id. at 1206-07 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1393. Id. at 1207 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1394. Id.
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that persons who handled the book had been associated with the
book." 1395 Thus, in Giese, just as in McCrea, the use of book titles was
of "no probative value" and was therefore unnecessary.
1396
b. other criminal conduct
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit admission of ev-
idence of other crimes or acts to prove that a defendant possesses cer-
tain character traits consistent with the crime charged. 397  Such
evidence may be admissible, however, to establish circumstantially an
element of the crime charged, such as motive or intent. 1398 Once the
trial judge decides the evidence is relevant, he must weigh its probative
value against unfair prejudice to the defendant.
399
In United States v. Aims Back,14 ' the defendant was charged with
raping a woman who was accompanied by a friend. The friend was
allowed to testify that she too had been raped, although defendant was
not charged with this second offense.'140  The Ninth Circuit noted that
the evidence had little, if any, probative value and was highly prejudi-
cial, 140 2 because the jury could have inferred that if the defendant
raped the friend he also raped the victim. The court held that this was
1395. Id. at 1206-07 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1396. See 583 F.2d at 1086.
1397. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) provides in part: "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform-
ity therewith." However, FED. R. EvID. 609 allows evidence of conviction of a crime to be
established by public record in order to attack the credibility of a witness, including a de-
fendant who takes the stand. But there are restrictions. In United States v. McLister, 608
F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979), in which the defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine, the
Government had cross-examined him about a nine-year-old misdemeanor conviction for
marijuana possession. The Ninth Circuit, in holding admission of this evidence improper,
noted the admission did not satisfy rule 609(a) requirements. The crime did not involve
dishonesty or false statement, it was not punishable by death or imprisonment for more than
one year, and its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Id.
at 789.
1398. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) includes "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
1399. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See, e.g., United States v. Batts, 573 F.2d
599, 603 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978) (evidence of prior activity in drugs was
considered relevant to show defendant's knowledge, motive, and intent even though a differ-
ent drug had been involved).
1400. 588 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
1401. Id. at 1285.
1402. Id. at 1286. The Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 403 defines unfair
prejudice as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one."
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"an inference which rule 404(b) specifically intends to prohibit.' ' 1403
The court further cautioned that such evidence is "not looked upon
with favor and must be carefully scrutinized to determine probative
value." 1404
The prejudice to Aims Back was further compounded by the trial
judge's cautionary instructions to the jury. He gave them no specific
reasons for the introduction of the evidence but did remark that it
could be considered for "'what value it may have in just establishing
the whole pattern of the evening.' ,,,40 This instruction was almost an
open invitation for the jury to infer the commission of one criminal act
from another. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded
that Aims Back had not been afforded a fair trial.1
40 6
Evidence of a prior theft was in issue in United States v. Watkins,
where defendant was convicted of tax evasion. 1407 He had attempted to
take advantage of tax laws which provide preferential treatment to in-
come derived from the sale of timber. But Government figures showed
that he had included an excessive amount of timber in this category. 1408
The Government also was able to successfully introduce evidence
which suggested that the defendant's excessive lumber had been stolen
from the property of another company. 40 9 Defendant objected to the
use of this evidence because the amount of timber he claimed excluded
any illegally taken.'
4 10
The Watkins court, however, found the theft evidence justified
under rule 404(b) which allows for admission of other crimes in order
to prove that defendant was acting in accordance with a general
plan,:14 1 The court found the evidence of stolen timber relevant to
1403. 588 F.2d at 1286.
1404. Id. at 1287.
1405. Id. at 1286. The court distinguished United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th
Cir. 1978), where testimony of the victim's friend that the defendant had raped her just
before raping the victim was found to be nonprejudicial. This testimony, unlike that in Aims
Back, was used to show opportunity because the defendant claimed that he had not been at
the scene of the crime. 588 F.2d at 1286.
1406. 588 F.2d at 1286.
1407. 600 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979). The defendant was
charged with three counts. It is unclear how the evidence of the timber and alleged theft
related to these counts.
1408. Id. at 203.
1409. Id.
1410. Id.
1411. Id. at 204. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
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prove a plan of providing "false information in an effort to avoid
tax.'1 412 Exactly why this conclusion follows was not made very clear
by the opinion.
The Watkins "general plan" holding is one of the few exceptions
to the general rule which excludes evidence of prior independent of-
fenses. 14 13 Under the general rule, the similarity between the two of-
fenses must be so great that commission of one shows intent to engage
in the other. 1414 If any significant degree of dissimilarity exists, there is
a strong possibility that the evidence will be excluded.
For instance, in the 1979 Ninth Circuit case of United States v.
Marques,141 5 evidence of prior cocaine sales was held to be inadmissi-
ble in a trial concerning charges of manufacturing
methamphetamine. 41 6 The court found significant dissimilarity be-
cause of the differences in drugs, activities (versus manufacture) and
the scope of distribution.
141 7
The holding in Marques basically was consistent with that of
United States v. Moreno-Nunez where evidence of defendant's at-
tempted sale of marijuana and other contraband was admitted in a her-
oin conspiracy trial. 14 18 Even though the drugs involved were not the
same, the great similarity in the pattern of activity ("willingness to deal
in illegal drugs") was certainly material to establishing defendant's mo-
tive and intent under rule 404(b).
14 19
However, in United States v. Hernandez-Mfiranda, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found significant dissimilarity between smuggling marijuana in a
back pack and importing heroin in the trunk of a car.1420 Even though
smuggling was the common denominator in both offenses, the court
justifiably found the connection too tenuous to support admission of
1412. 600 F.2d at 204.
1413. Rule 404(b) allows such evidence to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident," Accord, Bowie v. United
States, 345 F.2d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1965).
1414. E.g., United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251, 252 (9th Cir. 1978).
1415. 600 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979).
1416. Id. at 751.
1417. Id.
1418. 595 F.2d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 1979).
1419. Id Accord, United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant's will-
ingness to arrange for the sale of marijuana was relevant to the issue of his predisposition to
distribute cocaine because entrapment defense raised); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d
1331, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (evidence that the defendant
had assisted her companions in escaping from a sporting goods store and in stealing a vehi-
cle was relevant to show that she had not been acting under duress during her participation
in the robbery).
1420. 601 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the evidence. In so holding, the court noted that such a linkage could
be established only if "common human experience demonstrates that it
is more probable than not that a person who has knowingly smuggled
marijuana on his person will know of the presence of contraband con-
cealed in a vehicle."'
1421
Similarity of activities, however, was insufficient to overcome the
strong prejudicial effect of evidence introduced by the Government in
United States v. Calhoun .1422 Defendant was charged with a bank rob-
bery and had later purchased a car using $3,000 in small bills. None of
the bills could be traced to the robbery in question, but the Govern-
ment established that some were the fruits of a former robbery in which
defendant had participated. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court conviction, holding that such evidence was overly prejudicial to
defendant under rule 403 and that its only value was to establish crimi-
nal disposition, a practice which is prohibited by rule 404(b).
1 4 23
2. Use of prior convictions to impeach a testifying defendant
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure include specific guide-
lines for the use of a defendant's prior criminal record for purposes of
impeachment if he testifies at trial. Rule 609(a) limits the use of such
impeaching evidence to: "(1) crimes punishable by death or impris-
onment of more than one year, provided that the probative value of
such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; (2) crimes involving
dishonesty or false statements."'
' 424
1421. Id.
1422. 604 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1979).
1423. Id. at 1218-19. Cf. United States v. Riggins, 539 F.2d 682, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977) (because it was stolen in the same burglary and cashed at
same location at approximately the same time, introduction of money order bearing defend-
ant's fingerprint was proper even though it was not among those money orders named in the
indictment).
1424. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was con-
victed, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
Rule 609(a) is a codification of the approach espoused by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (trial judge
should use discretion in determining whether impeaching evidence should be admitted by
considering such factors as "nature of prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the age
and circumstances of the defendant, and, above all, the extent to which it is more important
to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's story than to
know of a prior conviction").
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In United States v. Cook, the Ninth Circuit considered for the first
time an appeal by a potential witness who refused to testify after he
learned that under rule 609 his prior criminal record could be used for
impeachment purposes. 425 Prior to Cook, the Ninth Circuit generally
followed the rule of United States v. Murray, which denied such an
appeal when a defendant refused to testify.1426 The courts considered
the defendant's silence as a waiver of his right to later object to the
adverse ruling which would have allowed the admission of impeaching
evidence.1 427 The majority in Cook, however, recognized that such de-
cisions were not in reality waivers, but rather were made for tactical
reasons.
428
The Murray rule also presented a non-testifying defendant with
what amounted to a Hobson's choice. If she remained silent, she would
lose her right to appeal an adverse ruling on the admissibility of im-
peaching evidence. If she testified in order not to lose her appeal rights,
she would instead lose the protections afforded by the fifth amendment
right to remain silent.'429
The Cook majority also noted that prior to rule 609, courts were
not required to make preliminary rulings on issues involving the ad-
missibility of evidence. 430 Rule 609, on the other hand, made such
decisions mandatory. 43 I As a result, appeals courts could now review
concrete decisions. But Murray's absolute bat against review frustrated
this policy.
For these reasons, the Cook majority had little difficulty in dis-
1425. 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
1426. 492 F.2d 178, 197 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 942 (1974). Accord, United
States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977). See, e.g., Shorter v. United States, 412
F.2d 428, 431 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969) (when defendant elected to tell jury
about his former convictions in order to mitigate their adverse impact, he was deemed to
have waived his opportunity to object to the issue of their admissibility on appeal). Contra,
United States v, Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082, 1087 (1st Cir. 1979). But see United States v.
Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 773, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J.) (appeals court remanded an
erroneous lower court decision on rule 609 where defendant chose not to testify); United
States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1977) (trial court's rule 609 decision that it
would have refused to suppress evidence under rule 609 was reviewed even though defen-
dant chose not to testify).
1427. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d at 197.
1428. 608 F.2d at 1184.
1429. Id. at 1192 (Hufstedler, 3., dissenting).
1430. Id. at 1185. See, eg., Shorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969) (because trial court had not rendered a decision on the admissi-
bility of impeaching evidence, appeals court declined to review).
1431. Rule 609(a) requires a trial judge to weigh probative value of the evidence versus its
impeaching effect except when prior crimes of falsehood or dishonesty are involved. See
note 1424 supra.
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carding the Murray rule. 432 In its place, the Ninth Circuit now re-
quires that prior to trial a non-testifying defendant must: (1) satisfy
the court that he would be willing to testify if his prior convictions are
excluded and (2) disclose the nature of his testimony in order that
both the trial and appellate courts can perform the requisite balancing
test required by Rule 609.1433
In addition, the court held that a defendant must now follow the
procedures outlined in Federal Rule of Evidence 103. This rule re-
quires a party to show that a substantial right has been affected by an
evidentiary ruling.
1434
Having moved this far away from the Murray waiver doctrine, the
majority suddenly reversed course and retreated to the secure haven of
legal tradition. It reinstated the waiver doctrine under the new name of
"abandonment."' 1435 The court went on to hold that if a defendant fails
to properly comply with the requirements of rule 103, he will be
deemed to have "abandoned the point."'' 436 On this ambiguous note,
the majority concluded that "pre-Rule 609 cases in this circuit still have
some value." 
1437
1432. 608 F.2d at 1187.
1433. Id. at 1186.
1434. Id. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) provides:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
The concurring opinion authored by Judge Kennedy voiced concern over the specula-
tive nature of this procedure since defendants would not be bound by their pretrial state-
ments after they took the stand. 608 F.2d at 1189 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus,
according to Judge Kennedy, courts would be forced to make advanced rulings based on
proposed hypothetical testimony which might never materialize in the actual trial. Id.
But such concerns would still not justify a retention of Murray because a defendant's
constitutional right to remain silent would still be jeopardized by its absolute waiver doc-
trine. Cf., e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 & n.6 (1972) (Tennessee statute re-
quiring that a defendant desiring to testify do so before other defense evidence is presented
imposes a penalty on his fifth amendment rights if he chooses to initially remain silent).
1435. 608 F.2d at 1197 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). See Id. at 1186 where the majority
requires non-testifying defendant to take certain steps to preserve his right to appeal.
1436. Id.
1437. Id. Both the majority and one concurring opinion cited New Jersey v. Portash, 440
U.S. 450 (1979), in support of or in opposition to the issue of whether a non-testifying de-
fendant waived her right to appeal. 608 F.2d at 1185-86; id. at 1191 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). But Portash did not address this question because it had already been dealt with by
the New Jersey appellate court. See 440 U.S. at 462 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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With the waiver doctrine not so neatly disposed of, the Ninth Cir-
cuit then considered the merits of Cook's evidentiary claim. Cook had
objected to the Government's intended use of his past robbery convic-
tions for impeachment purposes. 438 Because robbery is not classified
as a crime involving "dishonesty or false statement,"'' 4 39 a trial court,
under rule 609, would be required to weigh the probative evidentiary
value of such a conviction against its prejudicial effect. 140 The district
court in Cook failed to do this because it erroneously assumed that
robbery convictions were crimes of falsehood which did not require a
rule 609(a) balancing test. 44'
Rather than reverse the lower court action and follow the express
will of Congress, the Ninth Circuit adeptly carved out its own legisla-
tive exception to rule 609.1442 This action arose from the court's fear
that the particular defendant in Cook might take the stand and misrep-
resent himself. According to the court's hypothetical scenario, this
would occur after a pretrial conditional ruling that would have prohib-
ited the Government from impeaching defendant's testimony with his
record of prior convictions. The advance conditional ruling would
then have no relevance to what would later occur during trial. And,
once it had been made, the Government would be forced to sit by si-
lently unable to rebut defendant's misrepresentations.1
44 3
1438. 608 F.2d at 1183.
1439. Courts have experienced difficulty in following the plain language of rule 609(a)(2)
which exempts only crimes involving dishonesty or falsehood from the probative value bal-
ancing test. Other crimes such as larceny and robbery have found their way into this cate-
gory. But the Senate Report covering rule 609(a) was very explicit on this subject. It stated
that
[w]ith respect to defendants, the committee agreed with the House limitation that
only offenses involving false statements or dishonesty may be used. By that phrase,
the committee means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false state-
ment, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or any other offense, in the
nature of crimenfalsi the commission of which involves some element of untruth-
fulness, deceit or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truth-
fully.
S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051, 7061. Accord, United States v. Gross, 603 F.2d 757, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (Government did not meet burden for establishing probative value of prior narcot-
ics offense); United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (petty larceny
not within 609(a)(2)); United States v. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38, 41 (8th Cir. 1978) (narcotics);
United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1978) (shoplifting); United States v.
Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 191 (10th Cir. 1978) (burglary); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d
824, 826-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977) (importing narcotics); United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (armed robbery).
1440. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
1441. 608 F.2d at 1187; id. at 1194-95 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1442. Id. at 1186-87. See id. at 1195 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1443. Id. at 1187.
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The Cook majority then concocted its own judicial home remedy
for this perceived rule 609 shortcoming, namely, the "rare case excep-
tion." It noted that "in rare cases the court's suspicions may be ade-
quately grounded in the prior course of the trial to permit an advance
ruling that the accused's record will shed probative light on the testi-
mony the accused has indicated he will offer." 1 "4 The court then con-
cluded that Cook could qualify as one of these rare cases.
1445
Cook's "rare case" exception is a classic example of how judicial
gerrymandering can frustrate the clear intent of a piece of legislation.
Nowhere in rule 609 are these provisions for Cook's "rare case" excep-
tion. Rule 609 provides that for past felonies not involving crimes of
dishonesty, the court must perform a balancing test, not a "rare case"
test. In a balancing test the Government has the burden of showing
that the probative value of the defendant's past convictions clearly out-
weigh its prejudicial effect. 144 6 In a "rare case" such as Cook this bur-
den will not be met. 1447
3. Hearsay
Hearsay is defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence as "a state-
ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted."' 144 With certain exceptions, hearsay is not admissible in fed-
eral courts.' 449 The hearsay rule is based on the principle that the
opponent is unable to confront and cross-examine 450 the "real" wit-
ness in order to expose errors, weaknessess, or deficiencies in his state-
1444. Id. (emphasis added).
1445. Id.
1446. E.g., United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
1447. 608 F.2d at 1195 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). See id. at 1186 (trial judge did not
establish a clear record on balancing); id. at 1187 (his balancing was inarticulate).
The Ninth Circuit did, however, in United States v. Gross, 603 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam) apply rule 609 in a straightforward manner. There, a trial court had errone-
ously admitted evidence of defendant's prior narcotic conviction. The court noted that nar-
cotics offenses did not fall within the crimenfalsi category of rule 609(a)(2). Since the
Government had not met its burden of showing the probative value of this evidence, the
conviction was reversed. Although Gross did not acknowledge the "rare case exception," it
relied directly on Cook for the proposition that the Government was required to meet its
burden of proof. Id. at 758-59.
1448. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
1449. FED. R. EVID. 802.
1450. Cross-examination contributes to reliability of testimony by shedding light on a wit-
ness' perception, memory, and narration and by exposing inconsistencies, incompleteness,
and inaccuracies in his testimony. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
800[01], at 800-10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
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ments. 145 l  In addition, admission of hearsay evidence would
circumvent two other Anglo-American judicial devices designed to in-
sure accurate testimony: the oath and personal presence at trial.
452
But certain exceptions have been carved out of the hearsay rule. In
some circumstances there is an overriding need to admit hearsay, while
in others there is a high probability that the hearsay will be trustwor-
thy.1453 In fact, the exceptions are so numerous that the rule has been
said to be shaped by them.
1454
a. statements against interest
One exception to the hearsay rule concerns declarations against
interest. This exception allows a statement made by an unavailable de-
clarant adverse to his own interest to be admitted into evidence, be-
cause it is assumed a person would not make a damaging statement
against himself unless it were true. 1455
Developments in the last century limited this exception to state-
ments concerning the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest.
Thus, declarations against penal interest are not admissible. 145 6 This
limitation has been criticized 14 1 on the ground that a person would be
as unlikely to make a statement rendering him liable to criminal pun-
ishment as he would be to subject himself to pecuniary or proprietary
obligations. 1458
The Federal Rules of Evidence1459 and other modern codifica-
tions1460 expressly include statements against penal interest as hearsay
exceptions. However, some state codes do not.146 1 Consequently, the
United States Supreme Court, in the 1979 case of Green v. Georgia, was
confronted with the question of whether certain evidence, normally ex-
cluded under one of these state codes, should be admitted. 1462 In
1451. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362, at 3 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE].
1452. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, at 800-11.
1453. WIGMORE, supra note 1451, § 1420, at 251-53.
1454. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, at 800-09.
1455. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-90.
1456. See WIGMORE, supra note 1451, § 1476, at 349-58.
1457. Id. § 1477, at 360 ("barbarous doctrine"); C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 278, at 674 (2d ed. 1972); Morgan, DeelarafinsAgainst Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv. 451, 475
(1952) ("foolish rule").
1458. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 1 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-91.
1459. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
1460. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(j) (1976); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, EVID. R. 63(10) (West 1976).
1461. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-301 (Harrison 1974).
1462. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
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Green, two defendants, Green and Moore, had been tried separately
and convicted of raping and murdering the same person. At a second
trial, held for sentencing purposes, Green sought to introduce testi-
mony indicating that he had not been present when the murder was
committed. This testimony came from a witness who had testified at
the trial of Moore. The witness stated that Moore had admitted to kill-
ing the victim after sending Green on an errand. At Moore's trial, this
testimony had been admitted under Georgia' hearsay exception as an
admission against the declarant. But at Green's punishment hearing
the trial court had excluded the same testimony because it constituted a
statement against penal interest as far as Moore was concerned.
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that regardless of whether the
testimony fell within Georgia's hearsay rule, its exclusion constituted a
violation of due process since it was "highly relevant to a critical issue
in the punishment phase of the trial. . . and substantial reasons ex-
isted to assume its reliability."' 463 In Green's case, reliability was un-
derscored by the fact that the State had earlier considered the
testimony highly relevant when it imposed the death sentence on
Moore.14 64 But, as it had done in a prior case, 1465 the Court declined to
rule on the constitutionality of Georgia's hearsay exception. It found,
instead, that its application in "these unique circumstances" had de-
prived Green of a fair trial on the issue of punishment.
466
In view of the criticism of non-admissibility of declarations against
penal interest and the trend to include such declarations within the
hearsay exception, it seems curious that the United States Supreme
Court has approached this issue on a case-by-case basis. The abandon-
ment of such an archaic impediment to the fact-finding process is long
overdue. The Supreme Court's hesitant approach to this issue can only
prolong the lingering of this anachronism in state statutes.
b. expert opinion of business records
Records kept for business purposes can often be admitted under
1463. Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
1464. Id.
1465. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Court held that "under the facts
and circumstances" of that case, the exclusion of statements against penal interest deprived
the defendant of a fair trial. .d. at 303.
1466. 442 U.S. at 97. In contrast, the Court's rulings in the areas of the confrontation and
compulsory process clauses of the sixth amendment have persuaded one commentator to
conclude that "the Court has rejected the more narrow interpretations of the two clauses in
favor of broad readings which effectively constitutionalize the law of evidence in criminal
cases." Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Un#Fed Theory of Evidencefor
Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. Rv. 567, 625 (1978).
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an exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides such an exception for records that are regularly pro-
duced and can be attested to by a qualified expert witness. 1467 In
United States v. Licavoli,14 68 the Ninth Circuit was called upon to de-
cide an issue of first impression-the requirements for admissibility of
an expert's opinion under the business records exception of rule 803(6).
Licavoli was indicted by a federal grand jury on a charge of know-
ingly receiving stolen property valued in excess of $5,000 and constitut-
ing a part of interstate commerce, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315. The
property consisted of a valuable painting ostensibly stolen from the
home of its owner, Charma Signer. Signer and her insurance company
had retained an appraiser who had valued the painting at $10,000, and
the insurer had adopted the appraisal as the basis for settling Signer's
insurance claim. Licavoli claimed that the painting was actually not
worth more than the minimum federal jurisdictional amount of $5,000.
Over his objection, the $10,000 appraisal was admitted into evidence as
a business record of the insurance company. On appeal, Licavoli ar-
gued that the appraiser's qualifications as an expert witness had not
been established in accordance with rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.14 69 But the court decided against an inflexible rule requiring
that such qualifications be established in every case. 1470 Such a rule
would be particularly burdensome and unnecessary in the case of many
routine business records. These documents normally tend to be inher-
ently trustworthy because of the relatively high degree of care that goes
into their preparation. 1471 This degree of care undoubtedly occurred in
Licavoli where an insurer, obviously interested in minimizing costs,
readily accepted the appraiser's $10,000 valuation of the stolen prop-
1467. FED. R. EVID. 803(b) provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activ-
ity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless.the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit.
1468. 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979).
1469. Id. at 622. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
1470. 604 F.2d at 622.
1471. Id.
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erty. 1472 Since Licavoli failed to mount a serious challenge to the ap-
praiser's qualifications, the $10,000 estimate was allowed to stand. 1473
Thus, the Ninth Circuit appears to be adopting a standard akin to a
rebuttable presumption in favor of an expert's qualifications when a
circumstantial endorsement of his work product or statements can be
found.
c. summaries of business records
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 permits the use of summaries when
an exceptionally large number of documents are involved. 1474 In some
instances, summaries can provide the only useful means by which both
the court and jury can evaluate a large volume of evidence.
1475
The latest Ninth Circuit opinion dealing with rule 1006 and sum-
maries was United States v. Johnson.1476 In Johnson, the Government
attempted to admit a summary of documents under rule 1006 without
first establishing that the underlying materials used as the basis of the
summary were covered by one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 1477
In support of its position, the Government argued that rule 1006 obvi-
ated the need to comply with hearsay requirements. 1
478
The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting this contention, made a number of
telling points concerning the structure of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. It noted that rule 1006 was located under Article X which deals
1472. Id. at 623. Cf., e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 576 F.2d 269, 276 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978) (court used circumstantial evidence to substantiate the validity
of a cashier's check); United States v. Hudson, 479 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1012 (1973) (court did not require independent evidence in order to establish that
the person who recorded certain selective service records actually had first hand knowledge,
because the face of the record itself indicated as much).
The business evidence contested in Hudson was admitted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1733(a)(1976) which is similar to FED. R. EVID. 803(b), which is set out at note 1467 supra.
Section 1733(a) provides: "[B]ooks or records of account or minutes of proceedings of any
department or agency of the United States shall be admissible to prove the act, transaction
or occurrence as a memorandum of which the same were made or kept."
1473. 604 F.2d at 622-23.
1474. FED. R. EVID. 1006 states:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which can-
not conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for
examination or copying, or both, by other parties at [a] reasonable time and place.
The court may order that they be produced in court.
1475. "The admission of summaries of voluminous books, records or documents offers the
only practical means of making their contents available to judge and jury." FED. R. EvID.
1006, ADV. COMM. NoTEs.
1476. 594 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
1477. Id. at 1257.
1478. Id. at 1255, 1257.
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with best evidence exceptions. Hearsay exceptions, on the other hand,
are found under Article VIII. An exception under one Article cannot
by some magical formula produce an exception under another. Only
Congress may expressly exempt a particular item of evidence in both
areas. 1479 The court observed that Congress has done this with respect
to certain types of evidence, 480 but not in regard to the type of business
records the Government sought to introduce in Johnson.'
48'
Before summaries of such records can be introduced, the propo-
nent must satisfy the court that the underlying records are admissi-
ble. 1482 Since this was not done in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit reversed
defendant's lower court conviction. 483 The court, however, stopped
short of the Second Circuit requirement 48 4 that the underlying materi-
als already be admitted into evidence before an exception to the best
evidence rule can be invoked, holding that they must only be admissi-
1479. See id. at 1255: "[W]hen Congress intended to provide an exception to the hearsay
rule for materials which it exempted from the best evidence rule in Article X, it did so by a
provision in Article VIII."
1480. Id.
1481. For example, rule 1005 provides that public records may be proved with other
than the original under some circumstances. Rules 803(8), (9), and (10), however,
provide the hearsay exception for various types of public records. Similarly, rule
1007 allows the use of secondary materials to prove the contents of testimony or a
written admission of a party. But rule 801(d)(2) provides that admissions are not
subject to the hearsay rule.
594 F.2d at 1255.
The holding is supported by Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger: Before the
chart, summary, or calculation may be admitted, it is necessary for the party offer-
ing the exhibit to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original or du-
plicate materials on which the exhibit is based, or for the parties to stipulate to the
admissibility of the materials. Charts, summaries, or calculations are inadmissible
as evidence if, for any reason, the original or duplicate materials on which they are
based are inadmissible. Thus, if the original materials contain hearsay and fail to
qualify as admissible evidence under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
chart, summary, or calculation based on that material is inadmissible.
5 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 1006[03], at 1006-5 to 1006-6 (footnotes omitted).
1482. 594 F.2d at 1257.
1483. Id.
1484. "As was stated in Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 876 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 828,92 S. Ct. 63, 30 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1971). . . when summaries are used...
the court must ascertain with certainty that they are based upon and fairly represent compe-
tent evidence already before the jury. . . ." United States v. Conlin, 551 F.2d 534, 538 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977). Although the Second Circuit still adheres to this
requirement, the Fifth Circuit does not. There is a lack of unanimity in the interpretation of
rule 1006 by the various circuits. See, e.g., Case & Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355,
361 (7th Cir. 1975) (inference that summary is admissible if underlying evidence made avail-
able to opposing party); United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 946 (1979) (purpose of summaries is to aid jury in examination of evidence already
admitted); United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1977) (no requirement that
underlying document must be admitted, but there is an implication that they must be admis-
sible).
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ble. 1485 This allows a judge discretion in determining that the founda-
tion requirement has been satisfied, while maintaining the integrity of
that requirement.
d public records
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)1486 provides a hearsay exception
for public records and reports. The purpose of this exception was to
avoid disruption of governmental work when public officials had to
come into court to authenticate documents. 48 7 Rule 803(8) supplanted
section 1733 of title 281488 which was considered unduly restrictive, in
that it applied only to records of federal departments or agencies,
which necessitated resort to the less appropriate business record excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.14 89 In contrast, rule 803(8) does not distinguish
between federal and non-federal offices; the only requirement is that
the record be that of a public body.
14 90
In United States v. Orozco, 149 1 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the rule 803(8) hearsay exception would apply to routine law
enforcement reports. Defendants were convicted of possessing cocaine
and heroin with intent to distribute. At their trial, computer data
cards 14 9 2 were admitted into evidence 1493 to show that one defendant's
1485. 594 F.2d at 1257 n.6. The court adopted the Fifth Circuit rule which requires only
that the underlying materials be admissible, but not necessarily admitted.
1486. FED. R. EVID. 803 provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(8) P.ublic records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compi-
lations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factu-
al findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trust-
worthiness.
1487. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 803(8)[01], at 803-191.
1488. 28 U.S.C. § 1733(a)(1976) provides: "Books or records of account or minutes of pro-
ceedings of any department or agency of the United States shall be admissible to prove the
act, transaction or occurrence as a memorandum of which the same were made or kept."
1489. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 803(8)[01], at 803-190. Unlike rule 803(6), which
governs the admissibility of business records, rule 803(8) omits foundation requirements,
because the assurances of accuracy are usually even greater for public records than for regu-
lar entries.
1490. Id. at 803-190.
1491. 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1979).
1492. The Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) procedure is for a cus-
toms official to enter into a computer the license plate numbers of vehicles approaching the
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car had been recorded crossing the Mexican border on the night of the
arrest. The data on the cards consisted of license plate numbers which
were routinely recorded by customs officials as vehicles approached an
inspection station. Normally law enforcement reports and observations
are not afforded any protection from the hearsay rule. But the court of
appeals reasoned that Congress did not intend to exclude records of
routine, non-adversarial matters. 1494 The routine recordation of license
numbers of all vehicles passing the customs station was not of an ad-
versarial confrontation nature which might cloud the perception of the
customs inspector, and in the absence of circumstances indicating lack
of trustworthiness, the Treasury Enforcement Communications System
data cards were admissible evidence.
14 95
e. confessions of a co-defendant
In Bruton v. United States,1496 the United States Supreme Court
established a rule that the confession of a co-defendant who did not
take the stand could not be introduced if the confession implicated the
defendant. If admitted, the defendant would be deprived of his rights
under the sixth amendment confrontation clause.
In United States v. Vissars,14 97 the Ninth Circuit held that a viola-
border station; the computer determines whether a particular license number has appeared
within the previous 72-hour period. Id. at 793.
1493. The district court had admitted the evidence under the "business records" exception,
FED. R. EvID. 803(6), but the court of appeals felt the evidence qualified under the "public
records" exception of rule 803(8)(B). 590 F.2d at 793.
1494. Id. In United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit
upheld the admission of Irish police records of routine recording of serial numbers of weap-
ons found in Northern Ireland, under rule 803(8)(B), stating:
Rule 803(8)(B) allows admission of records and reports of public offices or
agencies setting forth 'matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report,' but is subject to an exception for 'matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.' In adopting this
exception, Congress was concerned about prosecutors attempting to prove their
cases in chief simply by putting into evidence police officers' reports of their con-
temporaneous observations of crime. . . . The reports admitted here were not of
this nature; they did not concern observations by the Ulster Constabulary of the
appellants' commission of crimes. Rather, they simply related to the routine func-
tion of recording serial numbers and receipt of certain weapons found in Northern
Ireland.
1495. 590 F.2d at 794.
1496. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Court, in overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S.
232 (1957), held that limiting instructions that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay
against the defendant were not an adequate substitute for the defendant's constitutional
right of cross-examination. 391 U.S. at 137. The Court was concerned that, in spite of
instructions to the contrary, jurors would not be able to disregard the wrongly-admitted
testimony. Id. at 128.
1497. 596 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1979).
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tion of the Bruton rule does not require an automatic reversal. Co-
defendants Vissars and Keenberg were convicted of theft of
government property. At a joint trial, an F.B.I. agent testified about a
post-arrest conversation in which Vissars implicated Keenberg in the
thefts. Keenberg then took the stand and admitted the thefts, relying
on an entrapment defense. On appeal he claimed that the agent's testi-
mony violated his constitutional right to confront an adversary because
Vissars never took the stand.
The court noted that because Keenberg repeated on the stand all
the evidence concerning his participation in the thefts, the agent's testi-
mony was cumulative and provided the jury with no information they
would not otherwise have heard. The court ruled that the Bruton viola-
tion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because other evidence
properly admitted against Keenberg was overwhelming and because
the agent's testimony had an insignificant impact on the minds of the
jurors. 1498 In using the Constitutional error standard 1499 to find that a
Bruton violation did not constitute reversible error, the Ninth Circuit
followed well-defined precedent. 150
The Ninth Circuit applied the Bruton rule to a non-jury case in
United States v. Longee.150 1 There, the trial court allowed an out-of-
court statement of one defendant to be admitted against a co-defen-
dant, even though the defendant did not take the witness stand. The
holding is seemingly inconsistent with an earlier ruling in Cockrell v.
Oberhauser,1502 in which the Ninth Circuit held that the Bruton rule
does not apply in a non-jury trial because a judge is assumed to be
capable of applying the law of limited admissiblity. 5 3 In Cockrell,
however, one defendant in a joint trial was tried by a jury and the other
by the court, and the trial judge had carefully instructed the jury on the
limited admissiblity of certain statements against the defendant in the
1498. Id. at 404.
1499. See notes 1565-88 infra and accompanying text.
1500. Eg., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1968) (Bruton violation harmless
error where other evidence was overwhelming and challenged testimony was cumulative);
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972) (Bruton violation harmless error where
evidence of guilt was overwhelming and prejudicial impact of challenged statements was
insignificant).
1501. 603 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1979).
1502. 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970).
1503. Id. at 258. Other courts have cited Cockrell for this proposition: Young v. Mary-
land, 455 F.2d 679, 687 (4th Cir. 1972) (Sobeloff, S.C.J., dissenting); United States v. Corbin
Farm Service, 444 F. Supp. 510, 538 n.13 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
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jury trial. 5 ' The appellate court reasoned that nothing in Bruton sug-
gests that the judge was incapable, in the non-jury trial, of applying the
law that he had himself announced. 50 5 In Longee, by contrast, the
trial judge made no attempt to disregard the impermissible testimony.
In fact, he had specifically referred to it in his findings. 506 The distin-
guishing factor in these cases is apparently some indication that the
trial judge recognized the evidentiary restrictions mandated by Bruton
and complied with them in his decision.
4. Prosecutorial Misconduct
a. use ofperured testimony
A criminal defendant is denied due process of law if his conviction
is based on perjured testimony knowingly used by the prosecution.15
0 7
The same is also true if the prosecution allows unsolicited false testi-
mony to be presented and permits it to go uncorrected. 50 8 False testi-
mony that relates only to the credibility of a witness is also covered by
this principle.
50 9
In Carothers v. Rhay,' 5'0 decided in 1979, the Ninth Circuit was
confronted by a similar question: whether a defendant's due process
rights had been violated when the prosecutors knew that one of their
witnesses was in defendant's words "an admitted perjuror.' '1" The
principal evidence introduced against the defendant was the testimony
1504. This was not sufficient under Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, and the conviction of this defen-
dant was reversed. 413 F.2d at 257, 258.
1505. Id. at 258.
1506. 603 F.2d at 1345.
1507. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam).
1508. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (per curiam). InAlcorta, a man accused of
murdering his wife admitted his guilt but claimed the killing was done in a fit of passion
from finding his wife, whom he had suspected of infidelity, kissing another man. Id. at 31-
32. The other man had told the prosecutor of an affair with the victim and was advised not
to volunteer this information but to answer truthfully if questioned about it. At trial, he was
questioned about his relationship with the victim but denied anything more than a casual
friendship. The prosecutor did not challenge this testimony. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the defendant had not been accorded due process of law. Id.
1509. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). A prosecution witness testified that he
had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. The state attorney
knew this was false and did not correct it. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court noted that "the
jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determina-
tive of guilt or innocence ...." It therefore ruled that "[t]he principle that a state may not
knowingly use false evidence, including: [flalse testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction
...does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of
the witness." Id. at 269.
1510. 594 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1979).
1511. Id. at 229.
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of an accomplice, who admitted at trial that he had previously lied to
investigating officers and to a special inquiry judge. The court ruled
that this admission merely went to the credibility of the witness, which
"was fully explored at trial and was properly a matter for the consider-
ation of the jury."'' 51 2 The court held that the perjured testimony doc-
trine does not apply when there is no allegation of any specific evidence
presented that the prosecutor knew to be false.
51 3
b. evidence of defendant's post-arrest silence
In Doyle v. Ohio, 5" 4 the United States Supreme Court held that it
is a violation of due process to use a defendant's silence, either at the
time of arrest or after giving Miranda warnings, for impeachment pur-
poses. 11 5 In 1978, the Ninth Circuit further defined this rule in Doug-
las v. Cupp, 51 6 holding that even an inadvertent mention of a
defendant's post-arrest silence necessitated reversal of a conviction.
517
Even though the defendant's silence was not used either to suggest guilt
or to impeach the defendant, and was not mentioned during the rest of
the trial,' 1  the court concluded that a juror might have inferred that
the defendant was guilty and that his alibi defense was a later
fabrication. 1519
But, some nine months later the Ninth Circuit effectively blunted
the impact of Douglas with its decision in Bradford v. Stone. 1520 The
prosecutor, during cross-examination, asked the defendant if he had
said anything about his alibi to the arresting policeman. Defendant
admitted he had not. The prosecutor then used this silence to attack
the defendant's credibility. Although the court found both the cross-
1512. Id.
1513. Id.
1514. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
1515. Id. at 619. The Court also reasoned that post-arrest silence in response to Miranda
warnings is "insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person
arrested." Id. at 617 (footnote omitted). Even in a decision concerning a pre-Miranda trial,
however, the Ninth Circuit held that admission of a policeman's testimony as to the defend-
ant's silence in the face of accusatory statements, as an implied admission of guilt, was viola-
tive of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Cockrell v.
Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256, 257 (9th Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970).
1516. 578 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1081 (1979).
1517. Id. at 267.
1518. Id. at 268 (Carter, J., dissenting).
1519. Id. at 267. The Ninth Circuit has refused to extend the rule prohibiting the im-
peachment of an accused by his prior silence to situations in which the silence of non-de-
fendant witnesses might conceivably suggest that the explanation of a defendant is recent
fabrication. United States v. Shields, 571 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1978).
1520. 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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examination exchange and the prosecutor's summation comments to be
violations of the rule set forth in Doyle, it concluded that neither war-
ranted a reversal. With regard to the exchange, the court simply stated
that defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's question, nor did
he ask that the answer be stricken.'52
As to the summation comments, the court held that by virtue of
defense counsel's closing argument, in which he suggested possible ex-
planations for a defendant's failure to discuss his alibi, the door had
been opened for the prosecution to respond by suggesting contrary ex-
planations. 5 2 2 The court also concluded that the remainder of the evi-
dence precluded doubt about the verdict. 5 23 The distinguishing factor
between the two decisions appears to be the sufficiency of other evi-
dence. In Douglas the majority felt that "much of the evidence" was
"equivocal."' 524 In Bradford, on the other hand, the court character-
ized the defendant's alibi as "inconclusive and uncorroborated."' 
5 25
Even in Douglas, however, the sufficiency of other evidence was in
some doubt, as the dissent concluded that other evidence against Doug-
las was sufficient to sustain a conviction. 52 6 Unfortunately, the facts in
Douglas were not published. 527
5. Opinion testimony
a. expert opinion
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence5 28 authorizes the ad-
missibility of expert testimony in a limited set of circumstances. Rule
104(a) gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether or not
an "expert" witness has the necessary qualifications.
1529
1521. Id. at 1296.
1522. Id.
1523. Id.
1524. Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d at 267.
1525. 594 F.2d at 1296.
1526. "In addition, the testimony of the victims of the burglary provided extensive affirma-
tive evidence of Douglas's guilt, including his admission of guilt when confronted by the
victims." 578 F.2d at 268 (Carter, J., dissenting).
1527. The case was tried in a base-line state court. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction without opinion. 23 Or. App. 221, 541 P.2d 833 (1975). The defendant did
not go to the Oregon Supreme Court but rather sought federal habeas corpus relief in a
district court: this relief was denied. 578 F.2d at 266-67.
1528. FED. R. EvID. 702 reads: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
1529. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
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The admissibility of expert opinion recently arose in the Ninth
Circuit concerning the controversial subject of hypnosis. While many
courts are reluctant to allow in-court hypnosis, many are more willing
to allow a witness' memory to be refreshed by hypnotic means out of
court. 530 Some jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit, permit pre-
trial hypnosis of witnesses for the purpose of memory refreshment in
both civil' 53' and criminal1532 cases. In these jurisdictions there is no
longer any question concerning the reliability of such evidence, so the
fact that recollection was hypnotically refreshed goes to the issue of
credibility rather than admissibility.1533 This means there is no need to
establish a prior foundation concerning the reliability of such evidence
by means of expert testimony before the evidence itself is intro-
duced. 1534
In United States v. Awkard, 535 a 1979 Ninth Circuit case, a Gov-
ernment witness, after hypnosis, was able to recall the identity of par-
ticipants in a prison murder. The trial court allowed his testimony to
be preceded by that of a Government expert who attested to the relia-
bility of hypnotic stimulation in enhancing memory over the defense
counsel's objection that there was no need for such expert opinion.15 36
Since admissibility of the hypnotically educed evidence was not at is-
sue, there was no need for a foundation to be established prior to the
testimony itself. Thus the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court had
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
1530. Refreshing the Memory of a Witness Through Hypnosis, 5 UCLA-ALASICA L. REV.
266, 282 (1976). See also Dilloff, The Admissibili&y of Hypnoticall Influenced Testimony, 4
OHIo N.L. REV. 1 (1977).
1531. In Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974), the court ruled that
hypnotism did not render testimony inherently untrustworthy and noted that the witness, a
victim of a helicopter crash, testified about the accident from his present recollection, even
though it was refreshed by hypnosis. The court noted that the fact of hypnosis affects credi-
bility but not admissibility of evidence. Id. at 509-10.
1532. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1979), was the first Ninth Circuit criminal case in which hypnotically educed testimony was
admitted. The court suggested minimum standards to be followed to ensure reliability,
which include maintenance of complete stenographic records of interviews of hypnotized
persons who later testify. Id. at 199 n.12.
1533. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 179
(1979).
1534. However, in United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1979), the court suggested that the opposing attorney could have ob-
jected to the evidence on the basis that a proper foundation was not laid.
1535. 597 F.2d 667.
1536. Id. at 669-70. See note 1540 infra and accompanying text.
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failed to exercise its discretion 537 in allowing an expert on hypnosis to
testify in this regard. 538 The Ninth Circuit cited several factors which
supported its abuse-of-discretion finding. The defendant had not chal-
lenged the witness' recall ability; 1539 thus there was no need for the
prosecution to raise the issue of reliability in the first instance. In addi-
tion, the expert testimony was found to have improperly buttressed
1540
the testimony of the witness who then testified as a result of the hyp-
notic stimulation. The court also ruled that it was error to permit the
witness to testify on direct examination that he had been hypno-
tized. 1
54 1
b. lay opinion
Historically, witnesses were required to testify to "facts," rather
than "opinions," because inference-drawing was considered to be the
province of the jury. 1542 Inferences of witnesses having no greater skill
than the jury were inadmissible when the jury was equally capable of
drawing the same conclusions. 1543 Because of practical difficulties in
application, 1544 and the realization that a distinct line cannot be drawn
between fact and opinion, 1545 the so-called Opinion Rule has been criti-
cized by commentators 546 and eroded by courts and legislators. 547
1537. Id. at 670. Admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial judge.
United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974).
The general test regarding admissibility of expert testimony is whether the jury can receive
"appreciable help" from such testimony. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1973). The judge must weigh the probative value of the testimony evidence against its
prejudicial effect and this determination should not be disturbed unless blatantly erroneous.
Id.
1538. 597 F.2d at 670. The expert was internationally recognized, and the court felt his
testimony in support of the ability of the witness to recall events was prejudicial. Id.
1539. Id.
1540. Id. The rationale for not allowing expert testimony in this instance was analyzed in
terms of other evidence rules. For instance, prior consistent statements by a witness may not
be introduced unless an adverse party has charged the witness with recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive. Furthermore, evidence of truthful character may be intro-
duced only in the forms of opinion or reputation evidence, but only when the'witness' char-
acter trait for veracity has been attacked. Id.
1541. However, the court found the errors were not prejudicial in view of the sufficiency of
the other evidence. Id. at 671-72.
1542. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1917-20 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 7 WIG;
MORE].
1543. Id. § 1924 at 22.
1544. Id. § 1923 at 23.
1545. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 701101] at 701-06.
1546. Wigmore advocated "the entire abolition ofthe rule as such." 7 WIGMORE, supra note
1542, § 1929 at 27 (emphasis in original).
1547. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 701[01] at 701-07.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 548 has abandoned the tradi-
tional rule of exclusion for a discretionary rule of admission. 549 The
rule requires that the lay witness' opinion or inference must be ration-
ally based on his perception of matters testified to and be helpful to the
trier of fact. 155 ° Rule 701, when read in conjunction with rule 403, 1551
requires the trial judge to decide not only whether the proffered testi-
mony will invade the province of the jury, but also whether it will be
unduly prejudicial to the defendant.
552
In the 1979 case of United States v. Young Buffalo,153 the Ninth
Circuit had to weigh the prejudicial and probative effects of witnesses
identifying a criminal defendant from photographs. The defendant,
convicted of bank robbery, had objected after his estranged wife and
his probation officer had given their opinions about his resemblance to
a robber depicted 'in bank surveillance photographs. The defendant
contended that, since neither witness was an expert in photographic
identification, the testimony usurped the function of the jury. He also
argued that "the identifications by those close to [him] were more prej-
udicial than probative."'11 4 After noting that rule 701 permitted lay
testimony, the court conceded the danger of prejudice in this case, but
not for the reason defendant stated. The court cited United States v.
Butcher, 515 a 1977 Ninth Circuit decision, for the proposition that the
use of such testimony is not encouraged because the balance does not
weigh heavily in favor of probative value over prejudicial effect.
In Butcher, a defendant was identified from bank surveillance
photographs by two law enforcement officials and the defendant's state
parole officer. The Butcher court felt the possibility of prejudice was
increased because the defendant "was presented as a person subject to
a certain degree of police scrutiny."'" 56 The court also discussed an
1548. FED. R. EvID. 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
1549. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 701[01] at 701-09.
1550. Id. at 701-10.
1551. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
1552. See United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 1977).
1553. 591 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2178 (1979).
1554. Id. at 513.
1555. 557 F.2d 666.
1556. Id. at 669.
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issue that was not mentioned in Young Buffalo; namely, the merits of
requiring the Government to initially demonstrate the necessity of us-
ing a probation officer instead of some other witness. 1557 That practice
is questionable because after an officer testifies the defendant cannot
freely examine the effect which the relationship between himself and
the witness might have had on the officer's testimony without revealing
the prejudicial fact that the defendant was a parolee. Although admit-
ting the possibility of such prejudice, the Butcher court felt that the
lower court did not commit reversible error, because (1) a hearing on
the admissibility of the officers' testimony had been conducted, at
which time the defendant had the opportunity to extensively examine
the relationship between the defendant and the witnesses, and (2) the
other evidence was ample, by itself, to support the conviction. 558
The Young Buffalo court came to the same conclusion by a differ-
ent route. It implied that the testimony of the wife and parole officer
carried little weight, stating that the testimony was somewhat equivocal
and cumulative to identifications of other witnesses. The court also
noted that neither the wife nor the parole officer had unqualifiedly
identified the defendant as the man in the photographs.
559
Although the contention that the identifications were prejudicial
because they were made by those close to the defendant was not dis-
cussed in Young Buffalo, the 1979 decision in United States v. Saniti 56 °
seems to be dispositive of this issue. There, the witnesses who identi-
fied the defendant from bank surveillance photographs were his room-
mates. Rather than finding prejudice in that fact, the Ninth Circuit
implied that their close relationship increased the probative value of
their testimony, noting that "[t]heir perception of his appearance and
clothing were rationally based upon their association with him.' 561
6. Harmless error
Trial court errors in admitting or excluding evidence are deemed
to be harmless when they are found not to affect "substantial rights" of
a party. 562 The reviewing court must view the alleged error in the con-
text of the particular circumstances of the case. 1563 Trial court errors in
admitting or excluding evidence are divided into two groups, constitu-
1557. Id. at 670.
1558. Id.
1559. 591 F.2d at 513.
1560. 604 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1979).
1561. Id. at 605.
1562. 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 103[06] at 103-43; see 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976).
1563. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946).
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tional and non-constitutional, with a different standard used for
each. 1564
a. constitutional error
Federal constitutional errors are errors that violate federal consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights. 56 In Chapman v. Calfornia,1566 the
United States Supreme Court declined to rule that all federal constitu-
tional errors are harmful' 67 and stated that some constitutional errors
in particular cases may be so unimportant and insignificant that they
may be deemed harmless. 1568 The Court, declaring adherence to the
standard of Fahy v. Connecticut,1569 held that "before a federal consti-
tutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'15 70 This means
that the error complained of must be shown not to have contributed to
the adverse verdict.' 71 The degree of "contribution" required was left
unclear. If the Court meant that the error must not contribute at all to
the verdict, it would seem to belie the Court's acknowledgement that
some errors are harmless because it could be argued that any error con-
tributes, at least to some degree, to the verdict.
This question was addressed in Harrington v. Calfornia,1572 in
which the Court found a violation of the Bruton rule 1573 to be harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority, responding to a vocif-
erous dissent, claimed to be reaffirming Chapman, and held that the
case against the petitioner was so overwhelming that, unless it could be
said that no violation of the Bruton rule could constitute harmless er-
ror, the conviction must be affirmed. 574 Three Justices dissented,15 75
1564. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1977).
1565. Id. at 916; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967). Some examples are the
fifth amendment (self-incrimination clause), id.; the sixth amendment (confrontation
clause), Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1971); the fourth amendment (exclusionary rule
based on unreasonable searches), United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 842 (1975).
1566. 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
1567. Id. at 22. There are certain exceptions, such as errors dealing with coerced confes-
sion, right to counsel and right to an impartial judge. Id. at 23 & n.8.
1568. Id. at 22.
1569. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) ("[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction").
1570. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24
1571. Id.
1572. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
1573. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See note 1500 supra and accompany-
ing text.
1574. 395 U.S. at 254.
1575. Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Warren, C.J. Id. at 255.
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and charged that this decision overruled Chapman, claiming Chapman
meant "that for an error to be harmless it must have made no contribu-
tion to a. . .conviction." 1576 The dissent accused the majority of shift-
ing "the inquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to
the conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelm-
ing' support for the conviction,"' 15 77 and noted that the Supreme Court
in Chapman had criticized the reliance of California courts on "over-
whelming evidence" in finding error to be harmless. 1578
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court again relied on "overwhelming"
untainted evidence in Schneble v. Florida15 79 in finding a Bruton rule
violation to be harmless error. In an attempt to clarify its position, it
stated the Chapman rule in three different ways: that as beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the alleged error was harmless; 1580 that there was no rea-
sonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict; 1581 and that
the minds of an average jury would not have found the evidence signif-
icantly less persuasive had the error not occurred. 1582 By its decision,
the Court made clear that, no matter which formulation is used, the
impact of untainted evidence in deciding harmless error is not prohib-
ited.
The Ninth Circuit has followed this approach. In the 1979 case of
Bradford v. Stone, 1583 the court held that a Doyle violation 584 was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and "'did not contribute to the
verdict obtained."' 58 5 Although the court cited only Chapman for the
constitutional error rule, one of the factors contributing to its decision
was that "the remainder of the evidence preclude[d] doubt about the
verdict."'' 586 The court was more exacting in citing authorities in
United States v. Vissars,158 7 another 1979 decision. There, a Bruton
violation was held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
court cited both Harrington and Schneble for the proposition that a
1576. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
1577. Id.
1578. Id. at 256; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23.
1579. 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
1580. Id. at 430.
1581. Id. at 432.
1582. Id. (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)).
1583. 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
1584. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), it was "held that the use for impeachment
purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after [he received] Miranda
warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619.
1585. 594 F.2d at 1297 (quoting Chapman v. California, 388 U.S. 18, 24 (1966)).
1586. Id. at 1296.
1587. 596 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Bruton error can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of
"overwhelming" properly admitted evidence. 588 This broadens the
scope of "harmless error," with the result that fewer convictions will be
overturned for constitutional errors than under the stricter interpreta-
tion of Chapman.
b. non-constitutional error
Errors in such matters as jury instructions, comments by counsel,
and rulings on admissibility of evidence where fourth amendment
claims are not involved have generally been considered "non-constitu-
tional."'l589 As the Ninth Circuit stated in 1977 in United States v.
Valle- Valdez,1590 the interests involved in such cases are not sufficiently
important to merit explicit constitutional protection; the court stated it
was therefore not compelled to use the Chapman standard.' 59' The
court discussed two different standards for deciding reversibility of
non-constitutional errors, and chose the more lenient one. Subsequent
Ninth Circuit cases, however, have not been consistent.
The court in Valle- Valdez rejected the "highly probable" standard
under which an appellate court will reverse unless it is highly probable
that the error did not materially affect the verdict. 5 92 The court explic-
itly adopted the "more probable than not" standard, under which an
appellate court will reverse unless it is more probable than not that the
error did not materially affect the verdict. 5 93 In rejecting both the
Chapman and "highly probable" standards in cases where errors do
not reach federal constitutional proportions, the court showed concern
for judicial economy by noting that a test more rigorous than that cho-
sen would necessarily result in more reversals. 5 94 However, the court
observed that two previous Ninth Circuit cases 1595 had apparently used
the Chapman standard, and ended the discussion with the statement,
curious in light of the prior analysis, that, for purposes of the instant
decision, any inconsistency need not be resolved because under either
the Chapman or the "more probable than not" standard, the Valle-
1588. Id. at 404.
1589. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).
1590. Id.
1591. Id.
1592. Id. at 915-16.
1593. Id. at 916.
1594. Id.
1595. United States v. Duhart, 496 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974)
(non-constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Rea, 532
F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 179 (1979) (reversal because non-constitutional
error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Valdez conviction must be overturned. 159
6
Two years later, the inconsistency has still not been resolved. Four
1979 Ninth Circuit cases use either the Chapman standard, the "more
probable than not" standard, or a hybrid. In United States v.
Awkard,1597 the court held that impermissible bolstering of a witness'
testimony was not reversible error under the facts because it was "more
probable than not" that the erroneous admission of the evidence did
not materially affect the jurors' verdict;1598 the court cited Valle- Valdez.
However, in United States v. Lasky, 1599 substantially the same panel 16°
(including one circuit judge160 1 who sat in both Awkard and Valle-
Valdez) held that a non-constitutional error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt," and cited Chapman.' 6°2 Similarly, in United States
v. Marques,160 3 a different panel 1604 decided that the admission of evi-
dence of prior similar illegal activity "was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt because other evidence against [appellant] was substantial
to the point of being overwhelming."' 1615 The court did not cite Chap-
man, but the language used was the Chapman standard, as construed in
subsequent Supreme Court cases, almost verbatim.160 6 In United States
v. Hernandez-Miranda,160 7 yet another panel 60 8 held that the admis-
sion of evidence of a prior offense of the defendant was error, but was
not "prejudicial." The only reason given for this conclusion was that
"[a]ll of [the] evidence" (including, apparently, the inadmissible prior
offense evidence) created "a strong, if not overwhelming, case" against
the defendant. 609 This is neither the "more probable than not" stan-
dard nor the Chapman standard.' 6'0 As no authority was cited for it, it
1596. 554 F.2d at 917.
1597. 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 179 (1979).
1598. Id. at 671-72.
1599. 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1979).
1600. TheAwkard panel consisted of Goodwin, Tang and East; the Laskey panel consisted
of Goodwin, Tang and Merrill.
1601. Goodwin, C.J.
1602. 600 F.2d at 770.
1603. 600 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 119 (1979).
1604. Carter, Choy and Bright.
1605. 600 F.2d at 751.
1606. See notes 1566-88 supra and accompanying text.
1607. 601 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979).
1608. Hufstedler, Anderson and Firth.
1609. 601 F.2d at 1109.
1610. United States Supreme Court cases construing Chapman have indicated that one
factor an appellate court may consider in applying the standard is whether untainted evi-
dence of guilt is "overwhelming." See notes 1566-88 supra and accompanying text.
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is possible the court is breaking new ground here, which is certainly not
needed if consistency throughout the circuit is desirable.
The Chapman constitutional error standard is stricter than the
"more probable than not" non-constitutional error standard, and can
therefore be expected to result in more reversals of convictions. Of
course, where an error is found harmless under the constitutional error
test, as in Marques, Lasky and Valle- Valdez, it will be harmless under
the less stringent test. A potential equal justice problem might arise if a
court applying the Chapman standard might overturn a conviction that
would not be reversed under the lesser standard. For this reason, it is
advisable that all panels of the Ninth Circuit use the same test in decid-
ing whether a non-constitutional error is harmless. To the extent that
the analysis of Valle- Valdez is persuasive, that test should be the "more
probable than not" standard.
7. Presumptions
A presumption is a procedural rule which requires the existence of
a "presumed fact" to be assumed when a "basic fact" is established,
unless and until a certain specified condition is fulfilled. 61 Presump-
tions are utilized in federal law to lessen the prosecution's burden by
authorizing shortcuts in proof and exerting pressure on persons most
knowledgeable to come forward with an explanation.161 2 Numerous
state and federal criminal statutes contain presumptions, which, like
other statutes, are invalid if they violate federal constitutional rights of
a criminal defendant.
A number of United States Supreme Court cases have defined
standards under which the constitutionality of criminal statutory pre-
sumptions are tested. In Tot v. United States, 613 the Supreme Court in
1943 held that the controlling test was "that there be a rational connec-
tion between the facts proved and the facts presumed."' 1614 The Court
stated that a statutory presumption will not be upheld if the inference
of one fact from proof of the other "is arbitrary because of lack of con-
nection between the two in common experience."'' 61 5 In the 1969 deci-
sion of Leary v. United States,6 16 the Court, attempting to clarify the
"rational connection" concept, held that a criminal statutory presump-
1611. 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1450, 1 300101] at 300-1.
1612. Id., 303[01] at 303-8.
1613. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
1614. Id. at 467.
1615. Id. at 467-68.
1616. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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tion is irrational and arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, unless it
can be said with substantial certainty "that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend."' 1617 Because the presumption in question did not pass this
test, the Court did not reach the issue of whether a criminal statutory
presumption that does pass this test must also satisfy the criminal "rea-
sonable doubt" standard if an essential element of the crime charged
depends upon its use.
16 18
This issue was reached in 1979 in Ulster County Court v. Allen. 6 19
The defendants had been convicted of illegal possession of two hand-
guns that had been found in the handbag of a female companion with
whom they had been travelling by automobile when they were arrested.
The New York statute under which they were convicted stated that,
with certain exceptions, the presence of a firearm in an automobile is
presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occu-
pying the vehicle. 6 z0 The defendants sought habeas corpus relief in
federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without
deciding if the presumption was constitutional as applied in this case,
had concluded that the presumption was unconstitutional on its face,
under the Leary test.' 62 ' The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing
between permissive and mandatory presumptions, and enunciating a
different standard for each.
The Court first noted that the ultimate test of a presumption's con-
stitutional validity is that it "must not undermine the factfinder's re-
sponsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."'1622 The Court then defined
a "permissive presumption" as one in which the trier of fact is allowed,
but not required, to infer the presumed fact from the proven fact.
623
Because the burden of proof remains with the State, and the trier of
fact is free to accept or reject the presumption, the Court reasoned that
the facts of the particular case are to be considered in deciding if the
connection between the assumed and proven facts is valid. 624 The
proper test to apply is the Leary standard, as long as "the presumption
1617. Id. at 36.
1618. Id. at 36 n.64.
1619. 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979).
1620. Id. at 2217-18 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980)).
1621. Allen v. County Court, 568 F.2d 998, 1007 (2nd Cir. 1977), reversed, 99 S. Ct. 2213
(1979).
1622. 99 S. Ct. at 2224.
1623. Id.
1624. Id.
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is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt," since the pros-
ecution may rely on all the evidence to meet the "reasonable doubt"
standard required for a guilty verdict.
1625
The Court defined a "mandatory presumption" as one requiring
the factfinder to find the assumed fact from the proven fact, at least
until the defendant rebuts the connection between the two. 626 It thus
may affect both the strength and the placement of the "no reasonable
doubt" burden. Because the trier of fact must accept the presumption
(absent a sufficient rebuttal by the defendant), and may not reject it
based on an independent evaluation of the particular facts of the case,
"the analysis of the presumption's constitutional validity is logically di-
vorced from those facts and based on the presumption's accuracy in the
run of cases."' 1627 For this reason, mandatory presumptions are judged
on their face. Because the prosecution bears the burden of establishing
guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption, unless the
proven fact supports the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1628 The Court noted that the New York statutory presumption
involved was a permissive one, and it was therefore error for the appel-
late court to judge it on its face. The Court ruled that, considering the
facts of the case, the jury could have validly assumed that it was more
probable than not the assumed fact flowed from the proven fact.1
629
8. Spousal privilege
The marital relationship yields two types of privileges that are rec-
ognized in federal courts. 63 0 The first protects confidential communi-
cations between spouses, and the second prevents one spouse from
testifying against the other in a criminal trial.' 63' The reason most
often cited for the privileges is that they act to protect "the sanctity and
tranquility of the marital relationship."'
' 6 32
The privilege which renders a spouse incompetent to testify
against his or her marital partner is also known as the "anti-marital
facts privilege." It has been criticized as an impediment to the truth-
1625. Id. at 2230.
1626. Id. at 2224-25.
1627. Id. at 2226.
1628. Id. at 2229.
1629. Id. at 2230.
1630. United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1975).
1631. Id.
1632. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953). See also 8 WIGMORE, supra note
1451, § 2228 at 214-15 and § 2332 at 642-44.
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finding process, 1633 and, at least where a spouse wants to testify, as an
illogical anachronism. 1634 In such a case, it can be argued, the marital
relationship is beyond the point of being protected. The United States
Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument in the 1958 decision
Hawkins v. United States. 6 35 It reasoned that some troubled marriages
can be saved, absent an unforgivable act by one of the parties, such as
adverse testimony in a criminal proceeding. 636
Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptions to the rule. The
privilege does not apply in proceedings brought by one spouse against
the other for personal wrong or injury, such as battery, bigamy and
abandonment. 6 37 In 1979, the Ninth Circuit utilized two other excep-
tions in refusing to recognize the privilege in United States v. Saniti1
638
and Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS.6 39 In Sanit, the trial court had found
that the defendant had entered into the marriage for the purpose of
invoking the marital privilege. The appellate court followed well-de-
fined precedent 6 '" in holding that the privilege cannot be claimed
when the marriage is not entered into in good faith. In Garcia-
Jaramillo, the defendant had entered into a sham marriage in order to
avoid immigration laws but had obtained a divorce prior to his depor-
tation hearing. In denying the spousal privilege, the court cited
Volianitis v. INS, 64 ' which had noted that the generally accepted rule
is that "divorce removes any bar of incompetency."'' 642
In United States v. Tsinn(/innie,11 3 a 1979 case, the Ninth Circuit
first squarely considered a collateral issue: should the anti-marital facts
privilege be extended to bar a witness from relating an excited utter-
1633. ."This privilege has no longer adequate reason for retention. In an age which has so
far rationalized, depolarized and dechivalrized the marital relation. . . this marital privi-
lege is the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in
practice." 8 WiOMORE, supra note 1451, § 2228 at 221.
1634. "But family harmony is nearly always past saving when the spouse is willing to aid
the prosecution. The privilege, in truth, is an archaic survival of a mystical religious dogma
and of a way of thinking about the marital relation, which are today outmoded." C. Mc-
CORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 at 145-46 (1954) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
1635. 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958).
1636. Id. at 78.
1637. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1632, § 2240 at 253; MCCORMICK, supra note 1634, § 66
at 145.
1638. 604 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1639. 604 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1979).
1640. E., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 614 (1953); United States v. Mathis, 559
F.2d 294, 295 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975).
1641. 352 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1965).
1642. Id. at 768.
1643. 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ance by a spouse who was prohibited from testifying? The findings of
the lower court showed that the defendant, after arguing with his wife
and threatening to kill his mother-in-law, drove his truck into the struc-
ture in which they were staying. As his mother-in-law fled, he struck
her with the vehicle, killing her. At trial, the defendant prevented his
wife from testifying against him by invoking the spousal privilege. A
witness was permitted to testify that moments after the crime, he heard
the wife exclaim, "He ran over my mother."' 6  On appeal, defendant
contended that this violated the spousal privilege.
The Ninth Circuit had never directly considered this issue. In
three previous cases,1645 it had held that the privilege should be ex-
tended to bar admission of a spouse's out-of-court statements, but in all
three cases this conclusion had been mere dicta. 646 The court, after
noting that privileges are to be narrowly construed because they act as
barriers to the fact-finding process, 1 7 considered the impact of admis-
sion of a spouse's hearsay statements on the underlying reason for the
privilege. 1648 In determining that the possibility of damage to the mari-
tal relationship in these circumstances is slight, the court cited with ap-
proval from a similar Second Circuit case:
This is not a case where the prosecution called the hus-
band to the stand. If he had testified under those circum-
stances, the common law rule would have been violated.
Here, however, we are one step removed from actual testi-
mony. Therefore, there is no chance that we might be re-
pulsed by a spouse actually testifying against his mate ....
Nor is there a chance that marital frictions will be aggravated,
; ..for there is the convenient buffer of the third person actu-
ally making the remarks. 649
1644. Id. at 1037.
1645. United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978);
Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964); Olen-
der v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
1646. In two cases, the privilege had been waived: Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934,
943 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964); Olender v..United States, 210 F.2d 795,
800 (9th Cir. 1954). In the other, United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978), the statements had been admitted as admissions of a co-conspir-
ator.
1647. 601 F.2d at 1038.
1648. Id. The court stated that Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), "outlined
two justifications for the privilege: fostering marital harmony and avoiding the spectacle of
pitting one spouse against the other." 601 F.2d at 1038. However, a careful reading of
Hawkins reveals no mention of the second justification.
1649. 601 F.2d at 1038 (citing United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968)). The Seventh Circuit allows admission of a spouse's out-
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The Tsinnffinnie court agreed with the argument that a person cannot
prevent his or her spouse from making adverse statements in public, for
if they are revealed in court by a third party, any strain on the marriage
comes from "the out-of-court behavior of the spouse, not the advent of
the trial . . 1
The arguments the court cites are persuasive, but one of the court's
own conclusions is of questionable validity: "[W]hen a marriage has
deteriorated to the point where one spouse makes statements damaging
to the other, that marriage will usually proceed to its fate regardless of
how the spousal privilege is applied."' 65 1 Nevertheless, the court's re-
fusal to extend the spousal privilege to bar a witness from relating an
excited utterance by a spouse was proper. It may be viewed as further
erosion 165 2 of a privilege seen by some as having lived beyond its use-
fulness.1
653
V. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Double Jeopardy
The United States Constitution provides that "no person shall be
. ..subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy."'1 654 In a
jury trial, once the jury is impaneled and sworn, jeopardy attaches;1651
from that moment, unless certain defined exceptions apply,1 65 6 the de-
of-court statements, United States v. Cleveland, 477 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1973) (following
the reasoning in Mackiewicz), but the Fifth Circuit does not, United States v. Williams, 447
F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1971) (ruling that it would undercut the marital privilege). Contra,
United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1971) (held admission of out-of-court
statement by wife to impeach husband's testimony at trial was in violation of marital privi-
lege).
1650. 601 F.2d at 1039 (citing 2 D. LouIsELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 218 at
625 (1978)). Accord, Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 913-14 (1980). The Trammel
Court excluded inter-spousal testimony concerning acts committed or words spoken in the
presence of a third person from the reach of the Hawkins immunity rule. Confidential com-
munications between spouses is still protected. Id. at 913. See Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951).
1651. 601 F.2d at 1039.
1652. See text accompanying notes 1637-41 supra.
1653. See notes 1633-34 supra and accompanying text.
1654. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an evaluation of recent trends in double jeopardy, see
Comment, Double Jeopardy Consequences of Mistrial, Dismissal and Reversal of Convictions
on Appeal, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 235 (1979) (recent cases may diminish number of defend-
ants spared second trials).
1655. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 29 (1978).
1656. These exceptions are certain mistrials, see notes 1659-77 infra and accompanying
text; certain dismissals, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (defendant himself
sought to have his trial dismissed on the merits, so government appeal did not offend double
jeopardy clause); and certain retrials after appeal; cf. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
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fendant cannot be retried for the same offense.
The United States Supreme Court recently expressed the rationale
of the double jeopardy clause: "[Tihe guarantee against double jeop-
ardy assures an individual that, among other things, he will not be
forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal strain, public
embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the
same offense."' 1657  A secondary reason for the protection against
double jeopardy is the promotion of judicial economy. 658
1. Separate offenses
When a defendant is prosecuted twice under separate statutes for a
single act, the United States Supreme Court applies a test first fash-
ioned in Blockburger v. United States.1659 In order to prosecute the
defendant twice, it must be determined that the single act constituted
two separate offenses. The Blockburger test to determine whether there
are two separate offenses arising from a single act examines "whether
each provision [of the statutes] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."'1660 The focus of the test is on the statutory
elements of the alleged offenses. If each statute under which the de-
fendant is being prosecuted requires proof of facts not required by the
other, then the test is satisfied, and separate prosecutions are not barred
under the double jeopardy clause.
166 1
The Blockburger test permits successive prosecutions for several
offenses arising from a single act. Although it has been suggested that
consecutive sentences be imposed for several offenses rather than sub-
jecting the defendant to successive prosecutions, 1662 this alternative to
(1978) (defendant whose conviction was reversed because government's evidence was insuf-
ficient to support verdict cannot be retried). See notes 1695-1703 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the relationship between retrials and the double jeopardy clause, For
a discussion of Burks, see Note, 1979 DET. C. L. REv. 193 (1979).
1657. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977).
1658. United States v. Gamble, 607 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1979).
1659. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
1660. Id. at 304. For Ninth Circuit cases using this test, see United States v. Kearney, 560
F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977).
1661. 284 U.S. at 304. In Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975), the Court ex-
plained that the Blockburger test serves the function of "identifying congressional intent to
impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or trans-
action." Id. at 785 n.17.
1662. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan argued that the practice of permitting successive prosecutions enabledthe govern-
ment to wear down the defendant via a multitude of prosecutions which amounted to "re-
petitive harassment." .d. at 199-200.
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Blockburger has not been adopted by the Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the Blockburger test in
the 1979 case of Walker v. Loggins.1663 The defendant in Walker had
been convicted of manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon aris-
ing from a single act perpetrated against the same individual. Walker
argued that conviction for both offenses constituted double jeopardy.
However, under Blockburger, the Ninth Circuit found the offenses dis-
tinct-manslaughter need not be committed with a deadly weapon, as
is required for the assault charge, and the death of a human being is
not an element of assault with a deadly weapon, but is required for a
manslaughter charge. Thus, Walker was properly convicted of both
offenses. 
1664
The Ninth Circuit also followed Blockburger in United States v.
Snell,166 5 where the defendant had been convicted of conspiracy to
commit bank robbery and attempted extortion. The extortion convic-
tion was reversed on appeal, the Ninth Circuit deciding that attempted
bank robbery was the proper charge. 1666 Snell contended that a subse-
quent prosecution for attempted bank robbery arising from the same
transaction would constitute double jeopardy. The court rejected the
standard applied inAbbate v. United States,1667 which had called multi-
plying offenses for the same acts "repetitive harrassment."' 1668 Noting
that in Walker v. Loggins the Ninth Circuit had reaffirmed its adher-
ence to the Blockburger test, 16 69 the court held that, since attempted
extortion involves elements not required for attempted bank robbery,
and vice versa, double jeopardy did not bar the retrial. In addition, the
court said that the government's conduct here was not "repetitive har-
rassment," where the court of appeals had reversed the conviction be-
cause attempted bank robbery was the proper charge. 1670
In another 1979 decision, United States v. Bender,r67 1 the defend-
ant had been acquitted of an income tax violation under 26 U.S.C.
1663. 608 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1979).
1664. Id. at 733. Walker had originally been prosecuted in California superior court, and
had filed a petition for habeas corpus with the United States district court. The Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that, under federal law, Walker could have been convicted and sentenced for both
offenses. California state law, while allowing the convictions, prohibited punishment for
both. The court could find no error in California's more lenient rule. Id.
1665. 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
1666. United States v. Snell, 550 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1977).
1667. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
1668. Id. at 200.
1669. 592 F.2d at 1085.
1670. Id. at 1085 n.2.
1671. 606 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1979).
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§ 7201.1672 He was then found guilty of violating 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1), 1673 dealing with perjury convictions as a result of false in-
come tax statements. The government contended that, since the latter
was a lesser included offense of the former, the double jeopardy clause
did not prevent Bender's conviction on the second charge. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit held that section 7206(1) would not be a lesser included
offense within section 7201 unless the section 7201 charge required
proof of elements not required for the first charge. 6 74 Conceding that
the elements of both offenses are not identical, the Ninth Circuit never-
theless stated that "in any particular case. . . on the proof offered, the
factual elements may be identical."'' 675 The court determined that
Bender had been acquitted of the section 7201 violation because the
court believed both his story about the source of unexplained funds and
that his failure to report certain interest income was not willful. Since
the court had found Bender's story to be true, and had found a lack of
willfullness, there were no grounds for the perjury conviction under
section 7206(1).
In United States v. Guido,1676 the court did not reach the double
jeopardy issue; instead it used its supervisory power to reverse a convic-
tion pursuant to a second indictment for conspiracy. The defendants
had been convicted in the Eastern District of California and then in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, for conspiracy
to import and possess marijuana. In finding separate conspiracies, the
Arizona court had relied on a difference in participants, time, and pur-
poses. The Ninth Circuit found that these differences were more Mu-
sory than real. Although some minor participants had changed, Guido
and Boyle were the key participants at both times. Further, although
there was a six-month time lapse, the court found that this apparent lull
did not necessarily indicate a lapse in or termination of the conspiracy.
Nor did the Ninth Circuit find a difference in purpose; although the
California indictment mentioned merely a conspiracy to import, and
the Arizona indictment charged both conspiracy to import and conspir-
acy to possess with intent to distribute, it was clear that the purpose of
1672. This section provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who willfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this .title or the payment thereof shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony."
1673. Section 7206(l) provides that anyone who "willfully makes and submits any return,
statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is
made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as
to every material matter,. . . shall be guilty of a felony."
1674. 606 F.2d at 898 (citing Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965)).
1675. Id. at 898.
1676. 597 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the California acts included both. Finding the same source, the same
distribution points, and one period of time, the Ninth Circuit held that
there was only one conspiracy.1
677
Although the court could have applied the Blockburger test to this
fact situation, it did not reach the constitutional issue of double jeop-
ardy. Instead, the court used its "supervisory power of the administra-
tion of criminal justice"'1678 to correct the unfairness which stemmed
from two prosecutions for the same offense.
167 9
In United States v. Solano,1680 members of the Hell's Angels Mo-
torcycle Club had been prosecuted in state court for various offenses.
For violations arising out of the same acts, they were charged in federal
court under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) provisions of the United States Code.1681 They contended that
the double jeopardy clause precluded the RICO prosecution. The
Ninth Circuit stated that the doctrine of dual sovereignty allows succes-
sive state and federal prosecutions for the same act.' 682 In addition,
even where some of the defendants had been tried in federal court, the
Ninth Circuit reiterated its holding in United States v. Rone,168 3 where
1677. Id. at 198.
1678. Id.
1679. Other cases in which the court used its supervisory power to reverse a conviction
include Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943); and Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
1680. 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979).
1681. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1976). This statute, which had as its purpose "reducing
invidious capabilities of persons in organized crime to infiltrate the American economy,"
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978), made it unlawful to invest proceeds of racketeering activity in enterprises engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce. Such proceeds can be invested in securities if they do not
amount to one percent of the outstanding securities in a class.
1682. 605 F.2d at 1143 (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)). For a general
discussion of the problems of successive state and federal prosecutions, see The Problem of
Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Prosecutions: a Ffth Amendment Solution, 31
STAN. L. REv. 477 (1979) (arguing that such successive prosecutions violate the purpose of
the fifth amendment).
1683. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.. 1979). In Rone, the Ninth Circuit applied the Blockburger
test (see note 1660 supra and accompanying text) to determine that the defendants could be
sentenced consecutively for two extortion offenses and for RICO violations arising out of the
same acts since the offenses involved different elements. The defendants had also contended
that Wharton's Rule precluded the RICO conviction. That rule, which takes its name from
Francis Wharton, whose treatise on criminal law identified the doctrine, states an exception
to the general rule that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its goal do not merge.
Wharton said that where the offense itself requires two or more participants-e.g., adul-
tery-the act should not be indicted both substantively and as a conspiracy. 2 F. WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1604, at 1862 (12th ed. 1932). E.g., Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770
(1975) (applying Wharton's Rule). The Rone court held that, since § 1962(c) plainly indi-
cates that an individual acting alone may violate the statute, Wharton's Rule did not cause
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it had held that "a defendant can be convicted and separately punished
both for the predicate acts which form the basis of a RICO charge, and
for a substantive violation of RICO without violating the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause."'684
2. Mistrials
a. on defendant's motion
When the defendant himself moves for a mistrial, the bar of
double jeopardy is generally waived. However, where the prosecutor
or judge in bad faith deliberately provokes a mistrial, there is no
waiver. 1685
In United States v. Gamble,16 16 the defendant was charged with
failure to file income tax returns. Gamble moved for and was granted
a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct because the
government attorney had continually given his assurance that certain
facts placed in issue were true. Gamble then filed a motion to bar re-
prosecution because of double jeopardy. 1687 The court stated that, after
a defendant's motion for a mistrial, retrial is not barred under the
double jeopardy clause "unless there is bad faith conduct by the judge
or prosecutor which threatens harrassment of the accused by multiple
prosecutions or affords the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to
convict by intentionally provoking the mistrial request."'' 68 The Gam-
ble court, in affirming the defendant's conviction, held that although
the trial judge had been correct in finding prosecutorial misconduct, he
had also found that "the prosecuting attorney did not act in bad faith to
deliberately provoke a mistrial."'
1689
b. mistrial on judge's sua sponte declaration
Where the mistrial is declared on the judge's own motion, a stricter
standard is applied by the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Sanders
691
the substantive offense to merge with the RICO charge. In addition, legislative history indi-
cated that Congress intended separate offenses. 598 F.2d at 570.
1684. 605 F.2d at 1143 (citing United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1685. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (double jeopardy clause pro-
tects against conduct by judge or prosecutor intended to provoke mistrials, thereby subject-
ing defendant to burden of multiple prosecutions).
1686. 607 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1979).
1687. Id. at 822.
1688. Id. at 823 (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)).
1689. 607 F.2d at 823. The court refused to disturb this finding since it was "clearly sup-
ported by the record." Id.
1690. 591 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979).
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involved such a sua sponte declaration. There, a prosecution witness
was indicted for perjury as a result of her testimony at trial. The judge,
fearing that the defendant would be prejudiced in the jury's eyes by the
"tainted" testimony, declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection.
The Sanders court observed that, since the defendant intended to at-
tack the witness's credibility, it was more likely that he "would have
benefited rather than suffered from the 'tainted' testimony."'1691 The
court cited Arizona v. Washington169 for the proposition that, to justify
a new trial, there must be "manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial
over the objection of the defendant. 693 Not finding such necessity in
Sanders, where it appeared that the trial judge did not consider alter-
natives to a mistrial, the Ninth Circuit ruled that double jeopardy
barred further prosecution of the defendant. 694
3. Retrials
In United States v. Phillps, the defendants' convictions had been
reversed on the ground that the government's conduct had unduly
prejudiced them.169  Upon remand, the defendants moved to dismiss
on the ground that a retrial would violate the double jeopardy clause.
They argued that "the double jeopardy clause bars a retrial after a suc-
cessful appeal by a criminal defendant when reversal was predicated
upon prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching."' 1696 Although the
1691. Id. at 1298.
1692. 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978) (trial judge acted responsibly in declaring mistrial after
improper comment by defense counsel where order supported "by high degree" of necessity
for new trial). For a discussion of Arizona v. Washington, see Note, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
365 (1979).
1693. 591 F.2d at 1298. For a discussion of a Second Circuit case dealing with manifest
necessity, see Dunkerly v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1978) (retrial after sua sponte decla-
ration of mistrial was prohibited where the record showed no manifest necessity), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979). See Comment, 10 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 457 (1979).
1694. 591 F.2d at 1298. The court suggested that the judge might have allowed cross-
examination o'f the witness whose testimony was in question or might have issued a curative
instruction. Nothing in the record indicated that such alternatives were considered. Id.
Other circuits agree with the Ninth Circuit that the reasons for a trial judge's declara-
tion of a mistrial must affirmatively appear on the record of the trial court. Eg., United
States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1978) (nothing in record to support trial
judge's conclusion that jury was deadlocked); Dunkerly v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 147-48 (2d
Cir. 1978) (lack of record evidence indicating why continuance would have been unreasona-
ble alternative to mistrial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); United States v. Starling, 571
F.2d 934, 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial judge's declaration of mistrial based on belief that
jurors were prejudiced against defendant not supported by the record; alternatives to mis-
trial not considered).
1695. 600 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Phillips, 575 F.2d
1265 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 131 (1979)).
1696. Id. at 187.
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Ninth Circuit expressed some question about this reading of the
law,16 97 it assumed arguendo that the defendants' premise was correct.
Since previously the Ninth Circuit had explicitly stated that it did not
find prosecutorial misconduct, 1698 and since the district court had
found none on remand, it was held, even by this stricter standard, that
the retrial was not barred. 6
99
In United States v. Bodey, 1700 the defendant had been tried on a
bank robbery charge. His defense was insanity and he had moved for
acquittal on that ground. The jury, however, had been unable to reach
a verdict. Later, he was retried and convicted. He moved under 28
U.S.C. § 22551701 to vacate the sentence, claiming that he should have
been acquitted at the first trial, so that the second violated the double
jeopardy clause. He relied on Burks v. United States,170 2 which had
held that where the evidence was insufficient at the first trial, the gov-
ernment should not have another chance at a second. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, finding that the evidence for Bodey's sanity at the first trial had
been insufficient to meet the government's burden, followed Burks to
hold that the double jeopardy clause barred Bodey's second trial. 70 3
4. The Petite policy
Under a Department of Justice policy known as the Petite pol-
icy, 17 4 several offenses arising out of the same transaction should be
1697. Id. The court was not required to determine if the appellants were in fact correct in
their interpretation because it could not affect the outcome of the case. The interpretation
would only be relevant if in fact the court had found prosecutorial misconduct. However,
the court had explicitly stated in the original appeal that it did not find any misconduct, and
the district court on remand similarly found none. Id. The court also refused to address the
government's contention that recent Supreme Court cases established that retrial is barred
after a successful appeal by criminal defendants "only when the reversal resulted from insuf-
ficient evidence." Id. at 187 n.2 (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
1698. United States v. Phillips, 575 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1978).
1699. 600 F.2d at 187.
1700. 607 F.2d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1979).
1701. Id. Bodey filed this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) which provides that a
prisoner who claims his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of
the United States may move the sentencing court to vacate it.
1702. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
1703. Procedurally the two cases were slightly different since Bodey had been retried and
Burke had not. The Bodey court characterized this difference as an "'arbitrary distinction'
which should not be given significance." 607 F.2d at 268.
1704. The policy is named for Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). In Petite, the
Government fied a motion to dismiss charges at a second trial which arose from the same
transaction at issue in the first trial "on the ground that it is the general policy of the Federal
Government that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and
tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions." Id. at 530. This
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tried together. In two cases during the survey period, defendants con-
tended that their second indictments violated the Petite policy and
were, therefore, barred. Whether such a violation mandated dismissal
had been expressly left open earlier in United States v. Mikka. 7 5
In the first 1979 decision, United States v. Snell,170 6 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that, assuming arguendo that the Petite policy had been vio-
lated, "such a violation of the internal housekeeping rules of the
Department of Justice does not entitle Snell to dismissal of the indict-
ment."170 7 The court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
remanded cases because of the Petite policy only at the request of the
Department of Justice, and that the Supreme Court had stated that the
Petite policy is not constitutionally required.170 8 According to the in-
ternal policy of the Justice Department such "binding effect" would,
the Ninth Circuit said, "discourage the Department from adopting
other such laudable policies."'
170 9
In United States v. Solano,'7' ° the court held that invocation of the
Petite policy was not properly a part of a pre-trial appeal from a denial
of a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy.17 1  However, the
court cited Snell for the proposition that, even if properly part of a: pre-
trial appeal, such an argument "does not compel dismissal of a federal
prosecution." 1712
policy is "dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and or-
derly law enforcement." Id See generally Comment, The Problems of Double Jeopardy in
Successive Federal-State Prosecutions: Fth Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REv. 477,
488-94 (1979).
1705. 586 F.2d 152, 154 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979).
1706. 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979). For a discussion of the
separate offenses in Snell, see notes 1665-70 supra and accompanying text.
1707. 592 F.2d at 1087.
1708. Id. (citing Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 (1977)).
1709. Id. The court also noted that the other circuits which had considered the question
had agreed that "a criminal defendant cannot invoke the Petite policy as a bar to federal
prosecution."' Id. The court cited United States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564, 567-68 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); United States v. Wallace, 578 F.2d 735, 740 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978); United States v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 626 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1007, 1012, 1024 (1970).
1710. 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the separate offenses in Solano,
see notes 1680-84 supra and accompanying text.
1711. Id. at 1143. The court characterized this type of appeal as an "Abney appeal," after
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), which established the right to immediately
appeal denials of such motions. 605 F.2d at 1142-43.
1712. 605 F.2d at 1143 (citing United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 2889 (1979)).
19801
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [o
5. Harsher sentences
In United States v. Clayton,'17 3 the defendant contended that the
more severe sentence imposed at her resentencing "constituted double
punishment for the same offense in violation of [her] right to be pro-
tected from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
'
1
7 14
Clayton had been convicted of passing counterfeit government obliga-
tions. 71 5 She was sentenced to six years imprisonment but was placed
on probation under certain conditions, one of which was that she "obey
all laws."' 17 16 She later pleaded guilty to petty theft and at her proba-
tion revocation hearing it was ordered that the previously-imposed six-
year prison sentence be carried out. Arguing on the technicality that
she had not been on probation at the time of her resentencing,1717 Clay-
ton contended that her resentencing constituted double jeopardy for the
same offense. Citing North Carolina v. Pearce,1718 the Ninth Circuit
said, "a harsher sentence on resentencing may be imposed if justified
by reference to conduct of the defendant occurring subsequent to the
original sentence."' 17 19 Since Clayton's violation of her probation con-
stituted such justification, the court upheld the six-year sentence.
6. Appeals
The double jeopardy clause protects the defendant from the threat
of multiple prosecutions for a single offense. Thus, where a defendant
has been acquitted after jeopardy has attached, the government is pro-
hibited from attacking the judgment of acquittal on appeal. 720 Yet,
1713. 588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979).
1714. Id. at 1290.
1715. Passing counterfeit government obligations or other securities is proscribed by 18
U.S.C. § 472 (1976).
1716. 588 F.2d at 1290.
1717. Clayton contended that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976), she could not have been on
probation. She had served twenty-four days of her sentence by twelve weekends of impris-
onment before an earlier violation of probation and then had been required to serve six
months. This constituted more than the six-month maximum provided for such probations
under § 3651. However, since Clayton had not raised the question of the illegality of her
sentence at the first probation hearing, she was precluded from doing so later. In addition,
the Ninth Circuit found that any illegality had been corrected when she was resentenced.
588 F.2d at 1291.
1718. 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (harsher sentence on retrial after appeal did not violate double
jeopardy clause where conduct occurring after the time of the original sentence appeared in
record as reason for more severe sentence, and sentence was not the result of government
vindictiveness).
1719. 588 F.2d at 1291.
1720. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) (reversal of judgment of acquittal
would subject defendant to further litigation of factual issues in violation of double jeopardy
guarantee against successive prosecution for single offense). See also United States v. Rojas,
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when a defendant's conviction has been overturned, the government
may fie an appeal if the conviction will be merely reinstated and if the
defendant will not be subjected to another trial should the government
be successful. 172 1 A defendant may appeal an order denying a motion
based on double jeopardy grounds. 17 2 Further, the defendant need
not wait until a final judgment has been entered to file the appeal.1
723
Failure to immediately appeal an order denying a motion based
on double jeopardy grounds, however, may bar such an appeal later.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that in criminal
cases appeals must be filed within ten days from the entry of the judg-
ment or order from which the appeal arises. 1724 In two 1979 cases, de-
fendants raised the bar of double jeopardy after the ten-day period had
elapsed.
In United States v. Ajimura,'7  a mistrial had been granted, and
Ajimura filed a motion to bar a retrial on the ground of double jeop-
ardy. The motion was denied. Nine months later, Ajimura filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment, which was denied,1726 and he appealed.
554 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1977) (government may appeal if judgment of acquittal does not
violate double jeopardy when reversal would reinstate prior guilty verdict and not subject
defendant to retrial). Cf. United States v. Winnie Mae Mfg. Co., No. 78-2101 (9th Cir. June
13, 1979). The district court dismissed an indictment against the defendant after a jury was
impaneled and sworn and a witness examined. The defendant attacked the government's
appeal of the dismissal of the indictment, alleging that jeopardy had attached on the basis of
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (jeopardy attaches when jury impaneled and sworn). Be-
cause the dismissal of the indictment was unrelated to the defendant's guilt or innocence, the
court allowed the government's appeal and ruled that a reversal of the dismissal of the in-
dictment would not bar a trial of the defendant. No. 78-2101, slip op. at 2124.
1721. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (government may appeal determination
of trial judge to set aside jury guilty verdict when reversal would reinstate guilty verdict and
not subject defendant to second trial). Accord, Forman v. Wolff, 590 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2839 (1979); United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d
539 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979).
1722. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (district court dismissals of motions to
bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds constitute final decisions from which an immediate
appeal may be taken).
1723. Id. at 662. The defendant may wait and ifie the appeal after the entry of a final
judgment. E.g., United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir.) (order denying motion
based on double jeopardy is merged in the final judgment and can be reviewed on appeal of
final judgment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976).
1724. FED. R. App. P. 4(b) provides in pertinent part:
In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district
court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Upon
a showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the time has
expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise
prescribed by this subdivision.
1725. 598 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1979).
1726. Id. at 511.
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The Ninth Circuit, observing that an order denying a motion to bar
retrial because of double jeopardy is immediately appealable, 727 held
that, under rule 4(b), Ajimura's appeal nine months later was not
timely. The court also agreed with the district court that the doctrine of
resjudicata 1728 had barred further consideration of the double jeopardy
claim.
In a similar case, United States v. Gamble,1729 the defendant had
moved to dismiss after a mistrial on the ground of double jeopardy.
His motion was denied. Like Ajimura, he did not appeal the order at
that time; but unlike Ajimura, he was subsequently tried and convicted.
On appeal, he raised the issue of double jeopardy. The Ninth Circuit
said, "The issue we face is whether a defendant must appeal an order
denying a motion to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds within the
ten days prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) after
entry of the order, or be thereafter foreclosed from raising the is-
sue."'1730 Noting that Ajimura had specifically left open the question of
whether a double jeopardy claim may be reviewed on appeal from
judgment of conviction,1731 the Ninth Circuit held that "although an
order denying a motion to bar retrial on grounds of double jeopardy is
immediately appealable, this is permissive but not mandatory. The de-
fendant may choose to appeal immediately or reserve the issue for ap-
peal upon conviction in the subsequent trial."'1732 The court reasoned
that the rights of the defendant and judicial economy will be furthered,
and "piecemeal appeals" avoided, by permitting the issue to be raised
on appeal after conviction. 1733
7. Collateral estoppel
The United States Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson 1734 said that
collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact
1727. The Ninth Circuit relied on Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 598 F.2d
at 512.
1728. "The doctrine of res judicata.. . prevents 'splitting of a cause of action' and re-
quires all grounds upon which a single claim is based to be asserted and concluded in one
action, on pain of being barred from separate suit." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 386 (1976).
1729. 607 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1979).
1730. Id. at 822.
1731. Id. at 822-23 (citing 598 F.2d at 513).
1732. 607 F.2d at 823. The Ninth Circuit cited a recent Seventh Circuit case in accord
with its holding, United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (de-
fendant within his rights to delay appeal until final disposition of case in district court), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979).
1733. 607 F.2d at 823.
1734. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future law-
suit."'7 3 5 Ashe established that this principle, first developed in civil
litigation, is embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy."736
In United States v. Sarno ,'" Sarno, acquitted of bribery and then
indicted for perjury in the bribery trial, contended that the double jeop-
ardy clause and the collateral estoppel doctrine precluded his indict-
ment on the latter charge. The Ninth Circuit observed that acquittal of
a defendant on a substantive charge should not per se bar his subse-
quent prosecution for perjury at the earlier trial. Thus, the court rea-
soned, "To hold otherwise. . . would be to put a premium on perjury
and to make immunity from punishment for perjury rest on success in
commission of the crime."'
173 8
If, however, the alleged perjured testimony was material to the
case, "the fact of its falseness should have been raised by the prosecutor
during the course of the trial." 7 39 The Ninth Circuit held that, in such
cases, the prosecutor has no right to try to recover from its initial failure
to convince the trier of fact by "rehashing evidence previously
presented" in plain violation of the collateral estoppel doctrine.17 40
To facilitate analysis of such cases, the Ninth Circuit, since United
States v. Hernandez,1741 has applied a three-step analysis:
(1) An identification of the issues in the two actions for the
purpose of determining whether the issues are sufficiently
similar and sufficiently material in both actions to justify in-
voking the doctrine; (2) an examination of the record of the
prior case to decide whether the issue was "litigated" in the
first case; and (3) an examination of the record of the prior
proceeding to ascertain whether the issue was necessarily de-
cided in the first case.
1742
In Sarno, the focus at the trial had been on the affirmative defense
of entrapment. The Ninth Circuit held that Sarno's testimony concern-
1735. Id. at 443.
1736. Id. at 445.
1737. 596 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
1738. Id. at 407 (quoting U.S. v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir.) (quoting 70 C.J.S.
PERJuRY § 26 at 492), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978)).
1739. 596 F.2d at 407.
1740. Id. The court cited Note, PerJUry by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and
Collateral Estoppel, 74 HARV. L. REv. 752, 763 (1961).
1741. 572 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1978).
1742. 596 F.2d at 408 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir.
1978)).
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ing his defense had already been challenged, and therefore, the collat-
eral estoppel doctrine applied as required by Hernandez. In addition,
the same judge who granted the motion for judgment of acquittal had
dismissed the perjury indictment, stating that he had already decided
the issue.174 3 The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the dismissal.
The issue of collateral estoppel was also raised in United States v.
Lasky, 7' but the Ninth Circuit declined to apply that doctrine. The
defendants raised what the court called the "novel" contention that a
prior favorable administrative decision precluded trial on the same is-
sues.1745 The United States Postal Service, charging defendants with
mail fraud, had filed an administrative complaint seeking to suspend
mail service to the defendants' corporation. The administrative law
judge, after a hearing, had dismissed the action on the ground that the
evidence failed to establish the fraud. Noting that courts "have in-
creasingly given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to the deter-
minations of administrative agencies,"'17 46 the Ninth Circuit said that
collateral estoppel should not be applied as rigidly to administrative
decisions as to their judicial counterparts. The court cautioned that
"due regard must be given in each case as to whether the application of
the doctrine is appropriate in light of the particular prior administrative
proceedings."1747 However, since the defendants had not met their bur-
den of isolating what issues were present in both the hearing and the
pending trial, the Ninth Circuit held that it could not properly decide
the issue of collateral estoppel on appeal. 1748 Thus, the issue of the
applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a criminal pro-
ceeding following a prior favorable administrative determination re-
mains open.
B. Appellate Review
In the federal judicial system, several threshold requirements must
be satisfied prior to litigation before an appellate court. The appeal
must be filed in a timely manner 74 9 and involve issues which will have
1743. 596 F.2d at 408. Compare this holding with that in United States v. Bender, 606
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), discussed at notes 1671-75 supra and accompanying
text. Bender also involved a perjury charge, but the issue raised was that the perjury and
substantive offenses were the same.
1744. 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1979).
1745. Id. at 768.
1746. Id. The court cited United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-23 (1966),
and Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978) for this proposition.
1747. 600 F.2d at 768.
1748. Id. at 768-69.
1749. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) provides in part: "In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a
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significant legal consequences for at least one of the parties.1 750 The
record presented to the appellate court for review must be adequate.'1
7 5
And, with a few limited exceptions, the decision rendered by the trial
judge must be final.1 752 In 1979, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
all of these procedural issues when deciding whether certain criminal
cases should be heard on appeal.
1. Significant legal consequences
The Ninth Circuit refused to review United States v. Martin,1
753
which involved the pivotal question of whether or not defendant suffers
any significant legal consequences as a result of conviction. Defend-
ants were convicted on one count for conspiracy and on a second count
for using a telephone to further that conspiracy. The trial court im-
posed concurrent sentences of equal length for each count. Defendants
then appealed the validity of their convictions for the illegal use of the
telephone. The Ninth Circuit declined to review and cited the concur-
rent sentencing doctrine as the basis for its refusal.
1754
The concurrent sentencing doctrine provides for the exercise of ap-
pellate discretion, to review any cases where a defendant, convicted of
two counts and concurrently sentenced, contests only one of the convic-
tions. 1755 Under this doctrine a court may decline review where "no
adverse collateral legal consequences . . . result from the additional
conviction."'' 756 Because the defendant is serving one sentence, rever-
sal of the conviction of one count will have no effect on the duration of
the prison term to be served. Thus, in the interest of judicial economy,
the courts have fashioned this doctrine in order to avoid review. For
instance, even if the defendants in Martin had prevailed on the merits,
they still would have to serve the same length of prison term because of
the concurrent sentence for the uncontested count of their conviction.
defendant shall be filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or
order appealed from."
1750. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (case or controversy must exist before federal courts can
exercise jurisdiction); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (actual controversy must exist
at the time a case is under appellate review).
1751. FED. R. APP. P. 10 outlines procedures for preparing and forwarding records of trial
court proceedings to the reviewing court; Frizell v. United States, 394 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir.
1968) (reviewing court did not consider an affidavit prepared by Government because it was
not part of the record).
1752. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in part that "[t]he courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions.
1753. 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979).
1754. Id. at 887.
1755. Id.; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943).
1756. 599 F.2d at 887.
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However, the concurrent sentence doctrine ignores the fact that
numerous adverse legal consequences may result from a conviction
even though an additional sentencing is not involved. An additional
conviction on a person's record may, for example, adversely affect a
sentencing judge in a subsequent criminal proceeding or enhance pun-
ishment under some states' habitual criminal statutes.1757 Additional
convictions may also be used to impeach a person's testimony at
trial. 1758 As the Supreme Court noted, it is an "obvious fact of life that
most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal con-
sequences."' 1759 Yet in spite of such language, numerous appellate
panels in the Ninth Circuit have only paid lip service to potential ad-
verse consequences in concurrent sentencing cases. 1760 Martin appears
to be no exception to this firmly established practice.
2. Timeliness
Appeals by both the government and defendants must be made in
a timely manner.'17 6  The timeliness of a government appeal was at
issue in the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Humphries1762 where
a district court judge granted defendant's motion to suppress certain
1757. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
54-56 (1968).
1758. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1968).
1759. Id at 55 (1968). The Court extrapolated this from language in Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957).
1760. Eg., United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 893
(1978) (court refused to hear defendant's challenge to his conviction under count of using
mails for a scheme to defraud because he had been sentenced concurrently under another
count involving interstate transportation of stolen money); United States v. Easley, 505 F.2d
184, 185 (9th Cir. 1974) (even though it appeared there was insufficient evidence to convict
petitioner of counterfeiting charge, court refused to review because of concurrent sentence
under conspiracy charge); Argo v. United States, 473 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 906 (1973) (even though technically incorrect to convict defendant of Federal Bank
Robbery Act violation and assault with a dangerous weapon as an enhancement of the sen-
tence under the Enhancement Sentencing Act, court found no prejudicial error because de-
fendant had received the maximum sentence under the assault count); United States v.
Martinez, 429 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1970) cert. deniedsub nom. Rojas v. United States, 401
U.S. 915 (1971) (even though evidence to support conspiracy count was tenuous, court re-
fused to review in light of a concurrent sentence for a conviction of selling heroin).
1761. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecu-
tion.
1762. 600 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1979), appealdocketed, No. 78-1803 (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 1,
1979).
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evidence. 1763 After the second hearing on this matter, the Government
appealed. Defendant contended that the Government's appeal was
nothing more than a device to circumvent the time limits of the Crimi-
nal Appeals Act by contesting the second order rather than the first.
The Ninth Circuit held that since substantially different issues
were involved in the second hearing, the Government's subsequent ap-
peal was timely.1764 However, in dicta the court noted that even if the
Government's appeal had been outside the requisite thirty day limit,
this statutory violation would not have prevented the appellate court
from hearing the appeal. 7 5 The court based this dictum on the earlier
Ninth Circuit case of Meier v. Keller 766 which held that even though
the courts did not favor violations of the thirty day maximum, that
limitation would not be considered as a jurisdictional bar to appellate
review. 1767 In reaching this decision, the Meier court appeared to be
strongly influenced by precedent in other circuits.17
6 8
The approach taken by the Humphries court contrasted sharply
with that of a different panel of judges in United States v. Ajimura,
1719
decided almost six months later. In Ajimura, the defendant did not
appeal a lower court ruling which initially disallowed his claim of a
double jeopardy violation until well after the ten days allowed by rule
4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 770 In refusing to
hear petitioner's tardy claim, the lower court agreed with the Govern-
ment's contention that the initial decision was res judicata and could no
longer be attacked because the statutory time period for appeal had
expired. 1771 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision on the
1763. Id. at 1240.
1764. Id. at 1242-43.
1765. Id. at 1243 n.7.
1766. 521 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
1767. Id. at 553.
1768. Id. For similar decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Crumpler, 507 F.2d 624 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1146 n.2 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Welsch, 446 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1971).
1769. 598 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1979). The Humfphries panel consisted of Judges Choy,
Sneed, and Kelleher. Judges Browning, Choy, and Hug made up the Ajimura court.
1770. Id. at 512.
1771. .d. The majority of other circuits hold that a tardy appeal creates an absolute juris-
dictional bar preventing appellate review. E.g., United States v. Mathews, 462 F.2d 182, 183
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); United States v. Miles, 510 F.2d 1362, 1362 (4th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Shillingford, 568 F.2d 1106, 1107 (5th Cir. 1978); Powell v. Ohio,
284 F.2d 522, 522 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19, 22 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 957 (1962); Lewis v. United States, 555 F.2d 1360, 1362 (8th Cir. 1977);
Robinson v. United States, 345 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965).
But see Schwander v. United States, 386 F.2d 20, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1967) (court accepted
untimely appeal because petitioner had made a good faith effort to file after his conviction
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tardiness of defendant's claim, noting that "[t]he time limits of rule 4(b)
prevent undue delay in the administration of justice and provide final-
ity of orders and judgments, and thus must be carefully respected." 1772
The language of the Ajimura court suggests that an absolute juris-
dictional bar exists against appeals not filed within the requisite statu-
tory limits. Yet, as Humphries demonstrates, a much more tolerant
approach is taken when a potentially late government appeal is in-
volved. This disparity can be explained by the provision regulating the
timeliness of government appeals, which calls for a liberal construc-
tion.1773 Nonetheless, the end result indicates that an appealing de-
fendant must carry a comparatively greater burden in order to meet the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure than those of
the Criminal Appeals Act.
3. Finality
With the exception of a few specifically enumerated interlocutory
matters,1774 federal appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to review
lower court decisions unless those decisions are final. 17 7 5 Generally,
trial court rulings are not considered final if they are reached either
before the trial or the decision on the merits. 1776 One notable exception
to this rule is a trial court's decision allowing a second trial notwith-
standing the double jeopardy clause. 1777 Clearly, if such a decision was
not considered final, then the defendant would be precluded from an
appeal until after the unconstitutional trial in question took place.
The issue of whether a lower court double jeopardy decision is
and was thwarted by court-appointed counsel who had insisted there was no merit in filing
an appeal). The Supreme Court has also held that a court is without jurisdiction when an
untimely notice of appeal is filed. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960).
1772. 598 F.2d at 512.
1773. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part that "[t]he provisions of this section shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes."
1774. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976).
1775. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
1776. E.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971) (district court order denying
defendant's motion to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum not final and was not sub-
ject to immediate appeal); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962) (ruling by trial
court on admissibility evidence was not a final order); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 326 (1940) (appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over an appeal from an order
denying motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum because such an order is not final); How-
field, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1969) (district court order dis-
missing supression action was not final and appeal from that order was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction).
1777. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) ("pretrial orders rejecting claims of
formerjeopardy... constitute 'final decisions' and thus satisfy the jurisdictional prerequi-
sites of § 1291").
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final arose in the 1979 case of United States v. Ajimura.778 Although
the Ninth Circuit refused to hear the merits of defendant's double jeop-
ardy claim because a timely appeal was not filed, 17 7 9 the court noted
that the district judge's initial consideration of the decision allowing the
subsequent trial, notwithstanding the district court's double jeopardy
determination, was final and therefore "immediately appealable."17
8
0
Defendant's failure to immediately appeal this final decision resulted in
his untimely petition to the Ninth Circuit and thus foreclosed the possi-
bility of review at that level.'
171
4. Inadequacy of record on appeal
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure outline specific guide-
lines which must be followed when providing a reviewing court with
the trial court record of proceedings. 782 If the record is unavailable,
the appellant may reconstruct the evidence or proceedings from the
best means available, pursuant to rule 10(C).
178 3
If, on appeal, a petitioner's only claim of error is that of an inade-
quate trial court record (e.g., omission of the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment), then the reviewing court may vacate the judgment and remand
the case for a determination as to whether petitioner was prejudiced. If
the lower court determines that petitioner was prejudiced, a new trial
can be ordered. If no prejudice is found, the original judgment may be
reinstated. 1784
The issue of an inadequate record submitted on appeal arose in
the recent Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Mills. 17 85 In that case,
defendant contended that he entered into a plea bargaining argument
1778. 598 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1979).
1779. Id. at 513.
1780. Id. at 512. Since no conviction resulted from the trial court proceedings which
Ajimura contested, the Ninth Circuit was not faced with the question of whether or not a
double jeopardy claim could be reviewed on appeal following the conviction. Id. at 513.
This practice is allowed in the Seventh Circuit. Id. See also United States v. Gaertner, 583
F.2d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979).
1781. 598 F.2d at 511 n.l.
1782. FED. R. App. P. 10.
1783. FED. R. App. P. 10(c) provides in part: "If no report of the evidence or proceedings
at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including his recol-
lection."
1784. Brown v. United States, 314 F.2d 293, 295 (9th Cir. 1963). In Brown, appellant
failed to show the error in the court reporter's neglecting to record counsel's closing argu-
ment. The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case to determine if
appellant had been prejudiced.
1785. 597 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1979).
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with the trial judge at a pre-trial conference. The judge then sentenced
him to practically the maximum term allowed for the particular of-
fense, 1786 as if a plea bargaining agreement had not been made.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit denied defendant's claim for relief
due to the unavailability of a record upon which his claim could be
evaluated. Moreover, even though a transcript was required pursuant
to rule 10(C), 178 7 it was not preserved. Defendant relied on two Ninth
Circuit cases where the court vacated the sentences and remanded the
cases for new trials because of an inadequate lower court record.1
7 88
The Ninth Circuit rejected this authority as factually dissimilar in that
they involved omissions in the trial record of "open court" proceedings,
which constitute a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 753(b). 1789 Mills, on the
other hand, involved chamber proceedings not subject to the require-
ments of section 753.1790
5. Appeals by the Government
18 U.S.C. § 3731 sets forth the requirements for the government's
appeal of an adverse criminal decision. Under this statute, the govern-
ment essentially may only appeal dismissals or orders suppressing evi-
dence. 179 1 Furthermore, a section 3731 appeal is unavailable to the
government if it occurs at a stage in the criminal proceedings which
would result in a defendant being subjected to double jeopardy.
792
1786. Id. at 697-98.
1787. Id. at 698.
1788. Id. The cases relied on were United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545, 546-47 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978) (court reporter failed to record closing argument),
and Brown.
1789. 597 F.2d at 698. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1976) provides in part:
One of the reporters appointed for each such [district] court shall attend at each
session of the court and at every other proceeding designated by rule or order of
the court or by one of the judges, and shall record verbatim by shorthand or by
mechanical means . . . (I) all proceedings in criminal cases had in open court
1790. 597 F.2d at 698.
1791. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision
or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the re-
turn of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has
been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or infor-
mation, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is
not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact
material in the proceeding.
1792. Id. The pertinent language of the statute reads as follows:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
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A government appeal under section 3731 was at issue in the Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Humphres.17 93 The Government ap-
pealed two trial court orders which suppressed evidence stemming
from the arrest of defendant Humphries. Defendant argued that the
Government had no right to appeal because the subject of review was a
"Motion to Determine the Admissibility of Evidence" and not a "deci-
sion. . . suppressing or excluding evidence" as is required by section
3731.1794 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this rather "hypertechnicar' dis-
tinction, noting that the effect and not the label is the critical matter in
determining whether a trial judge ruling is actually a motion to sup-
press. 1795 In reaching this conclusion, the court also observed that sec-
tion 3731 should be construed broadly and significantly limited only by
the strictures of the double jeopardy clause imposed by the Constitu-
tion.1
796
6. Waiver of the right to appeal
The rules and statutes governing the conduct of federal criminal
procedure often contain specific provisions which allow defendants to
challenge the legality of actions taken by government or law enforce-
ment officials. But if a defendant fails to utilize the specific procedures
available to him for challenge, the courts invariably will construe this
inaction as a waiver of the defendant's right of appeal.
797
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in the 1979 case of United
States v. Morgan1798 where a defendant failed to utilize his option
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act which expressly al-
lows for challenges to government electronic surveillance practices.
Since the defendant was neither denied the opportunity to make such a
challenge nor unaware of the fact that it could be made, the court held
that he had waived his Title III objections and that such objections
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecu-
tion.
See United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), supplemented,
574 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1978).
1793. 600 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1979) appeal docketed, No. 78-1803.
1794. Id. at 1241.
1795. Id.
1796. Id. at 1242.
1797. Eg., United States v. Plotkin, 550 F.2d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
820 (1977)(appellant's neglect to timely raise issue of Government's alleged failure to com-
ply with wiretapping law, constituted a waiver of right to appeal this issue); United States v.
Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same as above); United States v. Chiarizio,
525 F.2d 289, 293-94 (2nd Cir. 1975) (appellant's failure to timely raise issue of tape record-
ing constituted waiver of right to appeal this issue).
1798. 595 F.2d at 1168 (9th Cir. 1979).
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could no longer be raised on appeal. 799 The court, however, con-
cluded that if defendant's belated challenge had involved matters
which fell within the plain error category, an appellate court would
have had discretion to review such a claim.Is °°
C. New Trials
Under rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a de-
fendant is entitled to a new trial when he discovers evidence which was
not presented at his or her trial.'l "' To qualify for the new trial, de-
fendant must make the appropriate motion within two years after the
initial judgment was rendered.' 2 In addition, he must demonstrate
that the new evidence could alter the outcome in his favor.
80 3
Cases raising these issues have been particularly troublesome for
the federal judiciary because no uniform standard of probability has
been used to determine whether the new evidence will mandate a new
trial. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits appear to follow
the more liberal "Larrison rule" which permits a new trial when a de-
fendant can demonstrate that an acquittal might have resulted had the
evidence in question been initially introduced. 8 °4 On the other hand,
1799. Id. at 1170.
1800. Id. at 1170-71.
1801. FED. R. CRiM. P. 33 provides in part:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in
the interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion
of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional
testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based
on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within
two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the
motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other
grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within
such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.
1802. Id.
1803. Id.
1804. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Smith, 433 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1970); Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950); United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 98 (7th
Cir. 1979). See United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977) (Larrison
cited as standard under which appellants would gauge new evidence). Contra, United States
v. Williams, 415 F.2d 232, 233 (4th Cir. 1969) (court used "probability" test instead of Lar-
rison test).
The Larrison rule, originating from the case of Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82
(7th Cir. 1928), requires that the following conditions be met before a new trial will be
granted:
a. The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material
witness is false.
b. That without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion.
c. That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testi-
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the District of Columbia, First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits follow a standard which requires that the new evidence
"wouldprobably produce an acquittal."' 180 5
The Ninth Circuit addressed this "possibility - probability" dichot-
omy in United States v. Krasny, 8 I decided in 1979. Krasny was con-
victed of a drug distribution conspiracy partly on the strength of
testimony given by a co-conspirator. After trial, the Government in-
formed Krasny that new information had been uncovered which shed
considerable doubt on the veracity of the co-conspirator's testi-
mony. 180 7 Krasny's motion for a new trial on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence was denied by the trial court. On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, the issue was whether the Larrison or the more stringent
"probability" standard should apply.
Noting that Krasny was a case of first impression, the court ac-
knowledged confusion in the Ninth Circuit over the appropriate stan-
dard because Larrison, rather than the more prevalent "probability"
mony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until
after the trial.
Id. at 87-88.
1805. E.g., United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
Street, 570 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Perno,
605 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
The "probability rule" derives from United States v. Bertone, 249 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir.
1957) and requires that:
a. The evidence must have been discovered after the trial;
b. The failure to learn of the evidence must not have been caused by defendant's
lack of diligence;
c. The new evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching;
d. It must be material to the principal issues involved; and
e. It must be of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an
acquittal.
The District of Columbia Circuit refers to this same test as the "Thompson" test after
Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Accord, United States v.
Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of the two competing stan-
dards, but has not found it necessary to resolve this issue. United States v. Johnson, 327
U.S. 106, 111 n.5 (1946).
Courts in several circuits have occasionally recognized both tests in the same opinion
without giving an explicit endorsement to either. See, ag., United States v. Mackin, 561
F.2d at 961; In re United States, 565 F.2d 173, 177 n.3 (lst Cir. 1977); United States v.
Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1973).
1806. 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979).
1807. Id. at 842.
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standard, was authority in two former cases.18 08 However, the court
noted that under Larrison even a witness's relatively minor indiscre-
tions would be sufficient to warrant a new trial.' 0 9 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Larrison and held that the "probability" standard is
proper where a convicted defendant discovers that the government has
used false testimony during the initial trial. 8 10 But the court was care-
ful to limit the use of the "probability" standard to situations where the
government has not knowingly used the false testimony.'
8 1'
The dissent relied on the United States Supreme Court case of
Mesarosh v. United States18 11 which established a virtual per se rule
mandating a new trial where a government witness presented "tainted"
testimony. 1813 Mesarosh's per se approach was based on Chief Justice
Warren's analogy which likened the introduction of false testimony at a
trial to the total contamination of a reservoir.' 8' 4 Since, according to
Chief Justice Warren, all the waters in a reservoir would become
tainted by the offending substance, the only practical remedy would be
a complete drain and refill. This he likened to a new trial.1
8 1 5
No one can argue with the Chief Justice's physics. Liquid sub-
stances will spread uniformly throughout a solution. But the pervasive-
ness of false testimony is certainly open to question. Nonetheless, the
principles behind Mesarosh were not challenged by either the majority
or minority. Both, however, did disagree over the breadth of its hold-
ing.' 8' 6 The majority sought to limit Mesarosh to its "peculiar" facts
which involved a government witness who had been "wholly discred-
ited.",18
17
But these differences appear less than persuasive. Normally any
witness who has perjured himself can be "wholly discredited." Ironi-
cally, the Krasny majority indicated as much when it argued against
the less stringent Larrison standard. The majority noted that in situa-
1808. Id.
1809. Id. at 843 n.2. The court noted that one case, Mejia v. United States, 291 F.2d 198
(9th Cir. 1961), was decided on its own "peculiar" facts, while the other, Strangway v.
United States, 312 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963), did not involve
newly discovered evidence.
1810. 607 F.2d at 846. The court utilized the reasoning of the Second Circuit in United
States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
1811. 607 F.2d at 846.
1812. 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
1813. Id. at 12.
1814. Id. at 9.
1815. Id. at 14.
1816. Id. at 9, 14.
1817. 607 F.2d at 845 (quoting Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. at 9).
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tions where even a part of a witness's testimony is discovered to be
perjured, juries are normally instructed to disregard all of it.1818 Ar-
guably then, a "wholly discredited" witness is not very different from
one whose testimony is "totally disregarded." Thus, there appears to
be little justification for the majority's distinction which results in an
overly restrictive interpretation of Mesarosh.
To compound matters, the majority attempted to distinguish an
earlier Ninth Circuit case, Williams v. United States, 1"9 which relied
directly on Mesarosh. 18z0 In Williams, a defendant challenged his con-
viction after it was discovered that the chief prosecution witness con-
spired to deprive another defendant of his civil rights by offering
perjured testimony.' 821 Although factually similar to Mesarosh, there
is nothing in the Williams opinion which attempted to limit Mesarosh
to a situation where a government witness was "wholly discredited."1
822
Thus, the Krasny majority's statement that "[w]e have followed this
approach in cases where the factual circumstances have closely paral-
leled those found in Mesarosh" is simply an ex post facto attempt to
create support for a legal principle which did not exist prior to the
Krasny case itself.
1818. 607 F.2d at 843 (quoting United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)).
The weakness of the Krasny majority's "wholly discredited" distinction is also evident
from a quoted passage in Mesarosh which observed: "When uncontested challenge is made
that a finding of subversive design by petitioner was in part the product of three perjurious
witnesses, it does not remove the taint for a reviewing court to find that there is ample inno-
cent testimony to support the Board's findings." 352 U.S. at 11 (quoting Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956)). Thus, Mesarosh would appear
to encompass situations where penury occurred but where there was also "ample innocent
testimony." This would parallel many of the factual patterns found where a witness is not
totally unreliable or discredited.
On the other hand, the presumed "wholly unreliable" category could easily be sub-
sumed under both the Larrison and "probability" tests. A court would inevitably conclude
in a Mesarosh situation that a jury would either "probably" or "possibly" reach a new ver-
dict because of the severity of the taint involved when a witness has committed perjury in
another case dealing with the same subject matter. Professor Moore appeared to make this
connection when he noted that "the testimony of a principle government witness inherently
possesses a high degree of materiality." 8A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 33.04(1), at 33-
27 (2d ed. 1978). He then compared this statement favorably with Mesarosh, apparently
indicating that in a Mesarosh situation the factors which are critical to finding a new trial
under the traditional "probability" test would be present. Id. at § 33.04(1), at 33-27 & n.4.
1819. 500 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1974).
1820. 607 F.2d at 845.
1821. 500 F.2d at 106.
1822. In fact there is language in W, Iliams which would support a broad application of
Mesarosh. The court noted that "[a] conviction based substantially upon tainted evidence
cannot stand." Id. at 108. Nothing was said about the degree of taint.
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Arguably, Mesarosh's rather inflexible per se approach leaves
much to be desired. Rather than critically examine this Supreme Court
opinion directly, the Ninth Circuit chose to circumvent its effect by cre-
ating the somewhat artificial "wholly discredited" standard and rule 33
distinctions. However, the Krasny majority's concern with the
problems created by the relatively lenient Larrison rule appears to be
well founded. Krasny's clear expression in favor of the more demand-
ing "probability" standard may help eliminate the potential tendency
to award a new trial where only "inconsequential" prevarications have
occurred.
D. Sentencing
1. Judge's information in determining sentence
A judge has wide discretion in selecting the type of information
which may be considered in determining a sentence.' 823 The informa-
tion need not conform to the standards required for evidence intro-
duced at trial, as long as it is not false or unreliable. 824 Short of this, a
sentencing judge is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from any in-
formation which is introduced.
1825
These principles were applied in the 1979 case of United States v.
Morgan,8 2 6 where defendant claimed that the trial judge unjustifiably
considered his acquittal of a prior charge in enhancing his sentence.1827
Morgan relied on United States v. Tucker,1828 in which the Supreme
Court held that a sentencing judge could not consider a prior convic-
tion obtained in violation of the sixth amendment to enhance a sen-
tence. 182 9 But the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that
1823. E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949); Accord, United States v.
Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1979); See also United States v. Wright, 593 F.2d 105,
109 (9th Cir. 1979) (sentencing judge may take into account the character of defendant's
associates); United States v. Martinez-Navarro, 604 F.2d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (sentencing judge may take into account the defendant's truthfulness while on the
witness stand).
1824. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (sentencing based on materially
untrue assumptions inconsistent with due process). Cf. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d
626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentencing judge was not allowed to rely on information of "little
value," including speculative assumptions by law enforcement officials that defendant may
have been involved in more serious criminal activities); Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d
1339, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("unwarranted weight [may] not be given to [hearsay
evidence] to enhance [a] sentence").
1825. E.g., United States v. Robelo, 596 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1979).
1826. 595 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1979).
1827. Id. at 1135.
1828. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
1829. Id. at 449.
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Tucker has traditionally been limited to its particular circum-
stances.1830 Therefore, the court declined to extend it to cover prior
acquittals. 18 3' In addition, the court found nothing to indicate that the
sentencing judge in Morgan relied on erroneous information.1832 In
fact, it appeared that contrary to Morgan's assertions, the judge may
have viewed Morgan's acquittal in a favorable light. 833 Thus, the
court had little difficulty in upholding Morgan's original sentence.
8 34
2. Disclosure to defendant
The Ninth Circuit requires that a defendant be informed of all
harmful information used by a judge in arriving at the sentence.
8 35
This procedure allows the defendant an opportunity for rebuttal. In
Serapo v. United States,"36 the trial judge, who had heard the trials of
two co-defendants, stated that she believed defendant Serapo was more
deeply involved in a drug conspiracy than he had previously admitted.
She then sentenced him to a one year prison term. On appeal, Serapo
contended that the use of such information was an abuse of the court's
discretion because there was no opportunity for rebuttal.
837
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court because the same infor-
mation had been available in the pre-sentence report. Thus, there had
been ample opportunity for a response by the defendant prior to sen-
tencing.1
838
3. Enhancement
An enhancement statute generally increases the minimum and
1830. 595 F.2d at 1136. Eg., Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (Tucker requires a prior conviction rendered invalid by Gideon, mistaken belief in
its validity, and enhancement of sentence); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 457 (9th
Cir. 1976) (Tucker not extended to fourth amendment violations). Contra, Jefferson v.
United States, 488 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1974) (extended to fifth amendment); Taylor v.
United States, 472 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1973) (extended to fifth amendment); Marti-
nez v. United States, 464 F.2d 1289, 1290 (10th Cir. 1972) (Tucker extended to invalid statu-
tory presumption).
1831. 595 F.2d at 1137.
1832. Id.
1833. Id.
1834. Id. at 1138.
1835. E.g., United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1975).
1836. 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979).
1837. Id. at 3-4.
1838. Id. at 4. Accord, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 589 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1979)
(defendant's sentence was affirmed in light of the fact that he failed to take advantage of
opportunities provided at sentencing hearing to contest the accuracy of the pre-sentence
report).
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maximum sentence which may be imposed for a subsequent offense
following a prior conviction.18 39 But, a person sentenced under an en-
hancement statute because of a prior offense which is later overturned,
can petition for a reduction of the enhanced sentence. In such situa-
tions, a remand for resentencing can be ordered even though there is no
showing that the trial court relied on the enhancement statute when
making the original sentence.'ls 0
However, in the application of an enhancement statute the sen-
tencing judge is required to give a defendant the opportunity to affrm
or deny the existence of prior convictions. 1841 In United States v. iar-
ris,1 '8 42 decided in 1979, the Ninth Circuit addressed for the first time
the issue of whether a defendant is personally required to make such an
affirmance or denial. 8 43  Defendant claimed that the enhancement
statute was violated when his attorney, rather than Harris himself, ac-
knowledged the existence of a prior conviction at a sentencing hear-
ing."' However, the Ninth Circuit instead found that Harris, by
remaining silent at the hearing, had failed to take advantage of the
"opportunity" afforded him by the statute.1845
1839. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976) provides:
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. In the case of his
second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty-five
years and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend
the sentence in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of such person or
give him a probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed
under this subsection run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for
the commission of such felony.
1840. United States v. Harris, 592 F.2d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 1979). See also, Murgia v.
United States, 448 F.2d 1275, 1276 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (petitioner's motion for re-
sentencing was granted after his first conviction was overturned even though he had only
received the minimum sentence for second time offenders).
1841. 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) (1976)) provides in part: "It]he court shall after conviction but
before pronouncement of sentence inquire of the person. . . whether he affirms or denies
that he has been previously convicted. . ....
1842. 592 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1979).
1843. Id. at 1060.
1844. Id. at 1059.
1845. Id. at 1061. The court referred to the Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Garcia,
526 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1976), which required literal compliance with this provision:
however, Garcia followed the Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Scales, 249 F.2d 386,
370 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 945 (1958), which did not require the defendant's
personal affirmance or denial.
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4. Government's option to prosecute under a more severe statute
Generally a defendant who violates more than one statute can be
prosecuted and sentenced under either, even though different penalties
may be prescribed for the same conduct. In the 1979 case of United
States v. Batchelder,846 the Supreme Court found that because a de-
fendant does not have a constitutional right to choose the statutory
scheme under which he may be prosecuted, the Government's decision
to pursue the harsher of two such statutes did not violate defendant's
due process rights.1 847
The Ninth Circuit extended the Batchelder rule in the 1979 case of
United States v. Brown, 848 where defendant, who pleaded guilty to one
count of bank robbery and one firearm count, 18 49 was sentenced to con-
secutive terms of twenty years for the bank robbery count and five
years for the firearm violation. Alternatively, the Government could
have prosecuted the combined offense under a third statutory provision
which had a more lenient sentence.185 0 In relying on Batchelder, the
court nevertheless found that the Government could prosecute under
the harsher alternative if it chose to do so.'
85 '
5. Increase in sentence at retrial
In North Carolina v. Pearce,18 5 2 the Supreme Court addressed the
problem of sentencing after a defendant had successfully overturned
his original conviction, was retried, again convicted, and then given a
harsher sentence. 8 53 Although the Court held that it was constitution-
ally permissible to impose a harsher sentence on retrial, 8 54 it expressly
prohibited this practice unless defendant's behaviorfollowing his origi-
nal conviction justified such a result.85 5
The Ninth Circuit applied the Pearce rule in United States v.
Young, 856 where defendant was convicted and sentenced to a twelve
1846. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
1847. Id. at 125.
1848. 602 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1979).
1849. Id. at 910.
1850. Id. at 912.
1851. Id.
1852. 395 U.S. 711 (1968).
1853. Id. at 713.
1854. Id. at 723.
1855. Id. at 726. Accord, United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1979)
(second sentence imposing greater probationary period was justified in view of fact that
defendant failed to satisfactorily comply with conditions of original sentence).
1856. 593 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1979).
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year prison term and special parole of three years. 857 While on bail
pending appeal of this sentence, he was convicted of yet another of-
fense, and given a prison term to run concurrently with the original
sentence.1858 The original conviction was then overturned and upon
retrial the defendant was reconvicted and sentenced to a prison term
which ran consecutively with his other sentence. 859 As a result, defend-
ant's original twelve year term was lengthened to a twenty-seven year
term. Because nothing in the record supported such a dramatic in-
crease in punishment, the Ninth Circuit remanded for resentencing.
1860
In so doing, the court stated that due process considerations "require
that a trial judge. . . never impose a heavier sentence upon a recon-
victed defendant simply to punish him for having his original convic-
tion set aside."'
186'
6. Concurrent sentence doctrine
Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, an appellate court may
decline to hear an issue raised with regard to one count of an indict-
ment when the defendant was also convicted of another count and con-
currently sentenced. 862 But the doctrine may only be used if no
adverse collateral legal consequences will result therefrom.
863
The Ninth Circuit applied this doctrine in two 1979 cases which
involved concurrent sentences with no apparent adverse consequences
to defendants.18 64 But in United States v. Magdaleno-Aguirre, 8 65 the
court refused to apply the doctrine where a juvenile was convicted on
both a misdemeanor and a felony count. 866 After he was concurrently
sentenced on both counts, he then appealed the felony conviction. 867
The Government contended that the felony conviction should stand be-
1857. Id. at 892.
1858. Id.
1859. Id.
1860. Id. at 893.
1861. Id. On some occasions it may be necessary to assign a new judge when the original
sentencing judge adheres to an erroneous view even after such error has been brought to his
or her attention. Leano v. United States, 592 F.2d 557, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1979).
1862. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943). Accord, United States v. Diaz-
Alvarado, 587 F.2d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 927 (1979); United
States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1288 (9th Cir. 1978).
1863. E.g., United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Moore, 452 F.2d 576, 577 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
1864. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1865. 590 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1979).
1866. Id. at 815.
1867. Id. at 814-15.
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cause defendant would have received the same sentence under the mis-
demeanor count alone. 1868 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument and held that the concurrent sentence doctrine was inappli-
cable due to the potentially damaging consequences of a felony convic-
tion as compared to those of a misdemeanor conviction. 1
869
7. Presentence jail credit
In computing a defendant's sentence, there is no constitutional re-
quirement that credit be given for time served prior to the imposition of
the sentence. 1870 Any credit given is the result of legislative grace.'
87'
Pre-sentence jail credit was ostensibly at issue in the 1979 Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Clayton,1872 where defendant Clayton
was originally sentenced to six years imprisonment.1 873 The sentence
was then modified so that Clayton would be confined on successive
weekends until she had accumulated ninety days in a "jail-type institu-
tion." The rest of her six year sentence was suspended and replaced by
a five year probationary period. 1874 Clayton completed twenty-four
days of her weekend sentence and then failed to appear. Her probation
was revoked, the original six-year sentence was reimposed and, as part
of its conditions, Clayton was required to spend six months in confine-
ment plus another five years on probation. 8 75 She then completed the
six-month sentence, but during the ensuing probation period she was
convicted of three petty theft violations. The lower court thereafter or-
dered her to complete the remainder of the original six year sentence in
confinement.
876
On appeal, Clayton contended that the order imposing the six-
month confinement (subsequent to violation of the weekend imprison-
ment) was invalid in that the total prison sentence exceeded the six
months limitation provided in 18 U.S.C. Section 3651.1877 Clayton ar-
1868. Id. at 815.
1869. Id. (citing United States v. Homing, 409 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1969)).
1870. E.g., Makal v. Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976); Gray v. Warden, 523
F.2d 989, 990 (9th Cir. 1975).
1871. E.g., Gray v. Warden, 523 F.2d 989, 990 (9th Cir. 1975).
1872. 588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979).
1873. Id. at 1289.
1874. Id.
1875. Id. at 1290.
1876. Id.
1877. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides in part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense. . . if the maximum pun-
ishment provided for such offense is more than six months, [the] court... may
impose a sentence in excess of six months and provide that the defendant be con-
fined in a jail-type institution... for a period not exceeding six months and that
1980]
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gued that the twenty-four days served under the original sentence or-
der, plus the six months of subsequent confinement, resulted in a prison
sentence in excess of the six months statutory maximum. Conse-
quently, the second order placing her on probation was also invalid.
Accordingly, Clayton believed that she was not on probation at the
time of her arrest and conviction for petty theft. Therefore, the final
reinstatement of the six-year sentence did not amount to a revocation
of probation, but rather double punishment for the same crime. 
1 878
The court suggested two different modes of analysis to judge the
legality of Clayton's sentence. First, it characterized the original order
as a split sentence of ninety days and five years probation. Under this
approach, probation could not begin until the completion of the ninety
day confinement.18 79 Thus, Clayton would not have been technically
on probation when she failed to comply with the terms of her weekend
service. 180 However, the court refused to rule so since Clayton had
neglected to raise this issue at the appropriate time.18 81 Additionally,
the court noted that an imposition of weekend service rather than regu-
lar confinement was actually illegal.18 8 2 However, this error was cor-
rected by the second order which required a six-month period of
confinement. 88 3 Thus, the court concluded that the first alternative
was a legally imposed sentence.18 8 4 Under the second approach, the
Ninth Circuit construed the original punishment as a six-year sus-
pended sentence, followed by a five-year probationary period, which
was conditioned on Clayton's serving ninety days in jail.l as5 This alter-
native was also found to be legal.
18 8 6
Nevertheless, the court was still faced with the problem of how to
compute the six-month limitation of 18 U.S.C. § 3651, ie., should the
multiple sentences be measured cumulatively or on a "sentence-by-sen-
tence basis."' 18 7 The court held that although the six-month limitation
should have been calculated on a cumulative basis, Clayton's sentence
the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant
placed on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems best.
1878. 588 F.2d at 1290.
1879. Id. at 1291.
1880. Id.
1881. Id.
1882. Id. (citing United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1969), rev'd on
other other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 351 & n.3 (1972)).
1883. 588 F.2d at 1291.
1884. Id.
1885. Id.
1886. Id.
1887. Id. at 1292.
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still was affirmed.18 88  The Ninth Circuit seemingly misapplied 18
U.S.C. § 3568 which vests power in the Attorney General, rather than
the courts, to deduct pre-sentence time served in confinement as a
credit toward reducing a prisoner's overall sentence.88 9 However, the
twenty-four days served in jail were part of Clayton's original sentence
and not related to a pre-sentencing confinement. Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit considered the interpretation of a federal statute, an issue to be
clearly within the province of the judiciary. Thus, the application of a
pre-sentence credit statute to these facts appears to be nothing more
than an avoidance of the consequences of its own statutory interpreta-
tion.
. Probation
The federal system of probation is governed by the Federal Proba-
tion Act.18 90 Section 3651 of the Act provides that the court "may sus-
pend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems best."89" The Ninth Circuit has limited this broad
grant of discretion by holding that probation conditions must "reason-
ably relate" to the underlying purposes of the Act, 1 892 construed as the
rehabilitation of the convicted person and the protection of the pub-
lic. 1893 Numerous Ninth Circuit decisions have considered the extent
to which probation conditions may infringe upon the constitutional
rights of probationers. 1894 A successful constitutional challenge may be
foreclosed if there is a reasonable relationship between the conditions
1888. Id.
1889. Id.
1890. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1976 & Supp. 1979). Probation is a system of tutelage
whereby a court supervises and controls the conduct of a convicted defendant. Frad v.
Kelly, 302 U.S. 312, 318 (1937). Important policy considerations underlie any system of
probationary release, similar to those supporting prisoner release on parole. Probation, like
parole, seeks to reintegrate individuals as constructive members of society as soon as they
are able. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
1891. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
1892. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
1893. Id.
1894. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(probation condition, though overbroad in its scope, nevertheless supported search of proba-
tioner because authority granted by the condition was narrowly and properly exercised);
United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739-41 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978) (condition of probation requiring release of confidential financial information not
necessarily an infringement on probationer's right against self-incrimination); United States
v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1976) (same as Jeffers).
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of probation and the goals of the Federal Probation Act. 895
Tension exists between probationers' rights and the purposes of
the Act not only in the area of probation conditions, but also in the
revocation process. The procedural rights guaranteed a probationer
before revocation include a preliminary and final revocation hearing,
written notice of claimed violations, an opportunity to be heard and
present evidence, a limited right of confrontation, a "neutral and de-
tached hearing body," and written findings by that body. 18 96 Recently,
there have been challenges as to the propriety of revocation absent a
formal warning to the probationer as to what conduct will result in
revocation.
1. Grounds for revocation
The principle Ninth Circuit decision in this area is United States v.
Dane8 97 decided in 1977. In Dane, the probationer contended that
revocation was improper because he was not notified of which condi-
tion he allegedly violated. The Ninth Circuit initially noted that the
essential element of due process was a prior "fair warning of those acts
which may lead to a loss of liberty."' 898 The court considered the cir-
cumstances surrounding the grant of probation and then implied the
existence of a prior fair warning. The probationer's actions trans-
gressed this "fair warning" and thus probation was justifiably re-
1895. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(infringement of fundamental rights must serve the broad purposes of the Federal Probation
Act). The probation system cannot, however, serve as "a subterfuge for criminal investiga-
tions." .d. at 267. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 897 (1975). See also United States v. Graham, 575 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978) (search proper since probation was not a subter-
fuge for criminal investigations; probation has law enforcement as well as rehabilitative as-
pects).
1896. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788-89 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
489 (1972). A probationer is also granted a limited right to counsel. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. at 790; Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
1897. 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978).
1898. Id. at 843. The court in Dane noted:
[A]s a general matter, formal conditions of probation serve the purpose of giving
notice of proscribed activities. But a formal condition is not essential for purposes
of notice. Courts have sustained the revocation of probation for criminal activity
committed prior to the effective date of the conditions,. . . or where the defendant
was not aware of the conditions.... In such a case knowledge of the criminal law
is imputed to the probationer, as is an understanding that violation of the law will
lead to the revocation of probation. On the other hand, where the proscribed acts
are not criminal, due process mandates that the petitioner cannot be subjected to a
forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he is given fair prior warning.
Id. at 843-44.
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Dane was relied on in the 1979 case of United States v.
Furukawa. 19° As a condition of his probation, Furukawa was told to
associate with only "law-abiding" persons. His probation officer spe-
cifically instructed him not to associate with Takagi because he ap-
peared to be involved in "law-violating" activities.1 9 1 Furukawa's
continued association with Takagi and two other individuals led to the
revocation of his probation. 9 2 On appeal Furukawa contended that
this condition exceeded the scope of the probation officer's authority
because Takagi was a "law-abiding" person.1 9 3
The Ninth Circuit upheld the order of the probation officer noting
that "[a] person disobeying the law today and hence not being law-
abiding may as yet have no criminal record ... ,1 90 Furukawa also
challenged his association with one of the two other people, Okubo, on
the grounds that he was unaware of Okubo's prior conviction for tres-
passing.1 905 But the court found that knowledge of Okubo's previous
arrest for narcotics violations and his reputation as a gambler should
have put Furukawa on notice that Okubo was not "law-abiding."' 190 6
Therefore, Furukawa "had fair warning that association with Okubo
would violate the. . . condition of his probation and might 'lead to a
loss of liberty.' "1907
2. Mitigating evidence
The right of the probationer to present evidence to mitigate the
probation violation is absolute. In United States v. Diaz-Burgos,190 8 the
defendant was convicted of illegal entry into the United States, placed
on probation, and deported. After another illegal entry, he was again
arrested and his probation revoked. At the hearing the violation was
"obvious if not admitted" and the district court refused to hear any
evidence offered by Diaz-Burgos, or to hear a full explanation from his
attorney.190 9 The Ninth Circuit reversed and noted the Supreme
1899. Id. at 844-46.
1900. 596 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1979).
1901. Id. at 922.
1902. Id. at 923.
1903. Id. at 922.
1904. Id.
1905. Id. at 923.
1906. Id.
1907. Id. (quoting United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 959 (1978) (emphasis added).
1908. 601 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1909. Id. at 984.
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Court's two step revocation process: (1) the court must determine
whether probation conditions were violated and, if so, (2) whether the
violations warrant revocation of probation. 910 Since the court failed to
allow appellant to show mitigating facts, the Ninth Circuit found that
probationer's due process rights had been violated.1911
3. Revocation hearing procedures
a. dissimilarity to criminal trials
Another challenge to the hearing process was heard in United
States v. Rilliet.' 9'2 Rilliet's probation was revoked for two violations
of state law: the possession of firearms by an ex-felon and possession of
cocaine. 1913 Defendant raised two issues regarding the revocation hear-
ing. The first was whether the arrest was sufficient grounds for revoca-
tion. 19 14 The Ninth Circuit found that since "substantial evidence" of
state law violations was presented, a proper basis existed for revocation
of Rilliet's federal probation status. 915 Second, Rilliet argued that
since the revocation hearing was held prior to his trial on the state
charges, he was forced into an impermissible election of either remain-
ing silent at the revocation hearing, thereby risking revocation, or testi-
fying on his own behalf at the hearing thereby risking usage of his
statements against him at the subsequent state trial.1
916
The court noted that this argument had been previously rejected
by the Ninth Circuit' 917 and thus held that the timing of the hearing
1910. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972), made applicable to probation
revocations in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). The revocation hearing must
allow "an opportunity to be heard and to show... that he did not violate the conditions, or,
if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revoca-
tion." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 488.
1911. 601 F.2d at 985-86. The remedy for the procedural violation was not a release from
custody, but a remand of the case at which the probationer would be accorded his full proce-
dural rights. Id.
1912. 595 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1913. Id. at 1139.
1914. Id. at 1140. See United States v. Marron, 564 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1977) (convic-
tion not a prerequisite to revocation); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (revocation proper when judge is reasonably satisfied that a state or fed-
eral law has been violated); United States v. Carrion, 457 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) ("[P]robation may be revoked when the judge is reasonably satisfied that a state or
federal law has been violated, and conviction is not a prerequisite.").
1915. 595 F.2d at 1140.
1916. Id.
1917. Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1978) (use immunity for testimony
given at state probation revocation hearing not mandated as a matter of constitutional law).
See Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (no denial of due process
or violation of the fifth amendment to hold state criminal trial after the revocation hearing).
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had not forced Rilliet into an impermissible election. ' 91 There are
two reasons underlying the Ninth Circuit's position. First, full criminal
procedural safeguards are not accorded a probationer in a revocation
hearing. 1919 Second, refusal to waive the fifth amendment privilege in
a revocation hearing does not automatically lead to revocation or to
any other sanction. Therefore, the court decided that defendant was
not forced to make an unconstitutional election. 1920
b. delay
In United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 921 the probationer was in state
custody when the district court issued an order for his arrest to show
cause why probation should not be revoked. 1922 Two years later, after
the expiration of the initial probation period, a writ of habeas corpus
was issued, and the probationer was released to appear at a federal
probation revocation hearing. The probationer then moved to dismiss
the original order to show cause on the ground that his appearance for
the revocation hearing had been unreasonably delayed. 923 The Ninth
1918. 595 F.2d at 1140.
1919. See, e.g., United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
919 (1977) (same as above); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (revocation not
the equivalent of a criminal prosecution).
1920. 595 F.2d at 1140. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) (disquali-
fication from political or public office for refusal to waive fifth amendment privilege; govern-
ment cannot penalize assertion of that privilege by imposing sanctions to compel testimony
not immunized); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973) (disqualification from re-
ceipt of public contracts for failure to waive fifth amendment privilege held unconstitu-
tional). See Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 990-94 (9th Cir. 1978). It is permissable to
force a criminal defendant to make a "strategic choice" between testimony in mitgation of
guilt or punishment and the risk of self-incrimination. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 213-17 (1971) vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) (no constitutional right to
trial bifurcation into separate guilt and punishment stages; not improper to condition right
to remain silent on the issue of guilt on the surrendering of the opportunity to testify in
mitigation of punishment); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976) (permissible to
draw negative inferences from prisoner's refusal to testify at a prison disciplinary hearing).
In the past the Ninth Circuit has indicated that although not constitutionally mandated, use
immunity for testimony given at revocation hearings held prior to criminal trials may be
preferable. Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Segal, 549
F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977) (revocation process not to be
equated with a criminal prosecution). See also United States v. Vandemark 522 F.2d 1019
(9th Cir. 1975) (exclusionary rule not applicable in revocation hearing when law enforce-
ment officials conducting search were not aware of defendant's status as a probationer);
United States v. Miller, 514 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (admission of hearsay
evidence and unauthenticated records in a revocation hearing held proper).
1921. 600 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1922. Id. at 188.
1923. Id.
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Circuit held that section 3653 of the Federal Probation Act 1924 does not
mandate a revocation hearing immediately after the issuance of an or-
der beginning the revocation process, if the probationer was in state
custody at the time the order was issued.
1 925
F. Habeas Corpus
1. Independent state grounds doctrine
A federal prisoner can petition for habeas corpus relief if his or her
confinement was the result of a criminal conviction which was obtained
"in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 1926 Fed-
eral habeas corpus petitions can also be made by state prisoners if they
have exhausted all possible avenues of relief available to them within
the state judicial system.
1927
When the petition comes from a state prisoner, the success of that
petition may ultimately depend on whether the prisoner complied with
his state court procedures. 1928 Failure to raise certain objections during
trial may often preclude a prisoner from later collaterally attacking his
1924. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976) provides that one accused of violating the terms of proba-
tion shall be brought before a District Court "as speedily as possible" for a hearing on the
alleged violations.
1925. 600 F.2d at 189. The execution of the order and bench warrant for probationer's
arrest, issued within the original probationary period, could properly await enforcement un-
til after the outcome of the pending state criminal charges and sentencing. See United
States v. Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972) (deferment of execution on bench
warrant held proper, citing to prior Ninth Circuit law dealing with parole revocation).
1926. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) provides in part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sen-
tence.
1927. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) provides in part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
m violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. (b) An
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of'a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the appli-
cant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
1928. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 453-54, 486-87 (1953) (because petitioner's
attorney mailed appeal papers one day late and state supreme court thus refused to hear the
appeal, there existed adequate and independent state procedural grounds which barred
hearing of petitioner's habeas corpus motion by federal courts).
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conviction by way of a section 2254 or section 2255 habeas corpus mo-
tion.
1929
In this regard, the Supreme Court established what came to be
known as the "deliberate by-pass" doctrine in the 1963 case of Fay v.
Noia.193 ° Under this doctrine, a state prisoner was not barred from
federal habeas relief unless he or she deliberately by-passed or waived
certain state court procedures.19 31  In Fay, for instance, defendant
failed to appeal his conviction on the grounds that his confession was
coerced for fear that the appeal might result in the imposition of a
death sentence instead of the possibility of a life term.1932  The
Supreme Court held that defendant was not thereby precluded from
raising this issue by way of a section 2254 habeas motion, since his
failure to do so during state proceedings did not amount to a deliberate
by-pass of his available remedies.
1933
But Fay's deliberate by-pass doctrine was weakened some ten
years later by Davis v. United States in which the Supreme Court held
1929. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977). A habeas corpus petitioner
may also encounter procedural difficulties upon pleading guilty at trial and then later collat-
erally attacking the validity of the conviction. Courts have recognized a guilty plea as the
equivalent of a waiver or a deliberate forfeiture of the opportunity to raise most substantive
constitutional issues on appeal. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (plea of
guilty prevents defendant from raising "independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the plea"); Journigan v. Duffy, 552
F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1977) (guilty plea may operate as deliberate refusal to place constitu-
tional claims before the state trial courts; it therefore can be a deliberate bypass of state
procedure). See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("A plea of guilty is
more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a convic-
tion; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.").
However, if a state statute allows for appeal of constitutional issues despite the fact that
he or she has pled guilty, then further appeal is not barred. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S.
283, 289-90 (1975). In Phillips v. Attorney General, 594 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979), two
California state petitioners had pleaded nolo contendere (the equivalent of guilty in terms of
its legal effect-CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (West 1970)) but later contested their conviction
on the grounds that it violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Under CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1538.5(m) (West 1970), a defendant who has pleaded guilty is not precluded from raising
fourth amendment search and seizure challenges on appeal In Phillps the court held that
because of this statute, petitioners could also raise their fifth amendment claims since in the
particular case the two constitutional issues were inseparably linked. 594 F.2d at 1290.
Once this procedural barrier was hurdled, the court found that under Lef/owitz the fifth
amendment issues could also be contested by way of habeas corpus motion. Id. The fourth
amendment claims, however, were barred because of the rule in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494 (1976) which prohibits federal habeas corpus petitions for fourth amendment issues
if the "State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim. .. "
1930. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
1931. Id. at 438.
1932. Id. at 439-40.
1933. Id. at 439.
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that the failure of a federal defendant to make a timely objection to the
composition of his grand jury, as was required by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, was fatal to his habeas corpus petition. 934 The
Davis Court established the "cause and prejudice" rule which requires
a habeas corpus petitioner to show either that there was a valid reason
for his lack of procedural compliance or that he was actually
prejudiced by the alleged constitutional violation. 1931
The "cause and prejudice" standard of Davis was extended in 1976
to state court proceedings where a defendant had likewise failed to
make a timely objection to the make-up of his grand jury. 1936 Finally,
in 1977, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the deliberate by-pass
doctrine in Wainwright v. Sykes. 1937 In Wainwright certain inculpatory
statements made by defendant were admitted in evidence at a Florida
state court trial. Defendant did not challenge their admissibility until
he filed a petition for habeas corpus relief after his conviction. 93 8 Flor-
ida's contemporaneous objection rule required such challenges to be
made at the time the evidence was introduced at trial. 1939 Although
there had been no deliberate attempt by defendant to circumvent this
rule, the Supreme Court applied the "cause and prejudice" standard of
Davis rather than Fays deliberate by-pass rule and dismissed his
habeas petition. 9 4
0
Wainwright was applied by the Ninth Circuit in two 1979 habeas
corpus cases. In Lewis v. Cardwell, the court refused to consider a
habeas corpus motion because the petitioner had failed to object at trial
to the prosecution's unconstitutional use of his post-arrest silence.' 94
Since the state in question, Arizona, had a contemporaneous objection
rule similar to Florida's which barred appellate review of a claimed
error unless objection was made at trial, the Ninth Circuit found that
this constituted an independent state ground that prevented federal re-
view. 1
942
Wainwright was also cited by the Ninth Circuit in Carothers v.
Rhay where petitioner claimed that he had been denied due process
1934. 411 U.S. 233, 240-41 (1973).
1935. Id. at 238, 242, 244.
1936. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 436, 542 (1976).
1937. 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977).
1938. Id. at 75.
1939. Id. at 76.
1940. Id. at 87-88.
1941. 609 F.2d 926, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1979).
1942. Id. at 928.
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during his trial, but had failed to assert this issue on direct appeal. 1943
While the Carothers court denied petitioner's federal habeas corpus
motion primarily because of his failure to exhaust state remedies by not
completing the full appeals process, it also held in the alternative that*
petitioner's failure to pursue his direct appeal constituted a possible
waiver of his claim under state law. 1944 The court felt that such a
waiver could have amounted to a procedural bar under the Wainwright
doctrine.
1945
2. Exhaustion of state remedies
Both the independent state grounds and exhaustion doctrines are
predicated on notions of comity and the desire to extend due deference
to state court proceedings.1 946 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has on occasion
been extremely hesitant to hear habeas corpus petitions when any one
issue in that petition has not been properly presented to the state
courts. 1947 This practice is based on the rationale that consideration of
1943. 594 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1979).
1944. Id.
1945. Id.
1946. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44(1971); Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,251 (1886).
1947. See, e.g., Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1965) where the court, in
refusing to review a mixed petition, stated: "It would create an impermissible anomaly were
we to set machinery in motion which may ultimately afford Blair another state appellate
court examination of these issues, and then thwart or embarrass the state court by purport-
ing to decide those very questions on this appeal." Id. at 745 (footnote omitted). But see,
e.g., Phillips v. Pitchess, 451 F.2d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 1971) (court considered merits of peti-
tioner's habeas claim on unconstitutional grand jury composition although it stated it could
have denied relief because of his failure to exhaust state remedies on this particular issue);
Davis v. Dunbar, 394 F.2d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1972) (court
considered two habeas claims previously rejected by state appeals court although petitioner
had also included two new claims which had not been previously litigated). See also Shiers
v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964) (court evaluated each issue in a habeas
petition on the following procedural basis: "whether any of the contentions made in the
present petition are the substantial equivalent of contentions presented by petitioner to the
state courts upon his appeal from conviction")
With the exception of the Third and Fifth, the other circuits permit habeas review of
mixed petitions. E.g., Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 969 (Ist Cir. 1976); United States v.
McMann, 394 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1968); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320
(4th Cir. 1969) (exhausted and unexhausted claims must be unrelated); Meeks v. Jago, 548
F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Brown v. Wisconsin State
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 457 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); John-
son v. United States Dist. Court, 519 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (claims must
be unrelated); Smith v. Gaffney, 462 F.2d 663, 664-65 (10th Cir. 1972).
The Fifth Circuit has to date declined to review mixed petitions unless the district court
erroneously reviewed the exhausted claims. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 360-62
(5th Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit disapproved of mixed petitions in United States v. Ha-
track, 563 F.2d 86, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1977).
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"mixed petitions"-that is those containing both "exhausted" and
"unexhausted" issues-would unduly interfere with state proceedings
and result in piecemeal litigation.
1948
In the 1979 case of Carothers v. Rhay, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
this position, but since the district court had already erroneously ruled
on the merits of the exhausted issues in the mixed petition, the court of
appeals consented to review those issues as well.
1949
3. Collateral attacks based on competency to stand trial
Post conviction challenges to a defendant's competency' 950 during
trial raise special problems for the federal courts. Occassionally these
challenges will occur years after the trial has taken place.' 95 Thus, a
reviewing court may often be faced with an unpleasant dilemma. If
defendant has indeed raised substantial doubts as to his or her compe-
tency, the court will have to either: a) order a competency hearing, or
b) grant the relief unless a new trial can be expeditiously granted. 95Z
Obvious problems may arise with a competency hearing which seeks to
determine what a defendant's mental state was at the time he or she
originally stood trial. If several years have elapsed, this may become
an almost insurmountable task.
953
1948. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 356-60 (5th Cir. 1978) (court included an ex-
tended discussion of the policy reasons behind non-review of mixed petitions). The reasons
for the contrary policy of permitting review were enunciated by the Eighth Circuit in John-
son v. United States Dist. Court, 519 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (court noted
that "[a]lthough this requirement may be said to foster piecemeal litigation in the federal
courts, we have struck the balance in favor of the prisoner's interest in the prompt considera-
tion of exhausted claims").
1949. 594 F.2d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1979). The Carothers court followed the earlier prac-
tice of the Ninth Circuit in this regard, citing Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978). In Myers, however, thirteen different issues were consolidated
in one habeas petition and apparently only one had not already been exhausted through the
state appeals process. Id. at 506-07.
1950. Conviction of an accused who is mentally incompetent is a violation of his or her
due process rights. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, 385 (1966)).
1951. E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (six years); de Kaplany v. Enomoto,
540 F.2d 975, 976 (9th cir. 1976) (thirteen years); Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251, 1256-
57 (8th Cir. 1975) (seven years).
1952. E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966). Circuit courts subsequently read
Pate as not mandating a per se rule against retroactive competency hearings, but rather as a
prohibition against such hearings when there was no evidence available with which to judge
defendant's competency at the time of the trial. E.g., United States v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339,
343-44 (3d Cir. 1976).
1953. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (because of six year time lapse
between time of trial and proposed competency hearing, the difficulty associated with a jury
determination of this issue, and the fact that expert witnesses could only testify with respect
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For these reasons the Supreme Court in Pate v. Robinson, where
six years had elapsed since the original trial, took a somewhat jaun-
diced view of post conviction competency hearings. 1954 Nonetheless,
circuit courts, faced with a choice of the two unpleasant alternatives,
tended to opt for such hearings when at all possible.1
95 5
In the 1979 case of Darrow v. Gunn, the Ninth Circuit followed this
procedure, although by a somewhat circuitous route.1956 Darrow, a
state prisoner, brought a habeas corpus petition challenging his compe-
tency at the time he had entered his guilty plea. 957 The federal district
court refused to grant this motion. Darrow appealed and the case was
remanded by the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration of the competency
issue. The case was further remanded by the district court to the origi-
nal state court which then conducted a hearing and concluded that pe-
titioner had been competent at the time of his guilty plea.
1 958
On further review, Darrow urged that under the rationale of the
Supreme Court's holding in Pate v. Robinson, such a hearing was an
unreliable guage of his competency and that, in addition, the trial court
had erred in the first instance by not recognizing the need for a compe-
to information in a written record, the Court felt that a competency hearing was not in
order).
1954. See 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (Court noted that "we have previously emphasized the
difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused's competence to stand trial." (citing
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
1955. See, e.g., Miranda v. United States, 458 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972) (retrospective determination of competency some two years later was ap-
proved because unlike Pate v. Robinson, there was sufficient contemporaneous evidence of
competency); Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 93 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 978
(1978) (since contemporaneous evidence was available from original trial a state competency
hearing was approved by the court); United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 904-05 (5th Cir.
1976) (since trial court would have the benefit of testimony of witnesses and doctor who had
observed defendant at time of trial two and one-half years earlier, competency hearing was
recommended by the appellate court as the preferred course of action despite awareness of
its perils); Conner v. Wingo, 429 F.2d 630, 639-40 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 921
(1972) (when faced with the dilemma of a retrial or a postconviction hearing, most courts
would rather grapple with the relatively lesser problems presented by a competency hear-
ing); Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (8th Cir. 1975) (appellate court ordered
district court to determine the feasibility of a competency hearing six years after original
conviction); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1973) (since experts had been
allowed to examine petitioner prior to his original trial, a post conviction competency hear-
ing would not face the same problems which would have been encountered in Pate v. Robin-
son, and a competency hearing was therefore feasible); Barefield v. New Mexico, 434 F.2d
307, 309 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 959 (1971) (post trial competency hearing
four years after trial was adequate in view of fact that psychiatrists who examined petitioner
prior to his guilty plea were also available for testimony).
1956. 594 F.2d 767, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1979).
1957. Id. at 769.
1958. Id. at 770.
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tency hearing before his guilty plea had been accepted.' 95 9 The Ninth
Circuit held that there were sufficient grounds to justify the lower
court's finding of competency. 1960 Unlike prior defendants who should
have had a competency hearing, Darrow had not exhibited a long his-
tory of "irrational behavior and mental illness."' 19 61 Nor was he, as was
one earlir defendant, subject to violent outbursts during trial which
required forceable restraint.1962 Since Darrow was retrospectively
found to have been initially competent at his trial, the trial court's ini-
tial action in not requiring a competency hearing was upheld. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit did not have to reach the issue of whether the post-
conviction competency hearing was sufficient to "cure [any] omission of
[the] pre-plea competency hearing," since the lower court had deter-
mined that none had been required.1
963
4. Other procedural grounds for denial of habeas corpus relief
While habeas corpus petitions may normally be used to attack a
conviction based on alleged constitutional violations, the Supreme
Court has imposed one notable exception to this rule. In the 1976 case
of Stone v. Powell the Court held that a prisoner could not use a habeas
corpus motion to challenge the admissibility of evidence used at his
trial allegedly in violation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule if
he had been afforded a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate this issue
in the state court. 9 ' In 1979 the Stone rule was applied by the Ninth
Circuit in Phillips v. Attorney General where appellants were precluded
from raising such fourth amendment claims on habeas corpus re-
view. 1
965
The Ninth Circuit also held in Crawford v. Bell that while a habeas
corpus motion is designed to challenge the legality of a prisioner's con-
finement, it cannot be used as a vehicle for attacking the terms or con-
ditions of his imprisonment on the grounds that they constitute cruel
1959. Id.
1960. Id. at 771. "On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in not ordering a hearing to determine Darrow's competence to plead guilty sua
sponte, prior to accepting such a plea." Id.
1961. Id. Cf., e.g., Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (defendant had an extensive history of mental illness, thus necessitating a compe-
tency hearing at his initial trial).
1962. 594 F.2d at 771. Cf. Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1974) (defend-
ant's erratic and irrational behavior at trial, requiring his physical removal from the court-
room while he was screaming, required a competency hearing).
1963. 594 F.2d at 771.
1964. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
1965. 594 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1979).
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and unusual punishment.1 966 The court noted that even if relief had
been granted it would not have resulted in the prisoner's release from
confinement. 1967 Thus, other procedural devices need to be used in
such situations.
Nor can a habeas petition be used to challenge a defect in a trial
proceeding unless the trial resulted in a "complete miscarriage of jus-
tice."'1968 This position was reiterated by the Ninth Circuit in the 1979
case of United States v. Harris where the court noted that a section 2255
federal habeas motion could not be raised when all that could be
shown was the failure of a lower court to follow the formalities of a
particular procedural rule. 1
969
G. Challenges to Prison Conditions
1. Convicted persons
The eighth amendment to the Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 19 70 Generally, the cruel and
unusual punishment clause is thought to apply to punishment sustained
by a person who has been convicted of certain criminal acts. 197 1 Thus,
the punishment, and whether it is cruel and unusual, varies with the
nature of the criminal act involved.
The United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble set out the
modem interpretation of "cruel and unusual punishment." 19 72 In Es-
1966. 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979).
1967. Id. at 892.
1968. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). The Court noted that collateral relief
should not be granted unless there was "'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice."' Id. at 346 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
428 (1962)).
The Supreme Court relied on the Davis rule in the 1979 case of United States v. Ad-
donizio where it held that a prisoner could not use a habeas motion to attack the validity of
his sentence when all he could show was a possible misinterpretation or incorrect assump-
tion on the part of the sentencing judge. 442 U.S. 178, 186 (1979). Since the actions taken
by the sentencing judge were well within the limits of his authority'and did not result in the
imposition of an illegal sentence the Court's decision in denying petitioner habeas relief was
clearly called for.
1969. 592 F.2d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 1979) (petitioner claimed a technical violation of FED.
R. CRaM. P. 35 in that attorney, rather than defendant, admitted the existence of a prior
conviction at a sentencing hearing).
1970. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
1971. 248 C.J.S. § 1978 (1962). But see notes 2017 & 2018 infra and accompanying text,
regarding the use of the eighth amendment in the review of confinement of persons awaiting
trial.
1972. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). For a history of the eighth amendment, see Granocci, "Nor
19801
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telle the Court held that deliberate indifference by prison personnel to
a prisoner's illness would violate the eighth amendment.1 973 The
Court, per Justice Marshall, noted:
The [eighth] Amendment embodies "broad and idealistic con-
cepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency
. . " against which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus,
we have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punish-
ments which are incompatible with "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," or
which "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain."'1
974
The amendment, then, is concerned with more than just physically
barbarous punishments.
19 75
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the permissible
scope of federal remedial power in state prison systems, several lower
federal courts in recent years have delved into the task of correcting
objectionable prison conditions.1 976 These courts have relied on a
broad interpretation of the eighth amendment in light of individual
conditions or in some instances a totality of circumstances standard.
This new area of judicial concern represents a departure from a
traditional hands-off doctrine which had prohibited courts from super-
vising or interfering with prison administration. It was feared that such
interference would lead to an invasion of the separation of powers, to a
destruction of federalism, and to remedies fixed by persons without pe-
nological expertise. 9 77 The recent era (since the mid-1960's) of in-
creased judicial activism is partly in response to a lack of interest on the
part of the penal authorities, the legislatures, and the people in elimi-
nating improper prison conditions.' 978  During this period, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted" the Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839
(1969).
1973. 429 U.S. at 104.
1974. Id. at 102-03 (citations omitted).
1975. See, e.g., Laamon v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 317 (D.N.H. 1977) (prison author-
ities required to do more than allow inmates to "spend their days in a state of institutionally
induced numb lethargy").
1976. Eg., Id. See cases cited in Note, Eighth Amendment Challenges to Conditions of Con-
finement: State Prison Reform by Federal Judicial Decree, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 288, 293 n.48
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Eighth Amendment Challenges].
1977. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 1976, at 291-92. Criticizing such a doc-
trine was a 1963 comment, Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
1978. Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 1976, at 290.
A recent prison riot at New Mexico State Penitentiary is illustrative of this apathy. The
riot resulted in thirty-nine prisoner deaths, many due to grisly murders by fellow inmates.
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Supreme Court has also demonstrated some sensitivity to prisoner
rights.
1979
However, the Court recently has maintained that "[p]rison admin-
istrators. . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adop-
tion and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain insti-
tutional security." 1980 The rationale underlying the court's deference to
prison officials is the acknowledgement that federal court judges are
not the best experienced evaluators of prison needs and that they
should not second guess expert administrators. Thus, the new "due
deference" barrier seems close to the old "hands off" doctrine. 1981 Due
deference requires that courts interfere only when "constitutional viola-
tions and deprivations are clearly evident."'1982
Yet, indications of potential sources of trouble in the prison conditions abounded years
before the riot. Poor prison conditions (overcrowding; inadequate heating, ventilation, and
lighting; problems with roaches and vermin) may have been partially the cause of the out-
break. In addition, the prison violence probably was due to inadequate prison security,
which was under-manned and ill-trained.
These circumstances at the prison led to the filing of a 1977 federal class-action suit
alleging inhumane treatment and incidents of violence and homosexual rape. Allegedly
some inmates desired "'protective custody"' to save themselves from their fellow inmates.
Moreover, less than three weeks before the riot, an investigative report warned that "condi-
tions inside the prison were so dangerous that prison officials were 'playing Russian roulette
with the lives of inmates, staff and the public.'" "Playing Russian Roulette,' Report Had
Warned Prison, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1980, § I, at 17. See the lead article, Execution Squad
Atrocities in Riot Told; Toll Hits 39, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1980, § 1, at 1.
1979. See Jackson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (reaffirmed prisoners' right of access
to courts); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam) (freedom from religious
discrimination).
The Supreme Court has said "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution
and the prisons of this country." Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (prisoners' right of access to the courts well estab-
lished); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (reasonable opportunity to practice religious
faith to be accorded prison inmates); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (racial
discrimination" unconstitutional within prison, except for "the necessities of prison security
and discipline").
1980. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974), the Court stated, "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no
more than a healthy sense of realism." Id. at 405. Accord, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 544-
45 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
1981. For a critical discussion of "due deference," see Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and
Due Deference: the New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 U. Mo. KANSAS
Crly 7 (1978).
1982. Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). The Frazier court pro-
vides an example of the necessarily hesitant stance federal courts must take when dealing
with prison conditions and alleged constitutional violations.
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Consequently, two competing doctrines--broad interpretations of
the eighth amendment and the limiting notion of deference-are em-
broiled in any judicial review of prison conditions.
These competing doctrines were present in the 1979 case of Spain
v. Procunier.193 In Spain six prisoners in California state prison at San
Quentin brought suit on the grounds that the conditions of their con-
finement were a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.19 8 4 The prisoners were assigned to the "adjustment center,"
which segregated and disciplined "disruptive prisoners," because they
were involved in a major outbreak of violence in which three correc-
tional officers and two inmates were killed. 9 5 Awaiting the comple-
tion of their trial on charges stemming from the outbreak, the prisoners
had been in the adjustment center four and one-half years when the
Spain suit was filed.
The district court considered numerous allegations of constitu-
tional deprivation in the adjustment center. Although rejecting several
claims, the court first ordered that the six be returned to the general
prison population because they were not accorded a "'properly noticed
disciplinary hearing.' "1986 In addition, the court enjoined the use of
tear gas except when serious harm was imminent. 987 Third, the court
prohibited the use of mechanical restraints, such as leg manacles and
neck chains but not including hand cuffs, "'unless an inmate acts in
such a violent or otherwise dangerous manner as to present an actual or
imminent threat of bodily harm or escape.' "11988 Finally, it found
"'[t]hat the denial of fresh air and regular outdoor exercise and recrea-
tion constituted cruel and unusual punishment.' "1989
The Ninth Circuit left untouched only one of the district court's
orders-that dealing with outdoor exercise. It reversed and remanded
the first order, which concerned the need for holding a hearing when
the prisoners had been transferred to the adjustment center. 1990 Prior
Ninth Circuit case law had held that such a hearing was necessary. 199'
However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions found that the due
1983. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).
1984. Id. at 191.
1985. Id. at 192.
1986. Id. at 193 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 547 (N.D. Cal. 1976)).
1987. Id. at 194.
1988. Id. at 197 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 547 (1976)).
1989. Id. at 199 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 547 (1976)).
1990. Id. at 193.
1991. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 815, modofed, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1975),
rev'dsub nom., Enomoto v. Clutchette, 425 U.S. 308, vacatedinpart, 536 F.2d 305 (9th Cir.
1976).
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process clause does not require a hearing prior to prison transfers, un-
less the prisoner had some expectation "rooted in state law" that he
would not be transferred. 1992 Thus, on remand the district court was to
consider whether any justifiable expectations were to be found in the
appropriate state law.
1 993
In dealing with the substantive eighth amendment orders, the
Ninth Circuit initially strongly reaffirmed protections of the amend-
ment in the face of the state's position that the federal courts should
defer to the administrators working with these dangerous prisoners. 1994
The court emphatically pointed out that the eighth amendment was
designed specifically to protect convicted persons. Therefore, it refused
mechanically to defer to state prison officials because to do so would
make the eighth amendment a "nullity."'
1995
In the first substantive area, the court of appeals modified the dis-
trict court's sweeping prohibition of the use of tear gas. The court dif-
ferentiated tear gas dispensed in dangerous quantities (which was
projected from a "tear gas billy") from tear gas dispensed in
nondangerous quantities (which was projected from a "dust projec-
tor").1996 As a result the lower court's strict prohibition was modified to
allow for the use of nondangerous quantities "in order to prevent a
perceived future harm."'199 7 The court balanced the need for the gas
against its potential for harm and relied on language of the Supreme
Court from Estelle v. Gamble,99 8 which held that the eighth amend-
ment prohibits punishments "incompatible with 'the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"' or
which "'involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' 1999
Therefore, the use of dangerous quantities of tear gas in a situation
requiring only slight force would be an unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain to the prisoner involved and to those in surrounding cells.
1992. Montayne v. Haynes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976)). .Meachum held that the due process clause (U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV)
did not require a hearing with every disadvantageous transfer. In Montayne, the Meachum
analysis was applied to the narrower case of a transfer having "substantial adverse impact
on the prisoner." 427 U.S. at 242. The Spain prisoners faced a Montayne-type transfer.
1993. 600 F.2d at 193. The lower court was to reconsider in light of the later Supreme
Court cases which require an inquiry into state law. Cf. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,744
n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (Meachum distinguished because state law in Johnson did condition
transfer on certain occurrences).
1994. 600 F.2d at 193.
1995. Id. at 194.
1996. Id.
1997. Id. at 196.
1998. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
1999. 600 F.2d at 196 (quoting 429 U.S. at 102, 103).
1980]
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However, the use of dangerous quantities in "grave circumstances"
might be necessary, and thus, not a wanton infliction of pain.2000
Much the same balancing led to another modification of the dis-
trict court's order, which had completely prohibited the use of neck
chains and limited other mechanical restraints, except handcuffs, to
certain circumstances. 2001 Prior to the initiation of the suit, these
mechanical restraints were used whenever the prisoners had to leave
the facility for appointments within the prison, such as the visitor's
area, or outside the prison, such as court proceedings.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's injunction against
the imposition of the neck chains while within the prison confines but
modified the lower court's order on all other grounds. The Ninth Cir-
cuit declined to hold that the neck chains themselves were cruel and
unusual, but held that their use for four and one-half years was cruel
because the state could not justify such use over the entire period, espe-
cially when the prisoners met with family, friends, and counsel inside
the prison.2 o2 The court further prohibited the use of mechanical re-
straints beyond hand cuffs or waist chains unless individualized cir-
cumstances indicated they were needed.2 003
Regarding the denial of outdoor exercise, the court upheld the dis-
trict court's order that the prisoners be allowed outdoor exercise one
hour a day. While refusing to hold that outdoor exercise was constitu-
tionally mandated in all situations, the Ninth Circuit did agree that the
combination of conditions at the adjustment center made the denial of
the outdoor exercise cruel and unusual punishment. 2 04 In reaching
this conclusion the court relied on the modem trend of the courts to
recognize the importance of outdoor exercise.2zo This trend reflects
the overall liberalizing of eighth amendment protections-"that prison-
ers are not to be treated as less than human beings. ' '2006
Spain represents a liberal view of eighth amendment protections
balanced against concerns of prison administration. The Ninth Circuit
modified almost every order of the district court in light of the per-
ceived needs of the prison administration which had to deal with these
dangerous prisoners. While the court of appeals never cited the due
2000. Id. at 195.
2001. Id. at 197.
2002. Id.
2003. Id. at 198.
2004. Id. at 199.
2005. Id.
2006. Id. at 200 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., con-
curring)).
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deference language of the Supreme Court, the Spain opinion reflects
this competing theme of judicial review of prison confinement. Yet, at
the same time, the court did not lose sight of the constitutional protec-
tions afforded to convicted persons. Their needs as human beings were
not overlooked. The issue of outdoor exercise is perhaps most illustra-
tive of this point.
2. Detainees
While the prison conditions of incarcerated convicts have been re-
viewed in light of the standard of the eighth amendment, the prison
conditions (which do not raise specific constitutional questions-such
as the fourth amendment) of pre-trial detainees 007 did not have a clear
standard for constitutional review until the 1979 Supreme Court deci-
sion of Bell v. Wolfsh .2008
Those persons incarcerated while awaiting trial traditionally have
been viewed differently because detainees, unlike inmates, have not
been convicted of a crime. Detention, like bail, is a tool to ensure the
appearance of defendants at trial.2" Legal theorist William Black-
stone noted the differences between convicted prisoners and detainees:
But this imprisonment [pre-trial detention], as has been said,
is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in
this dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a
prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity, and
neither be loaded with needless fetters, nor subjected to other
hardship than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose
of confinement only. .... 2010
Thus, the state purposes of retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence,
which may validate certain treatment of convicted prisoners, is inappli-
cable to detainees.
As a consequence of these status differences between convicts and
detainees, federal courts have used three basic sources of analysis to
review prison conditions of detainees.0 11 Under one, the equal protec-
2007. Pre-trial detainees were defined by the Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
as "those persons who have been charged with a crime but who have not yet been tried on
the charge." Id. at 523. They are lawfully incarcerated prior to trial in order to insure their
presence at trial. Id.
2008. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
2009. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
2010. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 300.
2011. For a full discussion, see Note, Standardsfor Evaluating Conditions of PretrialDeten-
tion, 10 TOL. L. REv. 493, 496-508 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Standards]; Note, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Conditions of PretrialDetention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 948 (1970).
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tion theory, the detainee is considered to be essentially in the same po-
sition as a bailee awaiting trial. The only difference between the two is
that the bailee possesses sufficient wealth to avoid detention.2012 Thus,
some courts have taken the approach that conditions of detention
'which do more than merely insure a detainee's presence for trial are
equivalent to discrimination based on wealth and violate the equal pro-
tection clause.2 °13
The second theory is based on the due process clause. Under it,
the restrictions placed on a detainee are examined to determine
whether or not they constitute punishment.2 1 4 Punishment has been
construed to consist of any deprivation of liberty which does more than
guarantee a detainee's presence for trial.201 5 If a detainee has been
punished, a court could find that his due process rights have been vio-
lated, since he would be entitled to a hearing or trial before the state
could legally impose any punitive measures.01 6
Under a third analysis, the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment (which is normally applied to prisoners con-
victed of crimes) has been used to invalidate punishment of a de-
tainee.20 1 7 However, the analysis is essentially only a minimum-
2012. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (court
observed that the difference between the detainee and the bailee stemmed from the relative
poverty of the former).
2013. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (since
deprivation of a fundamental right based on poverty (i.e. wealth) is unconstitutional, any
greater loss of rights other than what is necessary to insure his custody would likewise vio-
late the equal protection clause). Cf., e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 358
(1962) (refusal by state to appoint counsel for indigent on appeal was an impermissible
discrimination based on wealth); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 19 (1956) (state's refusal
to provide indigent with transcript was discrimination based on wealth and violated equal
protection rights).
2014. See Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978) (under due process clause,
detainee may not be punished at all); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir.), aft'g,
371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("demands of due process" prevent state from depriving
detainee of any rights other than those necessary to insure he will appear at trial). See also
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (3d Cir. 1976) (constitu-
tional protections for a pre-trial detainee should be greater than those for a convicted pris-
oner).
2015. E.g., Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978); Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535
F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974),
aft'g, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
2016. Cf., e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1946), where the Supreme
Court, in referring to a particular congressional enactment noted that "ft]he effect was to
inflict punishment without the safeguards of a judicial trial and 'determined by no previous
law or fixed rule.' The Constitution declares that that cannot be done either by a State or by
the United States."
2017. See, e.g., Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (3d Cir.
1976) (since eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment for prisoners, de-
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threshold test, since courts have traditionally afforded detainees greater
constitutional protections than those given convicted prisoners.0 18
Each of these standards was discussed in the 1979 Supreme Court
case of Bell v. Wofish .2 019 There, pre-trial detainees confined at the
Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), a federally-operated short
term facility in New York City, brought a class action suit in federal
district court challenging the following conditions within the facility:
1) the housing of two persons in rooms designed for one; 2) prohibition
of all hard-cover books and magazines which were not sent directly
from a publisher; 3) searches of prison rooms conducted without per-
mitting detainees to observe; and 4) body cavity searches conducted
after a detainee had contact with persons from the outside.
20 20
Both the district court and Second Circuit found that any practices
other than those needed for purposes of detention could only be justi-
fied by "compelling necessity." 2021 The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, noting that the proper standard of review was that of due
process, not "compelling necessity."
20 22
Thus, the outcome of Bell primarily hinged on whether treatment
of detainees in the MCC was "punishment" and violated the due proc-
ess clause.0 23 In determining the punishment issue, the majority
adopted a test akin to the minimum rationality standard used in sub-
stantive due process cases.202 Under it, prison officials are required to
tainees should be afforded at least this much protection); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y.), art'd, 507 F.2d 333 (1974) ("detainee is-entitled to protection from
cruel and unusual punishment at least as a matter of due process if not under the Eighth
Amendment"); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (cruel and
unusual punishment clause should be applicable to detainees since they are presumed to be
less culpable than convicted criminals to whom the clause also applies).
2018. See, e.g., Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted)
(eighth amendment "may be taken as a legitimate starting point because... '[i]t would be
anomalous to afford a pretrial detainee less constitutional protection than one who has been
convicted.' ").
2019. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
2020. Id. at 528.
2021. Id. The district court had also applied an eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment standard, but this standard was rejected by the court of appeals. Id. at 529.
2022. Id. at 534-35. The dissenting justices, with the exception of Justice Marshall, also
applied a due process standard. Id. at 580 & n.4 (Stevens, I, dissenting).
2023. Id. at 535.
2024. Id. at 589 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the minimum rationality standard, all
that is required is a showing of some rational basis for the existence of the particular statute
or regulation. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). The Bell
majority noted that "if a particular condition or restriction of pre-trial detention is reason-
ably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
'punishment.'" 441 U.S. at 539.
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show only that there is some rational justification for the deprivation
imposed.2 25 As long as there is no subjective intent to "punish", the
action will be upheld. 2 6
But as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the majority's standard
amounts to no standard at all.20 27 Even the most repressive measures
adopted by officials can be justified under such rubrics as maintaining
order and discipline or improving the administration of the detention
center.
2028
In addition, the majority's use of a test based on subjective intent
flies in the face of standards traditionally used to measure punishment.
In the 1963 case of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court
established several objective criteria such as whether the practice in
question was traditionally regarded as punishment or promoted its
aims of retribution or deterrence, whether alternative methods were
available and whether the practice could be deemed excessive in light
of these alternatives.2 29
Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion, had no diffi-
culty evading the clear mandate of Mendoza-Martinez. After discuss-
ing its objective criteria, he interposed a classic non sequitur: "[t]hus, if
a particular condition or restriction of pre-trial detention is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to 'punishment.' "2030 Using this approach, the Bell ma-
jority was thus able to pay lip service to the due process standard, but
in effect rendered it a nullity by defining "punishment" in such restric-
tive terms.20 3'
The other disturbing aspect of Bell was the majority's cavalier
treatment of the detainee's first and fourth amendment rights. It held
2025. 441 U.S. at 538-39.
2026. Id. at 538.
2027. Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that:
[A] careful reading of the Court's opinion reveals that it has attenuated the de-
tainee's constitutional protection against punishment into nothing more than a pro-
hibition against irrational classification or barbaric treatment. Having recognized
in theory that the source of that protection is the Due Process Clause, the Court has
in practice defined its scope in the far more permissive terms of equal protection
and Eighth Amendment analysis.
Id.
2028. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters observed that "[u]nder the test as
the Court explains it today, prison guards could make regular use of dungeons, chains, and
shackles, since such practices would make it possible to maintain security with a smaller
number of guards." Id.
2029. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
2030. 441 U.S. at 539.
2031. See Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (due process standards made more permissive
by majority than test required by the eighth amendment or equal protection).
[Vol. 13
1980] CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
that these rights could be severely limited or restricted in the interests
of prison safety and administration. °32 Yet the cases relied on for sup-
port all dealt with the more limited rights of convicted prisoners.2 °33
Perhaps the real rationale for the Bell decision can be summed up
in Justice Rehnquist's comment that "[w]e think the District Court and
the Court of Appeals have trenched too cavalierly into areas that are
properly the concern of MCC officials. ' 20 34 Thus, it would appear that
Bell signals a retreat on the part of the Court to its former laissez faire
position. Short of oppressive measures which find no rational basis in
modem penal or human experience, it appears that little can be ex-
pected in the way of judicially mandated reform of the nation's prison
system or detention centers by the Supreme Court. °35
2032. Id. at 547. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist sought rather tenuous support for his
unprecedented holding on the basis that detainees may be equally or even more dangerous
than convicted criminals. Id. at 546 n.28. Such an assertion is at odds with the presumption
of innocence normally afforded detainees whose guilt has yet to be determined at trial. E.g.,
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973)
(because of presumption of innocence state should not attempt rehabilitation of a detainee).
Justice Rehnquist, in a bit of an ipse dixit, noted that the presumption of innocence "has no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before
his trial has even begun." 441 U.S. at 533.
Bell also is at odds with past Supreme Court decisions which were solicitous of rights of
pre-trial detainees. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1974) (defendants
confined and awaiting trial had a right to vote regardless of level of inconvenience this
caused the state); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 513, 520-21 (1973) (pre-trial detainees'
claim that state procedures denied them their constitutional right to vote should be evalu-
ated on its merits by lower courts).
2033. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (state prison
inmates); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (state prisoners); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974) (California state prison inmates).
Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the proposition that such cases should be distin-
guished because they dealt with convicted prisoners. 441 U.S. at 547 n.29. His justification
not only fails to support this point, but is also a contradiction in terms. He noted that
"Itihose decisions held that courts should defer to the informed discretion of prison adminis-
trators because the realities of running a corrections institution are complex and difficult,
courts are ill-equipped to deal with these problems ... ." Id. (emphasis added).
The majority's use of prior case authority (441 U.S. at 560 n.41) to justify body cavity
searches of detainees was also misconceived. All of the cases cited dealt with convicted
prisoners. See Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 293 (10th Cir. 1973) (federal prisoners in
maximum security at Ft. Leavenworth where there were known incidents of concealed con-
traband); Hodges v. Klein, 412 F. Supp. 896, 897-98 (D.C.N.J. 1976) (inmates in maximum
security at Trenton State Prison); Bijeol v. Benson, 404 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Ind. 1975)
(prisoners at U.S. penitentiary); Penn El v. Riddle, 399 F. Supp. 1059, 1060 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(violent prisoners in Virginia state penitentiary who were in maximum security).
2034. 441 U.S. at 554.
2035. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (despite atrocities, violence, and
inhuman conditions which were known to exist in the District of Columbia jail, the Court
rejected a theory of duress or necessity as justification for a prisoner's escape).
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H. Parole
Parole is a release from prison prior to the completion of a sen-
tence, on the condition that the parolee abide by certain rules during
the remainder of the time he has to serve.20 36 The United States
Supreme Court has defined the purpose of the parole system as "to help
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon
as they are able, without being confined for the full term of the sen-
tence imposed. 'u 37 Statutory authorization for the Federal Parole
Commission is found in the Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act adopted in 1976.2°38
One substantial area of litigation has been over the Act's retroac-
tive impact on those sentenced prior to its adoption. The Ninth Circuit
recognized that the Act could not be given retroactive effect,2 0 39 but
that the application of the 1976 Act's parole release standards to an
adult prisoner sentenced at a prior time was not violative of the ex post
facto prohibition. This is because the new standards do not increase
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the district court's order for a new hearing to consider Benites' institu-
tional performance as the basis for parole.2 °47
In United States v. Wallulatum,2°4 the prisoner challenged his sta-
tus as a youthful offender. Wallulatum asserted that, by being sen-
tenced for manslaughter as a youthful offender, he could serve up to six
years, while as an adult the maximum would be only three years.
Therefore, he contended, he was being denied equal protection of the
law.2049 The court of appeals did not reach this issue because the lower
court had not made a determination as to whether under the new "of-
fense severity" 2050 standard mandated by the Act,20 51 Wallulatum
would still benoft from his status as a youthful offender as required by
the Supreme Court.205 2 The case was remanded for that determination
to be made.20 53
Ex post facto problems have also arisen with regard to parole eligi-
bility criteria outside the context of the 1976 Act. In Mileham v. Sim-
mons,20 54 an Arizona state prisoner expected to be eligible for parole
after an eight year period of confinement. This eligibility was com-
puted by the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles in accordance with
1978). The court's conclusion can be reconciled with Rifai v. United States Parole Comm'n.,
586 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1978), on the theory that even prior to the passage of the 1976 Act,
"offense severity" could be considered by the Parole Commission in exercising its discretion
to grant or deny parole. See text accompanying note 2041 supra. Accord, Shepard v. Tay-
lor, 556 F.2d 648, 652 (2nd Cir. 1977) (Parole Commission's consideration only of the sever-
ity of defendant's offense rather than whether or not defendant was capable of being
rehabilitated was a violation of the Constitutional ban on ex post facto laws).
2047. The relevant provisions of the 1976 Act were not in effect at the time of Benites'
parole hearing and therefore were not applicable to his parole eligibility determination. 595
F.2d at 521. In explaining its holding the Benites court stated that "[t]he legislative history
...demonstrates that institutional performance was to be the 'primary criterion in deter-
mining parole release.'" Id. at 520, quoting Rifai v. United States Parole Comm'n., 586
F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1978). See also De Peralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749, 750-51 (9th Cir.
1978) (under Youth Corrections Act, criterion for release is whether prisoner is rehabili-
tated); Shepard v. Taylor, 566 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1977) (severity of youth offender's
crime is "conspicuously absent" as a parole eligibility factor under the Youth Corrections
Act).
2048. 600 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
2049. Id. at 1262.
2050. A prisoner may be released if, among other things, the Parole Commission finds that
"release would not depreciate the seriousness of [the] offense." 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a)(1)
(Supp. 1976).
2051. 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1976) of the Youth Corrections act was amended in 1976 so as to
mandate release in accordance with the provisions of the Parole Commission and Reorgani-
zation Act.
2052. The United States Supreme Court in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424
(1974) established the standard that sentencing for a youthful offender be to his benefit.
2053. 600 F.2d at 1263.
2054. 588 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1979).
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an opinion letter of an assistant state attorney general.2055 Two years
after his conviction, however, the Attorney General of Arizona reinter-
preted the penal statute governing attempted escapes. Under the new
interpretation, Mileham would have to serve forty years before becom-
ing eligible for parole release. 56 Mileham sought relief in the Arizona
courts when an earlier release date was denied. The Arizona Supreme
Court agreed with the new interpretation of the statute and denied re-
lief.20 57 On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit
denied relief, holding that Mileham had no "vested right" in the earlier
erroneous interpretation of the state statute by an assistant attorney
general, given the presence of a later state court pronouncement on the
matter.20 58 Since the reinterpretation of the statute by the state court
was not "unforeseeable," there was no ex post facto prohibition to the
consequent lengthening of Mileham's sentence.2 59
Mileham had relied on Love v. Fitzharris2°60 in which the Ninth
Circuit struck down an administrative reinterpretation of a California
statute governing parole eligibility. The reinterpretation effectively in-
creased punishment for a crime, and was held to be an improper ex
post facto increase, even though imposed by administrative, rather than
legislative, fiat.206 1 The Mileham court, however, considered In re Cos-
telo2 ° 2 to be more closely on point.2"63 The Costello court held that
no federal question was presented by a redetermination and increase of
a California parolee's original sentence upon cause shown.2064 The de-
cision was based on the fact that California law, as interpreted by the
state courts, had consistently held that such resentencing under the
state indeterminate sentencing law was proper. Indeterminate sentenc-
ing was held to be tentative and subject to increase. °65 The Mleham
court also relied on Rifai v. United States Parole Commission 2° 6 and
Forman v. Wo/ff2° 7 in support of its conclusion. 20 68 Rifai, however, is
2055. Id. at 1279-80.
2056. Id. at 1280.
2057. Mileham v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 110 Ariz. 470, 520 P.2d 840 (1973).
2058. 588 F.2d at 1280.
2059. Id.
2060. 460 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 1100 (1973).
2061. Id. at 385.
2062. 262 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
2063. 588 F.2d at 1280.
2064. 262 F.2d at 215.
2065. Id. (citation omitted).
2066. 586 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
2067. 590 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
2068. 588 F.2d at 1280.
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not on point since it involves a mere reemphasis of existing guidelines
within a statutory framework and does not involve reinterpretation of
the statutory framework itself. But, in Forman, it was ruled that there
was no ex post facto violation when the Nevada Supreme Court re-
versed itself as to the construction of a state statute and restored the
interpretation current at the time of the prisoner's original sentencing.
The Ninth Circuit's reliance in Mileham on In re Costello and For-
man is misplaced. Both involved sentencing under a law already inter-
preted by state courts adversely to the prisoner/plaintiff. A state court's
subsequent affirmation of that interpretation was therefore not unfore-
seeable. 2069 In contrast, Mileham was sentenced under a statute previ-
ously interpreted favorably to his position. His parole eligibility was
thereafter determined pursuant to a subsequent unfavorable determi-
nation.
The Parole Commission has been granted substantial discretion by
the 1976 Act in its determination of parole eligibility: "The Commis-
sion may grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the [statu-
tory] guidelines . . . if it determines there is good cause for so
doing. 2 0 70 This broad grant of authority has generated litigation
charging abuse of this discretion.
In United States v. Addonzio,0 71 the petitioners claimed that the
Parole Commission had exceeded its authority. The basis for this claim
was that the post sentencing actions of the Commission prolonged peti-
tioner's imprisonment, contrary to the original intent of the sentencing
judge.20 72 The Court held that the error alleged to have occurred--that
the judge was incorrect in his assumption about the future course of
parole proceedings-was not of such a fundamental magnitude as to
fall within the jurisdictional mandate for collateral attack.0 73 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Supreme Court found the opportunity to discuss
generally the role of the Parole Commission: "The decision as to when
a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be released has been
committed by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the
Parole Commission."
20 74
The Ninth Circuit has recently ruled on two similar challenges.0 75
2069. See Forman v. Wolff, 590 F.2d at 285; In re Costello, 262 F.2d at 215.
2070. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (Supp. 1976).
2071. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
2072. Id. at 179.
2073. Id. at 186.
2074. Id. at 188.
2075. See Izsak v. Sigler, 604 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1979); Petrone v. Kaslow, 603 F.2d 779
(9th Cir. 1979).
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In Izsak v. Sigler, °76 the petitioner had been convicted of manufactur-
ing and distributing amphetamines and phencyclidine. He was sen-
tenced for eight years under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) which provides that
the prisoner will be eligible for parole "at such time as the Commission
may determine." Under the general guidelines used by the Commis-
sion, Izsak would have been eligible for parole in twenty-six months.
However, the Commission felt that there was no excuse for the subject
to become involved in this behavior because of his excellent training
and education 20 77 and concluded that he should be required to serve his
full sentence. The petitioner contended that the Commission had acted
in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner in light of the fact that the
judge made him eligible for an early parole by sentencing him under
§ 4205(b)(2). 2° 78 The court rejected the argument that the actions and
intent of the sentencing judge preempt the Commission's determination
as to the factors relevant to the parole release. It held: "The import of
this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has no enforcible (sic) expecta-
tions with respect to the actual release of a sentenced defendant short of
his statutory term.
20 7 9
In Petrone v. Kaslow, °8 ° the petitioner's challenge of the denial of
his parole release, based upon an alleged frustration of the intent of the
sentencing judge, was rejected. The Ninth Circuit held that it is well
within the power of the Parole Commission to consider the prior crimi-
nal record of the petitioner in determining his parole eligibility.
208'
The court also held that an application for habeas corpus relief cannot
be used to attack collaterally the Parole Commission's decision on the
basis that its conduct frustrated the intent of the sentencing judge.
2082
In Brady v. United States Parole Commission, 0 3 the petitioner
used a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22412084 to chal-
2076. 604 F.2d 1205, 1205 (9th Cir. 1979).
2077. d. at 1206 (petitioner was a law school graduate).
2078. Id. at 1207.
2079. Id. at 1208 (quoting Addonizio v. United States, 442 U.S. at 188-90).
2080. 603 F.2d 799, 780 (9th Cir. 1979).
2081. Id.
2082. Id. The Parole Commission had decided to continue further consideration of peti-
tioner's parole beyond the one-third point of his original sentence. Id. at 779. Petitioner
had been sentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (Supp. 1976) which provides that
"the court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment to be served in which event the
court may specify that the prisoner may be released on parole at such time as the Commis-
sion may determine." Petitioner had contended that the extension of his parole release con-
sideration beyond the one-third point of his sentence was a frustration of the intent of the
sentencing judge. 603 F.2d at 779-80.
2083. 600 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1979).
2084. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that an attack upon custody, through a
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lenge the Parole Commission's decision to keep him in custody beyond
the one third point of his total sentence.085 Since during the pendency
of his appeal Brady was released on parole, the court dismissed the case
as moot.20 86 However, the court took note of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Addonizio and observed that, even though that decision in-
volved a construction of § 2255 whereas Brady's motion was brought
under § 2241, "much of what has been said in Addonizio concerning
the Parole Commission's discretion would seem to be applicable."
20 87
Conditions of parole are also established by the Parole Commis-
sion within the guidelines set by the Act.2 °88 In United States v.
Dally, 2089 Holiday, who had been convicted of possession of stolen
mail, consented to allow his residence to be searched at any time as a
condition of his parole. Holiday moved without notifying his parole
officer, in violation of his parole agreement, and consequently, his new
residence was searched. A firearm was seized and Holiday was con-
victed of possession of a weaponY.090 He contended that the search was
illegal and that the evidence should have been excluded. He proffered
four reasons for the search's invalidity: (1) the search was not con-
ducted by his parole officer and was not therefore a parole search, (2)
the search was unreasonable, (3) the search was not authorized by Cali-
fornia law, and (4) the search was a subterfuge for a criminal investiga-
tion.209 1 The Ninth Circuit upheld the search, finding that Holiday's
§ 2241 habeas corpus motion, is the proper method for attacking Parole Commission action;
by contrast, a motion for collateral attack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is an attack upon the
sentence. See Elliot v. United States, 572 F.2d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (§ 2255
motion is an attack on the sentence, not the Parole Board's actions); Andrino v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 550 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (§ 2241 motion proper
vehicle for obtaining judicial review of parole board decisions); Tedder v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 527 F.2d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (§ 2241 motion proper method for
obtaining judicial review of parole board decisions).
2085. 600 F.2d at 235. Petitioner was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976) which
leaves discretion as to parole release entirely to the Parole Commission. See note 2082
supra. The Commission decided that parole consideration should be made after one-third
of the imposed sentence had been served. 600 F.2d at 235.
2086. 600 F.2d at 236.
2087. Id. at 236 & n.l.
2088. See 18 U.S.C. § 4209(a) which provides:
In every case, the Commission shall impose as a condition of parole that the pa-
rolee not commit another Federal, State, or local crime. The Commission may
impose or modify other conditions of parole to the extent that such conditions are
reasonably related to-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; and
(2) the history and characteristics of the parolee.
2089. 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
2090. Id. at 862.
2091. Id. at 863.
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parole officer "reasonably believed" a search was appropriate. 20 92 Fur-
ther, the court held that the search, occurring immediately after Holi-
day was arrested, was nonetheless proper in that the state had a
continuing interest in the parolee's progress so as to determine whether
continuation or revocation of parole was proper under the circum-
stances.2 o93
Two aspects of Dally are troublesome. First, the court did not dis-
cuss the implications of a parole search conducted at the home of an-
other person. In Daly, the parolee was living with someone, and the
question arises whether a search of the residence would be proper if
that residence was the actual home of someone other than the parolee.
Second, the Ninth Circuit approved the forcible entry and search of the
residence, citing Latta v. Fitzharris.2° 4 The Latta court, however, spe-
cifically addressed and approved consensual search and reserved the
question of whether forcible search could be made of a parolee's resi-
dence.20
95
It is the procedural safeguards mandated for parole revocation
hearings which continue to provide the greatest constitutional protec-
tion for parolees. Due process mandates: (1) a preliminary and final
revocation hearing, (2) written notice of claimed parole violations, (3)
disclosure of adverse evidence, (4) opportunity to present favorable evi-
dence, (5) a limited right of confrontation, and (6) written findings by a
detached and neutral body.
20 96
In Robbins v. Yhomas,2 09 7 the question of what information the
Parole Commission may consider and to what extent in the process that
information may be heard was challenged. Robbins had been con-
victed of armed robbery, served some time and was then paroled.2 98
2092. Id. The court cited Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cer. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). Latta held that state parolees are subject to search by their parole
officer when he reasonably believes that such a search is necessary in the performance of his
duties. Id. at 250. Latta also held that the fourth amendment does not require the parole
officer to obtain a warrant. The special relationship between parolee and parole officer was
thought to dispense with standard constitutional requirements. Id. at 250-51.
2093. 606 F.2d at 863.
2094. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
2095. 521 F.2d at 252 n.2. Cf. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77
(1970) (Congressional remedy for refusal to consent to warrantless regulatory search pre-
cludes use of force as a remedy for that refusal).
2096. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). The requirements are codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4214 (1976).
2097. 592 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
2098. Id. at 547-48.
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Five years later, in October, 1976, as provided by the Act, 2 0 9 9 a hearing
was held and the hearing officer recommended to the Parole Commis-
sion that Robbins' parole status be terminated. The next day, Robbins
was arrested by local police for being under the influence of narcotics.
In November, 1976, the Commission announced that it would not ter-
minate Robbins' parole despite the hearing officer's recommendation.
At another hearing in August, 1977, termination of Robbins' parole
was again denied partly because of the October, 1976 arrest."o Rob-
bins claimed that his due process fights were violated and that
§ 4211(c)(1) limited the information which could be heard to the five
year period before the hearing.2101 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
reading, holding that all information may be considered up until the
moment the parole is terminated.2 2 However, if newly acquired evi-
dence is considered after the initial hearing, a supplementary hearing is
mandated by due process.2103 Therefore, although Robbins' due proc-
ess fights had been violated in November, 1976 when the Parole Com-
mission decided to terminate his parole without affording Robbins a
fight to be heard, the hearing in August, 1977 afforded Robbins such
an opportunity and provided a complete remedy. His writ of habeas
corpus was consequently denied.
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2099. 18 U.S.C. § 421 1(c) (1976) provides for termination of parole custody five years after
release, after a hearing pursuant to § 4214(a)(2).
2100. 592 F.2d at 548.
2101. Id. Section 421 l(c)(l) provides that "five years after each parolee's release on pa-
role, the Commission shall terminate supervision over such parolee unless it is determined
... that such supervision should not be terminated because there is a likelihood that the
parolee will engage in conduct violative of the criminal law." 18 U.S.C. § 421 l(c)(1) (1976).
2102. 592 F.2d at 548-49. The court relied on legislative history and the import of the
statutory scheme itself which extends jurisdiction of the Parole Commission over a parolee
until the date of actual parole termination. "Until such time as parole is terminated, and the
Parole Commission no longer has jurisdiction of the former parolee, it offends neither due
process nor the applicable statutes for the Commission to reopen its proceedings and hold
hearings concerning newly acquired information." Id. at 549 (footnote omitted).
2103. Id. at 549.
2104. Id.
19801

